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
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The Government of Bihar established the Nalanda Institute of Research and Post-Graduate Studies in Buddhist learning and Pali (The NAVANALANDAMAHAVIHARA) at Nalanda in 1951 with the object, *inter alia*, to promote advanced studies and research in Buddhist learning, and to publish works of permanent value to scholars. This Institute is one of the five others planned by this Government as a token of their homage to the tradition of learning and scholarship for which ancient Bihar was noted. Apart from the Nalanda Institute, four others have been established and have been doing useful work during the last four or five years Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit learning at Darbhanga, K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute at Patna, the Bihar Rashtra Bhasha Parishad for research and advanced studies in Hindi at Patna, and the Vaisali Institute for Post-Graduate studies in Prakrit and Jainology at Vaisali.

As part of this programme of rehabilitating and reorientating ancient learning and scholarship, the editing and publication of this Volume has been undertaken with the cooperation of the scholars of the Institute and outside. The Government of Bihar hope to continue to sponsor such projects and trust that this humble service o the world of scholarship and learning would bear fruit in the ulness of time.



PREFACE

The present work constitutes the Volume I of "The NAVANALANDAMAHAVIHARA RESEARCH PUBLICATION". It is the result of a team work in which the contributions of several scholars are embodied. The scholars chose their own subjects and almost all the papers relate to Buddhist learning, except one paper which discusses an interesting problem of Pāṇini's grammar. I do not think that an apology is necessary for this apparently non-Buddhist dissertation. The old Nalanda Mahavihara was a centre of SANSKRIT LEARNING and catholic in its academic interests. It fostered the study of the Vedas, medical science, grammar, logic Brahminical and Buddhistic, and all other branches and subjects which engaged scholars' attention of the time. It may suffice to observe that Pāṇini's grammar had a special fascination for the scholars of old Nalanda University, and every student was required to make a special study of it since SANSKRIT was the medium of instruction, and the Śāstras and other works produced by the old University were all composed in SANSKRIT. Of course Pali, Apabhrāṣṭa and Prākṛita, and what has been called HYBRID SANSKRIT by Professor Edgerton were also studied and understood by the scholars.

We now propose to give a brief survey of the contents of this Volume. The first paper is a monograph entitled 'The Absolutist's standpoint in Logic'. It discusses an interesting and intriguing problem which scepticism and metaphysical absolutism necessarily entailed because of their denial of the validity of the logical categories. This problem could not have arisen if formal consistency alone had been deemed a justifiable logical criterion. But even the sceptics could not give a wide berth to the commitment of Indian logic to the material truth of the syllogistic argument. It may not be idle to presume that this problem of Indian logic will have an interest for the modern mind.

Dr. Tatia has contributed a paper on the theory of causation, the famous doctrine of *Pratityasamutpada*. He draws upon the *Visuddhi*

magga of Buddhaghōṣa which has become a classic of the Pali Abhidhamma. It is a faithful representation of the theory of *Pratītyasamutpāda* as understood and expounded by the Theravada school of Southern Buddhism.

The third contribution is made by Dr B. Jinananda. He makes a comparative study of the Sanskrit Vinaya with the Pali Vinaya and discusses the relative merits of the two versions in an objective way.

The fourth paper is contributed by Sri Y. Kajiyama who was associated with our Institute for over two years as Lecturer in Japanese and Chinese. He discusses the logical position of the *Svātantrika* school founded by Bhāvaviveka. Bhāvaviveka criticizes the negative, non-committal and hypothetical logic of Buddhapālita and contends that logic must receive ungrudging recognition even from the Mādhyamika philosopher. The phenomenal truth must have a status in philosophical speculations and it is a scaffolding to the Ultimate Truth. Bhāvaviveka's position is the least represented in English and the Sanskrit original texts are no longer extant. Professor Kajiyama derives his data from Tibetan and Chinese literature. We trust that it will clear up the misunderstanding caused by the one-sided representation of the position of a celebrated philosopher and that again by an undisguised opponent, viz., Candrakīrti.

The fifth article deals with the strictures on Pāṇini and his school by ancient critics as represented by Kumārila and Jayantabhaṭṭa as the *pūrvapakṣa*, the *prima facie* position. A systematic representation of this position in a modern language was a desideratum. The subject is a technical one; but because Pāṇini's grammar has universal appeal, the article, it is hoped, will not fail to be of interest to Sanskrit scholars.

The last contribution is from Professor Dr Sitamsusekhara Bagchi of the Mithila Research Institute. He has given a free English rendition of Vasubandhu's *Vijñāsatikā*, the oldest philosophical work on Vijñānavāda known to us. It is the contention of Vasubandhu that our normal experience can be fully accounted for without the presupposition of an extra-mental objective reality. The original work is a classic and has been quoted and criticized by Uddyotakara who cannot be dated later than the sixth century A.D. Dr Bagchi has also edited the original text with annotations. This will satisfy a real

want, because the edition of Professor Sylvain Levi is long out of print and not available in the market. The importance of Dr Bagchi's contribution is bound up with that of the original work, and our trust that it will facilitate the understanding of an abstruse text may not be unwarranted.

In order to enable a modern scholar to assess the value and fidelity of the representation in English we have given some original Sanskrit texts as an appendix. It was also thought necessary to give the Sanskrit texts as they are not easily available. The articles are faithful to the thoughts and not always to the language. The old thoughts again have been presented in a modern way in a modern idiom. Indian thought has to be presented to the modern world and made intelligible to the modern mind. It has not only an antiquarian interest but also a perennial value in that the problems discussed are evergreen. They have not ceased to be problems notwithstanding the advance made by the modern mind in speculative thought. We propose to present a side of Indian speculations in the past in a manner more or less modern, which may be justified by the consideration that our attempt has not been forestalled by a predecessor. We end our apology by quoting the words of Jayantabhaṭṭa:

Kuto vā nūtanam̄ vastu vayamutprekṣitum̄ kṣamāḥ,
Vacovinyāsavaicitryamātram̄ atra vicāryatām̄.

(*Nyāyamañjari*)

The scholar has to pursue the pedestrian method of caution and slow movement necessitated by his obligation to avoid a statement which cannot be verified by objective data. He cannot create facts, nor can he put his own ideas in the mouth of the old thinkers whose thoughts he professes to present to the academic world. At most he can put the 'old wine in a new bottle'; but to put the new wine in the old bottle will be an act of infidelity. These are the limitations of a scholar and we have sedulously restrained ourselves from transgressing these limitations. It is for the academic world to pronounce judgement on the value of the labour undertaken by the scholars of our Institute.

The Government of Bihar have founded three Institutes for the resuscitation of India's old culture, among which the NAVANA-

LANDAMAHAVIHARA stands for the scientific study of Buddhist learning and culture, (2) the Mithila Research Institute for Sanskrit learning with its emphasis upon the Brahminical schools, (3) and the Vaiśali Institute for Prakrit and Jainology. The Government are anxious that these Institutes should foster researches on the subjects of their interest. The present Publication is an endeavour in this line. Our gratitude to the Honourable Acharya Badri Nath Varma, Minister of Education, and the Education Department of the Government of Bihar for their encouragement and their appreciation of our difficulties cannot be expressed in adequate terms. Our language will fail to represent our feelings.


NALANDA

S. MOOKERJEE

31st March, 1957.

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THE ABSOLUTIST'S STANDPOINT IN LOGIC



INTRODUCTORY

THE term 'absolutist' is to be understood in the present context as a thinker who does not believe in the reality of the phenomenal plurality and consequently denies that truth can be relative and found in judgments which are *ex hypothesi* relative in character. Such an absolutist may be committed to a metaphysical position in relation to which he may seek to evaluate the truth or otherwise of thoughts and assertions, or may maintain a non-committal attitude in ontology. The Vedāntist, for instance, believes in the reality of the Absolute *Brahman* which is a spiritual entity, and is the prius and background of the phenomenal world, although the latter is regarded as a logically unjustifiable appearance. Nāgārjuna, the celebrated exponent of the Mādhyamika philosophy, completely dedicates all his energies to the proof of the unreality of the pluralistic order envisaged by experience and thought. Whether he believes in an ultimate reality behind the appearance is a question on which the opinions of philosophers, exponents or opponents, are found to differ as poles apart. Stcherbatsky and the Japanese exponents of Nāgārjuna assert that he believes in an ultimate reality which is positive and not an unqualified void. Indian philosophers, particularly of the rival schools, have however unanimously declared Nāgārjuna to be the advocate of a negative Absolute. Candrakīrti, the commentator of Nāgārjuna, whose original work in Sanskrit has come down to us, does not seem to leave any loophole to foist a positivistic interpretation upon the concept of *śūnyatā*. It must be left an open question whether the *śūnyatā* which literally means 'Voidity' is capable of being equated with Absolute Being or Non-Being. The difficulty of the logical appraisal of this intractable concept lies in the consideration that all predication, either positive or negative, must of necessity be repugnant and alien to it. For a stickler in precision of terminology, our description of *śūnyatā* as a metaphysical concept is bound to be a misnomer. Both Nāgārjuna and the Vedāntist are agreed on the point that the ultimate truth, call it *Brahman* or *śūnyatā*, is only accessible to the realization of the mystic and bound to elude conceptual thought.

We shall concern ourselves in the present discourse with the position of the absolutist in logic and not with the metaphysical problem. Whatever be the ontological conclusion, the absolutist does not disguise his unqualified distrust of the logical categories which are employed both in the subjective and syllogistic inference by the orthodox logicians. The logical apparatus of inference must consist of three terms, *viz.*, the subject or the minor term, the probans or the middle term, and the probandum or the major term. Besides, it is the condition *sine qua non* of inferential proof that there must be a major premise which states a necessary and universal relation between the probans and the probandum, and a minor premise showing that the probans belongs to the subject. It is again the universal postulate of all the schools of Indian logic that the premises and the conclusion must be materially true. Mere formal consistency, regardless of material truth, is not accepted as the criterion of logical validity by any school of Indian logic. Even Dignāga and Dharmakīrti who introduced radical reforms in the logical speculations of India do not lend their countenance to any logical argument which is not founded on material truth. It is refreshing to observe that even Nāgārjuna and Śīharṣa, the exponent of the Vedāntic logic, do not seek to justify their anomalous logical position by appeal to formal consistency. Both of them endorse that logic cannot give wide berth to the question of material truth of its assertions. It is also tacitly admitted that disaffiliation from the objective reality is tantamount to disloyalty to the cardinal canons of logic and such deviation will reduce an argument to an abortive nonsense. Such being the logical background, the absolutist also has to observe scrupulously the rules of the logical game in order to be able to prove his position. The question would not have arisen, had the absolutist refrained from entering the arena of debate. He does not observe silence consistently with his metaphysical position, but, on the contrary, elects to establish his position and refute the opponent's contention by means of logically formulated arguments. It makes no difference whether his interest is positive or negative. How can the absolutist who takes up the role of an absolute sceptic in logic advance any argument, either by way of proof or refutation? In either case he must surrender his metaphysical commitment and thus court defeat in advance.

This is in brief the sum and substance of the logician's arguments against the sceptic. Let us examine the reaction of the absolutist to such an omnibus sentence of disfranchisement pronounced against him. This situation created by the orthodox logician against the sceptic assumed a tremendous importance and it was imperative for the absolutists to meet the challenge in order to establish their credentials for a philosophical debate.

This is an intriguing problem of philosophy which is too apparent to require elaborate exposition. The absolutist and the sceptic repudiate the ultimate validity of Logic and the apparatus it employs. But logic is the only means by which one can establish or refute a position. The sceptic claims the prerogative of refuting all assertions of the realist without involvement in the truth and reality of the arguments by which he attempts to achieve his objective. This position will be put in a clear perspective in the course of our exposition. We do not know of any European thinker or thinkers who have addressed themselves to the problem in the systematic manner in which it has been debated in India. The problem must possess an interest of its own and not fail to intrigue the modern mind. I therefore propose to tackle this problem from the standpoint of the Indian thinkers. The exposition is modern no doubt, being produced by a modern mind. But it is based upon the original presentations of the old philosophers of India.

The subject-matter is approached from the standpoints of the Mādhyamika, the Yogācāra and the Vedāntist of the monistic school. We have also given the position of the Naiyāyika realist who offers a stubborn resistance to the absolutist's defence. We have rounded off the discourse by a re-appraisal of the relative positions.

In the first chapter, we have expounded the standpoint of Nāgārjuna as set forth in his work, the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (Refutation of Opposition). In the second chapter, the standpoint is further expounded in the light of Candrakīrti's elaboration. In the third chapter, we have given the exposition of Śrīharṣa's defence of the Mādhyamika position. In the fourth chapter, this problem as approached and tackled by the Buddhist and Vedānta schools is set forth in abundant detail. The Yogācāra position is not found in any accredited work of the school, known to us. It is Śrīharṣa, the Vedāntist, who plays

the role of a defender of the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra positions. In Śrīharṣa's time, the logical speculations assumed a formidable aspect which is the natural outcome of vigorous thinking of several centuries. Śrīharṣa came after Dharmakīrti, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana. It is quite natural that the dialectics of Śrīharṣa exhibit astounding vigour and strength and the evolution in thought is clearly discernible. It is hoped that the growth of logical thought as recorded in this work will not fail to evoke interest among the students of modern logic in India and abroad.

CHAPTER I

THE MĀDHYAMIKA'S LOGICAL POSITION IN THE VIGRAHavyĀVARTANI

From the available literature it is found that Nāgārjuna, the paragon of the sceptic schools, took up the challenge with his characteristic boldness and courage of conviction and tried to vindicate the title of the sceptic to participate in a logical debate. In defence, he seeks to disprove the allegation of the logician that the use of the logical apparatus entails self-contradiction or inconsistency on the part of the sceptic. Fortunately, the monograph *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (Refutal of Opposition), written by Nāgārjuna which records a regular duel between the two schools, has been discovered by Mahā-paṇḍita Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana and the text has been edited by him,¹ and recently also by E.H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst.² The text in the latter edition is fairly correct and dependable. We have also consulted the Tibetan version³ wherever doubts were felt. The methodology of debate in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* is in the line of the time-honoured tradition in which the opponent's position is stated in full in the beginning and the answer to the objections is stated seriatim in the order followed by the opponent. We do not propose to give a literal translation of the text, but our paper will faithfully represent the arguments in a language and manner intelligible to the modern mind. Nothing possessed of logical value will be left out in our exposition. But we must avoid the repetitions which, though they might be useful in the past, are now calculated only to lead to inflation of the discourse, if not boredom.

THE LOGICIAN'S OBJECTIONS

Verse I. The fundamental objection of the logician is that the śūnyatāvādin maintains that no entity whatsoever can be believed

¹ JBORS, XXIV. II.

² Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, Neuvième volume: 1948-1951, pp. 99-152.

³ Edited and translated by G. Tucci in GOS, XLIX.

to possess intrinsic reality (*svabhāva*, literally 'self-being'). By 'intrinsic reality', the absolutist of the school of Nāgārjuna, seeks to understand 'the reality which a thing is supposed to possess in its own right and on its own account'. Reality must be integral and self-contained, neither borrowed nor derived from anything external. If a thing is to be real, it must be shown that this reality is a necessary part and parcel of it, and as such can never lapse or be abrogated under any change of condition. This is also the position of Śatikarācārya who defines that a real is that which has a uniform and unvariant mode of existence.¹ It is a cardinal tenet of Buddhist philosophy that there is no real which is exempted from the law of causality which is universal and relentless in its operation. Such being the case, everything is subject to change and cannot *ex hypothesi* stand as an isolated entity, apart and aloof from its predecessors and successors. Nāgārjuna does not believe in an uncaused phenomenon and the Law of Causality is made by him the foundation of his philosophy of *śūnyatā*. Anything that is subject to the operation of the Causal Law and as such externally determined by an alien entity cannot be supposed to have reality in its own right. The apparent reality or existence² of the phenomenon is, from the very nature of the case, either borrowed or derived and as such cannot be anything but appearance.

The truth of this philosophy that nothing exists in its own right and as such cannot be real does not lie on the surface and can only be established by a prolonged course of ratiocination. As a matter of historical fact, Nāgārjuna advances an unending series of arguments to drive home this philosophical truth. Is Nāgārjuna consistent in this logical enterprise? Apart from the question of self-consistency, can he hope to be successful in achieving his aim? The logician avers that Nāgārjuna essays an impossible feat. If all things are considered to lack in intrinsic reality, how can Nāgārjuna, or for that matter any exponent of absolutism, disprove the reality of anything? He can achieve this by means of an argument which in the ultimate analysis is found to consist of articulated words. And these words cannot lay claim to self-existence. Words are also products and, like all products,

¹ *ekarūpeṇa hy avasthito yo'rthaḥ sa paramārthaḥ*—*SBh*, on *BS* II. 1. 11.

² We follow McTaggart and refuse to draw a line of demarcation between existence and reality.

cannot be existent, either severally or collectively, in the causal conditions. The sprout is supposed to be generated by the seed and the accessory conditions, such as soil, water, air, season and the like. The sprout cannot be supposed to be existent in the causal conditions severally or jointly and must therefore be set down as destitute of self-being (*svabhāva*). But the words of the propositions which are uttered to prove the intrinsic unreality of the sprout and the like are also in the same position. They cannot be supposed to be existent in the physical elements or the organs of articulation or the physical effort, which are supposed to be responsible for their emergence. By any amount of permutation and combination of the causes and conditions, they cannot be supposed to derive their being from the former. Nor again can the words be considered independent of the stream of causal conditions. Being products, they must be considered destitute of intrinsic reality and as such void (*śūnya*). A thing which is void is unreal and an unreal appearance cannot have any causal power. Certainly an unreal fire cannot burn, nor can an unreal weapon cut. The words of the sceptic, being equally unreal, cannot be supposed to establish the conclusion that all entities are intrinsically unreal. Things obviously are felt to be real and this reality is sought to be negated by the absolutist. But this negation cannot be successfully achieved by an instrument which is obviously unreal. So the fundamental position of the absolutist that the reality of all entities stands refuted is incapable of being proved.

Verse II. Let it be supposed that the absolutist realizes the flaw in his argument, and sees reason to admit that his argument in the shape of verbal propositions is real and self-existent and as such capable of successfully contradicting the reality of all existents. This will amount to self-surrender on his part. He must recant his former assertion that all entities are devoid of intrinsic reality. The words of the sceptic are included in the subject of the proposition as they are also entities. It will not only be a case of self-surrender but also a case of self-contradiction. The categorical assertion "All entities are unreal" cannot be true if words are regarded as real.

The admission of reality or unreality of the logical ground would culminate in the following sixfold dialectic (*satkotiko vādah*).

- (i) If all things are unreal, your argument would also be unreal

being included in the class of entities. An unreal argument cannot rebut the obvious reality of things of experience. It would follow then that the thesis that all things are unreal would not be established.

(ii) If, on the other hand, the thesis is supposed to be logically established, that will *eo ipso* entail the unreality of your argument. And the unreal argument would fail to rebut the reality of things observed.

(iii) If, again, the argument be real and thus supposed to be capable of establishing the unreality of all things (the thesis of the absolutist), it (the argument) will fall outside the genus of existents and there will be no instance to justify such a hypothesis, because every possible instance will be one entity or another. A real that is not existent is not found anywhere. And the argument, supposed to be real, will be such a hypothetical fact which has no parallel.

(iv) If, however, the argument be supposed to fall within the genus of existents, then it would also transpire to be unreal. And an unreal argument would not have any logical efficiency.

(v) If, again, the argument be unreal and yet capable of rebutting the reality of all things, then all unreal things would also have causal efficiency, just as the unreal argument is considered to have. Certainly this is not a position which can be endorsed by any rational thinker.

(vi) Suppose again that all existents are unreal and as such incapable of causal efficiency. This will enable the absolutist to evade the charge of the preposterous hypothesis of an unreal having causal efficiency, no doubt. But this will be suicidal, as the argument employed will also be unreal and as such fail to prove the thesis.

To sum up: It is a contradiction in terms to say that a thing is unreal and at the same time is capable of producing an effect. So the absolutist is put between the horns of a dilemma: either he must repudiate his fundamental position that all existents are unreal or he must admit his incapability of establishing any conclusion, positive or negative.

This is not the only charge to which the absolutist exposes himself by his conduct. He is found to make an uncritical discrimination between his *argument* on the one hand and *all other entities* on the other, although no difference can be found. It will be a case of uncritical distinction without difference. He must state the ground of his discrimination (*vिशेष-हेतु*). But he does not and cannot offer any explanation for making fish of one and flesh of the other. This is admit-

tedly a grave dereliction of duty on the part of a serious and conscientious philosopher.

Verse III. The sceptic may offer an analogical argument. Suppose that the boys in a school are making a tremendous noise and this disturbs the normal course of instruction in other classes. The teacher comes and pronounces the command "Do not make noise". It is by making a sound that the teacher conveys his command and this sound prevents the emergence of further sounds. A sound counteracting a sound is the analogue of the negation of the reality of all entities by an unreal argument. So there is no inconsistency or inherent contradiction in the action of the sceptic.

But this is only a specious analogy. The parallelism does not hold good. The command of prohibition is conveyed by a real sound and this real sound prevents the future occurrence of (real) sounds. But the language of the sceptic's argument is not real. The (negative) argument is unreal and its content—the reality of all things—is also unreal. So the analogy is not relevant and as such cannot be adduced by the sceptic in his support.

Verse IV. The sceptic may make the countercharge: "If my negation of reality of things be logically absurd, your repudiation of this position will be equally absurd. Certainly nobody cares to refute an absurdity. My position is that all things are devoid of reality. You aver that this is an impossible position. If your contention were correct, there would be no necessity for the proof of an impossibility, which is a case of flagrant self-contradiction".

The logician replies : "This defence will cut no ice with any conscientious philosopher. The absurdity alleged against me does not arise at all. If I made the assertion 'All things are unreal', I would be guilty of absurdity. But that is not my assertion but yours. So the charge of absurdity ought to go home to you. I have only discharged the legitimate duty of an advocate of truth by exposing the fallacy in your argument. So this defence acts as a boomerang against you."

Verse V. Furthermore, if the sceptic appeals to the evidence of the recognized organs of cognition in support of his fundamental contention, that will be perfectly unavailing. How does he know that things exist at all? He cannot say that by means of perception, since perception is an entitative fact (*bhāva*) and as such must be condemned to be

unreal. Not only this. The percipient also will be unreal. Thus there will be no reason to suppose that things are perceived by a percipient and, such being the case, the sceptic cannot assert that he sees things regarding which he makes the assertion. When things are not perceived at all, one cannot make any assertion regarding them and certainly it is absurd to suppose that a man can deny anything of which he has no knowledge at all.

Verse VI. Nor can it be contended that inference or verbal testimony or analogy will enable him to take cognizance of things. They also stand in the same predicament as perception. And if perception be impossible, far more are inference and the like which are dependent upon perception for their genesis. Consequently, things which are sought to be proved by inference and testimony and analogy will also be unreal, being included within the subject of the thesis 'All entities are unreal'. Further, the epistemic subject who is supposed to take cognizance of the contents of the different cognitive organs must also be accounted as unreal, being an entity. The result will be that there will be no cognition of any entity whatsoever and as a consequence reality or unreality cannot be predicated of things which are not known at all. So the central thesis remains unproved.

Verse VII. Furthermore, the Buddhist scripture and the teachers who are well versed in the different branches of it propound a list of 119 *kuśala-dharmas* (moral excellences which are calculated to promote the spiritual progress of the aspirant).¹ These mental phenomena are asserted to possess the character of goodness. Such is also the case with immoral mentalities which degrade a person in the moral plane. None but a non-believer can impugn the reality and moral value of these mental states. But if the thesis of the sceptic were true, it would end in the repudiation of these virtues and vices, and thereby the validity of the scriptural *ipse dixit*. Certainly this cannot be acceptable to any seeker of truth.

Verse VIII. Besides, the spiritual forces which progressively lead to the attainment of *nirvāna*, and also those which lead to enlightenment, and those which are the constituent factors of it, and their opposites have been categorically propounded in the scriptures as

¹ A detailed treatment and exposition of morally good and bad mentalities has been given by E. H. Johnston in IHQ, XIV, 314-323.

real facts. The assertion of the sceptic that all existents are unreal appearances will give the lie direct to these categorical propositions of authoritative scripture—a contingency which cannot be acquiesced in by a lover of truth and aspirant for spiritual perfection.

Verse IX. Again, if all entities are devoid of reality and thus have no individuality, they would not be capable of being designated by names. But each entity has got a distinct name and designation, and each designation has got a meaning which must be a real fact. The omnibus denial of the sceptic would reduce them to nonsense, which is flatly contradicted by our experience.

Verse X. If the sceptic feels compelled to qualify his thesis out of deference to the realization of the significance of words and names, and concedes the possibility of self-existence as such (*svabhāva*) and still elects to deny it of the entities known, he must enunciate the thing or things which are credited with self-existence. Well, the latter must be distinct from the entities known. But the sceptic does not care to propound any such entity. It stands to reason to conclude that the hypothesis of a self-existent entity outside the category of existents known must be declared to be a nullity or a hoax.

Verse XI. Furthermore, negation has relevancy only with regard to an existent fact. The proposition, for instance, 'There is no jar in the room' implies the non-existence of a real jar. There can be no negation of an unreal fiction. Only a real can admit of logical negation. So the unqualified negation of all entities and their individual reality involves self-contradiction. Negation, as has been observed, presupposes real existence. The real denial of the reality of things experienced or known would consequently involve their reality and this will be nothing short of unabashed self-contradiction.

The idea of the realist is that since a significant negation necessarily presupposes the reality of the negatum, absolute and universal negation is necessarily vitiated by self-contradiction. If the negation be unreal the reality of things negated remains unaffected. If again this negation be real that will contradict the central thesis "All things are unreal" inasmuch as the negation itself would be an exception. Furthermore, since denial presupposes the reality of the thing denied the reality of all things is *eo ipso* admitted. So the sceptic is confronted with the dilemma whether he admits or denies the reality of denial. The

reality or unreality of denial thus fails to impair the reality of things.

This position has been improved in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*.¹ The crux of the problem broached by the realist centres round the fact whether conceptual reality or empirical reality is necessarily conterminous with metaphysical reality or not. The realist advocates the former position, whereas the sceptic or transcendentalist keeps the two orders of reality entirely separate.

Verse XII. If there be no reality anywhere in anything, what is then the meaning of the negative proposition 'All entities are devoid of reality'? Certainly a fiction cannot be an object of negation. The non-existence of a fiction is evident on the face of it and the statement of it is uncalled for. For instance, nobody feels called upon to negate coldness in fire, or hotness in water. Why? Because these attributes are non-existent. If there were no reality in existents, the denial of it would be not only irrelevant but positively repugnant to the nature of things.

Verse XIII. The sceptic may contend that the denial of reality of things known by us is neither irrelevant nor incompatible. The position may be made clear by a concrete illustration. A gullible fool is deluded into the belief that he sees a lake of water in the desert. It will be a notorious illusion as the mirage will be mistaken for water. In such a case, a wise man sees the plight of the dupe and hastens to correct him by asserting the belief in water to be entirely false. It is not denied that there is a persistent belief on the part of unenlightened people in the reality of things perceived by them. But the enlightened philosopher, out of mercy, declares 'All these things are devoid of reality', in order to combat the prevalent illusion. The belief in the reality of things, though almost universal, is a downright error in spite of its persistence.

Verse XIV. This is apparently a plausible argument. But even if that be so the sceptic cannot deny that there is (i) the belief, (ii) the object of belief, and also (iii) the person who believes. Again (iv) the denial of the false illusion is a fact and (v) the object denied (*viz.*, the illusion) is also a fact, and (vi) the factuality of the person who

denies it is also not capable of repudiation. This very illustration of common error and its correction demonstrate the reality of the sixfold entity. And this gives the lie direct to the sceptic's assertion 'All entities are devoid of essence'.

Verses XV & XVI. If, to escape this predicament, the sceptic chooses to assert that there is neither the false belief, nor any object of such belief, nor again any believer, then there would be no possibility of negation of such a belief, and as such no object of negation, and far less the person who negates. Then the negation of the reality of all existents would transpire to be a fiction, and with it the object of negation and the person making the negation should be set aside as impossible facts. The logical impossibility of negation as such would leave the reality of things absolutely unaffected.

Verses XVII & XVIII. Moreover, the universal denial of reality perforce entails the unreality of the condition of proof (*hetu*, the logical ground). If the logical ground by means of which any conclusion can be proved be itself unreal, the conclusion will not follow. So how can there be a logical possibility for the establishment of the proposition 'All entities are unreal'? The failure of proof would on the other hand imply the truth of the opposite, *viz.*, the reality of all things. The sceptic may seek to escape the plight and assert that things are proved without the help of a logical ground and so the denial of reality will be *eo ipso* established. But the same line of argument is open to the realist also. He can also claim with equal justice or privilege that the reality of things is proved by itself without reference to any logical ground.

Verse XIX. The affirmation of the reality of the logical ground would give the lie direct to the sceptic's thesis of universal unreality. Moreover, so far as the verdict of experience is concerned, it does not lend the remotest support to the existence of an unreal entity.

Verse XX. Finally, the absurdity of the absolutist's negation of reality in all entities can be brought into relief if we examine the relative status of negation and negatum. If negation be an antecedent event and the negatum be a subsequent phenomenon, the negation will be impossible. If, on the other hand, the negatum be an antecedent event and negation a posterior phenomenon, that also will not help the absolutist out of his difficulty. If the negatum be a *fait accompli*; safely entrenched in its place, a subsequent negation will not affect

its reality in the least degree. The previous existence as a historical fact cannot be rendered null and void. To suppose that they are synchronous will only make the confusion worse confounded. Two coexistents cannot stand in the relation of cause and effect. If negation and negatum be coexistent, neither negation will be the condition of the negatum, nor negatum will be the condition of negation, exactly like the two horns of an animal, which are coexistent, being synchronous in origin, but neither the right horn is the condition of the left, nor the left of the right. This shows that the reality of things does not admit of negation, and hence the thesis of the absolutist is a dogmatic assertion.¹

THE ABSOLUTIST'S REPLY

Verse XXI. The contention of the realist was that the words of the absolutist's argument would be devoid of reality and as such would not succeed in repudiating the reality of all entities. The absolutist admits the truth of the premise of the realist's argument. He affirms "Your contention is that my words have no reality in the causal conditions and there is no existent outside the sphere of causal operation, and so my words can lay no pretension to reality." We admit the truth of it. I do not claim that the words are real. Certainly they are

¹ The argument of the realist seems to presuppose that negation and negatum stand in the relation of cause and effect and *vice versa*. It is contended that the unreality of things, advocated by the absolutist, would subvert the causal relationship which is put forward as an undisputed truth. It seems difficult to follow how negation and negatum can be related as cause and effect. We offer a tentative explanation of the apparent puzzle. Negation and negatum are relative concepts and as such one cannot be understood without reference to the other. Each is a presupposition of the other. Such being the case, each serves as the determinant of the other. A determinant is however a species of cause. The causal relationship is easily understandable in so far as the understanding of the one requires that of the other. But as understanding is the key to the objective nature of things, the causal relationship need not be merely subjective. Besides, the status of a thing as a negatum and that of another as the negation cannot be a subjective superimposition. They must be objective. Otherwise the real character of a thing cannot be amenable to human cognition. If it be conceded that cognition introduces a difference in the character of the real, it will be impossible to distinguish what attribute belongs to the thing in itself and what is superimposed upon it by the human intellect. It is for this reason the Vaiśeṣika believes that numbers from 2 to n, though engendered by an intellectual act of synthesis, are vested as objective attributes in the reals.

as unreal as all other things, being subject to the law of causal operation. So your animadversion that my argument will fail to annul the reality of things falls as a damp squib.

Verse XXII. The law of Dependent Origination (*pratītyabhāva*) is equivalent to and proof of the intrinsic unreality (*śūnyatā*) of things. A thing which is found to come into existence in dependence upon an antecedent fact must forfeit its claim to intrinsic reality. The realist has failed to understand the logical import of *śūnyatā* and his animadversion proceeds from this basic misunderstanding. Now, *śūnyatā* is nothing else than the fact of this Dependent Origination. Whatever thing is found to derive its existence from an antecedent and thus depends upon the latter for its existence cannot claim intrinsic reality of its own. If things were real in their own right and by their intrinsic nature they could come into being independently of the antecedent causes and conditions. But, as a matter of fact, they are tagged on to the preceding events and as such cannot be conceived to have an intrinsic existence which a real, by the very definition of it, must be believed to possess. As regards my arguments which are nothing but a series of words, they are events in time and as such dependent upon antecedent conditions. They have no intrinsic reality. So yours is a case of wasted labour, so far as you seek to prove the unreality of my words.

The next charge that an unreal thing can have no causal efficiency is absolutely inconsequential. Causal efficiency is rather the criterion of things which have no intrinsic reality of their own. In these matters, we have to be guided by the testimony of experience and not *a priori* reasoning. Consider, for instance, the behaviour of such things as a chariot, a textile, a jar and so on and so forth. They are certainly produced by causes and conditions and yet are found to exercise their causal power in respect of their relevant effects. For instance, the chariot, as a conveyance, is used as carrier of men and things. The jar is used as a container of honey or water or milk. A textile serves to protect the wearer from heat and cold and the onslaught of winds. Certainly, being products, they cannot have intrinsic reality of their own and are yet found to be productive of definite effects. Such is also the case with my argument. It is also devoid of intrinsic reality, being the product of a set of definite causes and conditions. It produces

a result in that it communicates a meaning. So the whole argument of the realist is based upon a misconception that causal efficiency presupposes intrinsic reality. The ground of the charge is rather a pointer to the opposite truth, *viz.*, that only things which have no intrinsic reality and rigid constitution can act as causes and be the effects of their own causes.

Verse XXIII. Nāgārjuna now proposes to clinch his conclusion by means of examples which, though they may not be acceptable to the modern mind, were believed to be possible facts in his days.

Well, the negation of reality by an unreal argument is not actually impossible. It is notorious that phantom men and women are created by magicians and thaumaturgists and they behave exactly like real men and women. The cinematography in modern times also succeeds in creating verisimilitude by devices which are not far remote from the magician's tricks. A phantom man prohibits another phantom man from a certain course of conduct. Both the persons—the one who prohibits and the one who is prohibited—are equally unreal. But the factuality of the prohibition and its success are exemplified by the behaviour of such phantom persons. Such is exactly the case with my argument which, though unreal, succeeds in rubutting the prevalent belief in the reality of things. So your accusation that an unreal argument cannot successfully remove a superstitious belief has no cogency. And as regards the sixfold dialectic propounded by you, its hollowness stands exposed by this very argument. It is never the proposition of the absolutist that his argument is not included within the purview of all entities. Nor is it contended that it is not unreal, much less that all things are not unreal.

Verse XXIV. Well, the argument is not believed to be real *per se*. So it does not involve surrender of my fundamental position. And so the charge of uncritical discrimination cannot hold good. Therefore, there is no occasion for the statement of a special ground of distinction.

The fact of the matter is: My argument, being the product of a chain of causes and conditions, cannot be considered to come into existence by virtue of its own independent nature. It has been observed before that what has not self-existence is unreal. My argument also is equally unreal just like the rest of phenomena. So there is no case

of uncritical and irrational discrimination. If we maintained that the argument was intrinsically real, we would expose ourselves to the charge of discriminatory treatment. But this is just the reverse of our position. And therefore all the consequential charges are only the creatures of the imagination of the opponent.

Verse XXV. The analogy of the command by words prohibiting the creation of noise (that is, of words) is entirely irrelevant and is not employed by us for the purpose. In the example, words serve to prevent the occurrence of other words. But we do not assert that things have any intrinsic nature of their own, or that they have any claim to reality. Were it the case that an unreal argument was employed to rebut the unreality of things, the example could be relevant. But our position is just the opposite of it. The argument is used to prove the unreality of things and not to negate it. So the consequence thrust upon us that the negation of unreality would entail the reality of things is only a perversion of our intention. We emphatically affirm the unreality of things and so the example bears no analogy to our position.

Verse XXVI. It has been shown that the example would have been relevant had an unreal argument been employed to rebut the unreality of things. The example illustrates the use of a real word for the prevention of a real word. The negator and the negatum are of co-ordinate status. The argument, though unreal, is adduced to rebut the *reality* of things. If an unreal argument were advanced to rebut the *unreality* of things, things would have to be accepted as possessed of intrinsic reality. But this would run counter to our fundamental position, since we maintain with uniform consistency the intrinsic unreality of things and never subscribe to their reality.

Verse XXVII. The truth of our doctrine can be elucidated by the following example. The *Tathāgata* or a disciple of him created a phantom woman in order to annihilate the lingering weakness of a person for the opposite sex. The unregenerated man was deluded into mistaking this phantom woman for a real woman and developed affection for her. In order to purify him of such evil propensities, a phantom man is created. This phantom man is made to behave by a fiat of his will as a wise saint and to enlighten the deluded soul by his instruction. The dupe of the illusion is made to realize the hollow-

ness of his love and thus, by a process of spiritual catharsis, is freed from the sway of lower passions. Though the woman in question is a false appearance and so also the saint, yet the weak aspirant is emancipated from the shackles of lower impulses and passions. This will be the appropriate illustration of our procedure. The argument is like the sermon of the phantom saint and the phantom woman is the prototype of all unreal phenomena. The unreal argument serves to dispel the illusion of reality to which the unregenerated souls fall easy victims. The example of the prohibitive injunction is however devoid of any parallelism.

Verse XXVIII. If we look closely into the argument of the opponent, it will be found to be vitiated by a fallacy. The example of the sound of warning derives its cogency from the supposition that it has an intrinsic reality of its own. And this is made the logical ground. But the sound also cannot lay claim to intrinsic reality, being the product of a chain of causes and conditions. The assertion that the sound is real and serves to prohibit the future occurrence of real sounds proceeds from a misconception. The reality of sound is only of the empirical order. And we endorse this empirical reality as a concession because of its pragmatic utility. The admission of empirical reality is only a make-believe necessary for the creation of conviction of the ultimate truth. It is a necessary expedient and even the enlightened saint must have recourse to it in order to edify the ignorant seeker of truth. It may be an illusion. But it has a pragmatic value, both intellectual and moral. Though it may not have a logical justification and from the rational standpoint there is no *raison d'être* for the world, it cannot be denied that it is there. The appearance may be irrational. But no amount of logical speculation can cancel its existence. Besides, all intellectual and moral disciplines derive their validity from this empirical reality and they also cannot claim a superior order of reality *qua* empirical facts. The appearance of a *Tathāgata* is necessary because there is this imperfect world. And the necessity of salvation from this imperfect world would not be felt by any person unless the imperfect world were an existent fact. What the Mādhyamika philosophy and so also Śaṅkara's Vedānta seek to emphasize is that the world of plurality is not an ultimate truth, though its factuality cannot be denied so long as one is in it. The assertion of the unreality of the world does

not therefore spell any danger to the historical, intellectual and moral orders and the disciplines appertaining thereto. These orders have only a provisional validity and as much reality as is felt to be necessary by the realist.

Verse XXIX. The realist has defended his repudiation of the denial of reality by the plea that it is occasioned by the absolutist's assertion of his thesis and so the charge of self-contradiction and inconsistency lies at his door. "But this is nothing but a perversion of my standpoint", says the absolutist. "If there were any thesis propounded by me, then the charge of self-contradiction could be brought home against me. But as a matter of fact I cannot be supposed to make any real assertion when all things are known to be unreal, being destitute of self-existence and autonomy, which are the criteria of ultimate truth. So you cannot charge me with the assertion of any thesis in which you can pick holes. The whole impeachment proceeds either from an intellectual incapacity or a deliberate dishonesty."

Verse XXX. The realist reprimands the absolutist that he contradicts the things which he cognizes by means of recognized cognitive organs and also unabashedly repudiates these very organs. This is nothing but a case of shameless self-contradiction or a deception.

But this charge is equally unfounded. The absolutist observes in reply— "If I made any pretension to apprehend anything by means of cognitive organs or cared to establish any position or repudiate any contention by appeal to the testimony of these cognitive organs, then I would lay myself open to these charges. But as a matter of truth I do not make any such pretension and so the charge is wide of the mark. At any rate it leaves me perfectly unconcerned."

Verse XXXI. "Furthermore, I may be permitted to pose a question to the realist in order to clarify the issue. If you, realist, really believe that all the things that are cognized are proved by means of well recognized cognitive organs such as perception, inference, analogy and testimony, I would like to be enlightened by you as to how you come to believe in the validity of these very cognitive organs. What is the warrant of their validity? What are their credentials? If you cannot adduce any warrant in support of your belief and, on the contrary, feel no compunction to declare that they do not require

any proof for their validity you will have to recant your thesis that all things are proved by valid cognitive organs".

Verse XXXII. If, on the other hand, the validity of the cognitive organs be supposed to be established by other such organs, then it will give rise to a vicious infinite series.

The cognitive organs are supposed to prove the existence of the things cognized by them and if the organs themselves are open to doubt, they will not succeed in the task credited to them. The appeal to other organs will necessitate the postulation of a series of such organs which will have no limit.

Well, what is the reason of such a series being condemned as a logical flaw? The answer is "If the chain of the cognitive organs as vehicles of proof be extended without limit in the infinite past, there would be no primary cognitive organ whose validity can be considered to be established. There being no primal cognitive organ secure in its validity, the succeeding organs, which are supposed to derive their validity from their predecessors, will themselves be assailed by authentic doubt. The consequence will be that no selection can be made, from this infinite chain, of any one, either in the beginning or in the middle or in the end, as being securely established in its validity. In the absence of an initial limit, there will be no end and consequently no middle because these concepts are relative; and the collapse of the first term will entail that of the succeeding links."

Verse XXXIII. If the cognitive organs *quā* proof are accepted to be valid without recourse to the verdict of other such organs, that will involve the surrender of your fundamental position. Moreover, the propounder of such a thesis will expose himself to the charge of making an unauthorized discrimination. Or, in the alternative, he will be compelled to adduce a reason for this differential treatment.

The fundamental position of the realist is that the reality of things is attested by a cognitive organ bearing upon it. Now the question is legitimately posed "If a cognitive organ validates the reality of anything known by it, what is the source of the validity of the organ itself?" Suppose that no such validating ground can be adduced and, on the contrary, that it is dogmatically asserted that so far as the cognitive organs are concerned, their validity does not require any further proof. Well, this dogmatic assertion will amount to a confession that

there may be things which are accepted to be valid without any (organ of) proof. This will invalidate the fundamental standpoint of the realist that all things are proved by some cognitive organ. The organs of proof are also things, and if they are established without the attestation of another cognitive organ, the universal proposition will have to be amended. The realist will be under an obligation to make a reaservation for the cognnitive organs themsalves. And the differential treatment involved in this reservation has to be justified. But no logical ground has been and can be adduced in support.

The realist may strike a pose of injured innocence. Well, so far as the cognitive organs are concerned, they stand in a different position by their very nature. They prove things and prove themselves. This is not a newfangled theory, but has the support of ancient tradition. Here we quote an *ipse dixit* of the school. "Just as fire illumines other things as well as its own self, so the cognitive organs prove the existence of things as well as their own."

Verse XXXIV. But the example is entirely irrelevant and has no parallelism with the present case. It is not the case that fire illumines its own being. Certainly nobody can claim that fire remained unperceived and unillumined like a jar in darkness. The fact of the matter is that the realist suffers from a misconception. It is not a fact that fire is self-illumining. The analogy of fire is entirely out of the question. It is on this analogy that the doctrine of self-validation is propounded by the realist. There might be a presumption of the possibility if the self-illumination of fire were a fact. But it is not. All cases of illumination are simply preceded by an unilluminated state. For example, the jar was covered by darkness and as such remained unperceived. It comes to be subsequently perceived whenemaillumined by fire. If the fire were previously unillumined and rinedned unperceived in darkness and then subsequently became illuminated, it could be held to be illuminated by itself. But this is not the case. No body can adduce any evidence to establish a previous unilluminated condition of fire. So the example is only an instance of misconception and utter irrelevance.

Verse XXXV. Furthermore, if on the basis of an *ipse dixit*, fire is supposed to illumine itself just in the same manner as it illuminates an external object, it should also burn itself as it is seen to burn other things.

This is the idea of Nāgārjuna. A thing cannot bring its causal power to bear upon its own self, though it can do so in respect of an alien object. The subject-object relation involved in the transitive verbs presupposes numerical difference. The subject can never be the object of the same act. Were it not so, fire could burn its own self as it burns others. So the conclusion that a cognitive organ is self-proved does not follow, as the premise of the self-regarding activity of fire is itself a false assumption.

Verse XXXVI. If fire be supposed to be capable of bringing its act of illumination to bear upon its own self, it could also be supposed with equal plausibility that darkness will also cover its own self. An analogical argument is notorious for its weakness and has very little cogency even when it is true. But it fails as a broken reed where it is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of a thing. The present is an instance of it.

Verse XXXVII. Furthermore, there is no darkness either in the being of fire or in its locus. So how can there be an illumination in respect of fire as its object? Illumination is nothing but the destruction of darkness.

The idea is this. Illumination has no meaning except with reference to a previous state of darkness. Darkness is a positive entity according to the Buddhist, the Jaina, the Mīmāṃsist and the Vedāntist. Why should a thing remain unillumined and become illumined when light is brought to bear upon it? What is the *modus operandi* of light in the act of illumination? Certainly, it is nothing but this that the absence of light is concomitant with the presence of darkness whose function is to envelop a thing and make it unamenable to perception. The light makes the object fit to be perceived by removing the obscurity imposed by darkness. If fire chose to illumine its own self, it would have to be conceded that it also destroyed the darkness which impeded its illumination. But this cannot be proved. So this theory of self-illumination has no foundation in truth.

The realist may put up a defence. Well, the absolutist's argument is calculated to confirm the realist's thesis. It is true that there is no darkness in fire, nor in the place where fire exists. This very fact ought to be construed as proof of the thesis that fire illuminates its own self as well as an other. Fire annihilates darkness as soon as it is born. The

birth of fire and the annihilation of darkness are synchronous events. It stands to reason therefore that there cannot be darkness either in the body of fire or in the locus where it exists. This is due to the fact that fire illuminates itself and all other things within its range at the very time when it comes into existence.

In reply to this it may be observed:

Verse XXVIII. The argument that fire illuminates as soon as it is born is preposterous. Certainly, fire does not come into contact with darkness at the moment of its origination.

The position that fire illuminates itself and others as soon as it comes into being is an unfounded assumption. To be sure, it cannot be supposed that fire makes an impact upon darkness even at the time of its birth. This assumption will, on the contrary, necessitate the admission of the coexistence of fire and darkness at least for one moment. But this will be an absurdity which even the realist demurs to endorse. In the absence of synchronism there can be no impingement upon darkness and so there can be no occasion for annihilation of darkness by fire. It follows that no illumination will be possible, because it is nothing but annihilation of darkness.

Verse XXXIX. Further, if we admitted that fire can make away with darkness without coming into contact with the latter, you would be compelled to admit as a consequence that fire existing in a corner of this room could also destroy all the darkness that exists in all the worlds.

This is only an elaboration of the previous argument. The argument is a *reductio ad absurdum*. The idea is that the relation of destructive opposition in which fire and darkness are supposed to stand to each other must necessitate the congruence of the two at least for a moment. But this admission will prove that they are not absolutely incongruent. Nāgārjuna banks upon the fact of absolute incongruity of fire and darkness. The fact that they cannot coexist in the same substratum at any time shows that there can be no contact, much less a tussle, between them. But if there be no contact possible, the question of one superseding the other will be a *petitio principii*.

Verse XL. If you, realist, assert that the organs *qua* cognitions are known by themselves, you will have to admit that they will be known

without reference to their relevant objects. For self-cognition is incompatible with dependence on an alien fact.

The idea is this. Organs of cognition are believed to be of the nature of cognition according to the Buddhist and other Indian schemes of epistemology, excepting the later exponents of the Nyāya theory of perception and their followers here and there. That cognitions are known by themselves is the position of Dharmakīrti, Prabhākara and the Jaina logicians. This is opposed by the Nyāya School, Nāgārjuna and also Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. The Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta, though they do not believe that cognitions are self-intuited, assert that they never remain unperceived, being revealed by the eternal light of the self with which they are connected from the very beginning.

We must distinguish the theory of self-cognition (*svaprakāśatva*) from the theory of self-validation (*svataḥ-pramāṇya*). We reserve the treatment of this logical problem for a subsequent paper.

Nāgārjuna's argument applies against both these theories. He enters a strong caveat against all philosophers who advocate one or the other theory, though not necessarily both. The gravamen of his complaint lies in the inherent impossibility of the same thing being the subject and the object of the same act.

As for the present argument, Nāgārjuna shows with considerable force of logic that the concepts of cognition and cognitum, subject and object are relative, and one cannot be thought of without the other. If cognition as an organ be numerically and functionally different from the cognitum, the dependence of the former upon the latter will deprive it of all claim to be known and proved by itself. Dependence upon a foreign element is incompatible with the self-autonomy of cognition, either as an act or as an organ.

It may be urged: What is the harm if cognitions *qua* organs are supposed to be independent of the objects to be known by them? In reply to this, Nāgārjuna observes:

Verse XLI. If cognitions are known or proved without a necessary reference to the objects, as you assert, these cognitions will not be known as having necessary relation to any cognitum.

The idea is: If a cognition be self-contained and self-centred, it will not have any reference to any object. It will then cease to be the cogni-

tion of a fact. But cognition which is not the cognition of anything is a chimera.

If the cognitions stand in necessary relation with their objects, you cannot maintain that cognitions are proved irrespective of their objects. In other words, this will entail the abandonment of your thesis of self-cognition or self-validation.

Verse XLII. Suppose we admit that cognitions are realized with necessary reference to their objects, what will be the harm? Well, this admission will involve the further admission of the antecedent existence of the cognitions as accomplished facts. The reason is that nothing can be supposed to have reference to and stand in need of another unless it is already found to be in existence.

To admit that cognitions come into being having necessary reference to and thus standing in need of their relevant objects will amount to the metaphysical fallacy of bringing into existence of what already is in existence. This will be a case of wasted labour of love. It is exactly on a par with the logical fallacy called 'proof of a proved fact' (*siddhasādhana*). When an arguer seeks to prove for the conviction of his opponent any fact which the latter does not dispute, the former is accused of proving a proved fact. It is sheer waste of energy and skill. An argument is necessary only when there is a doubt regarding any fact at issue.

Nāgārjuna uses the expression *siddhasādhana* in such a way as can be supposed to admit of twofold explanation. Cognitions as organs of proof may be supposed to be proved by themselves or by the objects to be known. The first alternative is ruled out of court, and the second alternative is elaborately criticized by Nāgārjuna. If however it be supposed that cognitions come into play in dependence upon their objects, the former must be conceded to have prior existence as accomplished facts. Certainly, when a thing is known to depend upon another, it must be conceded that the depending thing is already existent. None but an existent can be supposed to depend upon or stand in need of another. If this be so, this question of dependence upon another fact, either for coming into existence or for proof of itself, will be entirely redundant. There is no meaning in trying to bring into existence what is already possessed of it, or to make known what is already known.

Verse XLIII. Furthermore, if cognitions *qua* organs are supposed to be proved by their reference to and consequent dependence upon the objects to be known, the proof of the objects will not be dependent upon the good offices of the organs.

If cognitive organs are made to depend upon their objects either for proof or for existence, the independent existence of the objects would be presupposed by the act. In that case, the proof of objects will be independent of the services of the cognitive organs. But this is plainly absurd. Certainly, the objects to be proved cannot be supposed to furnish proof of the organs which are requisitioned for the proof of the former.

Verse XLIV. If the objects to be known or proved are supposed to be known or proved independently of the good offices of the cognitive organs, the search for the latter will be entirely uncalled for. The cognitive organs are requisitioned for the proof of the objects. And if the objects themselves are already known and thus stand independent of any proof, the postulation of the different organs and their application will be absolutely abortive.

Verse XLV. If, again, it be supposed by you that the cognitive organs are brought into existence and made effectual by the service of the things to be cognized, that will only lead to the entire subversion of the relation of the organs and the cognizables.

If the cognitive organs are supposed to depend upon the cognizables in order to come into existence and function, the charge of inconsequence will be ruled out, no doubt. But it will give rise to a grave disaster in the logical field. The status of organs and cognizables will suffer reversal. The organs will be reduced to the status of cognizables and the cognizables will be raised to the status of organs, because the nature of their services will be entirely revolutionized. The cognizable would have to be reckoned as organ, since it would serve as the instrument of the proof of the recognized organ and the latter would be degraded to the status of the former, because its very existence and functional success would be dependent upon the good offices of the cognizable. This reversal involved in the interchange of position or function is bound to give shock to the logical conscience of all believers in the logical tradition.

Verse XLVI. Let it be supposed that the proof of the cognizable

is the consequence of the proof of the organ, because the former depends on the latter. Be it supposed again that the proof of the organ depends upon that of the cognizable. In that case neither of the two will be susceptible of proof. The reason is this:

Verse XLVII. The cognizables will be proved by the organs and those very organs will be proved by those very cognizables. If this be the situation, the cognizables will be responsible for the existence of the organs, and if the former again are supposed to be dependent upon latter for their very existence, the former will not be capable of bringing into existence the latter.

If the proof and existence of one be supposed to depend upon that of the other and *vice versa*, neither will be independently existent. In other words, both of them would be non-existent. And thus none can afford to be the proof of the other. The reciprocal dependence of both the relata thus makes both of them non-existent figments.

Verse XLVIII. To put it the other way about: If the organs be supposed to be proved by the cognizables, and the latter again are to be proved by the former, how can the cognizables, dependent as they are for their existence and functioning upon those very organs which are to be brought into play by them, be the proof of the organs?

The fallacy of reciprocal dependence, either in respect of genesis or in respect of cognition, lies in the failure to recognize the antecedent existence of one of the terms independently of the service of the other. It must be recognized that the relation is at bottom one of cause and effect whether one term is believed to be dependent upon the other for its existence or its proof. The condition and the result cannot be self-identical. "Thus if A depended upon B and B in its turn depended upon A for its genesis or subsistence, and A depended in order to be cognized upon the cognition of B, and B again in order to be cognized were found to depend upon the cognition of A, the result would be a case of mutual dependence in respect of genesis, subsistence and cognition respectively."¹

Nāgārjuna seems not to be satisfied by only pointing out the fallacy involved in a circular argument and therefore gives a concrete example which will convince even the most obtuse person of the absurdity involved in such tactics.

¹ Dr. Bagchi: *Inductive Reasoning*, p. 157.

Verse XLIX. If one were to say, the son is one which is generated by a father, and that father again is supposed to be generated by that very son, then we challenge the assertor of such a proposition to point out who is the son and who is the father. Who begets whom? The absurdity of such a proposition does not stand in need of further elaboration.

The absurdity of the proposition is writ large upon its face, and it does not require any proof to be driven home, because it is self-transparent. Absurdity can neither be proved nor refuted unless the exposure of it does not constitute refutation enough.

Nāgārjuna claims that the same absurdity is involved in the supposition that a cognizable is proved by an organ and the latter again by the former. The upshot is that none can make out what is the organ of proof and what the cognitum of it. It makes no difference whether the relation between them be one of 'generator and generated' or 'prover and proved' or 'cognizer and cognized'. In the first case, the causal relation will stand between the two terms directly and in the latter two the relation will hold between the cognitions of the same. Whether the organ is dependent upon the cognizable for its being, or the cognition of the former upon that of the latter, and *vice versa*, the fallacy of mutual dependence will be equally present.

Verse L. We ask the opponent to prove who is the father and who is the son in the case cited above. Our doubt honestly arises since both of them are asserted to be possessed of the characteristics of father and son.

It is extremely difficult to make out who is the father and who is the son in the example cited above. Both of them are possessed of the character of fatherhood and sonship, since each one of them is believed to be the generator and also the generated. The generator is the father and the generated is the son. Each, being generator, is entitled to be considered as father. And each, being generated, is entitled to be considered as son. The doubt is quite legitimate, but does not admit of solution, since there is no characteristic which can distinguish the one from the other.

The parallelism of the same persons being the father and the son of each other is exactly applicable to the issue between the organ and the cognizable. When the same thing is trotted out to be the organ and

its cognitum and *vice versa*, the case is exactly parallel. The difficulty of determination of each of them either as the organ or as the cognitum is exactly the same.

Verse LI. The upshot is that the organs are neither proved nor generated by themselves, nor by one another, nor by other organs, nor again by the cognizables; nor can they be supposed to be proved without the help of any condition.

It cannot be maintained that a perception is generated or made known by itself, that is to say, by that very perception. An inference also cannot be supposed to be conditioned or proved by that very inference; an analogy cannot be supposed to be proved by that very analogy; and a verbal testimony cannot be supposed to be proved by that very verbal testimony. It is not again possible to maintain that each is proved by inference and the rest, or inference by perception and the rest and so on. Nor is it possible to maintain that these organs are proved by another organ of a different kind, simply because there is no evidence of such an organ. And if it were possible, the same difficulty would arise with regard to it. We have also seen that the organs cannot be dependent upon their objects, either for existence or for proof. The situation will not be improved if the cognizables are taken separately or collectively and in different permutation and combination. The last alternative that these organs of proof are independent of any other condition in respect of their origin or function is doomed to failure. It is inconceivable that an event can happen without any condition preceding it.

The conclusion is irresistible that the realist's thesis that there are cognizables which are proved by their organs which are equally existent facts is only a dogmatic and uncritical assertion. So all the objections based upon the postulation of the organs of proof or their cognizables are found on scrutiny to be the unreal figments of the realist's imagination.

Verse LII. If your contention that the celebrated masters convergent with the content and value of moral acts have enunciated the exact character of each such act be true, then you are under the obligation to demonstrate each such act and its content by way of distinct specification.

For instance, you will have to demonstrate that these are the moral

acts and this is their content; this is morally good cognition and this its character. But such differentiation and specification have not been enunciated by the teachers of the tradition. The truth of the matter is that a thing and its character cannot be disentangled because they are ultimate unanalysable facts. So though these acts are also admitted by all followers of tradition, including Nāgārjuna himself, it is not admitted by the latter that they have got intrinsic reality and distinctive character undetermined by a chain of causes and conditions. This is going to be explained in the next verse.

Verse LIII. If the character 'goodness' of the good acts and states is produced by a previous chain of causes and conditions, then this character will not be intrinsic to those acts and states, but will be an external fact, and as such it cannot be regarded as an integral factor of its being.

The same law will apply to the morally bad (*akusala*) acts, since they are also dependent for their existence upon a previous causal chain.

Verse LIV. If these good (and also bad) acts and states are believed to have an intrinsic reality and nature undetermined by a definite chain of causes and conditions, this will end in proving the futility of the observance of moral discipline enjoined for holy life.

If you suppose that good acts do not derive their character of goodness from antecedent conditions and so also the bad acts their character of badness, and indifferent acts their character of indifference, and that these characters are distinct and different from the phenomena in which they are embodied, this will make havoc of the whole scheme of moral life and discipline. This will lead to the repudiation of the doctrine of causality. It is the cardinal doctrine of Buddhist ethics and ontology that every event comes into existence under the influence of a chain of antecedent conditions. Ethical indeterminism will involve the negation of this Law of Causation which is believed to be universal in its scope. Nothing is believed to be undetermined by an antecedent condition in Buddhist philosophy. An undetermined phenomenon will either be an eternal verity or a fiction, as has been observed by Udayana. But all ethical actions and states are believed to be determined by a definite set of causal conditions. It has, therefore, been declared by the Master "One who comprehends the Law of Causation

(*pratītyasamutpāda*) understands the religious truth (*Dharma*).” It follows as a corollary from this assertion that moral acts and religious values cannot be causally undetermined. If indeterminism is conceded in the ethical plane, the observance of the rules of holy life will have no consequence.

Not only this. The denial of the law of causality will lead to the abrogation of the four Noble Truths. The origination of suffering is a case of causality. The denial of causality will *ipso facto* lead to the denial of origination of suffering. If there be no origination there can be no suffering. Suffering also is dependent upon a cause for its existence. In the absence of suffering and its origin and the condition thereof, there will be no *raison d'etre* of annihilation of suffering. Annihilation of suffering presupposes the actual existence of suffering. And the repudiation of such annihilation will make enlightenment which is the way to this goal absolutely nugatory. Thus the admission of uncaused goodness or its opposite will subvert the whole course of spiritual discipline laid down in the scripture and the whole institution of monastic brotherhood (*saṅgha*), which is one of the pillars of Buddhism as religion, will be reduced to a mockery and fraud.

Verse LV. If your contention were true, there would be no vice (evil), no virtue (good), nor even the conventional activities (individual and social). All things would have to be believed to be eternal being possessed of an intrinsic reality, since they would not be determined by causes and conditions.

Well, these are the serious consequences of the repudiation of the law of causation. There would be no good action, nor a bad one. And all the empirical and conventional laws of social and individual conduct would lose their validity. Why so? The answer is that each and all of them are determined by antecedent causes and conditions. The denial of the law of causation which is the *raison d'etre* of all things will deprive all these facts of their title to existence. If, on the other hand, they are believed to be possessed of intrinsic and self-sufficient reality undetermined by any cause and condition, they will have to be accepted as eternal verities existing in their own right and suffering no change or lapse. The consequence of this preposterous doctrine will be the utter futility of all moral and spiritual discipline and endeavour. This will also be a case of flagrant contradiction of

the universally accepted truths of the Buddhist Faith. The Master has declared without reservation and beyond the possibility of doubt that all that exist are impermanent.

Verse LVII. The same vicious consequence will invalidate the acts which are morally evil or are asserted to be conducive to the emancipation from metempsychosis. And consequently all impermanent things will transpire to be permanent entities. The selfsame logic, which has proved the moral value of the good to be impossible or eternally existent, will also entail the same consequences with regard to evil, indifferent and the liberating acts. And thus everything that is observed to be subject to origination and destruction will have to be regarded as bereft of these characteristics. They will be in your theory eternal and unalterable verities. The result will be the negation of all moral and religious activities. So this cannot be an acceptable interpretation.

As regards the realist's contention that in the absence of the intrinsic reality of things, the whole system of nomenclature will be reduced to nonsense as no name can be attached to an unreal fact, we give the following reply.

Verse LVIII. Well, one who affirms that names are inherently significant and real will be under the obligation to admit that the thing bearing the name is also possessed of intrinsic reality. We are not concerned over it, since we do not assert that a name has any intrinsic reality.

It is you, the realist, who affirm that names have intrinsic reality. The onus of proof of the reality of the thing which bears the name rests upon you. You will have to accept the logical consequence that is entailed by the reality of the name. Certainly, the name must refer to a real entity if it is to be real. But so far as our position stands, we cannot subscribe to this view. The name also is believed by us to be bereft of intrinsic reality. It is thus an unreal appearance. So the whole contention of the realist collapses like a house of cards.

Verse LVIII. Moreover, if the name be admitted to be an unreal convention, let it be considered whether it can refer to a real or unreal entity. Whether it be referred to a real or an unreal, your thesis will fail to materialize in either case.

An unreal name cannot attach either to a real or an unreal thing. Both these alternatives will lead to the abrogation of the thesis. Cer-

tainly, a real cannot have an unreal name. That would imply that the name which is unreal is real—which is a contradiction in terms. If the unreal name be supported to attach to an unreal entity, that would be a downright nonsense. There can be no occasion for naming an unreal fiction. So the whole argument based upon nomenclature topples down.

Verse LIX. Further, all things have already been proved to be devoid of intrinsic reality. So this censure relates to a position which is not asserted by us.

Well, we have taken elaborate pains to establish the intrinsic unreality of all that exists. The establishment of the thesis *eo ipso* involves the unreality of names. But you misunderstand the whole thing and taking your stand upon the reality of the custom of naming elect to accuse me of the absurdity of attaching real names to unreal things. This is nothing short of perversion of my position. I never affirm the reality of names. So this censure does not assail me in the least. It, on the contrary, implies that you are fighting against a figment of your imagination.

As regards your charge that the admission of intrinsic reality outside the circle of existent things lays an obligation upon me for the demonstration of an entity possessing this reality, the answer is:

Verse LX. It has been presumed that I made the assertion that reality exists, though not in the existent things. But this is entirely far from the truth, and so the presumption has no basis.

We neither refute the reality of things, nor assert the reality of anything outside the pale of existents. So the entire animadversion upon me is inspired by a perverted belief that I endorse the reality of anything other than the existents, and consequently the onus of proof of such a thing lies on my shoulder. This is of a piece with the previous censures, and requires no answer from us.

As regards the charge that negation presupposes the reality of the negatum and thus the negation of reality of things presupposes the previous affirmation of it on the part of the absolutist, the answer is stated below.

Verse LXI. If negation is relevant only to an existent fact, the doctrine of *Sūnyatā* is established by your denial. You are candid in the denial of the doctrine of the intrinsic unreality of things.

If your position that negation is possible only of a real existent and not of an unreal fiction be true, your denial of the doctrine of intrinsic unreality of things will end in the establishment of the truth of the doctrine. Your denial of intrinsic unreality will have for its presupposition the truth of the negatum. Thus you will be a convert to the credo of the absolutist.

Verse LXII. You negate the doctrine of *śūnyatā* and at the same time affirm that *śūnyatā* does not exist. By this, your thesis that negation is admissible only in respect of a real negatum is automatically relinquished.

You seek to refute the absolutist's position of the intrinsic unreality of things, which is called *śūnyatā*. And at the same time you assert that *śūnyatā* is an impossibility. This runs counter to your thesis that negation is always possible only of a real existent and not of a non-existent. Your denial of *śūnyatā* should presuppose its reality from your standpoint.

Verse LXIII. Furthermore, I do not undertake to negative any position, nor do I believe in the reality of any negatum. So when you charge me "you negative it", you indulge in false and futile recrimination.

Were it a fact that I undertook to negative any position or fact, then certainly you would be justified in advancing this charge against me. As regards your contention that the negatum must be a real fact, it will suffice to observe that there is nothing to be negated by me. So the question of reality or unreality of the negatum has no *raison d'être* so far as I am concerned. When it is established that all entities are destitute of intrinsic reality and consequently a real negatum or a real negation are only figments of a muddled intellect, the accusation that I, as an exponent of this philosophy, am guilty of contradicting a real fact is not only unfair but also defamatory. And it is a false defamation at that.

As regards the charge formulated in verse XII that if there be no reality then the argument denying reality of things is without a purpose, for a non-existent fiction does not require any argument to prove its unreality, our answer is:

Verse LXIV. You contend that the non-existence of a fiction is proved by itself and does not stand in need of a negative proposition

to affirm it and so the assertion of this negation does not carry any meaning. To this our reply is that the assertion only makes known that it (an existent) is unreal. Certainly, it (assertion) does not by virtue of its causal efficiency bring about the cessation of reality.

You contend that a non-existent fiction does not require any statement, much less an argument, to prove its unreality. A fiction (say a square circle) stands contradicted by itself. What purpose is then served by your assertion: "All that exists is destitute of reality"? Our answer is: Well, our assertion does not propose to rob things of their reality, thus serving to make unreal what is real. It only serves to make manifest the truth that things are devoid of intrinsic reality, as reality is not capable of being discerned in any of them. This can be brought home by an apt illustration. Suppose that when Devadatta is absent from his home, somebody asserts "Devadatta is at home". A knowledgeable person corrects him by saying "No, he is not at home". This corrective does not actually make Devadatta non-existent at home, but only communicates his factual absence from home. Analogously the assertion "There is no reality in anything" does not make things unreal, but only communicates the absence of reality which is true of all that is found to exist.

As regards the animadversion delivered in the four consecutive verses No. XIII to XVI, we give the following reply:

Verse LXV. You have delivered a protracted discourse making the example of the mirage your basis. Listen to our clarification of the issue how that example becomes perfectly appropriate.

Verse LXVI. If the erroneous belief in the water in the mirage were possessed of an intrinsic reality, it would not be produced by any cause. Whereas this belief is brought into being by a set of definite conditions and causes, it must be an instance of the doctrine of *śūnyatā*.

If the illusion of water in the mirage were possessed of an intrinsic reality, it would not be produced by a set of causal conditions. But it is brought into existence by a set of definite conditions, *viz.*, the mirage, the misdirected vision and unvigilant mentality and unfounded belief (*ayoniśo manaskāra*). Being produced under the stress of a definite set of causal conditions, the phenomenon cannot obviously be credited with intrinsic reality. This has been plainly established in the foregoing discourse.

Verse LXVII. Furthermore, if this mistaken belief were existent in its own reality and nature, who would be able to combat it? As regards the remaining charges, they are only consequential and accordingly lie exposed to this very line of criticism. So the censure you pronounce falls short of the target, so far as I am intended to be.

If the perception of water in mirage be possessed of an intrinsic reality of its own, it will not be susceptible to contradiction. To be sure, the nature of things cannot be cancelled and contradicted. For instance, the heat of fire, the fluidity of water, the non-resistance of space are naturally inherent and thus not capable of being cancelled. But this mistaken belief under consideration admits of cancellation and rebuttal and so must be believed to be devoid of reality. This line of argument will also apply to the object, the subject and the rest and will prove that they also cannot lay any claim to intrinsic reality. The sixfold dialectic based upon the assumption of the reality of the belief consequently turns out to be a pleasant illusion. As regards the charge of the unreality of the logical ground, our answer to it is:

Verse LXVIII. The charge of the unreality of the logical ground stands refuted by this very line of reasoning. The line of argument that has been employed to refute the sixfold dialectic should also be adopted in the case under consideration.

Verse LXIX. The reason advanced by the realist to prove the impossibility of negation in all the three divisions of time stands refuted in advance, since the position covered is precisely identical. On the contrary, the reason asserting the impossibility of negation in all the three divisions of time will be welcomed and endorsed by the advocate of the universal unreality of things.

The reason advanced by the realist to refute the possibility of negation in the three divisions of time ought to be regarded as refuted in advance. Why so, you may ask? The answer is that you set out to prove that negation of the reality of things by the absolutist is impossible. Granted that the argument is successful, what is the result you achieve by it? Your success would imply that your negation of the absolutists' position is correct. The absolutist negates the reality of things and you negate this negation. The absolutist's negation is impossible according to your argument, and if so how will your negation

of this negation be in a different position? If negation as such be logically impossible, your negation of this impossible negation will also have no logic to support it. In other words, in the absence of the negation of reality, which the absolutist seeks to prove, your negation will have no object to negate. That being so, your contention that the absolutist's negation stands negated proves to be a hollow unmeaning proposition.

On the contrary, the reason you employ to prove the unreality and impossibility of negation as a fact will come handy to the absolutist. You will establish the thesis of the absolutist who endorses the unreality of all things including that of negation. Negation and affirmation are equally unreal according to the absolutist and when you prove the unreality of negation, you are unwillingly playing the role of an advocate of the absolutist's position. You are not conscious that you are destroying your own case.

The assertion that the realist's reason of the impossibility of negation in the three divisions of time stands refuted may admit of an alternative explanation.

The argument has already been disposed of in Verse LXIII in which the absolutist disclaims all responsibility for the consequential presupposition of the negatum.

Suppose despite these decisive arguments, the realist would insist on the reality of negation in the three divisions of time. He may assert that there may be a cause which is antecedent, which is subsequent and which is synchronous. Thus, for instance, the father is the antecedent cause of the son; the pupil is the subsequent cause of the teacher¹; and the lamp is the synchronous cause of illumination. Negation and negatum also stand in causal relation. The impossibility of negation, either as a causal determinant or as a determinate effect, shows that negation of anything, far less of the reality of all things, is not logically tenable.

The absolutist would rejoin "Does the realist believe in the reality of negation?" If the answer be in the affirmative, all the three absurdities

¹ The idea seems to be that the status and function of the teacher are relative to those of the pupil. A person cannot become a teacher unless he has a pupil to teach. The tutelage of the pupil is thus a determinant condition of the attainment of the status of teacher in spite of the fact that it is a subsequent event in the chronological scale. The priority of the pupil is only logical.

ties demonstrated by him will *a fortiori* stare him in the face. If the answer be in the negative, he will fail in his self-appointed task of refuting the position of the absolutist. The absolutist does not disguise his disbelief in the reality of things. And the negation of all entities is his mission. If the realist is to negate this negation, he cannot escape the charges put forward by him. Moreover, if the realist believes in the reality and possibility of negation, he will go back upon his thesis. And this admission on his part will leave open the possibility of the negation of reality of all things to the absolutist.

Verse LXX. All activities and interests will remain in a secure position for a person, who believes in the ultimate truth of *śūnyatā*, as expounded in this work. Nothing will be safe and secure for the man who does not subscribe to *śūnyatā* as the final estimate of truth.

All interests, mundane and extra-mundane, will be perfectly safeguarded to the person who believes in the universal truth of *śūnyatā*. One may enquire how and why all these interests, social, intellectual, religious and ethical, will receive their justification and fulfilment from this philosophy? The answer is obvious. The law of causation, on which the whole Buddhist discipline is founded, can find its rational justification from this philosophy alone. If the law of causation is vindicated, the four Noble Truths, which constitute the bedrock of moral and spiritual disciplines, will stand vindicated as verities. The four noble truths will make safe provision for the spiritual and empirical results of monastic life. The latter will ensure the attainment of all excellences, including final emancipation. To such an enlightened person the truth of the triple jewel, *viz.*, the Buddha, the Law and the Monastic Order, will become a matter of transparent and unassailable conviction. The believer in the truth of the law of causation will automatically believe in the truth of *dharma* (moral excellence), the cause of it and the effect of it. He will consequently believe in *adharma* (moral degradation), the cause of it and the effects of it. The believer in *dharma* and *adharma*, and their causes and effects, will naturally believe in the passions and defilements, their causes and effects. To the believer in all these events, the belief in the distinction of higher and lower courses of life, the attainment of these states of existence, the way to these states, the deliverance from them and the means of deliverance therefrom, will come naturally and with un-

wavering certitude. Even the mundane laws of individual conduct, social behaviour, political affiliations and every rule and regulation for the profitable and useful conduct of the affairs of life will have their metaphysical justification and explanation from this doctrine. In one word, all institutions will derive their meaning and significance from this law. The whole truth, which we have sedulously endeavoured to expound in this book, has been stated in a nutshell in the verse:

"I offer my obeisance to the Enlightened One who is without a peer, who has declared that *Sūnyatā*, Law of Causation and the Middle Path are identical in import."

Here ends the work of the venerable teacher Nāgārjuna.

CHAPTER II

CANDRAKĪRTI'S EXPOSITION OF THE MĀDHYAMIKA POSITION IN LOGIC

CANDRAKĪRTI raises the logical problem in connection with the elucidation of the position of Nāgārjuna that the concept of causality is a logically unwarranted convention. Nāgārjuna asserts in the first verse of Chapter I of the *Mūlamādhyamika-Kārikā* that no entity can be said to be produced by a cause. Now, Candrakīrti quotes a real or a hypothetical opponent challenging the validity of this assertion. Is this assertion inspired by authentic knowledge produced by an authentic organ or not? In the former alternative, Nāgārjuna puts himself under the logical obligation to state in a definite manner that there are such organs and that their number is such and such, and they have definite characteristics conversant with definite objects. Moreover, he ought to embark upon the discussion whether the authentic cognitions are produced by themselves or by others or by both, or without any cause at all, that is, promiscuously.

If, on the other hand, the conviction of the irrationality of causation cannot be proved to be produced by any authentic cognition, the assertion will be baseless and will not carry conviction. The knowledge of a fact cannot be accepted to be authentic if it has not the support of an authentic cognitive organ (*pramāṇa*) at its back. A thing not known can be known only by a recognized organ of knowledge and not otherwise. On the assertion of the sceptic himself the knowledge of the irrationality of causation is not supported by any cognitive proof, and as such it cannot commend itself as an authentic assertion. If no proof were necessary to warrant the validity of an assertion, then any assertion would pass muster. His assertion that nothing is real can be confronted by the opposite assertion that all things are real. His conviction that things are unproduced will be countered by the opposite assertion that all things are produced. As regards the question of truth and falsity, validity and invalidity, it will not simply arise, because the criterion of the

verdict of a recognized organ is neither available nor thought to be necessary.

If the Mādhyamika affirms that he has no conviction of the truth of the assertion that things are not capable of being produced, then his confession will deprive him of any pretension to write a dissertation for the conviction of uninstructed people. Certainly a man cannot hope to prove any position to the satisfaction of others when he himself lacks conviction of the same. The upshot will be that the reality of things quā causes and effects will stand unrefuted. The failure of the sceptic to prove the falsity of phenomena amounts to the admission of their truth.

In answer to these charges, the absolutist observes that all the consequences alleged by the logician are hypothetical issues which proceed from misunderstanding of the fundamental position adopted by him. The Mādhyamika does not claim that he has any conviction either way. Accordingly the question whether the conviction is conditioned by an authentic organ of knowledge or otherwise has no basis. The fact is that conviction is a relative psychosis and has significance only as the opposite of doubt or uncertainty. The Mādhyamika philosopher is not disturbed by any doubt and so the attainment of certitude as the antidote to it is uncalled for. It is as unreal as the interrogation of the length and the breadth of an ass's horn. The consequential issues regarding the organs of knowledge, their number, their characteristics, and their genesis and objects, are thus only the cobwebs of imaginary construction, which do not require any refutation from the absolutist.

But what about the categorical assertions such as "Things are not produced by themselves or others or both or without a cause" and the like? These assertions are assuredly the deliverances of categorical certitude. The answer is that the categorical proposition is the exponent of a conviction not of the philosopher but of the general run of people. The average man of the world labours under the superstition that causality is real and he can be corrected of his bias by the exposure of the absurd implications of his beliefs. The use of logical canons by the absolutist is not inspired by his personal faith but by that of the person who has to be disabused. The philosopher who is enlightened in the inward significance of

the phenomenal world knows that these logical concepts cannot be proved to have an ultimate validity and he only asserts this fact which it is for the opponent to disprove. But it may be asked "Has not the philosopher any conviction of his own?" This question however does not deserve any answer. Who can say whether he has any conviction or not? The real answer would be the maintenance of perfect silence. So the question of conviction and of its rationality has no *raison d'être*.

But if the enlightened philosopher has no reason to offer, how can he edify the uninitiated people regarding the ultimate truth? The answer is that though the arguments employed by the philosopher have no validity from his own standpoint, they have their necessary value for the conviction of the people who believe in the logical categories. The case is exactly analogous to the false conviction of people and its correction regarding the nature of the human body. Average people are enamoured of their physical organism and believe it to be pure and lovely though its impurity and ungainliness are much too true. The *Tathāgata* (the enlightened one) seeing the pitiful plight of such ignorant people creates a phantom person and makes him deliver a sermon to enlighten them of the real nature of things and ultimately cures them of their deep-rooted nescience. The procedure of the philosophers is also akin to this. They succeed in disabusing them of their superstitious beliefs in the truth of causality and the like by means of arguments which are bound to be accepted as valid by the people concerned. It has been urged that the truth of causality is attested by experience and so cannot be brushed aside by any dialectic. But this defence has no weight. Logic knocks it out as a hollow error just like the experience of a double moon. The experience being causally determined stands in the same position with all other phenomena and its validity cannot be established. The first chapter of the *MūlaMādhyamikaKārikā* combats this superstition of the validity of the causal law and the remaining chapters are directed to confute the other unfounded beliefs. It is established that the procedure of formal logic is based upon uncritical convention and has only a pragmatic value to a limited extent. It is absolutely irrelevant and inconsequential in the determination of the nature of ultimate truth.

It may be contended in defence by the logician that the question of proof and its condition and object has the sanction of intellectual convention and exigencies of thought. It is not claimed by him that these logical concepts have ultimate metaphysical validity. Logic as a formal discipline is interested in putting these concepts on a scientific and intelligible basis. Sophists and deluded logicians have destroyed their rational basis by false definitions. The task of true logic is to formulate sound and correct definitions in order to show that the science of Logic is erected upon an unshakable rational foundation and it only tries to accomplish this task. But this defence of the reformist logicians headed by Dignāga does not carry conviction to the absolutist and the sceptic. If the definitions and theories sponsored by older logicians of the orthodox Nyāya School were contrary to the empirical truth, they would *eo ipso* be scouted as illogical vagaries, being opposed to the nature of things and normal experience. The logical reforms would in that case meet with justification. But such is not felt to be the case by us. So the whole labour of the reformer is reduced to an uncalled for waste of ingenuity. Moreover, the fundamental postulate of epistemology that there are cognizable truths, which are ascertained by recognized cognitive organs is only an uncriticized assumption. The whole question has been thrashed out in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*.¹ If things are validated by cognitive organs, what is the guarantee of the validity of the latter? The problem has been shelved by the logician and so his pretension to propound authentic definitions cannot deceive the true philosophers who are conversant with their fundamental weakness.

Furthermore, the logical reformist (such as Dignāga) admits only two cognitive organs in conformity with the supposed two-fold nature of things, *viz.*, the fact of being (i) self-characterized unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and (ii) the universal *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. The former is cognized by perception and the latter by inference. There is no necessity for the admission of other cognitive organs as has been done by the Naiyāyika, because experienced facts cannot have any character other than these two. These two characteristics are accordingly held to be the differentiae of things. But it might be asked "Do these differentiae belong to independent entities or

¹ See para 1 Ch.I

not?" If the first alternative be accepted, then there would be entities which are different from the two differentiae, *viz.* particularity and universality. The existence of other facts would necessitate another organ, because the two organs are occupied with the characteristics alone. So the postulation of twofold character will not thus be adequate to entire reality. If, on the other hand there be no independent entities as substrata, the twofold character will have no basis. The whole conception of defining character and definable entities is only a logical device inspired by intellectual inertia which precludes a deeper probe into things. If the defining character does not pertain to anything independent, the concept of the definable transpires to be an unreal homeless abstraction. And in the absence of the definable entity, the *raison d'être* of definition will disappear.

Let it be supposed that definition *quā* defining characteristic is not different from the thing defined, but identical with it. The Sanskrit word '*lakṣaṇa*' should not be construed in the instrumental case, that is to say, as an instrument by which a thing is defined, but as the accusative of the act. In other words the defining characteristic should be understood as identical with the thing defined. So the contingency of a differentia as other than the defined entity and consequently of their relation will not be disturbing issues. But this supposition will not be anything but a bluff. The concept of a differentia other than the entity defined is not an uncalled for indulgence of fancy, but enforced by the logical necessity of understanding a thing as different and distinct from others. The issue is that even if a thing be conceived to be a unique individual the conception of its uniqueness and individuality apart from the individual cannot be avoided by any device. So the question "What makes the individual unique and different from others ?" must be confronted. The concept of a self-defined entity is not a self-explanatory ultimate fact but presupposes for its proper understanding another concept of instrument which serves to make it different to our understanding. So the difficulty remains as it was.

It may be contended that the differentiating instrument is nothing but our cognition of the thing defined, and the cognition is also a unique, self-characterized individual. So the issue of an entity other

than the self-characterized unique individual does not simply arise. But this defence does not seem to be satisfactory. Now, the uncommon character of a thing which is proper to it is called the unique character of it. For instance, 'hardness' of earth, 'the apprehension of a thing' by an intuitive feeling, 'the comprehension of an object' by understanding and so on, are known as the defining characters of the relevant entity.¹ Now the logician's interpretation makes the characters identical with the entities and in order to make possible the idea of differentiation regards the cognition of the same as the differentia. and this cognition again is also regarded as a unique individual. In other words, one individual is supposed to be the differentia of another individual. But this apology does not seem to be better than a prevarication. Granted that the cognition is a unique individual. Yet as an instrument of differentiation, it must be different from its object, *viz.*, the thing defined. And the admission of a differentia other than the thing differentiated will open the floodgates of the same difficulties as alleged before.

It may be affirmed that the admission of an object of differentiation other than the differentia does not involve any difficulty. For instance, the cognition of hardness in earth is the definition and its object hardness is different from it. And as hardness is not anything different from the individual which it is supposed to qualify and define, the objections based on the numerical difference of the defining character and of the defined object will have no ground. But this supposition is not also free from difficulty. Granted that the cognition is a unique individual and yet serves to define its object; but since the cognition cannot be the object of another cognition or of itself it will not be capable of being subsumed under the class of cognizables. Such being the case the assertion of the logician that there are two classes of cognizables, *viz.*, individual and universal, has to be explicated as follows: First, there are individuals which are objects of definition and differentiation and as such capable of being classed under cognizables (*premya*). Secondly, there are other individuals which are instruments of differentiation but not cognizables, e. g. a cognition. If on the other hand the cogni-

¹ *Mv*, p. 60

tion as the differentia be explained as the object of differentiation it must have another cognition as the instrument of its differentiation. The second cognition also will be in the same position, and as such will require another cognition to make it cognizable. This must lead to an infinite regress.

It has been contended that a cognition does not require another cognition to make it known. It is known by itself, and as such does not cease to be cognizable. But the conception of self-cognition cannot be justified. If the cognition be a unique individual and not different from itself, how can it serve as its own defining characteristic? It can do so only if there be an entity, distinct and different from it, which is to be defined by it. The identity of the definable and the defining characteristic is not logically conceivable. A cognition cannot be the differentia of itself since it cannot be the object of differentiation and the act of differentiation at the same time. As regards the question of the possibility of self-cognition an analytic examination of it is given in the work *Āryaratnacūḍaparipṛcchā* as follows :-

"One who sets about to examine the mind as distinct from the cognitive acts fails to find any such thing. He finds only a stream of mental acts. Now, a cognition as a mental act can arise only if there is an object to be cognized. If the mental act be its own object, are the act and the object identical or different? If they are two and are numerically different, there must arise two mental acts in each case, one as the object and the other as the act, of which there is no evidence. The other alternative that they are identical cannot stand a logical test. Certainly a mental act cannot operate upon itself as it can do upon an alien entity. The concept of a cognition intuiting its own self is as absurd as to suppose that the sword can cut itself or the tip of finger can touch its own self".¹

So the attempt to justify the concept of definition on the basis of self-intuition is only a hypothesis of despair.

The entire issue can be logically adjudged by the following dialectic. Is the differentia different and distinct from the definable or identical with the latter? If it be different it will not be its differentia, just as other characteristics, which belong to other things, are not regarded as its differentia. The relation of difference is the same between what is supposed not to belong to it and what is supposed to serve as its defining characteristic. So the supposed characteristic being other than the definable will fail to serve as its definition.

The definable also will not be anything distinct from what is *not* defined. If, on the other hand, the defining character and the thing defined be identical, then both will forfeit their individuality. There will be no defining character, because of its merger in the thing to be defined. The supposed defining character will thus have no individuality and as such the thing to be defined will also have none, because the individuality is constituted by the attributes set forth in the definition.

The fact of the matter can be made intelligible if the logical convention of the definition as a device of explanation of the nature of things can be sized up as only a *pons asinorum*. Its utility as an aid to the understanding of a confused concept cannot be denied. But it cannot be a safe guide to the determination of the ultimate nature of things. It is good in so far as it goes and in so far as we choose to remain content with the practical value of our inherited concepts. Any criticism, which serves to expose the uncritically accepted conventions of thought, is bound to give shock to our cherished beliefs. But Nāgārjuna and his exponents dared to give a merciless probe into the conventions and postulates of empirical logic and science and his relentless dialectic has exposed the unreliability and hollowness of most of them. The concept of definition, which is based upon the analysis of an entity into a substantive and an adjective, is shown by him to founder upon the issue of their relationship. A thing can only be sundered by abstract thought ; but individuality is lost in the process and cannot be restored unless the whole analytic stratagem is admitted to be a fiction of conceptual thought. The two elements which a definition asserts refuse to be brought together in harmony. If they stand in the relation of otherness, they will fail to serve the purpose. If, again, they are identical, the whole concept of definition has to be jettisoned.

It cannot again be accepted as an explanation, if it is supposed that the relation should be set down as one which cannot be explained, that it is inexplicable and indescribable. Because, this is only a device of escapism. The concept of indescribability can be accepted as an estimation of facts, when they are not known as distinct and different. But if the defining character and the defined entity be not known to be distinct facts, both of them will evaporate as nullities. So the relation cannot be set down as an indescribable concept.

Furthermore, if cognition be the instrument of determination of a thing, there must be an agent who is to operate the instrument. The concept of instrument presupposes an agent as a matter of necessity. It cannot be supposed that cognitive consciousness (*citta*) will serve the purpose of an agent. Cognition *quā* original consciousness takes stock of a thing as such and the derivative mental phenomena (*caitasa*) are conversant with specific character of things. So consciousness *quā* cognition and that again as specific acts cannot have a homogeneous function in which the contribution of one can be regarded as subordinate to that of the other. The concept of agent (*Kartṛ*) and that of an instrument (*karaṇa*) and an object and so on are intelligible only because the principal action, which is the province of the agent, is made possible by the subordinate operations contributed by the different factors. For example when a man cuts a tree with an axe, the axe is regarded as an instrument because the quota contributed by it is subordinated to the act of the cutter. But so far as cognitive acts are concerned, it is difficult to spot out a principal operation to which an instrument can contribute its quota as a subordinate ally. So the concepts of instrument and agent are entirely irrelevant in the context of cognitive acts.

An appeal to scriptural denial of an agentive soul will not help the understanding of the issue. Certainly no Buddhist can take his stand on the possibility of a soul as an agent. But the concept of instrument is unintelligible without an agent. In the absence of the latter the former will have no *raison d'être*.

It may be urged that such fastidious tests are not applicable to the case under consideration. These usages of 'defining character' and 'definable' are only metaphorical expressions like 'the doll's body', or 'the head of Rāhu'.¹ The expressions are current coins of popular parlance. Certainly nobody is deluded into thinking that the doll has a separate body or Rāhu a separate head. Such is the case with the logical definition also. But it is only a lame apology based on a fictitious analogy. The concepts of body and head are interrelated and so the assertion of one demands that of another.

¹ Rāhu is believed to be the head of a dragon who was severed in two parts. The head is called Rāhu and the trunk Ketu. So the expression, Rāhu's head is only an uncritical assertion. The possessive case has no meaning.

Thus when any person says that there is a body or a head, the question naturally arises "Whose head is it ?" or "Whose body is it ?" But the logical definitions, such as *hardness* of *earth*, are not intended to be metaphorical expressions. The impossibility of *earth* apart from *hardness* makes these serious assertions a source of confusion. These definitions are apt to produce the impression of a separate *earth* substance as the locus of the attribute of hardness. Of course the philosophers of heterodox schools have propounded such definitions and they are consistent with their metaphysical theories. They believe that there is a substance apart from an attribute. But this is a heresy according to the Buddhist and so the uncritical imitation of the methodology of these unorthodox philosophers cannot be justified. If the views of heretical thinkers are to be endorsed, the other sources of knowledge, apart from perception and inference, would demand recognition with equal plausibility.

It has however been defended that the examples 'the doll's body' etc. are apt parallels. They illustrate the truth that though there is no real difference between the adjective and the substantive, they serve as intelligible clues to the nature of things. Definitions also are not to be subjected to fastidious logical tests, but should be accepted as necessary aids to the understanding of the meaning of things and concepts. But this defence only shows that logical definitions are only uncritical devices of popular convention (*samvṛti*) which is nothing but a case of ignorance. If logical definitions be useful for aiding the ignorant people, they must not be passed off as critical estimates of reality. It has been argued in defence that the system of definitions and classifications of the sources of knowledge and their contents are not to be regarded as philosophical ultimate truths. They are based upon popular conception and uncriticized convention, and logic only seeks to reduce them to a system, more or less on pragmatic considerations. So the subtleties of dialectic are not to be pressed home.

This confession of the logician yields an important result. The absolutists also assert that popular conceptions have no rational justification. They must be accepted at their surface value and never mistaken as true estimates of entities. These conventions—

logical, ethical, psychological and also religious—have got their utility in their own spheres until the final enlightenment is reached. The logician, by his endeavour to give a metaphysical justification of these concepts, makes havoc of the popular conventions. Thus the logical reforms and innovations introduced by the school of Dignāga are calculated to discredit the popular conceptions and thus make confusion worse confounded. The absolutist is the champion of the popular convention and order and thinks it his duty to pull up and restrain the reformist from this wild goose chase. So if popular conception is to be respected, then the distinction of the defining character and the definable entity must be endorsed. And if they are to be treated as metaphysical verities, then both the concepts have to be thrown overboard as unreal constructions of fancy. The reformer's affirmation of only two sources of knowledge based upon the twofold character of things is an unjustifiable procedure.

It has been argued that all these objections are based upon the apparent meaning of words used in a sentence. The grammatical significance based upon the analysis of the words into their elements, and the hypostasis of these meanings are not acceptable as true facts. So the grammatical meanings of words, namely, *lakṣaṇa* (defining character) and *lakṣya* (the definable entity) should not be used as instruments of dialectic. But this argument does not appeal to us. The logician uses these words in his definitions and logical characterization of things, and yet refuses to accept their accredited meanings. This is nothing but arbitrary exercise of ingenuity. So the whole plea of the logicians that only two sources of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) have to be accepted in conformity with the twofold nature of things is as uncritical as the views of the logicians whom these reformers criticize. It must be admitted that verbal testimony and other sources of knowledge have as much validity as perception and inference in the pragmatic field.

Moreover the definition of perception, propounded by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, as 'non-conceptual cognition' fails to include such cases as "The jar is *pratyakṣa* (perceived)". Here the object of perception is also called *pratyakṣa*. The word *pratyakṣa* therefore has a twofold sense according as it relates to an object as well as cognition of it. It may be argued that this is a peculiarity of the Sanskrit idiom

that the same word *pratyakṣa* is used in respect of the object as well as its cognition. The object of perceptual cognition is called *pratyakṣa* in Sanskrit. The definition propounded has reference to the cognition and not to the object. The object is also designated as *pratyakṣa* only by extension of the meaning, that is to say, in the secondary sense. This is a case of transference of epithet. But the problem is not a question of linguistic propriety alone. Let it be admitted that an object is called *pratyakṣa*, because it is the condition of it. Let it also be admitted that the object is perceived; but it is difficult to justify the assertion "The jar is perceived". The jar has no existence according to the Buddhist apart from the atoms. It is the atoms that are real entities. When these atoms are produced in an unbroken line of space they are perceived. A true perception has for its content the different atoms. The idea of one jar or one chair or one table is not conditioned and warranted by the objective real, because it is the atoms that are real and the ideas of one jar and the like are only conceptual constructions, arising from the basis of a numerically identical pragmatic utility, e.g., the drawing of water and the like. So even if we accept the plea of the Buddhist epistemology that the condition of perception is the perceived object, it cannot be explained how such things as the jar, the chair and so on can be regarded as the objects of perception, when they do not exist at the time of perception. So it is not a case of mere transference of epithet. The rhetorical figure of transferred epithet is apposite only when one fact is designated as another on account of a recognized relationship. Thus, for instance, the cause is designated by the name of the effect in such propositions as "The birth of the Buddha is *happy*" or "Butter is *longevity*", because they are related as cause and effect. But the jar, the pen and the like are mere ideas and have no existence independent of the atoms. Besides, such concepts as 'blue' and the like have also no existence apart from the atoms of the earth etc. So they also cannot be regarded as objects of perception. But the popular belief and convention do not endorse such metaphysical distinctions, and if logic be only a systematization of popular convention it cannot leave out of account such assertions as "The jar is perceived". The definition must be comprehensive enough to include all cases of approved usage regarding perceptual cognition.

Candrakīrti next raises the question of the propriety of the term *pratyakṣa* (lit. sense-perception) as the epithet of perceptual cognition. His contention is that the designation of perceptual cognition by reference to the sense as opposed to the object has no special justification. But though this discourse seems to have only a linguistic value it has an important bearing on epistemology. The term *pratyakṣa* (*prati akṣa*, *prati pratigata* and *akṣa* means sense), etymologically means a cognition that is determined by a sense. But perceptual cognition is equally determined by an object and if emphasis is to be laid upon the object element it should be designated as object-perception (*prativiṣaya*). The designation of *pratyakṣa* (sense-perception) has been justified on the ground that though the sense and the object play equally important role in the emergence of perceptual cognition, it is called sense-perception, because the sense is the uncommon factor. The designation by reference to the uncommon factor is almost customary. Such designations as 'the sound of the drum' or 'the barley shoot' are approved forms of expression, though there are other equally important factors which are the necessary conditions of sound or sprout.

We admit the plausibility of the contention. But the case of perceptual cognition is not analogous. The designation of perceptual cognition by reference to the object would fail to bring out the distinction of one perception from that of another and this is the *raison d'être* of the conventional designation of perceptual cognition by reference to the sense and not the object. Thus, for instance, a self-same substance may be the object of tactful and visual perception or mental perception (*manovijñāna*¹), according to the orthodox Buddhist epistemology. Thus the designation of perception by reference to the object, e.g. 'jar-perception', would not throw any light on the distinctive character of the cognition as to whether it is visual or tactful or mental. The designation by the sense makes this distinction clear.

The Buddhist logician of Dignāga's school has deprived himself of this appeal and justification. He bases his classification of knowledge on the nature of the object. It is affirmed by him that perceptual

¹ Vide the Chapter on *manovijnana* in *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*.

cognition is entirely non-conceptual. The distinctive character of such cognition is made explicit by the conceptual interpretation which follows upon it. Whether the perceptual cognition pertains to colour or sound is determined by the conceptual interpretation (*vikalpa*) and so for this determination no appeal to the sense-organ is necessary. Moreover, a cognition is supposed to bear structural resemblance to the object and this structural affinity determines the cognition with reference to the object. The sense-organ, though it may be a condition of it, does not and need not make it more definite than the structural similarity. It would therefore be more appropriate to characterize a cognition, perceptual or non-perceptual alike, by reference to the relevant object and not the sense-organ from the standpoint of Buddhist epistemology.

But the Buddhist logician may argue that in the matter of classification he only follows the popular convention. Perceptual cognition is called sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) and not object-perception (*pratyartha*) in the popular parlance. The use of any other word would only make it unintelligible. Quite so, people call perceptual cognition sense-perception without reference to the object. But the logician insists on the ultimate validity of his definition and classification and by this distorts the nature of things. The etymological meaning of the term *pratyakṣa* has no bearing upon the character of perceptual cognition. It is not true that perceptual cognition rests on the sense-organ as its foundation, which the etymology would indicate. Popular convention has nothing to do either with etymology or the ontological theory of the logician. The logician's definition of perceptual cognition as non-conceptual is only inspired by his metaphysical theory of simple reals. Ordinary people, uninitiated into the subtleties of Buddhist logic, do not subscribe to such niceties. The popular conception of perceptual cognition gives wide berth to such ingenious distinctions and admits both the unique particular and the common universal to be equally perceptible. The reforms of Dignāga and his school rather tend to twist both facts and psychology and our quarrel with them is over this uncalled for and unwarranted introduction of scholastic ingenuities in the scheme of epistemology.

The logicians of Dignāga's school have made logic not only un-

realistic by their scholasticism, but twisted and tortured facts by a bad metaphysic also. *Candrakīrti* ends his discourse by a peroration in which he endorses the traditional epistemology of the *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣapāda. If popular convention is to be respected by logic, it should accept without reserve all the four sources of knowledge, *viz.*, perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison as propounded by the *Nyāya* theory of knowledge, which is noted for its loyalty to popular convention.

Of the four sources of knowledge, (1) perception, as has been observed before, takes note of the particular and universal alike and there is no reason to prefer one to the other. If the Buddhist logician were to be loyal to his ontological theory, he must regard all sorts of perception as conversant with false appearances. As has been already remarked the perception of jar or colour or sound is as much illusory as that of a snake in a rope. If popular belief be the criterion, the belief in the unique individual and the validity of indeterminate cognition alone are to be set aside as cobwebs of scholastic ingenuity, neither warranted by ordinary psychology nor his own ontological theory. (2) Inference should be defined as the mediate cognition generated by the probans which is necessarily concomitant with the probandum. (3) Verbal testimony is the statement of veracious persons who have directly envisaged supersensuous truths. Inference is in the ultimate analysis bound up with the deliverance of sense-perception and so cannot be competent to envisage the eternal verities which by their nature are bound to transcend the senses. Immortality or after-life and diverse transmigration of the individual soul are such facts. Inference can at best create a presumption of their possibility but the actual events can be known by a supersensuous organ which is also super-rational. (4) Comparison is the means of the cognition of a non-perceived fact on the ground of pronounced similarity. The example of it is "The gayal is like the cow".

These are the four sources of authentic cognition which have been propounded in the *Nyāyasūtra*. They cover the entire field of knowledge that can be attained on this side of final enlightenment. They are adequate to all the theoretical and practical interests of mankind and one ought not to be hypercritical regarding their validity. The absolutist does not believe in the ultimate validity of these sources

of knowledge and their testimony, but concedes to them all the validity that is necessary for the theoretical and practical purposes. They are not competent to give direct deliverance of the ultimate truth, but are stepping stones to it. The ultimate truth can be realized by a supra-rational organ. But philosophical speculation has got a definite value. It chastens and disciplines the intellect which is the necessary precondition of and propaedeutic to the ultimate enlightenment. It is true that the entire scheme of epistemology which treats of different sources and conditions and limits of knowledge is vulnerable to logical assaults. But that does not annul their pragmatic validity. The whole conception of sources or instruments of knowledge is relative to the knowables. Knowables are proved to be so only because there are instruments of knowledge to take stock of them. And the so-called instruments of knowledge find their validity only so far as they can operate upon knowable data. Thus they are interrelated and interdependent both for their functioning and existence. Judged by the standard of absolutistic logic, they have neither validity nor relevancy. Things which are interdependent in their being cannot be considered to be self-existent. And what is not self-existent cannot be a real in the absolute sense.

The absolutist is fully conscious of the relativity of knowledge and knowable. But in spite of their lack of ultimate validity they are useful instruments in the empirical plane. The besetting sin of the logician has been his bias and tendency to invest them with metempirical validity. To extend their application beyond the field of actual and possible experience is bound to end in error. It must however be borne in mind that empirical truth is the necessary basis of the metempirical. The Buddha could edify the enquirers of truth because he started from the empirical plane. The metempirical cannot be reached *per saltum*, but only by gradual stages of advance. The wise teachers of mankind succeeded in enlightening their followers because they approached the problems from the empirical standpoint. They took them step by step up to the penultimate stage and made it possible for them to envisage the ultimate truth by their own self-realization. The central and fundamental position of the absolutist in logic is the realization of the provisional validity of the epistemological architectonic with its limitations. It has application

within its own sphere and beyond this it is not only irrelevant but also fruitful of mischief. It is the consciousness of the limited applicability of logical categories that makes the absolutist impatient with the refinements and niceties which were introduced by the school of Dignāga. He therefore gives his seal of approval to the epistemology of the Nyāya school which squares with common-sense and also meets the needs of the professional philosophers and scientists by providing a necessary scaffolding for erecting their metempirical edifices. The absolutist however emphatically maintains that the ultimate truth is to be envisaged by a supra-empirical intuition, and logic only renders a negative service by clearing away the cobwebs of fancy and superstition. Logic can at best convince the enquirer of the untruthfulness of appearance and stops short at this stage. It provides the canons for finding error and not positive truth.

CHAPTER III

SRĪHARŚA'S EXPOSITION OF THE MĀDHYAMIKĀ POSITION IN LOGIC

Śriharṣa is an advocate of Monistic Vedānta and his work, *Khaṇḍa-khaṇḍakhādya* is preeminent for its polemics against the realists. Now the logical presupposition of the Monistic philosophy is the belief in and persuasion of the ultimate invalidity of empirical knowledge. An unbeliever in the phenomenal plurality must necessarily withhold his approval of the canons of formal logic which starts with the assumption of the validity of propositions, judgments and syllogistic arguments which are pluralistic by their very nature. The logician on the other hand must believe in the validity of the sources and organs of knowledge and the instruments of proof and the existence of objective reals as susceptible of proof. The *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣapāda states in the first aphorism the sixteen topics of enquiry, *viz.* the organs or sources of knowledge, their objects, and so on which are bound to be accepted by all schools of philosophers. The belief in the validity of these logical and ontological categories is considered the indispensable prerequisite of the inauguration of discussion. They are valid for all schools of thought and any person, who wants to engage in a debate and seeks to prove a thesis and disprove that of the opponent, must affirm tacitly or expressly his belief in the logical categories enunciated in the *Nyāyasūtra*. Such being the case, the Vedāntic Monist is disentitled to hold a discussion, far less initiate one, and has no better claims than the Mādhyamika philosopher. The Vedāntist's explicit belief in a Positive Absolute and the Mādhyamika's reluctance to commit himself to a metaphysical tenet do not make any difference in the logical field. Both of them are agreed on the unreality and intrinsic falsity of discursive knowledge and so they place themselves beyond the pale of logic, theoretical and practical. The participation in a logical discussion must, therefore, on their own assertion, be an insincere make-believe and a deceptive hoax on the part of these philosophers.

But this rule is not regarded as relevant or necessarily binding by the opponent. The problem may be set forth as follows. What is the logical necessity of the admission of the reality and absolute validity of the sources of knowledge and so on? Firstly, does the necessity lie in the consideration that such admission is the necessary concomitant of the initiation of debate and so the proponent or the opponent, who does not share this belief, is not capable of initiating a logical discourse? In the second place, does this rule imply that such admission, tacit or explicit, is the necessary condition of a debate? In the third place, is it to be considered that such belief is endorsed by the universal traditional convention and custom and such convention is the exponent of an inviolable truth? In the fourth place, is the rule to be so interpreted as to imply that though the lack of such belief may not physically make the initiation of debate impossible, it will make it ineffectual and indecisive? The consequences of debate are either the ascertainment of truth or the defeat of the opponent which consists in proving the falsity of the latter's conclusion. Truth and falsity can be determined respectively by conformity and disagreement with a certain accepted standard. This standard is the instrument of knowledge and if there be no belief in such a standard or instrument, there will be left no criterion to determine the correctness or otherwise of any argument. In the absence of such a determining factor, the utterance of a sane man and that of an insane person will have the same value.

Now the first alternative does not seem to be tenable. The belief in the infallibility of the accepted sources of knowledge and criteria is not the necessary concomitant of debate. The materialists of the Cārvāka School and the Mādhyamikas, who do not entertain any such belief, are found to engage in logical disputations. They advance arguments to prove their position and refute that of their opponents. This shows that there is no necessary connection between belief and employment of logical categories. Were such belief a compelling factor, the sceptics would have been debarred from such activities and the logician would not have felt called upon to strive for their refutation. This want of belief would then have operated as a powerful magic spell, and ought to have restrained Br̥haspati, the preceptor of Gods, from propounding the doctrine of materialism,

the Buddha from promulgating the Mādhyamika tenets and Śāṅkarācārya from commenting on the *Vedāntasūtra*. Each of these philosophers is known for his undisguised avowal of the ultimate worthlessness of the canons and organs of formal logic and yet this did not make their philosophical activities impossible. So there is no necessary concomitance between belief and actual logical activities.

But the logician asserts that this is not a fair objection. The absolutist puts a construction upon the logician's stand suitably to his interest. He refuses to understand the obvious implications of the logician's thesis. It is too naive to suppose that these obvious historical facts are unknown to him. It is clear that what the logician means to assert is that the law does not operate like the laws of nature such as the law of gravitation. It is rather like an ethical law and a law of the penal code. It cannot prevent any irresponsible person from violating the rule, if he be prepared to defy the consequences. The rule under consideration is normative in character. The logical activities may be actually undertaken even by a person who has no faith in the cogency of the logical categories. But such activities will amount to reckless behaviour, and will not succeed in achieving the objectives of such endeavour. A logical discussion aims at twofold result, namely, the proof of one's position and the refutation of the opposite thesis. Belief in the validity of the logical apparatus is thus the necessary concomitant of a successful debate. The arguments of persons who are avowedly sceptical of the validity of the logical instruments are bound to be denounced as frivolous sophistry.

But this defence is denied by the absolutist to have any substance. It only confuses issues. Belief or disbelief is only a psychical fact which has no bearing upon the logical cogency of an argument. Personal conviction or the want of it has no relevance to the probative force of an argument. Whether an argument is to be successful in producing the conviction in a person of the truth of a particular thesis is determined by the consideration whether it is free from a fallacy or not. The presence of a fallacy disqualifies the argument and not the belief or disbelief of the arguer. This is the law and rule which must be accepted as the determining factor. The logician's argument that belief is the necessary concomitant of successful debate only imports an irrelevant consideration and makes confusion of the psychical with

the logical issue. That a personal belief in the efficacy of the logical categories is entirely irrelevant can be brought home by the example of the practical behaviour of the orthodox logicians of different schools, advancing opposite arguments in respect of a particular belief. For instance, the Mīmāṃsist believes that *word* is a substance and the Naiyāyika thinks that it is a quality. The Mīmāṃsist's argument is : "Word is a substance, because it is directly perceived like a jar". The Naiyāyika combats it by the opposite argument: "Word is a quality, because it comes exclusively within the province of a particular external sense-organ of hearing, entirely different from others, just as colour is the province of the organ of sight."

The purport of the first argument is that the sense-organ comes into direct relation with a substance and indirectly with a quality inherent in it. Word is perceived directly and not through the mediation of any other substance. And so it should be regarded as a substance. The purport of the second argument is that direct or indirect relationship is not the determinant of a sense-datum's being a substance or otherwise. Certainly word is perceived independently of its substratum, namely, ether (*ākāśa*), because the sense of hearing is incompetent to take cognizance of ether which is unperceivable by its nature. A quality is perceived as inherent in a substance only when the substance in question is competent to perception. It is further argued by the Naiyāyika that word should be adjudged to be a quality because it falls within the range of a particular external organ. A substance is not the province of a particular sense-organ, but of both, namely, sight and touch.

We have made a digression. But this has been necessitated by the logician's insistence on a psychological fact, namely, belief as the determining condition of the validity of an argument. We have shown, by this conflict of views between the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsist, that both these arguments cannot be true. The appeal to belief in the logical convention is absolutely indecisive in the present case, as both are equally vocal in their profession of loyalty to the rules of formal logic. The validity or the invalidity of the argument must, therefore, be determined by some other criterion. And this criterion is nothing but the presence or absence of a fallacy, belief being the common property of both. This is a crucial instance

which demonstrates that validity and invalidity are logical issues and can be determined by means of logical canons. Belief or otherwise has nothing to do with it.

If the logician can find a logical fallacy in the argument of the sceptic, that will convict him of his failure. If, on the contrary, he cannot detect any logical flaw, the validity of the argument cannot be impugned. The logician's arraignment that the sceptic has no faith in the validity of the logical weapons will not detract in the least from the cogency of the argument. Mere accusation without the support of a logical ground amounts only to abuse and false recrimination. If recrimination were a logical procedure, the sceptic might also convict the logician on the ground of his belief. If disbelief be a disqualification, there is no ground why belief should not be so, since they are equally irrelevant. Thus the introduction of a psychical question in the matter of a logical debate is only calculated to side-track the logical issue and is tantamount to evasion of an uncomfortable situation by a questionable device.

It has however been urged by the logician that the matter is not a mere psychical issue as the sceptic seeks to make out. The former's contention is that the very initiation of debate itself is the proof of the reality of the logical categories. The debate is a fact and that it is so is not open to doubt. But what makes it known? Certainly it is some cognitive instrument. That anything exists can be ascertained only by the knowledge of it and such knowledge can be achieved by a cognitive instrument alone. As regards the plea of the sceptic that the validity or invalidity of an argument is determined by the absence or presence of a logical defect, that is not disputed by the logician. On the contrary, it is the logician himself who has propounded the scheme of fallacies and maintains that they vitiate an argument. But a fallacy is a deviation from the norm and norm is fixed by the verdict of the recognized instruments of knowledge. So belief in the latter's validity is an inescapable issue.

The absolutist admits the plausibility of this plea. But what he contends is that the validity in question is a matter of relative value. That the logical categories are held to be valid by the logician and his adherents is acknowledged by him. It is also acknowledged that they hold good within a circle of conventions and so long as

one is to move within this circle one has to respect them. The absolutist however is convinced that these categories have no validity beyond the sphere of relative judgement and his acceptance of the logical conventions does not commit him to the logician's implicit faith in their absolute validity. The charges of the logician proceed from his idea that the absolutist denies the possibility of these epistemic categories. He neither accepts nor denies their existence and validity within their proper sphere. His contention is that belief or desbelief in their validity is more or less a question of psychological attitude which has no bearing on the logical issues. What is necessary for the adjudication of a logical issue is whether the convention established by the logical tradition is respected or infringed by a debater. If the other party concerned does not attend to the logical issue but elects to question the motives of the proponent or the opponent, that will be an unwarranted digression into the sphere of psychology or metaphysics. It will be as irrelevant as the interrogation of one's religious belief for the validation of a purely logical argument. Our discussion proceeds irrespective of the consideration of the metaphysical faith of the participants, and as regards the acceptance of the logical convention, that does not require any argument to establish it. The very fact that an absolutist or a metaphysical sceptic initiates an argument shows that his metaphysical conviction has nothing to do with actual discussion. If the absolutist proceeded with the initial declaration of his want of faith in the logical categories, the charges of the logician could hold good. But the absolutist maintains a non-committal attitude in logic and when the logician finds fault with his argument on the score of belief, he admits that such belief is not the determinant of argumentation so far as the absolutist is concerned.

The matter can be clearly elucidated by the examination of the possible conditions of a formal debate. We shall then be in a position to determine what sort of debate the objections of the logician can relate to. (1) It is possible that a debate may be instituted by parties which equally adhere to the validity of the logical canons. (2) It may be held between parties, neither of which believes in the validity of the logical categories. (3) It may be held between parties, one of which believes in the validity of the logical categories and the

other does not. The first alternative cannot be the target of the attacks of the logician, because both the parties profess their faith in the rules of formal logic. The second alternative also is not liable to such charges because both the parties are in the same position, and the accuser in that case lays himself open to the same objection. The third description also does not seem to be in a better position. The debate cannot be regarded as perfectly orthodox because the belief of both the parties is the condition of it. If any relaxation is made in this regard, then there will be no unerring criterion for the adjudication of the result. The result must be indecisive if the parties are allowed to entertain different beliefs. For instance, the *Naiyāyika* believes that a perfect syllogism must consist of five propositions, whereas the Buddhist accepts three or two members as the essential constituents of it. The Buddhist may charge the *Naiyāyika* with the commission of superfluity and the *Naiyāyika* on the other hand may seek to convict him of making incomplete statement. In such a dispute, it is extremely difficult to adjudge the victory or defeat of either party. The accuser has to prove that the charge he puts forward is supported by accredited criteria, and if he succeeds his charge will be accepted and the result will depend on it. But so far as the belief in the logical organ is concerned the absolutist or the sceptic gives a wide berth to it. He does not regard it as an essential criterion of correct debate and propounds only convention or a special covenant to be the starting point. The believer in the validity of the logical canons has also to abide by this convention and at the same time place himself under the obligation to prove that belief also is an essential factor. But, as we have seen, mere belief does not contribute to the strength of an argument, or lack of it does not make an argument less effective. The advocate of the belief in the logical canons as the prerequisite of debate thus labours under double obligation. He has to substantiate that this is the necessary validating condition and also that the specific argument he employs is sound and correct. He imposes upon himself an unnecessary and superfluous liability.

It must be admitted that discussion is initiated under a tacit or express covenant that the recognized organs and canons are to be followed as the criteria apart from the question of belief or disbelief,

which must be kept in the background as a subjective factor. The logician misunderstands the entire issue and alleges that the absolutist is guilty of inconsistency or insincerity. The boot is on the other leg. It is the logician himself who is guilty of inconsistency. He asserts that no discussion is possible without an implied belief in the infallibility of the logical instruments and yet finds fault with the argument which the absolutist has advanced without any such commitment. He takes exception to the argument which is an actual fact and yet asserts that the argument is not possible. He fails to understand that his denial of the possibility of argumentation is inconsistent with his allegation of self-contradiction on the part of the absolutist in the act of advancing an argument. When he is not sure of the significance of his own behaviour, it is not strange that he will fail to realize the meaning of the absolutist's assertion. The absolutist asserts that the admission, much less assertion, of the validity of the recognized organs and canons is not a necessary concomitant of discussion. This is interpreted by the logician as the denial of the validity and possibility of the said organs. As a matter of fact, the absolutist neither affirms nor denies it. He regards the question as entirely inspired by idle curiosity, which has no logical value or relevancy.

But the logician may amend his charge. He may assert that he does not make this charge in the actual performance of debate. That would amount to self-contradiction. Nor again does the logician mean that want of belief actually precludes discussion by a compelling causal efficiency. The absolutist and the sceptic may advance arguments in refutation of the accepted beliefs as there is nothing to gag him. But his argumentation will have no logical value as the arguer does not possess the credentials which qualify a person for engagement in a debate. He does not possess the right and franchise and so his arguments will only be frivolous and irresponsible utterances, unworthy of notice. The criticism of the sceptic's conduct is made in a text-book and not in actual debate. This criticism is necessary for the instruction of pupils. So the sceptic cannot recriminate on the logician with self-contradiction or inconsistency.

But this self-defence, in spite of its apparent plausibility, does not suffice to absolve the logician from the charge of self-contradic-

tion. The criticism of the absolutist purports to edify the pupil that such activity on the part of the sceptic involves these flaws. Let it be so. But how can the sceptic expose himself to this charge? Well, there will be no occasion for the accusation when the sceptic keeps silent and refrains from entry into a debating forum. The occasion arises only when he engages in a discussion. But then the charges will recoil upon the logician himself as has been set forth above. It is therefore established that belief or want of belief is not the necessary concomitant of discussion, but agreement to abide by a convention which has the sanction of tradition and custom. Acceptance of the tradition is the requisite qualification and this does not involve or presuppose faith—a fact which may only have a subjective interest.

Let us now consider the second alternative¹ which avers that admission of the validity of the cognitive organs and logical canons is the necessary precondition of debate. The relation is affirmed to be one of cause and effect. The belief is said to be the cause of the debate. But the causal relation could be ascertained if the absence of belief entailed as a matter of universal necessity the absence of debate. But such is not found to be the case. Were it true, those who do not admit the infallibility and universal validity could not advance any argument at all, since there can be no effect without the previous occurrence of the cause. But no such causal relation can be posited between belief and argumentation. The Mādhyamika and other sceptics, who openly declare that the so-called organs of knowledge and canons of proof have only a provisional value and that they have no intrinsic validity, prove their contention by means of arguments. Their lack of belief does not make the use of conventional instruments of logic impossible or ineffectual. So this criticism must be dismissed as absolutely valueless.

But if the organs are not the necessary condition of inference and the like, what will then be the condition of it? If the organs and canons be the necessary condition, the admission of their efficacy and validity will be consequential. The debate as an event must have a cause, since it cannot be accepted that an event can occur

without a cause preceding it. But this objection is only an outcome of the belief that initiation of debate is conditioned by an unquestioning acceptance of the validity of the cognitive instruments. The very issue is denied by the sceptic and he can be convinced by an argument. The argument can be advanced only when a debate takes place. If the sceptic is to be proved to be mistaken in the course of a debate and it be supposed that debate is conditioned by a previous belief, the debate in question cannot be asserted to have been preceded by the belief. Let us suppose that the sceptic is persuaded to believe that such is the case. This belief will be the outcome of discussion and as such cannot be the cause of the latter. It cannot be supposed that the unbeliever can be convinced by any other means than discussion in a debate. So the initial discussion must be held to have been commenced without any such belief, and this implies that belief is not the necessary condition of debates.

What is then the condition of a debate if belief be regarded as an outcome of it and not an antecedent event? The answer is not difficult to guess. We have already hinted at it, in the third alternative.¹ It is the acceptance of the convention that has been current among all arguers. The parties in a debate must accept certain rules of procedure in order to be able to achieve their objectives. The objectives of a debate can be twofold, *viz.* successful establishment of one's intended position or proof of the invalidity of the opponent's thesis. We admit that debate is not a frivolous pastime. It is a serious pursuit with a definite purpose. The condition precedent of such a course of activity is nothing but a mutual covenant that such rules are to be respected by both the parties and the infringement of any such rule will result in the disqualification of the party concerned.

Now these rules of logical convention are known too well. They may be formulated as follows: (1) The first party must employ only those organs and canons which have received the sanction of common tradition. This also applies to the other party when he will seek to prove his thesis in opposition to his opponent. The second party will be naturally interested in exposing the flaws in

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 60.

the argument advanced by the first. He can convict him of any fallacy or any other disqualifying defect. These defects may be first a logical fallacy and secondly such events as the silence of the opponent, which indicates his inability, or any procedural drawback such as the surrender of the original position, shifting the ground or amendment of his previous thesis. These may be extra-logical drawbacks, but they have a remote bearing on the logical issue inasmuch as these manoeuvres and tactics are indicative of the person's incapacity to meet the challenge of the opponent. It is possible that the arguer's reasons may be sound, but he must be able to justify them when the other party challenges their validity. The failure to do this has been accepted by the logical tradition of India as the ground of defeat. They may not have the same logical value and there may be justification if somebody demurs to accept any one of them. But whatever be the logical merit of these defects, they have been accepted to be the occasions for censure and defeat by a large majority. Whatever be the difference among logicians, they must agree on the rules and canons of correct logical conduct before they can engage in a formal debate. This agreement is the condition precedent of debate irrespective of the faith of the parties concerned.

It has been urged that the acceptance of the logical convention, which is regarded as the self-sufficient condition of debate by the absolutist, has also to be justified by a reason, which would impart validity to it. If there be no ulterior basis of validity, the convention will have no effective application and binding force. And if the validating reason is to be demonstrated after the initiation of the debate, the same consequence of logical seesaw will raise its head. The convention will be proved to be valid in the course of the debate and the debate will be made possible by the convention. The defence of the absolutist thus involves a vicious circle. In reply to this charge the absolutist avers that the two cases are fundamentally different. He maintains that the employment of the logical apparatus does not involve as its consequence or presuppose as its condition the belief in the infallibility of the logical categories and the epistemological theories, because the absolutist or the sceptic freely endorses the legitimacy of the use of these categories as a matter of convention, though they are not persuaded of their metaphysical validity. So

participation in a debate is not conditioned by belief in the logical tenets. If the unbeliever is to be convinced, that can be achieved by means of argument and the conviction will be the consequence and not the condition of it. When the logician makes this conviction the previous condition, he certainly lands himself in a vicious circle by making it (the conviction) the condition and result at the same time and in the same context and reference. But the absolutist's contention steers clear of this contingency. In his opinion the condition of debate is convention and acceptance of this convention is free and unfettered by any metaphysical commitment by which the logician binds himself by his insistence on the belief in the metaphysical validity of the logical categories. What is necessary is that both the parties, irrespective of their metaphysical creeds and epistemological convictions, must agree on the use of certain logical categories as the weapons of debate. Their proper employment will ensure success and misapplication will involve failure and defeat. There is no metaphysical or epistemological string attached to this acceptance of convention, because it is free and spontaneous on the part of both.

But the logician has denounced this explanation on the ground that convention, arbitrarily agreed upon, has no compelling authority. If there be no proof and validating ground as the ultimate basis, the convention will be a playful pastime indulged in for the sake of intellectual amusement. It will reduce logical debate to a sportive recreation, however dignified it may appear. Both the proof and disproof of a position by arguments for and against it will have no cogency and seriousness. The alignment of the parties on the basis of their advocacy of a thesis or a counter-thesis will have no determining criterion and the unreality and frivolous pursuit of the debate will entail no consequence. The success or failure, the credit of triumph and the discredit of defeat, will be equally meaningless and hence indeterminable, as neither party seriously believes in the outcome of the debate. There will be no determination of truth or refutation of a false view. So convention, accepted by an arbitrary fiat of will and undetermined by a compelling logical consideration, cannot be the determining condition of a philosophical discussion which is motivated by love of truth.

In answer to this charge of frivolity the absolutist asserts that it is occasioned by the logician's hasty refusal to understand the inward significance of convention. The former, whatever be his sins of commission or omission, does not mean convention to consist in personal caprice or arbitrary pact between two frivolous parties. The seriousness of logical discussion and philosophical speculation is not less emphasized by him than the logician. The convention is not personal or optional but sanctioned by unbroken tradition of the forms and rules of debate, accepted by the exponents of formal logic and the philosophers of other schools alike. The universal adherence to these rules and canons of logical procedure makes this tradition inviolable, and infringement of any one of them makes the party concerned liable to censure. These rules are followed without question and so the contingency of an arbitrary pact being set up as the convention cannot arise. These are accepted by debaters with the same unquestioning allegiance as the axioms and postulates of Euclid are by the students of geometry. There is absolutely no difference between the logician and the absolutist on the point of allegiance. The dispute sets in on the question of interpretation. The logician seeks to make metaphysical capital out of this universal allegiance when he makes it the proof of the ultimate truth and validity of the logical postulates. The absolutist demurs to set his seal of approval on this metaphysical interpretation. The postulates are the presupposition of empirical knowledge and nothing more or better than this. They have no metempirical value or reality.

The position of the absolutist is simple enough and meets the requirements of theoretical and practical logic. The tradition of logic is to be accepted as the legitimate condition of useful and effective discussion despite the consideration that it may or may not have any ultimate validity or truth. The Vedāntist unhesitatingly declares the traditional convention to be the figment of the empirical understanding and as such to be devoid of ultimate truth. The lack of metaphysical validity does not detract from its empirical utility and the belief of the logician in its ultimate truth does not add to the strength of an argument. The logician also admits the inevitability of the acceptance of the logical tradition as the condition of debate and when he couples it up with the belief in the metaphy-

sical truth of it he only adds to his burden without enhancing the logical value. Acceptance of the tradition is the common ground between the logician and the philosopher and that alone is to be regarded as the condition of debate, because without it no discussion is found to be possible irrespective of its dubious bearing on the metaphysical problem.

It has been found that the hypotheses that belief in the metaphysical implication of logical concepts and canons is either a necessary concomitant or a causal condition of logical discussion, are uncritical assumptions. Let us now consider the third alternative that belief in the metaphysical validity of the postulates of logic is proved by the universal and traditional convention and such convention is an exponent of the truth. Convention is accepted by the absolutist also, but he does not believe it to be the exponent of metaphysical truth. What is the character of convention? It is nothing but the usual and customary belief and behaviour of people. So convention boils down to popular belief and practice. Is this belief to be regarded as the proof of ultimate reality? To make it explicit, the problem may be posed as follows. Does popular belief stand for the authenticated belief of the philosophers, tested and confirmed by incontrovertible evidence or the common belief universally endorsed without reference to the canons of truth? The first alternative cannot be asserted, because the authenticity of belief cannot be ascertained without recourse to discussion and to make the former the condition of the latter will involve a vicious circle: (1) Discussion is the means of testing the authenticity of belief; (2) authenticated belief is the means of establishing truth; and (3) the acceptance of such established truth is the means and condition of discussion; thus discussion is made the condition of authenticated belief and the result of it. This proves that neither convention nor the acceptance of it is necessarily the exponent of truth. If, on the other hand, convention stands for commonplace popular belief, uncriticized and untested, that does not prove in the least the truth of the belief. For instance, the belief in the identity of the body and the soul is universal, but that does not make it the exponent of a metaphysical truth. Śaṅkarācārya has demonstrated the truth that even professional philosophers are not immune from this superstition and any injury to the body or the apprehension of it affects the philosopher.

and the unlettered man alike. Nevertheless, the universal currency of this superstitious belief does not erect it into a metaphysical truth. It may be argued that the belief, irrespective of the numerical strength of its adherents, is to be dismissed as wrong only if it is found to be invalidated by a discussion which consists in the examination of the grounds for and against it. Yes, this is also endorsed by the absolutist. He rejects conventional organs of knowledge and logical canons on the very ground that they are invalidated by a dispassionate examination of their nature and function. It must therefore be concluded that belief and the validation of it, if at all, are rather the outcome of discussion and cannot be regarded as the condition precedent.

The fourth proof¹ of the inevitability of the belief in the ultimate validity of the logical canons is supposed to be furnished by the consideration that the lack of such belief will make an argument indecisive and ineffectual. But this contention has no substance. It has been made abundantly clear that discussion is conditioned by the acceptance of the logical convention, and belief in the ultimate truth of this convention is utterly irrelevant to the logical cogency and strength of the argument. What gives the sanction and authority to an argument is the observance of the logical code endorsed by tradition. This logical code is as much respected by the absolutist as by the logician. And if, in spite of this fidelity to the logical convention, the argument of the absolutist fails to produce conviction, the logician would also be subject to the same disability. It has been observed time and again that the failure to adhere to this convention, in spite of the profession of belief in the ultimate validity of the logical canons and epistemic organs, does not rescue the logician from the ignominy of defeat and discomfiture. So by the process of elimination, the conclusion becomes irresistible that belief or no belief, adherence to the logical code and scrupulous observance of it are the only essential condition of a successful argument and this is also endorsed by the absolutist with studious fidelity. The contention of the logician that lack of faith in the ultimate metaphysical validity of the logical postulates and the epistemic instruments will disqualify the absolutist and foredoom his arguments is only the outcome of wishful thinking and subjective prepossession.

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 60

But the logician is not prepared to let it go on such easy terms. Granting the convention as the self-sufficient condition of successful discussion, he insists that the sceptic cannot escape the predicament in which he is pitchforked by the logician. The reality of convention has to be admitted at any event. If convention be a causal condition of debate, the latter must be believed to be real as a real effect. The cause and effect must be real, because an unreal cause and an unreal effect are only self-contradictory concepts. The cause is the antecedent real and the effect is that which has been brought into being, though not existent before. So the reality of convention must be conceded by the absolutist when he makes it the causal condition of debate. Not only this. If we analyse the content of convention or the covenant we find that it has a necessary reference to the epistemic organs. The covenant is nothing but the mutual agreement that the discussion should be carried on in conformity with certain epistemic organs and logical canons. This being so, the reality of convention will involve that of the epistemic and logical categories which constitute its content. It follows that the sceptic cannot evade the question of the reality and validity of logical categories even when he makes the covenant the condition of debate, simply because the covenant itself presupposes the validity of these concepts.

The sceptic in defence would raise the same issue. Are these charges advanced in the course of the debate or before? The latter alternative is out of the question because there would be no occasion for them. If however the charges are put forward after the initiation of the discussion, the possibility of the latter would not be conditioned by such belief. On the contrary the accusation of the logician will be condemned as an argument in vicious circle. The admission of the validity of the logical categories is supposed to make discussion possible and the latter gives the occasion for the levelling of these charges and the charges will bring home the necessity of the admission of the validity of the logical categories. Thus the initial condition of discussion turns out to be an outcome of it. The absurdity of the same thing being the causal condition and the result of the same act is writ large on the animadversion of the logician. It may be argued that the sceptic only resorts to a questionable device. The sceptic no doubt denies the necessity of belief in the validity

of the logical categories as the condition of discussion and asserts that the initiation of debate or participation in it is only conditioned by his free will embodied in the covenant. But this defence does not convince the logician. The latter insists that the covenant, whether accepted by conviction or free assent, presupposes the acceptance of the objective validity and reality of the logical instruments. In answer, the sceptic asserts that the logician's contention is accepted by him. The sceptic also endorses the acceptance of these logical instruments as the condition of debate. But his acceptance does not commit him to the ontological doctrine of the reality of these concepts. He endorses the concepts and he does not deny that he has the cognition of them. But his acceptance stops at this cognitive level and does not extend to the ontological reality of the content. Whether the logical categories are ontologically real or not is indifferent to him. He does not concede that his acceptance of these categories commits him to a belief in their necessary reality. The logician can succeed at the best in proving the necessity of only the acceptance of these categories and that is also regarded by the sceptic as the condition of debate. This should be a clincher of the issue.

But does not acceptance involve awareness and does not the reality of awareness necessarily involve the reality of the object of it? In the present context acceptance *qua* awareness has necessary reference to the reality of the convention which is equivalent to the reality of the epistemic and logical principles which are its content. Once you admit that awareness of the reality of the epistemic principles is the condition, your admission amounts to the endorsement and affirmation of these principles. The sceptic does not agree that it is a logically justified deduction. Mere admission or awareness of a thing does not justify the inference of its ontological reality. There is awareness of a lake of water in mirage but that does not argue that the lake is a real entity. The logician may contend that though awareness as such may not be proof of the reality of the content, uncontradicted awareness must be endorsed to constitute the proof of it. The sceptic does not deny the plausibility of the contention. But he wants elucidation of the concept of uncontradicted cognition and the context in which it holds good.

In the first place, the absence of contradiction may refer only to the cognition of three persons, *viz.*, the proponent, the opponent and the umpire and that again during the time of the debate or even afterwards. But the non-emergence of contradiction regarding such cognition does not warrant the inference of the reality of the content for all time. The number of three does not offer any guarantee of the authenticity of the cognition. All of them may hold a certain belief which may be found to be contradicted subsequently by the experience of each or some of them. For instance, it is common knowledge that even three fellow travellers mistake a rope or garland lying ahead in the twilight for a snake and by the help of a torchlight discover their error. The Sautrāntika, the Vaibhāṣika and the Yogācāra schools of Buddhist philosophy are unanimous on the momentary existence of reals. But the other schools believe this theory to be wrong in spite of the unanimity of the three schools. So the lack of contradiction of a belief or experience for a certain length of time or in respect of one or more persons does not give any warrant of the reality of the content of such belief. Truth is no respecter of persons or even of majority. The verdict of a thousand blind men is set aside by the testimony of a single individual of unimpaired sight. If a subsequent experience is found to contradict a previous experience or belief, though entertained by a large number of people, the latter is held to be wrong and its testimony regarding the reality of the content is bound to be rejected as spurious and unreliable. It must therefore be maintained that non-contradiction must be absolute in order to confer absolute validity on a cognition. Absolute non-contradiction means that the experience or belief must hold good for all time and all persons.

Now the question naturally arises whether absolute non-contradiction is capable of being asserted without dogmatism. Assuredly no sober person, who is a lover of truth, can lay claim to such uncontradicted and uncontradictable belief. Only omniscience can offer such a guarantee. As regards popular belief—political, social or religious—its validity is only provisional and pragmatic, based on the testimony of a number of persons who by their intellectual superiority or social position shape the opinion of the general public. Average people are guided by their immediate practical interests

and have neither the time, nor inclination or curiosity to pursue an enquiry into the foundation of their beliefs. Even professional philosophers are not found to rise superior to this weakness. And as regards the logical convention, it is accepted without resort to metaphysical scruples. Even the metaphysical sceptic or the absolutist who is persuaded that the logical convention, in spite of the sanction of time-honoured tradition, has no ultimate validity, has to submit to it out of pragmatic considerations. So the acceptance of the convention by the absolutist or metaphysical sceptic does not commit them to the acceptance of the metaphysical truth of the convention or the principles presupposed by it. This also applies to the convention followed in science or logic or philosophy. Nāgārjuna, the paragon of metaphysical sceptics and Śaṅkarācārya, the protagonist of absolute monism, have unequivocally declared that their loyalty to the logical and epistemological schemes is necessarily provisional in character, necessitated by the limitations of the human intellect and the exigencies of the social environment. They make use of the logical instruments and the accepted categories, and, by exposure of their innermost self-contradiction, show their inefficiency to solve the metaphysical puzzles, which inevitably visit the thinking mind.

To sum up. The logical code embodied in the convention is the sole and sufficient condition of debate. The success or failure, victory or defeat, is determined by the judgement of the umpire whose impartiality and scrupulous fidelity to the accepted code of logical behaviour are like Caesar's wife above suspicion. If the umpire gives his considered verdict that the rules of debate have been loyally observed by a party and the argument employed by him to support his conclusion is free from a logical or extra-logical flaw, the palm of victory is adjudged to be won by him. If, on the other hand, the umpire finds that any party, proponent or opponent, has infringed a rule, he is adjudged to have failed in his objective. And again if the adjudicator is convinced by any party that the other participant has committed breach of a rule of logical conduct, implying his personal delinquency and incompetence, and this charge is not handsomely met by the party concerned, the latter must be declared to be vanquished in the debate, irrespective of the considera-

tion that the other party has cared to establish his position or not. The fact that the logical code has been followed or not is to be decided by the ruling of the umpire, and the ruling is the exponent of his judgement of the propriety or otherwise of the debaters concerned.

It may be urged that if the judgement of the umpire is to be the final arbiter of the issue, the factuality of the judgement must be admitted and this will prove that monism is not tenable. The reality of the judgement and conviction must be an objective fact over and above the absolute Brahman admitted to be the sole reality by the Vedāntist. But this objection is inspired by a fundamental misconception of the Realist. It is admitted by all, realist or idealist, that the existence of a thing is proved by the awareness of the same. But whereas the realist is interested in the postulation of an objective fact over and against the awareness, the Vedāntist and the Buddhist Idealist find reason to believe that awareness and the fact, which is its content, are identical. But leaving this metaphysical issue apart, the problem may be tackled from the epistemic standpoint. Let it be conceded that awareness furnishes the proof of its content as an objective real. That being the case the objectivity of the conviction of the umpire can be established if there be a proof of it, which ultimately can be found in awareness alone. The second awareness will be the proof of the first awareness. The Naiyāyika does not admit that awareness is self-certified and self-validated and thus if a question of its existence be raised, that can be answered by positing another awareness. The Vedāntist accepts the Naiyāyika's plea that the question of existence, be it awareness or a brute fact, is decided by awareness of the same. In the present discussion the existence of the umpire's judgement, if at all questioned, can be proved by another awareness only.

But does not the appeal to a second awareness lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*? No, it does not as a matter of fact. Even in a serious question regarding a pursuit, which involves the risk of considerable loss or gain, the examination is carried on up to a definite limit. For instance, the testing of a jewel is concluded by the verdict of three or four persons who carefully examine it for a specified length of time and by the application of a specified number of tests. The question of genuineness or otherwise is finally settled by their verdict.

This is also the case with a theoretical problem. If there be a felt need for the attestation of an experience or belief, the examination is carried on up to three or four steps and the doubt is set at rest. In the case under consideration, the judgement of the umpire acts as the final clincher. If there be a doubt about its reality or its content or both, that also is settled by the pursuit of enquiry up to three or four steps. At the most the reality of awareness, if doubted, is ascertained by three or four successive cognitions and the pursuit of the enquiry is not carried any further. Whether the cessation of enquiry is occasioned by an honest assurance or natural inertia of the human intellect or the urgency of other practical or theoretical interests is a matter of indifference to the debating logicians or the umpire. It is a matter of experience that no enquiry is pursued to an infinite length, which is neither feasible nor necessary for the human purposes. The contingency of infinite regress due to the necessity of proof by awareness therefore need not be seriously thought of, as no such consequence has ever arisen. Kumārila rightly remarks that for the resolution of a doubt of authenticity of a belief three or four cognitions are deemed to be enough. The last cognition is taken to be self-validated. The Naiyāyika of course does not believe in self-evident validity, but he also agrees that the doubt is finally resolved by a subsequent awareness which is not assailed by any further doubt.

But this pragmatic solution may not satisfy an honest enquirer of truth or a confirmed sceptic. It may be argued, granted that the umpire's judgement is the decisive factor. But there must not be any room for doubt that there is such a judgement and that it is a fact. This assurance can be secured only by further proof and every such proof will have to be proved by a further evidence, if the factuality of the unattested proof be not taken for granted as admissible evidence. Once you admit that the existence of a cognition is capable of proof by another cognition and if unproved cognition be ruled out as proof of the reality of its content, the possibility of the infinite regress cannot be ruled out of court by any logical procedure. If, however, out of practical consideration, it be supposed that the pursuit of the series of proofs is cut short at some stage, the last cognition will remain unproved and the lack

of proof of its existence will vitiate the entire previous series from the first to the last member. Thus the judgement of the umpire, unproved as a fact, will not suffice as the condition of debate. The result will be a veritable *cul de sac*.

The absolutist does not allow himself to be perturbed by such theoretical issues. He does not taboo this speculation as intrinsically invalid or illegitimate. He will not scruple to accept the justice of such contention. But he maintains that logic, theoretical or practical, is not influenced by such metaphysical considerations. So far as the Mādhyamika is concerned he does not let himself be deterred by such issues. What the contention might prove is that all logical discussion, in spite of its observance of the accepted logical code, will have no metaphysical validity or reality. The issue will be welcomed by him, but he does not think that these considerations will make the initiation of debate, far less participation in it, impossible or futile. Discussion, even strictly logical, has only a pragmatic utility and this is not impaired by metaphysical unreality. The whole world is a false show and appearance and even our serious pursuit of science and philosophical speculation is not immune from this fundamental weakness. The Vedāntist also does not accord metaphysical validity to debate or philosophical speculation, nor does he consider it to be necessary for the purpose of logic.

The logician will not submit to this easy show of superiority of metaphysical nonchalance. The logician of the Nyāya school does not subscribe to this demarcation of the logical and metaphysical hemispheres. Logical validity is not believed to be independent of metaphysical validity by the logician. Be that as it may, the logician also, despite his conviction of the identity of logical and metaphysical interests and issues, must admit that the pursuance of enquiry into the proof of the series of cognitions cannot and need not be carried on without end, which is practically impossible and logically not necessary. He must also stop at a subsequent stage, and as regards the theoretical questioning of its reality or validity, he may assert that it is not necessary or possible. He may have no honest doubt regarding this problem. In other words, he may deny that it is a real problem at all. But the honest sceptic may have his doubt which is not theoretically capable of being barred out. He

will however keep this doubt in abeyance or to himself. As a practical logician, he will stop short and start with some belief, which, though not metaphysically valid, may be made a satisfactory starting point in logical discussion. The convention of logic is founded on such a belief, which is left undisturbed by a metaphysical scruple. This is the only satisfactory explanation of the problem. Otherwise even the logician's implicit faith in the metaphysical validity of the logical categories and epistemic principles will not rescue him from the charge of the infinite regress. The pursuit of the chain of cognitions as proofs of the validity of the previous ones will lead to the same *regressus ad infinitum*. The acceptance of a datum without further enquiry is thus indispensable for the metaphysical logician also.

It has been found that the sceptic has tried to make out that there is no difference between him and the logician so far as the fundamental condition of debate is concerned. The sceptic holds that the logical convention, which consists of a series of propositions and beliefs, is based on an unverified postulate which also is accepted by the logician, subject to the proviso that it is susceptible of verification, if an occasion arises. The ultimate belief, which is the basis of all logical discussion, is an uncriticized assumption but accepted without question because there arises no doubt about its authenticity. The absolutist and the sceptic do not believe in the metaphysical validity of this basic belief, but accepts it as a working postulate. But this show of the community of interests has not proved acceptable to the logician. He maintains that there is a fundamental difference between the two standpoints. The logician takes exception to the attitude of condescension and air of patronage with which the fundamental basis is treated by the sceptic. His acceptance of this foundational proposition is half-hearted or, what is worse, disguised by pretence. It is true that the enquiry into the reality of the basal judgement of the umpire is not carried on without end. But the reason is different from what the sceptic thinks to be the case. The pursuit of enquiry is not banned for practical reasons, but because there is no felt doubt about its validity or reality. It is not necessary that every cognition has to be verified. The judgement of the umpire is accepted as valid because there is no reason

to doubt its reality or *bona fides*. The acceptance does not require a further act of cognition to certify its existence as a fact. Our final cognition of the preceding cognition remains unrecognized. Its mere existence is sufficient for the revelation of its content and it is not necessary that the latter cognition should also be cognized for the purpose. It is the position of Nyāya epistemology that a cognition reveals its content by its mere existence as a brute fact. There is no reason for questioning its existence and if the need for an enquiry arises the existence of the revealing cognition will be certified by another cognition. But as the revealing cognition does not stand in need of being cognized as a matter of epistemological necessity, the contingency of infinite regress does not arise. Nor is it held by the logician that a cognition is automatically known when it emerges. But as regards the absolutist who does not believe in the possibility of the revelation of content by an unrevealed cognition, the possibility and logical necessity of the infinite regress cannot be avoided by him. Nāgārjuna, for instance, does not believe in the possibility of self-revelation of cognitions and so he cannot avoid encountering the risk of infinite regress.

But the belief in the unknown cognition is due to an uncritical assumption occasioned by intellectual inertia. How can a thinker be sure of the existence of a fact, when he has no knowledge of it? To affirm the existence of an unknown cognition is a contradiction in terms. The necessity of the infinite regress cannot be ruled out by such a facile stratagem. An existent unknown is as good as and no better than a non-existent. The problem will be discussed in a later section and at present we leave the logician undisturbed. We take him at his word and agree for the sake of argument that an unknown cognition reveals the object of it by its sheer presence. It is contended that what is necessary for the revelation of a fact is the bodily presence of the cognition behind it. The object is also bodily present. It is a self-existent stubborn fact as much as the cognition of it. But though both are equally self-existent, it is the self-existent cognition that is held to make known the object and the object is incapable of yielding this knowledge of it. You can account for this difference in behaviour and function by appeal to the specific nature of things. The fact of existence is common to

both—the object and its awareness. In spite of this common attribute it is the existence of awareness, and not of the object, that makes assertion possible. If this be so, it does not lie with the logician to find fault with the absolutist if he asserts that both awareness and the object are equally unreal and yet it is the former and not the latter that makes possible our assertions and arguments. It will not be a fair objection that an unreal cannot have causal efficiency, when reality is not also the guarantor of it. Awareness and its object are believed to be equally existent and real; but it is the former alone that makes assertions possible and the latter is incompetent for it. Thus causal efficiency is not the necessary concomitant of existence. The absolutist further contends that it is not incompatible with non-existence either. A non-existent may exercise causal efficiency, though all non-existents may not. A particular non-existent may have a particular causal efficiency, just as existents are believed to have their distinctive and specific powers and functions. There ought to be then no difference between an existent and a non-existent in this respect, since existence is found to be as much irrelevant as non-existence.

NON-EXISTENT AND CAUSAL EFFICIENCY

It is urged by the realist that the assertion that a non-existent can operate as a cause is guilty of self-contradiction. But this objection is the outcome of a false preconception. It is assumed that the cause is the invariable antecedent entity. The definition should be amended as 'the cause is the invariable antecedent' which may be an *entity* or a *non-entity*. It is not an undisputed conclusion that the cause must be entitative. If there is a contradiction in the assertion of a nonentity as the cause, we do not see why there should not be one in the opposite assertion of an entitative cause. But the contradiction has been stated explicitly by Udayana. If a nonentity could operate as a cause, the effect would not occur at a determinate moment. Non-entity being present at all times, the effect could come into being at any time or always, since the cause is there all the while. But this is just the reverse of the truth. This objection also is an offshoot of the superstition of a bygone age. We do not find any

reason to subscribe to the dictum that the cause must be a positive existent, when as a matter of fact the cause is invariably defunct at the moment of the emergence of the effect. The cause is not synchronous with the effect and this follows from the definition of cause itself. The conception of the positive cause arises from the mistaken notion that any single fact can be a cause. But the cause is always a definite combination of a number of factors called conditions. The totality of conditions is the cause and to regard any one condition as cause will be a grievous error. The postulation of the cause is necessitated by the consideration that it accounts for the emergence of the effect at a determinate time and neither before nor after. But does the existence of the cause really account for this phenomenon? We do not see how it can do so.

We have observed that the cause as defined cannot be synchronous with the effect, and the reason is plain. The cause is necessarily followed by the effect and if the cause were to persist at the time of the effect, it would again be followed by the effect. But we never perceive more than one effect of one cause. This shows that the cause must be defunct when the effect comes into being. It follows that the effect is independent of the cause at the time of its first emergence. In other words, the effect is synchronous with the non-existence of the cause. The existence of the cause therefore cannot influence the existence of the effect. Now the question may be raised 'why should not the effect come into being at any other time when the cause does not exist?' The cause was non-existent before and becomes non-existent after having existence. The effect comes into being at the time the cause becomes non-existent. Why should not then the effect come into being during all these moments of the non-existence of the cause?

It may be answered that the cause may continue after and synchronise with the effect. But what determines the emergence of the effect is its existence at the immediate antecedent moment and not before or after. But still there is a difficulty. Why should the antecedent cause determine the subsequent effect when there is no existent relation between them? It may be again answered that the law of causation is an empirical law and should be determined by the verdict of experience and not by *a priori* reasoning. Let it be so. You have

to admit that the question of existence has very little bearing on the problem of causation. That being so, there is no difficulty in the theory of the advocate of nonentity as the cause. To the question of Udayana 'Why should not the effect occur before when the nonentity is available at all times?' the answer returned by the absolutist is that the nonentity as such is not the cause, but that qualified by the immediately preceding moment. This is just on a par with the entitative cause and the verdict of experience justifies the hypothesis. We should remind Udayana and his exponents that the law of causation is an empirical law and pure logic should not dictate terms to it.

But the logician claims to discover a logical determinant of the law of causation. The fact of being immediate subsequent successor determines the emergence of the effect at the second moment. Let us understand the meaning of this determinant. The attribute of being the immediate successor is thought to be the determining characteristic of the effect. But this is nothing different from the fact of its occurrence in the immediately subsequent moment and this cannot be the explanation of the question why it should occur in that moment and not before or after. The same thing cannot be its explanatory reason. It is no better than what is called the woman's reason as it amounts to the assertion that the effect occurs in the second moment because it is the effect or because it occurs so. The moment of the effect's emergence and the immediate subsequent moment to the cause are numerically the same thing and how can one identical fact be its own determinant and determinatum? It may be contended that the two attributes have different connotation and so one can determine the other. But the substantive, sic. the moment, cannot be made different by this difference of adjectives and so this cannot be regarded as a satisfactory explanation of determination. Besides, the two attributes, even if numerically different, cannot determine each other simply because they are synchronous like the two horns on the cow's head. Further, the adjectives, that is, the attributes *viz.* (1) the fact of being the moment of its (effect's) emergence and (2) the fact of being the succeeding moment to the cause, have the same denotation and thus are no better than synonyms. Again, the fact of being the immediate antecedent and the fact of being the immediate subsequent are equally contingent facts and each

of them requires an explanation why they occur at their own time and not before or after. So neither can be the explanation of the other. Let us further analyse the connotation of the moments, antecedent and subsequent, which distinguish the cause from the effect. The immediate antecedent moment is characterized by the presence of the cause and the absence of the effect and the subsequent moment by the presence of the effect. If the cause be not momentary, as the Buddhist holds, it may persist till the effect's emergence and in that case, what will distinguish the first moment from the second is the absence of the effect. But it is difficult to understand how the previous absence of the effect can determine the occurrence of the effect in the second moment, since this previous absence has been the characteristic of all the previous time. So nothing present can be found which may be understood as the determinant of the effect. It is then the previous occurrence of the cause which alone may be supposed to afford a clue to the problem. But as has been observed before, the relation of determination is not intelligible between an absent and a present event. The cause is not present when the effect comes into being and *vice versa*. It is thus the present non-existence of the cause or the previous non-existence of the effect that is supposed to influence the effect's occurrence and this also is not any more intelligible.

It must therefore be concluded that the search for an *a priori* determinant is a hopeless undertaking. The problem is purely empirical. What is a cause and what is an effect can be determined only in conformity with the evidence of experience and convention. The antecedent event is called the cause and the subsequent the effect and that is all. To search for an explanation of the effect in the cause is doomed to futility. It is not understandable how the cause exercises an influence on the effect. The fact that one follows the other is a mere empirical phenomenon. That being so, to insist that the antecedent and the consequent facts must be metaphysical reals is nothing but a superstition bequeathed by an ancient tradition, which has no logical sanction behind it. The cause and the effect are both phenomena, pure appearances, which have no claim to reality.

But there is a felt difference between the moment of the effect and the moment of the cause. What is it due to? Well, this need

not cause a difficulty. The origination of the effect demarcates it from that of the cause. To ask for a further determinant is an idle question. The determinant of the time may be intrinsic or extrinsic. The first is out of the question as all time-divisions are intrinsically the same. If an extrinsic determinant be posited, that will demand an explanation as to how it comes to be attached to it. It is better and simpler to suppose that the time-element has no intrinsic importance in the determination of the causal relation. It is the convention that the time of the cause, that is the moment in which it exists, is called the cause's time and the time of the effect is the effect's time. The differentiation of the time factors is not due to any intrinsic character, but purely accidental. According to the absolutist the so-called law of causation is nothing more than a human convention, necessitated perhaps by the constitution of the human mind, and in spite of the help and convenience it may give us in the progress of thought and intellectual development and understanding of the relation of phenomena, its validity cannot be stretched beyond the frontiers of empirical thought. In one word, it is not a metempirical law.

Is EXISTENCE INTRINSICAL TO THE CAUSE?

It is asserted by the realist that the causal relation obtains between two existents. Hence when the seed is asserted to be the cause of the sprout, it is implied that it is the existent seed that causes the existing sprout. But is existence a part and parcel of the sprout and if so is it proper and peculiar to each cause and effect? For instance, is the existence of the seed different and distinct from that of the sprout? We encounter great difficulty if we suppose that each entity has a distinctive existence of its own. If existence were to vary with the individuality of entities, it would be as individualistic and separative as the individuality and in that case we should have left no justification for conceiving and designating all these different characters by a common idea and name. To put it the other way about, existence will not be a universal character of more than one entity. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school asserts that existence is a universal and common to all facts. The different individuals, whether

substance or quality or action, are made existent by this universal alone, coming into relation with them.

Let us suppose that the cause is made existent by having the universal existence as its adjective. If that be so, the cause *per se* must be a nonentity and it is not intelligible how a nonentity can come into relation with existence. If, on the other hand, the universal existence is supposed to keep aloof as an external determination, the cause will not be existent as existence is not a part of its essence. Whether existence be an internal or external adjective the cause is *per se* non-existent.

Let us suppose an alternative possibility. The cause as an individual has an existence of its own and so the logical difficulty involved in a nonentity coming into relation with existence will not arise. It is thus an existent fact that comes into relation with the universal existence. But this seems too facile a solution. The first thing that will strike one is why should an existent thing be under the necessity of importing existence from outside. But this question will engage us later. Even supposing that relation with universal existence is necessary to make a cause existent, we cannot understand how this relation can take place. Is this cause existent before its relation? If so, is it made existent by having existence as an internal adjective? Suppose that the answer is in the affirmative to both these questions. But still another question will confront us. Is the existence which is supposed to make it real the same or different from the existence integral to it? If it be the same, it cannot be said to come into relation with it. The same term cannot stand to itself in a relation. Let us agree that a related whole is different from its constituent factors and thus the existent cause will be different from the adjective (existence), the substantive (the cause), and the relation. Existence can relate to such a related whole. But this also does not seem intelligible. The substantive *quâ* cause has existence as an element of its individuality and if existence is to qualify it as an adjective and make it existent, it cannot be the selfsame existence. A qualified whole cannot be supposed to have the same adjective over again to make it function in a different capacity. It is the position of the realist that the cause as a substantive has got existence as its qualifying adjective and this qualification makes it competent

to come into relation with existence and thus become an existent. But if it be the selfsame existence that is supposed to make it a substantive *quâ* cause and existent again, this double relation does not seem to be intelligible. It passes one's understanding how can one and the same existence give the character of cause to the seed and make it existent again. If the existence in question is exhausted in creating one characteristic *viz.* its causal competency, it cannot be happily supposed to confer the character of existence upon it in addition. The difficulty is further accentuated by the theory that a thing is made existent by coming into relation with the universal existence. Existence is supposed to make the seed a fact and a cause and thereafter to make it an existent cause. This seems too much.

Let us suppose that another existence is necessary to make it behave as an existent, since one existence is found to be incompetent to discharge both the functions. But the second existence is exactly like the first and will not be required by an entity so far as its status as cause is concerned. Let it be supposed to function as a cause irrespective of the consideration that it is existent or non-existent. If another existence be required to make it existent that will make the postulation of an endless series of existences necessary. Why so? A jar or pen is not believed by the Naiyāyika to be self-existent for the reason we shall consider later. It is made existent by the existence-universal. But the question may be pertinently raised 'If a fact is made existent by existence, what makes the latter existent?' If nothing can be self-existent in its right, existence too will be subject to this limitation and will require another existence to make it existent. But the second existence for the same reasons will require third and the process will have no end. It will not do if we concede the possibility of infinite existences, since the problem of common synthetic reference will remain an enigma in this hypothesis. Plurality of existences must have a common existence—universal in order to justify reference to them by a common concept and name. But that will again open the flood-gate of infinite regress, as the synthesizing universal being another existence can be lumped with the other existences by means of another universal existence and the latter will require another to make the synthesis of it with the rest

of the universals justifiable. The process will have no end. If there be no synthesizing universal to bring them under one class-concept, they cannot be thought of by a concept and name (existence).

The difficulty may be avoided by the supposition that the individual existences do not require a synthesizing universal. The common concept and name in their case do not presuppose a common class-character. The individuals, by virtue of resemblance, give rise to this common concept. But the solution seems to be more drastic than the problem. If different individual existences can lend themselves to be put under a class concept without an objective class character, the same possibility will have to be admitted in the case of other individuals. All common names, for instance, jar, table, tree, man, horse and so on can be supposed to be classed together under a common concept without a corresponding objective universal. The definite resemblance between the members of a class will do duty for a universal. In other words, the universal will only be an idea, a subjective concept, which is advocated by the Buddhist idealist and other conceptualists. What will then be the upshot? The very concept of existence will be an unfounded fancy and not an objective fact. Thus, your postulation of a number of existences will only be an idle hypothesis and sheer waste of intellectual energy when your hypothesis makes even one objective existence impossible.

It may be urged in defence that every individual has an objective status and an individuality distinctive and different from those of other individuals. This individuality constitutes its distinctive reality and existence and the absence of a common universal existence as inherent in an infinite number of individuals does not spell any disaster. The individual has its individualistic existence none the less. Let it be so. But this defence will cut away all the ground from under the acceptance of universal as such. If this consequence is accepted, the advocate of the *existent* cause will be compelled to confess that existence has nothing to do with causality. But the concept of causality has a necessary reference to a class and not individuals. When by the criterion of the joint method the causal relation between fire and smoke is established, the implication is that the relation holds good not only between the individuals under observation, but all such fires and smokes, present, past and future.

And this is possible of understanding because smoke is understood as a representative type and not a mere individual. In other words, smoke is understood as possessed of smokehood as a universal, which is equally present in all other smokes as its determining character. The knowledge of the causal relation thus presupposes the knowledge of a universal. And the denial of a common universal will fail to meet the requirements.

As regards individualistic existence, it cannot be anything more than its individuality. Take the case of a jar. We find it to possess a certain shape, size and colour etc. It is these properties which give it its individuality and we do not observe anything beyond. You admit that the jar's individuality is its existence. The individuality *quâ* existence is not anything different from the individual. It transpires then that the cause must have an individuality. In other words, it must be an individual and the question of existence is utterly irrelevant. That being the situation, the realistic logician ought to have no quarrel with the absolutist. The admission of existence superadded to the individuality has been found to be riddled with insurmountable logical difficulties and what is more has not been found to be necessary to add to or constitute the causal efficiency. It must remain an external adjunct. It is redundant to call the individuality existence, when the latter is not and cannot be anything different from the former and from the individual, of which they are supposed to be component factors.

Let us sum up the results of our examination of the nature and relation of existence in so far as it bears on the problem of causation. An individual only can be a cause and an individual is one that has a definite individuality. Nothing more is necessary to make it function as a cause. The question of additional existence is only a survival of deep-seated superstition. The realist believes that such phenomena as the jar, table, pen and the like have causal efficiency and the absolutist also accepts this proposition. Nāgārjuna, for instance, has no difference in this respect from the realists. The difference arises only with regard to the metaphysical problem. Whereas the realist avers that these phenomena have intrinsic metaphysical reality, the school of Nāgārjuna shows that this is only an uncriical belief and has no rational basis. The examination of

existence and its relation to the phenomenal entities has brought out the irrational character of this assumption. When Nāgārjuna or the Vedāntist denies metaphysical reality to these phenomena, they do not deny that each and every one of them has an individuality. When the cause or the effect is asserted to be intrinsically unreal, it does not follow that they have no distinctive individuality. It is for this reason that the cause is cognized as different from the effect. Leaving apart the metaphysical question, it is proved that an entity functions as a cause irrespective of the question of existence forming an internal or external determinant of it. This being the case, there is no repugnance in the assertion of the absolutist that things, though non-existent *per se*, can exercise causal efficiency, since existence or non-existence is entirely irrelevant to the causal function.

But the realist may complain that an adverse construction has been put upon his view in order to place it on a basis of equality with that of the absolutist. In spite of the subtleties introduced by the absolutist it remains a stubborn fact that the cause is always regarded by all unsophisticated persons as an existent fact and its causality is inseparable from existence. Causality lies in the invariable antecedent existence. To this defence the absolutist may also agree and thus signify his want of difference. But if the agreement be sincere, does it not imply that the absolutist has surrendered his position? He has been labouring hard all the while to prove that even a non-existent can function as a cause, and now he agrees that the cause is an existent fact. This is either self-contradiction or change of opinion, which implies his conviction of the falsity of his favourite position. The absolutist rejoins that this joy of triumph is due to a sad misunderstanding of his implication. The position is not so simple as the realist imagines. The *prima facie* existence which the concept of individuality implies is endorsed by him also. This is obvious from his assertion that existence is non-existent. If he did not endorse the concept of existence he could not make it the subject of the proposition. But is not the proposition an instance of blatant self-contradiction? Assuredly not. If the proposition 'Existence is existent' does not involve contradiction, the other proposition 'Existence is non-existent' should not also be condemned. It is the position of the Naiyāyika realist that a thing is made existent

by virtue of its relation to existence. But there is no other existence to inhere in 'existence'. In that case it will not be existent. If however existence *quâ* individuality be supposed to make it existent, that will not be denied by the absolutist, as he also believes in the individuality of things that appear, though he does not believe in an additional existence.

But the realist may retort that this is not a fair attitude. He believes in the individuality and also in its existence. The individuality has existence and this existence is its property. The absolutist does not accept this position and so how can he succeed in proving that his position is the same with that of the realist? This seems to be a plausible objection.

Let us analyse the realist's contention from the standpoint of the absolutist. It is asserted that individuality has existence as its property and that makes cause an existent. A nonentity lacks this existence and hence cannot be a cause. But does the existence become integrated with the individuality or remain outside as an external appendix? On the latter alternative the cause will remain as it was and cannot be made existent. An unintegrated existence is of no consequence to a fact. Let us suppose that existence and individuality are merged into one. But does that make the cause existent any more? Individuality cannot make the individual existent, as nothing can be existent by and in itself. It must incorporate the existence universal, which alone confers existence upon a thing. But is this existence self-existent? This is against the theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Besides, if existence can claim to be self-existent, it cannot be made out why things should be denied this capacity. If according to this dictum existence requires another existence, the latter will stand in need of another in order to be made existent. An existence, not-existent in itself, cannot make anything existent. But each existence thus requisitioned will be incompetent unless buttressed by another existence. This means a vicious infinite series, since each such existence will require another and there will be none which is self-existent. So the insistence on the existential character of the cause amounts to a claim which cannot be satisfied at any time. The only course left open is that things as they are should be believed to exercise their causal efficiency and their self-

existence which constitutes their individuality should be deemed sufficient for the purpose. The absolutist takes things as they are at their face value and though there is no reason to believe in their intrinsic reality their pragmatic efficiency is beyond cavil. It does not seem an outrage on our cherished beliefs if the question of existence or reality (which two are identical) is left out of account in the determination of causal relation. They have an apparent sort of reality which is consistent with metaphysical unreality. Phenomena, cause or effect, are unreal in their essence and only masquerade as reals. The assumption of reality by incorporation of real existence has not been found to be logically justifiable and these considerations have compelled the absolutist to take the phenomenal order as pure unsubstantial appearance.

IS THE DETERMINATION OF CAUSALITY POSSIBLE BETWEEN NON-EXISTENTS?

It is urged by the realist that there are consequential difficulties which prove the falsity of the theory of the non-existent cause. If the cause be non-existent, how can it be determined that A is the cause of B and not of C? If A, B and C are non-existent fictions, the application of the method of agreement or difference or the joint method is out of the question and so the causal relation will not be capable of determination. But this objection is not regarded as insurmountable. It should be borne in mind that though things that appear have no intrinsic reality, their distinctive individuality and character are felt to be factual. Even the dream appearances and illusory objects have their numerical and functional difference, though they cannot be real. Of course, the realists of Indian schools have tried to prove their reality, but that is only done by arguments which are dictated by desperate straits and fail to convince an unsophisticated enquirer or satisfy the scruples of even an average man. The realist however does not agree to draw a line of demarcation between appearance and reality and so refuses to take this explanation of the absolutist as anything but perverse. These arguments are therefore not pressed into request in the present context. The absolutist accordingly takes up another line and challenges him to explain the problem from his point of view of the reality of things. The postu-

lation of one existence does not make causal relation any more intelligible. The same existence is supposed to make the seed of barley and the seed of wheat real existents. There is no difference in respect of their existence. But the causal efficiencies are different. The barley seed produces a different kind of plant from the wheat, though their existence is identical. If existence be held to have no influence on the effects, it should be left out of account. Likewise non-existence is to be left out of consideration in the determination of the causal relation. Things have their individuality which alone counts for the causal operation and existence versus non-existence is only an extraneous issue. It matters little whether things have real existence or not, so far as the logical problem of causality is concerned. This is a problem of metaphysics and there is no necessity to introduce this into the commonsense estimate of things, which alone is the province of logic.

But the logician demurs to accept this explanation also as satisfactory. He contends that what is non-existent cannot even appear as existent. There can be no concomitance between non-existents in agreement. At most we can have concomitance in difference in the form that there is no effect because there is no cause, or to be precise, the non-existence of the cause is followed by the non-existence of the effect. But this is also not invariably the case. It is not always true that when the cause is non-existent the effect is also non-existent. To take an instance, the sprout comes into being when the seed is not. So the concomitance in difference also fails. And as regards the concomitance in agreement, that is out of the question, since it can hold between existents alone. So the doctrine of the Mādhyamika absolutist makes the determination of causal relation impossible of realization and this vital drawback knocks out the plea of equality claimed by him with the logician.

In reply to this charge the absolutist asserts again that there is perfect equality and the difference is only the creature of slipshod thinking. So far as the absolutist is concerned he does not deny the empirical existence of phenomena that act as cause or effect. And though they have not the metaphysical reality, that does not detract from their causal efficiency, since the latter (causal efficiency) does not only not presuppose but is incompatible with metaphysical reality.

The difference between empirical reality and metaphysical reality is entailed, as an unavoidable consequence, by logical thinking and cannot be brushed aside on sentimental grounds. But we may satisfy the realist even without having recourse to this obvious truth of the grades of reality out of deference to his scruples. The concept of existent has been thoroughly examined and found to be an inexplicable surd. Nothing can be supposed to be made existent by relation to existence either as an external or internal determination. This has been made abundantly clear in the foregoing sections and we need not repeat those arguments here. So there is no difference between the two schools of thought except in the psychological attitude, which is determined by emotional bias. Logically there can be difference in character and content of the existent from the non-existent. Besides, the denial of agreemental concomitance presupposes its existence according to the dictum of the realist that only an existent is susceptible of negation. And as regards agreemental concomitance as a real criterion of causality, it too cannot be proved to be existential since existence cannot form a determinant part of it externally or internally on account of the dialectical difficulties set forth by us.

Kumārila has posed a practical question which throws honest doubt on the justice of the gradation of existence as propounded by the absolutist. The position of the absolutist is that a cause has no real existence and only appears to exist. It is either conceptual or illusory like the snake in the coiled rope. If that be so, and if even stubborn objective facts are no better than mere ideas, why should there be such vital difference in the consequences? One can take imaginary food and this should give him as much nourishment and vitality as real food does. It would have solved the majority of economic and political problems if ideas could produce the same results as facts. The well-known adage "If wishes were horses, beggars could ride them" reminds the visionary that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the two worlds of ideas and facts. The objection of Kumārila is of a piece with that of Dr. Johnson against the good Bishop Berkeley who propounded his famous doctrine in the formula '*Esse est percipi*'.

It is assumed by the realist that the empirical reality of cause and

effect is denied by the absolutist. It has been remarked more than once that the factuality of experience and its contents is as much accepted by him as by the realist and it is upon the metaphysical implication of these contents that the absolutist joins issue with him. So this charge does not require refutation. Furthermore the exaggerated confidence in causal efficiency as proof of genuine reality is not warranted by experience. Even dream experiences and illusions have very definite effects on the nervous system and mental life, which persist through a length of time. Even illusory food and its consumption are found to have effects on the health of a person. So these arguments based on the supposed unshakable foundation of causal efficiency do not deserve to be treated as possessed of any philosophical worth. They may only strike the work-a-day man as effective refutation of idealism or absolutism, but they are no better than journalistic stunts.

One may complain that the dialectics of the absolutist have sought to prove that the cause is an unreal appearance and now the same end in proving that the effect also is no more real than the cause. The accepted connotation of the effect is the attribute of coming into existence of a fact which was not in existence before. The denial of existence amounts to the denial of effect itself. This does not seem to be a satisfying conclusion. The absolutist understands that his conclusion of the unreality of cause and effect is calculated to give a profound shock to the common-place beliefs and convictions of the average man. But philosophers must be prepared to accept conclusions, if they are enforced by irrefutable logic, despite their unpopularity and apparent grotesque outlook. The conclusion is enforced by the consideration that the realist cannot establish the reality of the cause or the effect. His conception of existence and its relation to facts of experience fails to explain their genuine existence and the opposite conclusion is entailed by a *reductio ad absurdum*. The absolutist accepts appearance at its face value and its pragmatic validity is not disputed by him. What he insists upon as a matter of procedural convenience and logical necessity is that the issue of existence or non-existence should not be raised in the determination of causal relation or logical validity. The problem of existence is the concern of metaphysics and must be kept apart from logical

discourse. As regards the determination of the causal relation it admits of easy solution if we pitch upon the immediate antecedent as the cause and the consequent as the effect, which is the common ground between both.

But an honest enquirer may voice his difficulty. The elaborate argumentation and the ingenious dialectic of the absolutist may have succeeded in scoring the point that existence of the cause cannot be proved. But that does not amount to the proof of his philosophical position that the cause is intrinsically non-existent. The realist asserted that if things were unreal the causal relation could not be established. The absolutist in reply made the counter-assertion that if things were real the causal relation also could not be determined, as both existence and non-existence would make a lump of them all and no room for discrimination would be left open. Even granting that the counter-charge of the absolutist is successful against the realist, it will only amount to a deadlock. The absolutist has employed what is called a *tu quoque*¹ argument, which does not prove a thesis, though it may checkmate the counter-thesis. We cannot accept the absolutist's contention until he explains how the causal relation can be understood between non-existents.

The absolutist maintains that the problem of causality is essentially empirical and should be solved by empirical evidence alone. The metaphysical differences of philosophers should not be imported to complicate a plain issue. It is to be admitted by all that whatever is understood to be the invariable unconditional antecedent entity is regarded as the cause. The question whether the antecedent event is ontologically real or unreal is entirely irrelevant. If one has the conviction that A invariably and unconditionally precedes B, he concludes that A is the cause of B. What serves as the criterion and ruling factor of the causal relation is thus the reasonable conviction of A being the invariable antecedent of B. This conviction is empirical and not *a priori*, and both the realist and the absolutist are agreed on this datum. Although from the metaphysical standpoint existence or non-existence may not admit of differences in kind or degree, the empirical events have these differences which

¹For the nature and form of *tu quoque* argument the reader is referred to Dr. Bagchi's *Inductive Reasoning*, pp. 163-166

are felt by all on this side of realization of the ultimate truth. The problem of causation relates to the empirical order, the factuality of which is equally accepted and believed by all, philosophers and laymen alike. So there is no especial difficulty for the absolutist and all these disputations owe their genesis to the confusion of metaphysical and empirical issues. Of course the realist regards this demarcation of empirical from metaphysical existence as gratuitous and uncalled for and so the charge of confusion cannot be fairly brought home to him. But whether the realist is in the right and the absolutist is in the wrong or *vice versa*, that is a question of metaphysics. What the absolutist contends is that these questions have no bearing upon a logical disputation or the problem of causality. The universally accepted data of experience and commonplace beliefs do determine these theoretical and practical activities and the metaphysical creeds of philosophers can have no possible truck with the practical life, which also includes scientific and speculative activities. The metaphysical truth is the terminus and not the starting point of speculative reasoning.

It has been contended that mere awareness of concomitance cannot be made the criterion of the truth of causality, as it is not infrequently found to be wrong. But this does not make the determination of causality impossible. As has been observed before, the conviction must be reasonable. A reasonable conviction is attained by the assurance that it is not invalidated by a subsequent *experience* within a reasonable limit. If the belief is found to hold good after subjection to scrutiny by three or four experiments and no contradiction is met with, it is to be accepted as true. This criterion is accepted by the absolutist also and the realist does not claim stronger evidence than that. But there is a fundamental difference in the attitude of the philosophers of the opposite school. The absolutist does not believe in the finality even of these tested beliefs. He leaves the question open and so his acceptance is provisional, if not entirely hypothetical. This is an attitude of healthy caution and should not be denounced as unwarranted agnosticism. The differences of philosophies are a pointer to this possibility. Certainly the antagonistic conclusions of different schools of philosophy cannot be all true. If the ultimate truth could be ascertained by all there would be left

only one philosophy—a consummation which remains unrealized up till now.

To return to the issue. It does not lie with the realist to question the *bona fides* of the absolutist, though he does not conceal his conviction of the unreality of the causal law. The belief in the absolute reality of all the phenomena does not give any advantage to the realist either. The realists also are found to group themselves in rival camps and the conclusion of one school does not find favour with others, though they are equally vocal in their profession of belief in the reality of things. The truth or falsity of a belief is therefore to be adjudged on the balance of evidence and when the absolutist, in spite of his metaphysical conviction to the contrary, accepts this test, the realist has no justification to doubt his acceptance as *mala fide*. The test of a cause is thus the reasonable belief that it is the invariable antecedent to an event.

A difficulty is encountered regarding a fact which is not seen to be followed by the expected effect. For instance, the seed in the granary or in a mountain crevice does not produce the sprout and if the test of cause be its antecedence to the effect, it will not be possible to regard it as the cause. But the difficulty alleged is either no problem or, if at all, a commonplace. The answer must be that the antecedence to a possible and prospective effect also is to be considered the criterion of causality. In point of precision the antecedence is realized after the emergence of the effect and there must be a gap between the two events, sometimes close and sometimes wide. The first event is not known as the first when it is observed by itself and without reference to the subsequent event. Everywhere the cause is past and the effect future and the relation of antecedence is understood later. The factual causal relation is understood when the effect actually occurs and in extreme cases like the seed in the granary it is a case of anticipation, which is more or less a case of hypothetical inference. As has been observed time and again, the existential status of the causal relation is determined by empirical belief, which does not and cannot stand in need of logical sanction. The Buddhist and also the Vedāntist do not repudiate their factuality as appearance. This is called conventional existence and the convention is metaphysically unreal and logically irrational.

But the realist has entered a protest against this conception of conventional or empirical reality which is only a euphemism for unreality. The cause is conceded to have conventional reality, but this is neither here nor there. It is neither fish, nor flesh nor good red herring as the saying goes. If convention (*samvṛti*) be unreal the cause will be unreal and as such cannot be the content of a real judgement. And the reality of convention is not conceded, as this involves contradiction. This has been the gravamen of the complaint of Kumārila against the Buddhist absolutist and it also applies to the Vedāntist who too subscribes to this classification of reality.¹ The objection reflects the fundamental standpoint of the realist. It is of course the contention of the absolutist that cause and effect are pure concepts which are hypostatized by the realistic bias of the human understanding. They are not metaphysical reals, because of the logical antinomies involved in the concepts. It now deserves to be examined if pure concepts can possibly be the determining factors of judgements.

It is the contention of the absolutist that the cause need not be the antecedent entity from the ontological standpoint. If we have the notion that there is an antecedent entity that will suffice. The fundamental proposition that all our assertions and activities are the direct outcome of our judgements is to be accepted by the realist and the absolutist alike. The difference arises over the question whether the contents of the judgements are objectively real or not. But what is the criterion of their objectivity? It is non-contradiction and nothing else. But though we cannot be sure that the judgement will not be contradicted in the course of infinite time, the non-emergence of an invalidating judgement within a reasonable time and after due scrutiny should assure us of the truth of the judgement. To return to the issue of the judgement of causality, if we find reason to believe that the notion of the antecedent entity is not contradicted by a subsequent experience or thought, we should accept it as a real cause. If by the pursuance of the chain of investigation it is found

¹ Sarīrvṛter na tu satyatvam satyabhedaḥ kuto nvayam
Satyatvam cet samvṛtih keyam mṛṣṭā cet satyatā katham.
Satyatvam na ca sāmānyam mṛṣṭhaparamārtha-yoh,
Virodhān na hi vṛkṣatvam sāmānyam vṛkṣasimhayoh.

to be contradicted, the cause will not be real. The judgement will then have an unreal content and our assertions will then be false. But a false judgement is a judgement none the less and has the same pragmatic consequences as a true judgement. Our judgement 'It is a snake,' when there is no snake but a piece of rope, is certainly not true. But that does not mean that there is no judgement at all. If our judgement of a causal situation be wrong, the cause will not be a real one. But that will not argue the impossibility of such judgements.

To revert to the original controversy that the belief in the reality of the logical and epistemological categories and their contents is the condition of debate, the absolutist again asserts with emphasis that this is an irrelevant issue. The convention is there and if the debate be diverted to the examination of the metaphysical truth of the convention or the *bona fides* of the debaters, the result will only be an interminable dispute. The question of metaphysical reality of the concepts is to be raised in metaphysics, and logic must steer clear of this issue. The contention of the absolutist that even a metaphysical unreality can be the content of a judgement should not shock the logical conscience of the realist, when he admits the justice and possibility of judgement regarding future events. The assertion of the causal efficiency of an entity regarding its effect, when it is not in actual operation, should also lend countenance to this position.

It has been contended that two cases are not at all analogous. The seed in the granary is regarded as the cause of the sprout though it has not materialized at the time. But given the necessary combination of the accessory conditions, the effect never fails to come into existence. There is a pronounced difference, both in kind and degree, between a possible and impossible fact. The judgement of the seed being the cause only stresses this possibility by way of anticipation and it will be nothing short of an outrage on our logical conscience if the possible be equated with a non-existent fiction. The possible is realized as actual in future and it is actual in the making whereas a fiction is a nonentity for ever. This difference in nature and function cannot be overridden by any amount of abstract speculation. The future event, though not existent at the time of the judgement of causality, has got a distinctive individuality of its

own, which is capable of being further specified and determined by an adjective. But a nonentity has no individuality and self-identity and to think of an adjectival determination of this nebulous and amorphous fiction is preposterous. A judgement is possible with regard to a future event because it has these ontological characteristics. And as regards the content of an illusory judgement, say a snake in the rope, it is a real entity though, in the context of illusion, it may not be bodily present there. The illusory snake or silver has got a distinctive individuality and is susceptible of further determination by adjectives. There is no instance of a fiction being the content of even an erroneous judgement. The content is never a downright fiction. It is always a meaning in the language of Bradley.

All these arguments have no effect upon the absolutist. He regards them as puerile commonplaces and is surprised at the naive assumption of the realist that these facts are not known to him. His conviction of the metaphysical unreality of the phenomena of our work-a-day experience is based upon deeper and more abstruse reasons. It is his grievance that the realist does not care to consider the sincere difficulties of the absolutist and tries to silence him by adducing trite commonplaces as philosophical arguments. It is true that the possible may be a future eventuality. But there is no guarantee that every possibility will eventuate into a real. All the grains do not germinate and all the flowers do not fructify. But this question also has no metaphysical value. What is future is not a fact now and here. Its future existence, if conceded, does not make the judgement 'The seed is the cause of the sprout' true, because the effect is not real at the time. It does not qualify reality. In one word, it is non-existent. It has no theoretical or practical value. It is as useless as the posting of a guard at the treasury after or before it has been plundered by robbers. When the realist voices his scruples against the grades of reality proposed by the absolutist, the latter does not accuse him of insincerity. He only asserts that this is the invariable consequence of logical thinking. The empirical reality is affirmed out of concession to the realistic bias of the human understanding. The absolutist does not ignore this psychological tendency, though he is assured of its deceptive character. The empirical real is as good as unreal. There is justice in the contention of the realist that empirical

reality is only a euphemism for unreality. Truth and reality cannot but be one and by their nature are repugnant to classification and gradation. But this is only a sop to Cerberus of hypostatising proclivity.

As regards the demarcation of appearance from pure fiction which cannot even have appearance, it is admitted on the pragmatic plane to be expedient and needful. But that does not invest it with an order of reality. Reality does not admit of order and gradation just as much as non-existence. The division of non-existence into four classes by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school has only a pragmatic and procedural value. A phenomenon of ordinary experience and the content of illusory experience are equally unreal in essence. The contention of the realist that these contents have a distinctive individuality and are meanings (that is, are meant to be ontological reals) is accepted by the absolutist. But this is also the case with obvious fictions. A square circle, a barren woman's son, a mare's nest, a hare's horn are fictions one and all. But one fiction is not the other. They have distinctive individuality. So long as they are uncriticized they also purport to be meanings. The average objects of experience are in no better position than these fictions, so far as their ontological status is concerned. The only difference is that ordinary people are not concerned with the philosophical problem of truth and error, reality and unreality, and so the invalidating thoughts do not occur to them. The philosopher finds unrefutable arguments to set aside their truth-claims and though they are seen to have pragmatic value, they are understood to be false and hence do no longer deceive them. The case is parallel to that of the magician and a knowledgeable person, who are conversant with the inward character of a magical show and hence are not deceived by them.

CHAPTER IV

THE BUDDHIST AND THE VEDANTIC STANDPOINTS

SECTION I: THE LOGICAL STANDPOINT OF THE BUDDHIST IDEALIST AND THE VEDANTIST

THE Buddhist idealist (*Vijñānavādin*) thinks that belief in extra-mental reality is only a hollow superstition. In spite of its universality and persistency, the belief has no philosophical justification and as such must be dismissed as downright error. We are not concerned in the present context with the ontological problem and so do not propose to embark upon the arguments by which the idealist seeks to establish his thesis and controvert the realist's position. It will suffice to say that idealism as a philosophical attitude and theory has its advocates both in the East and the West and from remote antiquity down to the present day. In spite of the difference of approach and methodology, it is not difficult to discern a community of thought and reasoning among the different schools of idealism and this is rather a proof and evidence of the community of the human mind, which has expressed itself in different dialects and terminologies. The Vedāntists of the monistic school inaugurated by Śaṅkarācārya believe in one reality, the Absolute *Brahman*, which is consciousness in its essence, impersonal and undiscursive in its nature. The plurality of phenomena, physical, psychical, ethical and religious, is believed to be nothing but unmitigated appearance. They are conceded to have a pragmatic value and are also asserted to be rooted in reality and as such the different disciplines, intellectual, ethical and religious, are instrumental in the realization of ultimate Truth, though by themselves and apart from their bearing upon the Reality, which is their ultimate basis, they are nothing more than pure and simple appearance. However fundamental their differences may be from the Mādhyamika, they stand in almost the same position in the field of logic. The Buddhist idealist must look upon the logical categories as unfounded concepts of the ignorant and unenlightened mind and the Vedāntist also does not differ from him in his attitude to the logical problems. It is, therefore,

equally imperative for these philosophers to vindicate their title to participation in logical discussions from the charges of insincerity and hypocrisy. These philosophers also employ arguments and rely upon the logical categories and principles to give their arguments the compelling authority both in the constructive and destructive sides of their philosophy. The challenge of the realist and the logician affects them in the same manner as the philosophers of Nāgārjuna's schools. It will be found in the sequel that the line of defence adopted by these schools is almost identical with that of the Mādhyamika whose position has been examined by us in the preceding sections in all its bearings. But they differ from Nāgārjuna and his school in one fundamental tenet. Whereas the latter believe in the relativity of consciousness and its content and dismiss both as unreal appearance, they affirm that consciousness is self-sufficient and absolute in so far as it is pure. The Mādhyamika's polemics only relate to empirical consciousness and not the transcendental consciousness, which is self-evident, self-apparent, self-attested and self-proved. It does not stand in need of an alien instrument of proof to vindicate its existence. Pure consciousness is self-consciousness.

The problem of self-consciousness is an intractable one and the dialectic of the Mādhyamika has assailed it with relentless vigour. But this is the fundamental tenet of the Buddhist idealist and the Vedāntist and it can be justified only if the charges of self-contradiction and impossibility advanced by the Mādhyamika can be met to the satisfaction of our scruples created by the latter.

The Mādhyamika has proved with enough force of logic that the employment of the categories of cause and effect and the like involved in our theoretical and practical activities does not presuppose their ultimate reality or validity. The validity of these concepts is confined to the empirical plane and the issues of empirical and ultimate validity should be kept apart. They may have remote points of contact in the sense that the empirical is the scaffolding to the transcendental plane, but the scaffolding is not an integral part of the transcendental edifice. The way has been prepared by the Mādhyamika for transition from the empirical to the transcendental, though there is not and need not be any bridge to heal up the gap. The empirical, even in its highest and most elevated forms of expression in science, religion and philo-

sophy, is only asymptote to the transcendental. There is admittedly an ascent to the transcendental from the empirical and a descent from the former to the latter, but that does not mean that the two are to be reconciled in a system as necessary correlates. This service to the philosophical advance is acknowledged by the Idealist and the Vedāntist alike. But they deny the necessity of the repudiation of consciousness; nor do they think that the assertion of consciousness leads to an infinite regress. Consciousness is self-proved and does not require another consciousness to prove its existence.

Consciousness does not depend upon the content, though the content depends upon consciousness. The existence of the content would remain unproved, if consciousness were not there to reveal it. That consciousness is self-evident and self-revelatory is proved by the following considerations. Consciousness never goes unknown. When a person becomes aware of anything, he is not found to doubt whether he has this awareness or not or to have the opposite belief that he has not such awareness. Again nobody doubts his existence or is in error that he does not exist. This absence of doubt and error regarding a consciousness in the form 'whether I am aware or not' or 'I am unaware' proves that consciousness and the certitude of its existence go together. It may be possible that in fits of absent-mindedness and inadvertence many things may escape our notice. But there also we are not in doubt whether we had this experience or not. And as regards experiences, when we are on the alert and are inquisitive, we are never in doubt about their occurrence or are sure of their non-occurrence. It may be possible that our enquiry regarding a cognition may be thwarted by diversion of attention or onset of sleep and as such we may fail to catch hold of it. But even this possibility does not prove that a cognition goes unnoticed. In that case, we might doubt its occurrence or have the opposite belief that the cognition did not occur at all. This shows that a cognition is not unrecognized; in other words, cognition and self-cognition are synonymous. The argument may be put in the syllogistic form: "A cognition is never unrecognized, because it is not liable to doubt or error, even when it is subjected to scrutiny. For instance, a particular jar, when perceived and subjected to scrutiny, is not found to be assailed by doubt; it is accepted that it is attested by an authentic cognition". This is found to be the case with

all our cognitions and the only explanation of this certitude and absence of doubt is that a cognition is self-cognized as a matter of necessity.

The absence of doubt and opposite belief regarding the occurrence of a cognition has been sought to be accounted for by a different hypothesis by the Naiyāyika. It may be asserted that a cognition comes to be cognized by a second cognition called introspection (*anuvyavasāya*) as a matter of rule and this precludes doubt or opposite belief. The theory of self-cognition is thus not necessitated by the circumstances. But this is a poor apology. Even granting that a cognition is invariably known by introspection, the possibility of doubt cannot be excluded if introspection itself remains unknown or becomes an object of another. Is introspection known by itself or by another? The former possibility is denied by the Naiyāyika and if it be conceded at some remote stage, there is no *a priori* or *a posteriori* evidence to prove that cognition as such is not capable of being known by itself. There is no special reason for regarding a later cognition as self-cognized; and whatever characteristic it may possess must be found in the prior cognition, as the former and later cognitions are not found to differ in their intrinsic character and the difference of contents is only an external and accidental attribute, which must vary in each case. But this is only a hypothetical argument, since no Naiyāyika is found to endorse the possibility of self-cognition at any stage.

The second cognition must, therefore, remain unknown and it can be supposed to reveal the first cognition by its brute bare existence. But there is no proof of such a brute fact. The Buddhist idealist does not believe in the possibility of introspection whereas the Naiyāyika is a staunch adherent of it. The difference of opinion would give rise to doubt whether an unknown cognition exists or not. The doubt of its existence would entail the doubt of the first cognition, which is its content. The doubt of the first cognition will involve the doubt of its object. The proof of the first cognition is supposed to be furnished by the second and if there be doubt regarding the existence of the second, the first will perforce be left unproved. But a question may be raised. How can there be a doubt regarding an unknown fact? If introspection be unknown, how can there be a doubt regarding it? The logical subject is never liable to doubt and if introspection be the subject, it cannot be subjected to doubt. But the objection is superfi-

cial. It is not introspection that is made the logical subject, but the knowing subject, the knower, whatever may be its ontological status. The knower may doubt whether he has any such second cognition. We shall ere long recur to the problem of unknown cognition and shall find reason to reject it.

If an unknown cognition fails to afford evidence of a prior cognition, let it be supposed that a cognition known can do this duty. But this will give rise to another problem, *viz.* how can the evidencing cognition be known? If it is known by another, the problem will shift to the latter. If the chain of cognitions, the subsequent knowing the precedent, comes to a stop at some remote stage, the last cognition will not be known and this will deprive the preceding cognitions of all proof. The result will be either an unmitigated doubt or unrelieved ignorance—all cognitions being reduced to unproved data. If the chain of cognitions be allowed to be prolonged indefinitely, the result will be the same. No cognition will have a certified existence, as there will be none to certify it, since there is no one cognition of whose existence we can be indubiously sure. So the theory of one cognition being cognized by another ends in a fiasco, if no ultimate cognition be found to be self-certified and self-known. But this is denied by these thinkers.

The theory of unknown cognition has, however, got respectable advocates. It is argued that there is no necessity that a cognition must be known in order to be able to make its object known. It is not necessarily true that what illuminates and makes known a datum must be known. For instance, our sense-organs do reveal their objects, though they elude perception. Senses are supersensuous so far as they are left to themselves. We come to know of their existence by other evidences and proofs. But they are neither perceived by themselves nor by others when they exercise their function of revelation. The eye sees colours though none sees the eye. The nature and function of cognition may be supposed to be analogous to those of senses and hence no such difficulty should arise. The *regressus ad infinitum* does not arise, because the revealing cognition may remain unrevealed and unknown and yet discharge its function of revelation without a hitch. What is necessary is that the revealing cognition should be existent and its existence will serve the purpose.

This defence seems to be an argument of despair. Let it be admitted for the sake of argument that a cognition by its brute existence suffices to reveal an object. But how can we be sure of ourselves that there is such a thing at all if there be no proof of it? When we have no means of knowing its existence, how can we confidently assert its existence as a fact? What will prevent us from declaring that such unknown cognition is an impossibility? It is idle to make an assertion that an unknown entity exists or does not exist. Such an assertion will be nothing but a dogmatic statement, the truth or falsity of which will be equally undeterminable.

It has, however, been maintained that the existence of cognition is not unknowable, though it need not be known at the time of its occurrence or after. It becomes known when there is a desire for its knowledge. We know that we come to have cognitions and they become our property. The actuality of knowledge is attested by our introspection and its possibility is a matter of inference or anticipation. When the conditions of knowledge are present in full, the occurrence of knowledge follows without fail. There is no difference of opinion on this matter between the advocate of self-cognition and that of brute cognition. The ensuing cognition reveals the object and enables the knower to assert that a pen or a chair, whatever may be the object of the cognition, exists. Though at the time of the emergence of the cognition of the pen, we have no means of ascertaining the existence of the cognition, we may come to know the specific cognition if we want to do so. The objective judgement 'The pen is there on the table' will serve as the logical ground for its inference. The assertion of an objective situation is made possible by the corresponding judgement and the transition from the objective fact to the subjective judgement is effected by a natural inference. Or, we may know it by introspection or by a recollection occurring later.

This defence seems too elaborate and ingenious to carry conviction. It presupposes the very thing which it seeks to prove. Let us take up the case of inference first. The revelation of an objective situation is believed to be the effect of the knowledge of an epistemic subject. But how can the causal relation between them be established? The existence of knowledge, either as a chronological or logical antecedent, must be already there and so also our awareness of this existence.

Existence unknown is as good as non-existence so far as the subject is concerned. The first cognition of the antecedent (sic, cognition) cannot be got by inference. But it may be supposed that the first cognition is known intuitively by introspection and this makes inference possible in future. But what is the *raison d'être* of 'introspection'? Does introspection occur as a matter of necessity or only when one feels inquisitive about it? The former alternative does not make the matter less difficult. If there is an introspection coming after every cognition, the first cognition will be known no doubt. But how can we assure ourselves of this introspection? Is introspection known by itself or by another cognition? The first alternative is ruled out by the Naiyāyika. As regards the second, if introspection *qua* cognition be necessarily followed by a third cognition, the third also will be followed by the fourth and so on without end. The result will be a vicious infinite series, since the proof of the first cognition will not be available until the last link is established in perfect security and there is no last link in the chain.

It may be urged, why is this insistence on the proof of the second cognition made by the idealist? The second cognition attests the first, which testifies to the objective situation and that satisfies our inquisitiveness. Why should Dharmakīrti assert "There is no cognition of a *datum* without the intuition of the cognition itself".¹ We do not feel the necessity of infinite questionings and the problem is only the creation of a hyper-critical mind. But the denial of the problem is an instance of the *argumentum ad hominem*. That the average practical man is not disturbed by the visitation of any such doubt is not denied by us. If the testimony of the average man gave solution of our problems, there would be no need of philosophical speculation or science. Our practical interests are satisfied without recourse to these subtle enquiries. But the philosopher's task is to ask for reasons for everything and he must find reasons to satisfy himself and men of his way of thinking. The philosopher cannot take anything for granted without asking for proof. Even for the most trite and commonplace statements one has to ask for the proof which makes these assertions valid and even possible. The enquirer of truth must not assume

¹ Apratyakṣopalambhasya na'rtha drṣṭih prasidhyati.

anything. He will cease to be a philosopher once he allows himself to make unproved assumptions and unwarranted assertions.

An assertion will be true if the judgement is true. We cannot be sure of the truth of the assertion without being sure of the truth of the judgement underlying it. Truth or falsity is essentially the characteristic of a judgement. A judgement can be regarded as true if it is known to relate to an actual fact. The knowledge of the judgement is thus the basis of the assertion of a fact. The dictum of Dharmakīrti 'One can have no cognition of a fact without being aware of the cognition' thus stands on an unassailable basis and expresses a fundamental truth. Such being the case, the demand of proof for every assertion is necessitated by a healthy love of knowledge and truth and the neglect of it will end in dogmatism and error and intellectual stagnation. The warrant of an assertion must be found in the judgement. The question will arise. 'How do we have the judgements and what is the source of it?' The legitimacy of the question cannot be called in question, since no fact or assertion can be accepted to be true without a proof. The proof of the judgement as a psychical fact can be furnished by awareness of the same. This awareness will also require proof to validate its factuality. So the necessity of the proof of awareness will entail an unending series of awarenesses and the result will be that no awareness will be found to be a proved and settled fact. The problem is solved if awareness of a fact is *eo ipso* held to be self-evident and self-regarding. This is the logical necessity of the doctrine of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). If, on the other hand, an assertion is made without waiting for proof and without consulting the accredited sources of knowledge, one cannot claim logical validity for it. It will be an irresponsible assertion unworthy of a philosopher. If a student can be made to accept a proposition without appeal to an accredited means of proof, and the existence of a supposed proof can be admitted without reference to a relevant validating instrument, the enumeration of the sources of valid cognition in the standard works of logic will be absolutely useless, because there will be no scope for their application. If you insist that the discussion of the sources of valid cognition is necessary for the differentiation of truth from error, what is sanctioned by such an accredited instrument is to be accepted as true and what is contrary to its verdict is to be accounted as false. A proposition

which is neither supported nor confuted by any such accepted cognitive organ, is an extra-logical fact, which can lay no claim to truth or be liable to be dimissed as false.

It has, however, been argued in defence that it is not necessary to postulate an uninterrupted series of cognitions, in which the successor cognizes the predecessor with its content. And so the charge of infinite series is unfounded. What actually happens is that whenever an enquiry regarding a particular cognition arises, the cognition is cognized. On the basis of this cognition it is natural to infer that all cognitions are capable of being proved. When one cognition is cognized on the emergence of an enquiry, there is left no room for doubt that other cognitions will also be cognized if one feels inquisitive, because all cognitions *qua* cognition are possessed of a common character. The knowledge of one pen or one rupee in its essential common character gives rise to the knowledge of the whole class and for this it is not necessary that all the members of the class should be present to the mind. We know by experiment that any cognition, though not known at the time of its occurrence, can be known on enquiry.

But this ingenious explanation proceeds on assumptions and presuppositions of which there is no evidence in support. It assumes that there may be a series of cognitions, in which the succeeding one cognizes the preceding with its content. There will necessarily be a progressive enlargement of the content in each successor. The second cognition will have the first cognition as its content, the third will have the first and second, the fourth will have all the three. But experience does not warrant us to suppose that there is such a cognition with an inordinately enlarged content, on the analogy of which we could presume that cognition as such, known and unknown, is capable of being proved to exist. This is the first assumption.

In the second place, it is assumed that an unknown cognition can be known if there is a desire for it. But it is not realized that there can be no desire for an unknown object. As regards enquiry, it is nothing but desire for knowledge of it and this presupposes that the object is not unknown entirely and wholly. We can be inquisitive about a thing of which we have some knowledge, implicit or imperfect or in outline. But if a cognition as such is supposed to elude our ap-

prehension, how can it come to be known on the rise of an enquiry? How can an enquiry regarding the cognition arise at all in the absence of a faint or indistinct knowledge? So the solution offered only begs the question.

It has, however, been contended that desire regarding an unknown cognition is not impossible. Though a particular cognition in the fullness of detail and particularity may remain unnoticed, we become aware of its existence in broad outline by inference. A cognition makes the object known, that is to say, it reveals the object's existence. This revelation is the effect of the known existence of the object. The transition from an object known to the knowledge of it is but a natural process. Thus a desire for the specific knowledge of the cognition does not presuppose an impossible condition.

This defence will excite admiration for its ingenuity, but will not bear the light of close examination. The argument is vitiated by a *petitio principii*. It is seriously maintained that a cognition reveals the object and thus enables us to make an assertion regarding it. But is not assertion tantamount to knowledge? Revelation of a thing again means that the thing is made known. What does knownness mean? "To be known" is only the paraphrase of 'to be an object of cognition'. How can a thing be known to be the object when the cognition is unknown? How can I be aware that it is the object of my cognition without being aware of the cognition which reveals it? I am conscious that the object is revealed to me. If revelation were an adjective of the object alone and did not pertain to me, I would have no means of appropriating it to me, just as it does not pertain to me when it is revealed by the cognition of another person.

There is another weighty consideration against unknown knowledge. If any knowledge remains unknown it will not have a place in the history of the subject. It would be as good as non-existent. Suppose that one had a cognition but was not aware of it. How in that case could he suppose that it occurred at all? It may be supposed that a memory occurs and that gives the clue? But we may ask 'Is it the memory of the object or of the cognition or both?' In the first case, it will not give any clue to the existence of the cognition, but only to that of the object. The second alternative will not be compatible with unknown cognition. Only that is remembered which has

been perceived before. There can be no recollection of an unrecognized fact. The last alternative is only a restatement of the second. Thus, if cognition as such is supposed to remain unrecognized at the time of its occurrence, it will ever remain unrecognized and unrecognizable. As regards the claim of introspection as the proof of the first cognition, we have seen that an unrecognized introspection can never be proved to exist and as such reliance upon its evidence becomes no better than reliance upon a broken reed.

Let it be supposed then that the cognition cannot remain unrecognized. But this will mean that it must be cognized. Is it cognized by itself or by another? On the first alternative, the dispute comes to an end. But the Naiyāyika cannot be brought to endorse this possibility. We have, however, seen that the theory of one cognition being cognized by another invariably leads to a *regressus ad infinitum*. But it may be contended that an infinite regress is not a fault if it is unavoidable. For instance, the chain of cause and effect is inevitably without a limit. The effect is necessarily a transitory event and its cause also must be transitory. An eternal cause could entail an eternal effect which is a contradiction in terms. An eternal effect or an eternal cause is neither cause nor effect. So for a transitory effect there must be a cause that is transitory and being a transitory event it must have another transitory cause and so also the latter. Thus, there is an inevitable regress and this is not regarded as absurd on the ground that the world of events is without a beginning. The denial of the causal chain would rather involve the admission of an uncaused event which is a preposterous issue. Similarly, the denial of cognition involves the contradiction of an experienced fact. And if the affirmation of cognition involves a *regressus ad infinitum* we must accept it as inevitable.

This defence is inspired by false analogy. The occasional character of an effect which occurs at a determinate place and time and did not exist before cannot be accounted for except by the postulation of an occasional cause. This makes the postulation of an infinite series of causes and effects unavoidable, because there is no alternative explanation. But this logical necessity is not found in the case of cognition. An unrecognized cognition is undoubtedly as unintelligible as an uncaused event. But it is not necessary that the awareness of cognition should involve an infinite number of cognitions. If cogni-

tions are regarded to be self-cognized, that squarely meets the problem. So self-cognition is the alternative solution, the repudiation of which would make infinite regress an inevitable consequence. The assertion of cognition presupposes that it is not unrecognized. But this absence of unrecognizedness is accomplished and explained by self-cognition. Besides, the theory of introspection affirms that a preceding cognition is known by a succeeding one. But this is not intelligible without a recognizable relationship between the two cognitions. Now this relation cannot be supposed to be an instance of conjunction which is thought by the Naiyāyika to be possible between two substances. Cognitions on the other hand are regarded as qualities of the knowing soul and so their relationship cannot be subsumed under conjunction. Nor can it be held to be inherence, because one quality cannot inhere in the other. It cannot again be supposed to be a case of identity, because two different entities cannot be identical. Nor again can their relation be regarded as a *sui generis* fact, because the Naiyāyika is committed to six or seven¹ categories and the relation of knower and known (*vिषया-विषयिभावा*) does not admit of subsumption under any one of these recognized categories. Apart from the metaphysical theory of the Naiyāyikas, the relation of subject and object (knower and known) is not intelligible to an inquisitive thinker. The logical and metaphysical difficulties involved in the postulation of a relation between cognition and its subject have to be encountered by the advocate of the theory of introspection.

It may be urged that the result of such dialectics would be the conclusion that knowledge as a fact is an impossibility. This is certainly the position of the Mādhyamika who is no better than a pure negativist. The Mādhyamika has also taken advantage of these dialectics and proved that knowledge and its object or content are pure nullities. The universal refusal of mankind to acquiesce in this unrelieved scepticism is the *reductio ad absurdum* of this extremism. So we are left no alternative to the theory of introspection in spite of its apparent difficulties. It has already been shown that the theory of

¹ In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and also in Praśastapāda's *Padārthaḥadharmasaṅgraha*, only six categories are mentioned. These are (1) *dravya*-substance, (2) *guṇa*-quality, (3) *karma*-activity, (4) *Sāmānya*-universal, (5) *Viśeṣa*-ultimate differentia, (6) *Samavāya*-inherence. *Abhāva* as seventh category was added later on. Sivāditya's work *Saptapadārthī* distinctly recognizes *abhāva* as an additional category.

self-awareness precludes all these difficulties and so the denial of consciousness is not necessitated by logic as the other extreme. We were confronted with two alternatives—(1) introspection and (2) repudiation of awareness as a fact. But the Vedāntist does not think that introspection is the last and the only alternative. As denial of consciousness proved unacceptable, the choice was supposed to be confined to introspection as proof of awareness. But this supposal is not thought to be warranted. The introspection has also been found to be attended with insuperable difficulties. So both these alternatives are equally unacceptable. The theory of self-awareness has the advantage of avoiding the scylla of scepticism and the charybdis of infinite regress. The Mādhyamika is guilty of self-contradiction when he condemns consciousness as an unreality. The denial itself involves consciousness and so it ends in affirming the very thing it denies. As regards the objection that the same thing cannot be the subject and object of the same act we shall show that it has no substance. The nature of consciousness is such as excludes all the attributes which are predicable of material entities. It is the position of the Advaitist that consciousness alone is the reality and unconscious matter which appears to be the object is only an appearance.

It has, however, been objected that the affirmation of consciousness as the only reality and the consequent denial of the differences involved in experience and linguistic expressions would make it impossible for the Monist to establish his position by arguments. On the contrary, his affirmation that consciousness is eternal, ubiquitous and all-embracing would be a nonsensical utterance. If these assertions were to have meaning they and their meanings must be regarded as real entities and thus militate against the fundamental position of Monism. In reply to this, the Vedāntic Monist asserts that consciousness as the Absolute is certainly beyond the range of linguistic expression. No word can have direct access to this eternal principle which stands detached from and precludes all predication. But the assertions made in the scriptural text and also by the Monistic philosopher are not unmeaning nonsense. Thus, for instance, the Absolute is called eternal simply because it cannot be supposed to be limited by time. The predicate 'eternal' has only a negative significance inasmuch as it only serves to deny the opposite possibility of temporal delimi-

tation. It is again characterized as ubiquitous simply because no spatial determination is compatible with it. It is not to be understood as standing in eternal relation with all the objects of limited magnitude as the Naiyāyikas define it. It is affirmed to be the constitutive principle of all that exists simply because no difference is discernible in it. These attributes do not connote any positive determination. They only deny the possibility of opposite attributes. They are only negative characterizations. But these negations cannot be regarded as factual determinations also. A negation has no reality of its own, but is only a conceptual and ideal construction which stands eternally rejected. The Advaitist here agrees with the Buddhist and Prabhākara in denying an objective status to negation apart from and independent of the substratum to which it refers and of which it is predicated. Even the Naiyāyika who is a realist of realists and thinks that every word and every concept have corresponding objects in reality is constrained to deny the objective status of negation in certain cases. Thus, for instance, a jar is affirmed to be numerically different from a chair and though this difference is further felt to be numerically different from the jar and the chair, the difference of difference is not regarded as distinct from the jar and the chair i.e., it is identical with the terms. Thus A (jar) being different from B (chair) may be said to stand in relation of difference to B. Then we have three terms A, B and 'difference' (C). Difference(C) as the third term would be different from A and B and this difference will stand in the relation of difference (D) to the three, A.B.C. The second difference (D) as the fourth term would be different from the first three and thus stand in relation of difference (E) to them and so on infinitely. In order to avoid this infinite regress, the Naiyāyika regards the second and other consequential differences as identical with the original terms A and B. These consequential differences are only so many reiterations of the original proposition 'A is not B' or 'A is different from B'. So here the difference of the difference of the jar is regarded as ontologically nothing, apart from the jar. The difference again is only an instance of negation. Accordingly, negation must be regarded as a conceptual construction without an objective implication. This is the case with the characteristics of the Absolute stated in the Upaniṣads. Words have no expressive power so far as

the Absolute is concerned. They serve rather as hints and indications and cannot denote the reality. The reality of consciousness is self-proved and the different characteristic attributes are affirmed only in order to negate the opposite characteristics. But though they cannot touch the Absolute, they act as pointers to it. The reality of consciousness is a felt fact and the limitations imposed upon it by ignorance are declared to be unreal impositions. Words certainly cannot express the full-blooded reality even of an empirical object which is known only to intuition. Thus though there is a difference in the sweet taste of sugar from that of grapes, the difference of kind or of degree is realized only by direct experience. Words here serve only as generic symbols. With regard to the Absolute the symbolism of words reaches its acme. In point of fact, the ultimate reality is inaccessible to conceptual thought or a logical judgement. Yet the verbal propositions found in the scriptures and also improvised by philosophers somehow serve to have a bearing upon it by way of negation. These propositions serve to focus the attention of the spiritual aspirant upon the internal reality by negation of the plurality of appearance. It is not endorsed that negation presupposes the reality of the negatum. If the latter has any reality and truth, that is only apparent, which the empirical world is entitled to claim. So negation does not either by itself or by its positive implication offer a rival entity to the Absolute which is consciousness pure and simple.

Now we propose to consider the objections raised by the rival thinkers to the possibility of self-consciousness. Awareness is affirmed to be a necessary case of self-awareness. Consciousness is always self-consciousness. A cognition must of necessity cognize itself. But this assertion involves serious logical difficulties. Cognition is an act and the datum it cognizes is its accusative. (1) The accusative is also a cause of the act. If cognition were to cognize its own self it would become its accusative and thus its cause. Certainly the same thing cannot be the cause of itself. If cognition were produced by itself the relation of cause and effect could not be intelligible, because the cause and effect must be two separate entities. The antecedent event is the cause and the subsequent event is the effect. Thus A cannot be the cause of A because A is not antecedent to A. This relation of causality is necessarily concomitant with a temporal gap

and sequence and this as a matter of necessity presupposes the numerical difference of the cause and effect. The implication of antecedence is the absence of the latter term, that is, of the subsequent effect at the time of the former's occurrence. If the same thing were to be the antecedent and subsequent, the time of the antecedent could not be the time of the absence of the subsequent. This is a blatant self-contradiction and does not require any elaboration to prove the absurdity involved in the concept of self-consciousness.

This objection proceeds from certain misconceptions and wrong notions. It is assumed that the accusative is the cause of an act and conversely the act is invariably the effect of an accusative. Acts are signified by verbs but all verbs are not transitive. Thus the act signified by an intransitive verb cannot be supposed to be generated by its accusative, simply because it has none. But it may be contended that acts signified by transitive verbs have necessary reference to their accusatives, which are also their cause. But this is also partially true. So far as the act of cognition is concerned, it is difficult to prove that it is always the effect of its accusative. The cognition of past objects which are defunct cannot be regarded as the effect of their accusative. A non-existent entity cannot be the cause of anything. But it may be possible to contend that the past accusative is not entirely defunct, because it continues in the shape of mental impressions (*samskāra*). And this latent impression may be legitimately supposed to be the antecedent condition of such a cognition. But, howsoever one may explain the causal relation between a past accusative and a future cognition, this becomes absolutely unavailing with regard to future accusatives. The future has not yet come into existence and thus cannot be supposed to exercise its causal influence through its survival in the form of a mental trace or impression (*samskāra*). It is established beyond doubt that all acts are not produced by their accusatives and even those acts which have a necessary reference to their accusatives are not necessarily the effects of the latter.

How do you then account for the designation of the accusative case as a causal factor (*karmakārakavyapadeśa*) by the grammarians? This designation of the grammarians has only a procedural value and is not necessarily based upon a philosophical appraisal of the nature and function of the accusative. In perceptual cognition, the accusative

necessarily precedes the cognition and because it serves as the objective datum of the sense-operation, it is regarded as the cause of the resultant cognition. This causal operation, so far as it accrues from the antecedent, is the *raison d'être* of the appellation of the accusative as the causal condition. This appellation is extended to all possible accusatives by analogy. But so far as the Vedānta theory of perception is concerned, the accusative may be regarded as the condition of cognition *qua* a mental event and not *qua* consciousness which is an eternal entity. The accusative may be defined as the one which is the object of the operation of an instrumental cause. In other words, the object called the accusative case (*karmakāraka*) is one upon which the instrument, e.g. sense-organ, is supposed to operate. It is again possible to define it as the substratum of the effect of an act belonging to another substance. Now all these definitions have been propounded in standard works on grammar and they do not involve any reference to the causality of the accusative.

The contention of the opponent that an act is necessarily the product of the accusative has been given a partial recognition. It has been conceded that some acts at any rate are the products of their accusatives. But this is only a concession. If we make a probe into the nature of the accusative, it will be found to be something which is not capable of logical determination. What is the nature of the accusative case which is supposed to be incompatible with the self-identity of the subject (the knower)? It is held that the subject cannot be the accusative of its own act. But what is an accusative? It has been defined, as observed before, that it is the substratum of the effect of an act belonging to another substance. Now each word of this definition is regarded as significant and necessary. If it was defined as simply the substratum of an effect, a meritorious person who enjoys the effect of his merit, namely pleasure, would be his own accusative. But this is absurd. In order to avoid this absurdity, the effect is further qualified as the effect of an act. The definition thus assumes the form 'the accusative is that which is the substratum of the effect of an act'. But this also would be inexact and overlapping. In the proposition 'A has reached the village by walking all the way', the result of the act of walking is the conjunction of A with B (the village). Here A and B both are the substrata of the conjunction. But it is B that is regarded as the

accusative and not A. In order to avoid the extension of the definition to the subject, the qualifying phrase 'belonging to another substance' is added as an adjective to the act. So the definition is free from defect.

Now this definition expressly states that the accusative must be numerically different from the subject and, such being the case, the identity of the subject and the accusative involved in the concept of self-cognition must be regarded as impossible. This objection is countered by the advocate of self-cognition on the ground of inadequacy. The definition is not sound. It even extends to grammatical cases which are other than the accusative. Thus, for instance, in the proposition 'The leaf drops from the tree'¹, the tree is the ablative case. But the definition of the accusative would apply to it. The result of the act of dropping of which the leaf is the subject and is different from the tree is disjunction which is as much a quality of the tree as of the leaf. Now according to the definition, the tree should be treated as accusative of the act. In that case it should have the case-ending proper to the accusative. The proposition should assume the form 'The leaf drops the tree.'² But this would be unmeaning. It has been urged in defence that grammatical cases are not determined by the intrinsic nature of things but by the intention of the speaker. It is not necessary that all that is real must be expressed by language. Such being the case, the tree is stated in the ablative case because it is not the intention of the speaker to stress its accusative character. But this seems to be a lame excuse. When the character of the accusative is actually present in the tree there is no inherent impossibility of its being intended to be expressed and in that case it would have the morphological difference appropriate to the accusative case. But the grammarian may rejoin that it is the convention that an ablative is never treated as an accusative. But this appeal to convention and authority which lamentably lacks the sanction of objective truth and logical validity shows that the classification of grammatical cases is only arbitrary. The ablative also is the accusative though it may be against the grammarian's convention to give expression to it. But it is not intelligible how the grammarian would endorse the character of the accusative in the ablative. The tradition cannot be entirely

¹ Vṛkṣat parṇam patati.

² Vṛkṣam parṇam patati.

blind to the nature of things. The definition of the accusative is thus found to be absolutely indefensible.

But an amendment has, however, been proposed to make the definition free from the alleged difficulty. The qualifying phrase 'provided it is other than the ablative case'¹ is to be inserted in the definition. But this amendment may save it from the previous objection, but it makes it liable to other serious objections. Thus, for instance, in the proposition 'The river swells'², the verb 'swells' should be treated as transitive, because the effect of the rising volume of the river current will be the inundation of the hitherto dry parts of the banks. The banks here are different from the river and are the recipients of the effect of the act of swelling, namely inundation. But this is not regarded as sound and proper. The bank is not the accusative though the definition applies to it.

But another amendment has been proposed. The effect of the act is proposed to be defined as one that makes the act defunct. This definition prevents its extension to the ablative. In the example of the tree the act of falling of the leaf is not arrested by its result, namely disjunction. It also covers such acts as 'reaching'. The act of moving comes to a stop when the village is reached. The effect of movement is conjunction of the mover with the destination and this conjunction ends the act. It is claimed that this definition should be regarded as perfect as it is not open to any objection. Unfortunately for the grammarian and the logician this claim is not tenable. Even this amended definition would not prevent its extension to certain intransitive verbs and make them transitive by ascribing unwanted accusatives to them. The result of the swell of the rivet is inundation which is nothing but the conjunction of the surplus water with the hitherto dry parts of the bank. This conjunction certainly arrests the further movement of water. The inundated bank would become an accusative and the act of swelling would thus become transitive which is both formally and materially absurd. Besides, the definition would fail to include accredited instances of transitive verbs. In the proposition 'The bird quits the tree', the 'quit' is a transitive verb and the 'tree' its accusative. But the result of the act of quitting is dis-

¹ Apādānetarat īdr̥sam karma.

² Nadi vārdhate.

junction and this does not annul the act. So the definition of the accusative does not apply to this obvious instance.

It may be urged that though the definition may not hold good in all cases it is intended to apply to the accusative of the act of knowing and this is the most important matter under consideration. If the definition holds good of the accusative of knowing, that makes the concept of self-cognition self-contradictory. But this plea also does not stand a better chance, and the proposition 'I know myself' has a definite and intelligible meaning. Here the subject and the accusative are identical and accordingly the definition will fail. But it has been maintained that in this case also a difference can be made out between the subject and the accusative. Though the self (*ātman*) as pure and simple taken by itself is identical, the subject is the self as qualified by the psycho-physical organism endowed with cognitive organs and the accusative is the self as qualified by the attributes of the agent and enjoyer. Though the substantive is identical, the attributes are different and this difference of attributes makes the accusative different from the subject. But this defence is not accepted as satisfactory. The difference of attributes and functions cannot entail numerical difference, if the substantive is identical. If difference of attributes and adjectives could make the substantive numerically different, no inference would be possible. Fire is found in the hill on the ground of the presence of smoke in it. If the hill qualified by the fire were to be numerically different from the hill qualified by the smoke, smoke and fire could not be supposed to exist in the same place and then fire could not be inferred to be present in it.¹ The presence of the smoke in the kitchen does not warrant the inference of the fire in the hill because they are not present in the same substratum. So it must be admitted that in spite of the difference of adjectives and qualifying circumstances the substantive does not undergo self-diremption. It remains the same. The qualified substantive is not, therefore, numerically different from the pure substantive.

However much the philosophers may differ on the question of functional and numerical identity, there can be no scope for difference of opinion in the matter of final self-realization. The intuition of

¹ *Vide Vidyāsāgarī* on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, page 111-lines 4-6

the self in its true character and absolute purity is regarded in all schools as the condition precedent of ultimate self-emancipation (*mokṣa*). Here the pure self is the subject and also the accusative. It follows that the definition of the accusative as propounded before is not capable of being restricted to the accusative of the fact of cognition alone.

This definition again fails to apply to divine cognition. God is affirmed to be omniscient and as such must know Himself just as He knows all other things. This divine cognition as an act has for its accusative all existing facts, and whatever may be the effect of such cognition, illumination or a verbal proposition or activity, it is not possible to maintain that the resulting effect is destructive of the act which caused the effect. Divine cognition is an eternal act and fact. If divine cognition were as ephemeral as the cognition of ordinary subjects like us it would fail to apprehend all entities. The future entity at any rate would not be envisaged by it, simply because it has not yet come into existence. The admission of this possibility would make God less than omniscient. God with limited knowledge will be a lesser God if not self-contradictory. It must, therefore, be held that God's intuition is eternal and as such the resulting effects would not affect its existence. The definition of the accusative as the substratum of an effect destructive of the act which produces it would not, therefore, apply to the accusative of divine cognition. The conclusion becomes irresistible that the concept of the accusative as propounded by grammarians is only a technical device which is not determined by the intrinsic nature of things. This does not affect the validity of the grammatical operation. The principal interest of grammar is the determination of correct linguistic forms and the technique it adopts is chosen for its pragmatic utility without reference to the objective value and status it may have in other fields. Thus, for instance, Pāṇini designates feminine nouns ending in long (i) and ū in Sanskrit as 'nadi' (river) and long Ā and 'Ai' and 'Au', as 'vriddhi' (enhancement or prosperity). But these designations have no intrinsic validity apart from the grammatical procedure. The designation of certain inflected nouns as the accusative cases also need not have any objective validity apart from the grammatical procedure. And that it is only a technical device is amply borne out by the scrupu-

tiny of the current definitions which are found to be hopelessly inadequate and unjustifiably over-extensive.

Let us consider another definition and see if it succeeds in shedding welcome light on the concept of the accusative. An accusative has been defined to be the object of the operation of an instrument. But this also is not a logically justifiable definition. In the proposition 'Rāma killed Rāvaṇa with an arrow by his own hand' both the hand and arrow are instruments. But the arrow is the object of the operation of hand and as such has the character of the accusative as defined. So this definition also is to be rejected on the ground of downright failure. As for the pragmatic utility of such concepts, we need not concern ourselves for the logical difficulties. We may accept any one of these definitions for the purpose of ordinary transactions.

As for the characterization of cognition as an act, it does not seem to have a logical justification or to be inspired by a philosophical examination of its intrinsic nature. It is obvious that cognition is not a physical act in the sense of physical movement which is the only action endorsed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. It has been maintained by Kumārila bhāṭṭa and also the Jaina philosophers that cognition is only a transformation (*parināma*) of the soul-substance. But this also does not seem to be intelligible. A transformation and its effect are found to inhere in the transforming substance. For instance, the jar is the transformation of clay. It is the clay which changes into the jar. But this change and its product inhere in the clay and are not found apart. If cognition were to be such a transformation it would only inhere in the soul and belong to it exclusively. In that case, it would not relate to any other objective fact. Thus it would fail to comprehend any object outside the subject. This means the impossibility of knowledge. The Sāṅkhya and Vedāntist philosophers therefore do not regard these acts of knowing, feeling, and willing as properties of the conscious self but of the mind as an organ associated with it. The felt attribution of these mental acts to self is due to a transcendental illusion which makes the self and the mind appear as identical. The upshot of this critical examination is the inescapable conclusion that the concepts of the act and its accusative are unintelligible and perfectly inapplicable to consciousness and its contents.

But is not there a relation between consciousness and its contents? Even if the relation between consciousness and external data be regarded as an illusory superimposition, the relation between consciousness and its own self-being as its content must be conceded to exist; otherwise, the cognitive relation cannot be accounted for. In self-consciousness, consciousness must bifurcate itself into a subjective and an objective pole, one as cognizant and the other as cognitum. A cognition must be a cognition of something and by something. This cognitive relation cannot be supposed to obtain and centre round a self-identical entity. A consciousness functioning as the cognizing principle must have objective reference. This implies numerical difference between the two terms. The concept of self-consciousness, therefore, transpires to be an uncritical figment of the idealist. It is obvious that a relation is impossible without two numerically different terms. The comprehension of relation is again contingent on that of the terms and if there be no antecedent knowledge of the terms, the knowledge of relation becomes an impossibility.

This objection seems to be possessed of a compelling logical cogency and may even pass for a truism. So far as *other* types of relations are taken into account the conception of the numerical difference of the terms is not capable of being gainsaid. But the relation of the cognizant and cognitum, consciousness and its content stands in a class apart. It is *sui generis* and does not presuppose the numerical difference of the terms. Consciousness and its self-being as its content are identical and this exception makes the unqualified assertion of the numerical difference of the terms as the precondition of relation as such partially true and partially false. The relation involved in self-consciousness is necessarily one-termed and what holds good only of two-termed relation is out of the question in one-termed relation.

The relation of consciousness and content is not numerically different from the terms. One may call it a cognitive relation. But this will be found in the ultimate analysis not to be different from the terms, *viz.*, the cognizing principle and the content cognized. But an objection may be raised. After all, consciousness is different from the content and it is felt that they are two facts and not one. So it is not possible to maintain that the relation is identical with the terms. A and B are different and if the relation be supposed to be not different

from them, it must be identical with A and B alternatively. The relation as identical with A must be different from the relation which is identical with B, simply because A is different from B. What holds good of A equally holds good of anything identical with it. But this contention does not seem to go deep enough. In the proposition 'I know myself' the terms are not by any stretch of imagination capable of being regarded as numerically different. Again the cognition of the universal proposition 'The nature of an object is different from that of cognition' can be true if it holds good regarding this cognition itself. But what can make the cognition known? If it be another cognition, the same question will arise regarding this second cognition. Is it known to be different from what it cognizes? In that case, the admission of a series of cognitions will only terminate in a *regressus ad infinitum*. If it (the second cognition) is *not* known to be different from its content (first cognition), the proposition will not be universal. At any rate, it cannot be affirmed that the cognition of the universal proposition is numerically different from the latter and thus the universal proposition that all cognitions are different from their contents cannot be established.

If on the other hand the validity of the universal proposition is supposed to be established it must be known by itself as it cannot be supposed to be known by another. But this admission only makes the universal proposition invalid, since the cognition of the universal proposition is known by itself though the two are numerically identical.

Let it be conceded that the relation of cognition and content is different from the terms. It is found that the relation of conjunction is related to the terms by another relation namely inherence. So here also the relation between cognition and content, being different from the terms it unites, can belong to them, if there is another relation. The cognizant and the cognized are supposed to be brought together by the cognitive relation and the latter can belong to the terms if it is brought into relation with them. If there is no such relation, the cognitive relation will fall apart and not belong to the terms as much as the relation holding between other terms does not belong to them. If, on the other hand, a second relation is admitted that will only become the fourth term. Thus the advocate of a numerically different

relation has to admit that A and B are related by C (a relation) and C being different from both A and B, can be made to belong to A and B by another relation D. Thus, the postulation of the relation (C) makes the admission of a fourth term inescapable. But that does not complete the process. The fourth term is in the same predicament as the third and the admission of another relation will only add to the number of the terms. The process will inevitably repeat itself and the result will be an infinite regress.

The logician has devised the solution of the problem by the assertion that the repeating relations from the second are not numerically different from the first relation. The second relation (D) is not different from the first (C) which is one of the terms it is supposed to relate to the original terms A and B. Thus the relation D becomes identical with C. Here the relation C and the relation D are admittedly identical. The proposition 'Relation is different from the terms it relates' is to be supposed to be inapplicable to the relation of relation, though the former is also one of the terms. Such being the case, there is nothing inherently repugnant in the assertion that the first relation between consciousness and its content also is identical with the terms.

It is found that relation as such is not of necessity numerically different from the terms between which it holds. At any rate, the second relation together with the consequential relations is admitted to be identical with the first, though *qua* term the latter might be contended to be numerically different from the former. Such being the case, there does not seem to be an *a priori* logical necessity for the relation to be adjudged as different from the terms it relates. The logician of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school has been constrained to concede that numerical difference is not the precondition of a relation which is called natural and intrinsic. As we have already alluded, the relation of conjunction is affirmed to be a quality of the terms it holds between. Being a quality, it must be related to the terms by inherence. This inherence, though a relation like conjunction, is not regarded as a quality and as such does not require another inherence to make it related to the terms it holds between. It is supposed to be related by its own self independently of the aid of another. The admission of another inherence would necessitate the admission of an infinite number of inferences and that will be suicidal since the first inference

is made contingent upon the subsequent ones for its possibility and success. In order to obviate this contingency inherence is asserted to be independent and self-subsistent. The relation of cognition and content must also be considered to be self-subsistent like inherence, because if it is made dependent upon another cognition and cognitive relation it would open the flood-gate of infinite regress and consequential scepticism. But as the first cognitive relation is not different from the second in kind and degree, the cognition and content need not be different. This is *a fortiori* true of cognition behaving as its content. The admission of second cognition as cognizant of the first has been found to lead to an infinite regress just like the admission of second inherence. It is, therefore, quite natural and reasonable to assert that cognition is known by itself because the alternatives of its remaining unknown or being known by another cognition are found to involve insuperable logical difficulties. An unknown cognition cannot be asserted, since there is no proof of its existence. The admission of another cognition on the other hand make an infinite regress inevitable. The conclusion becomes irresistible that the knowledge of the cognitive relation between cognition and content does not necessarily pre-suppose the knowledge of its numerical difference from the term or terms. When one is felt, the other *eo ipso* is felt along with it. In other words, consciousness is felt by itself without involving the knowledge of relation which has been found to be not anything different from the consciousness itself. In self-consciousness, the content and consciousness are identical and the question of relation, either logical or psychological, reduces itself to an otiose superfluity.

An objection may be raised. The cognitive relation is found to hold between two numerically different things in the case of ordinary cognitions. For instance, when a pen is known, pen is the content and its cognition is different from it. The cognizing term (*viśayin*) is numerically different from the term cognized (*viśaya*). But this numerical difference is supposed to break down in the case of cognition which is a self-identical entity and is believed to behave both as the cognizer and as the cognized content. In all other instances, the cognitive relation is found to hold between two numerically different terms. In the case of self-cognition, the two terms are rolled into one. The cognitive relation being identical and uniform so far as the

verdict of experience goes, the conditions cannot be different. One of them must be rejected. We are confronted with the two alternatives—numerical identity and numerical difference—and if our choice is to be confined to one to the exclusion of the other, it is common sense that we should vote for numerical difference which is found to hold good in all cases except the controversial case of self-cognition. Self-cognition must, therefore, be rejected as a downright impossibility since it infringes the law of numerical difference of the terms which is found to be the ruling condition in all cases of cognitive relation.

True, there is numerical difference between the cognition and content in ordinary cognitions and the relation involved in self-consciousness is entirely different. It is also plausible that the postulation of a novel relation if it differs even in a slight degree would be suspect. The uniformity of relationship ought to be sought for in similar cases. But lack of uniformity and consequential diversity are not necessarily a drawback or indicative of error. Where the uniformity is found to be out of the question, diversity does not connote a logical flaw. An example will suffice to prove this assertion. A quality or an action or a universal is held to be dependent upon some substratum because by their nature they are inherent in the latter. Here the quality of being inherent accounts for the fact of their dependent existence. A quality cannot exist apart from the substance and accordingly must qualify it as an adjective. But the relation of inherence itself is also not a self-subsistent entity. It must belong to the terms and depends upon the latter for its incidence. But this dependence is not due to the necessity of its inherence in another substratum as is found with the case of quality and the like. It can be explained, if an explanation is required, only by appeal to the peculiar character of inherence. So in some cases dependence is occasioned by the necessity of inherence in another substratum, and in the case of inherence it is the peculiar nature of it that makes it depend upon others. There is no uniformity in the condition and yet it is not regarded as a flaw in the explanation¹.

In point of reality, there is no breach of uniformity. The relation of cognition and content as observed in the empirical cognitions,

¹ Vide *Vidyāśārī* page 117, last four lines of the first para, on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*.

say of the pen or the jar, certainly involves numerical difference of the contents. But this cognitive relation is itself a conventional and empirical fact which is not capable of metaphysical justification. According to the Vedāntist and also Buddhist idealist, consciousness is the only reality and so the cognitive relation as different from consciousness cannot lay claim to ultimate validity. It is as much an appearance as the whole world of plurality. The cognitive relation can be ultimately true if it is identical with consciousness and bereft of bipolar reference. It may possibly be asked, why between consciousness and content the latter alone is declared to be false and not the former or both. The answer is that the content and consequently the cognitive relation cannot claim to have an independent existence. An unconscious fact is not capable of certifying its own existence. It is only consciousness of it that can bear evidence to its existence. Brute matter is necessarily dependent upon consciousness for certifying its existence. If there were no consciousness, matter will remain assuredly unknown and unknowable. To assert that an unknown and unknowable entity exists begs the question. Consciousness, therefore, is not capable of being denied. The denial is again an act of consciousness and thus involves self-contradiction.

But unconscious matter is obviously at a disadvantage. The denial of it does not involve self-contradiction. In illusory perception, the object of awareness has no objective existence, at any rate in the spatio-temporal context in which it appears. As a content it has no existence apart from the awareness concerned. So if we are confronted with the ultimatum to reject one of these terms, we have no alternative to the rejection of the content. The unreality of the content is not asserted by the Vedāntist or the Buddhist idealist out of deference to an uncritical dogma. The relation of content and awareness is not intelligible and still less defensible. The relation cannot be one of identity as in that case the terms would not be two but one. The residual term must be consciousness, since its existence cannot be denied without self-contradiction. The relation of identity between consciousness and content is affirmed by the Buddhist idealist. But as there is a felt distinction between consciousness and content, it is not possible to affirm absolute identity at least from the psychological point of view. The relation can neither be one of absolute difference,

because in that case there will be no criterion for distinguishing a known from an unknown fact. If a known fact were to be different from consciousness as much as an unknown fact, there will be left no test to determine what becomes known and why so. The Vedāntist, therefore, asserts that the so-called cognitive relation is logically indeterminable, inasmuch as it is neither a case of pure identity nor pure difference nor a combination of both. A thing cannot be identical and not-identical at the same time. It cannot be neither, because of the Law of Excluded Middle. As it is repugnant to all the laws of logical thought, it is declared to be illogical and irrational appearance. On this view, the charge of lack of uniformity has absolutely no legs to stand upon. Even in empirical cognitions, the terms in relation are not two but one, and so there is no numerical difference between consciousness and content. The content divorced from consciousness is only a non-entity.

The problem again may be solved by the line of argument adopted by Prabhākara and his followers. They assert that self-consciousness does not involve the relation of action and its accusative. Action is not an accomplished fact. It is a process and not a product, though the former ends in the latter. The accusative on the other hand is a *fait accompli*. The two cannot be identical. Accordingly, cognition as an act can never be its own accusative. As regards the relation of the cognizant (*vिशयिन्*) and cognitum (*vिशया*), that also cannot be supposed to hold between cognition and its own self. Of course, the Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher admits that the relation of a relation is not different from the latter. But that is like an admission extorted under duress. This admission cannot be logically true. It is difficult to accept that the relation is itself a relation and a relatum and again identical with another relatum. In self-consciousness three things are evident, viz. the cognizer, the cognitum and cognition. It is always a tripolar process. It is hard to swallow the bitter pill that cognition is its own object (*vिशया*) and at the same time is an act and again itself constitutes the relation. If cognition be admitted to be its own object, the relation of cognizer and cognitum has perforce to be posited and this is hard to reconcile with its numerical identity. Prabhākara accordingly does not think that the concept of self-consciousness involves either of these relations. He dismisses the possibility of self qua

relation which the Naiyāyika posits to escape the charge of infinite regress. It is rather a strategem or technical device which has no validity in the logical appraisal of the problem. He asserts that in self-cognition the cognition is neither the accusative nor the object of itself. Nevertheless, cognition does not go unapprehended. How does its apprehension take place or is made possible? It is not cognized by itself as an object, nor as an accusative, and yet does not remain uncognized. This seems to be nothing short of an enigma.

But Prabhākara does not consider it to be enigmatic. The Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher who creates such a row over the self-evident proposition need not have any reason for being surprised if he is told that cognition is known though it is not an object. Substance, quality and action are made existent by their direct relation to existence which is the highest genus. As regards the universal and ultimate differentia (*viśesa*), they are not directly related to existence but coinhere with existence in different substrates. As regards inherence, it simply coincides with existence in the substratum. So here their coinherence or coincidence with existence is responsible for their being designated as existents. As regards existence, it is not felt as a non-existent but on the contrary as an existent. The *raison d'être* of its apprehension as existent is neither the inherence of existence in it, nor coincidence with existence in another substratum. It is existent *per se*. The case of self-cognition is an exact parallel to it. Cognition reveals other objects which come to be associated with it. It does so by virtue of its specific character without the aid of any other external fact. Its nature is to reveal, because it is not unrevealed in itself. There is no question of numerical bifurcation of the same entity playing the role of act and accusative or cognizant and cognitum. Revelation is its natural property and it reveals itself simply as existence makes itself existent by virtue of its intrinsic character. The parallelism between existence and cognition lies in this. Other things are made existent by their participation in existence either directly or indirectly. But existence is existent in its own right. Cognition or consciousness reveals external objects when they are associated with it. But cognition reveals itself. And this act of self-revelation, if it is an act at all, does not involve self-diremption which would

be necessitated by the relation of act and accusative or cognizant and cognitum.

But does not the concept of self-revelation itself connote that the self is an object of revelation? Unless it be an object of revelation, how can we make an assertion about it? Assertion of a fact presupposes a knowledge of it as an object. To be known implies that it is the object of knowledge. The contention of Prabhākara is that when anything is cognized the cognition also is *eo ipso* cognized, though it is not an object of it. The cognition of cognition is either an effect (*kārya*) of the latter or attestative (*jñāpaka*) of it. Either way, it is not intelligible. How can the same thing be the cause and effect or be its cause and effect, or attestor and attested?

Prabhākara gives another illustration from Sanskrit grammar. The example cited in this connexion is not intelligible to a person unacquainted with the Sanskrit idiom. *Bahuvrīhi* is a peculiar compound of the Sanskrit language, the meaning of which is always a substantive other than what is signified by the component words. The meanings of the component words are rather an index and a pointer and not an integral part of the meaning of the compound. In the proposition "Fetch the long-ear (*lambakarṇamānaya*)" the expression 'long-ear' stands for a person having long ears. The 'long-ear' is rather an adjective and does not constitute a part of the meaning; yet from the nature of the case, the person denoted by the compound as its meaning is understood as associated with it (long ear). In English, such expressions as 'The five-year plan' may be given as illustrations of this kind of compound. The case of self-cognition possesses a close similarity to this. Though a cognition does not cognize itself as an object, yet when it reveals an external object it is revealed as an associate of it, just as some cases of *bahuvrīhi* compound signify their meaning associated with the adjective without having the latter as their meaning¹.

This is the explanation offered by the school of Prabhākara. The fact of self-revelation is here made contingent upon the revelation of an external object. A cognition reveals itself automatically when it reveals an external fact as its object. Consciousness, therefore, is

¹ *Tadguṇa-bahuvrīhi*

always bound up with an external object and self-consciousness is an automatic manifestation. This is perhaps due to the conception of consciousness as an act in Prabhākara's school. But according to the Vedāntists of the Monistic school, consciousness is a fact and not an act. Consciousness would be an uneternal and perishable entity if it were an ephemeral act. The Vedāntist does not believe in this doctrine. He has powerful reasons in support of his position. We are, however, not concerned with the metaphysical problem in the present context.

As regards the epistemological problem of self-consciousness, the Vedāntist agrees with Prabhākara that a cognition reveals itself though it is not its object. The assertions of self-consciousness in the Upaniṣads and in the philosophical treatises are intelligible in the light of this interpretation. According to the Vedāntist, self-consciousness alone is the ultimate reality and there is no external or internal difference in it. There is no second external entity or an internal diversity of contents in the shape of attributes and relations. It is pure, homogeneous, unfettered and undifferenced spirit. Of course in the empirical plane there is felt diversity, but this is only an appearance and has no ultimacy.

Let us return to our problem of self-consciousness. It is doubtlessly true that the fact of self-consciousness differs *toto caelo* from other knowledge-acts but this diversity cannot be pressed forward as an argument against its possibility. The undeniability of self-revelation enforced by the impossibility and absurdity of the alternative theories will act as the *reductio ad absurdum* of the futile objections urged against it. The fact of self-consciousness is enforced by the consideration that consciousness repels all negations and at the same time cannot be proved by any other evidence.

The *reductio ad absurdum* of alternative possibilities is the most powerful proof of a particular position. In common place judgement, the knowing subject and the known object are different. But this cannot be the universal rule, since it breaks down in the assertion 'I know myself'. Here the subject and object are one and the difference of adjectives does not annul the substantive identity of the self in the

¹ Svayam jyoti etc. (*Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*)

apparently different roles of the subject and object. This has been made abundantly clear in the foregoing discussion. The fact that cognition and cognitum are different in all other cases cannot be elevated to the status of the universal rule. 'I know' implies that I know that I know. This has also been made exceedingly clear. The aforesaid rule is invalidated by this exception. The logical impossibility of other explanations entails the acceptance of self-revelation as the only alternative explanation.

Self-consciousness or, to be explicit, self-revelation of consciousness, it has been observed, is proved by the *reductio ad absurdum*. A so-called *reductio ad absurdum* is proved to be ineffectual, if it can be shown that (1)there is an alternative explanation; or that (2)the alternative theory is the only explanation; or that (3)it involves an absurdity. None of these defects can be alleged in the present case. No alternative explanation has been found to be satisfactory. So the first two defects cannot be adduced against it. The last charge of absurdity is not capable of being entertained, since both experience and logical necessity rule out the possibility of unknown cognition. As has been repeatedly emphasized, a cognition is neither unknown nor known by another, and for the explanation of this the theory of self-revelation is offered. There is no escape from this admission. Śrīharṣa therefore, sums up this rather protracted discourse in the following words—"If *reductio ad absurdum* establishes a position that suffices to smash all the objections based upon the unwarranted generalization of the verdict of sectional experience. You have to propound an alternative satisfactory explanation or you should waive your insistence upon the verdict of experience in other fields. The reconciliation of self-revelation with the subject-object bifurcation is an impossibility, since two contradictorily opposed facts like light and darkness cannot co-exist in harmony. Only unconscious matter stands in need of revelation by the light of consciousness which is revealed by itself. Consciousness cannot remain veiled and un-revealed. This incompatibility of unrevealedness with the conscient character is styled self-revelation. The predication of self-revelation and hetero-revelation would connote that it is both material and immaterial—which is absurd on the face of it!".

¹ Yugapat kramena caikasya jaḍatvājaḍatve virodhādadeyukte ityarthāḥ Vidyāśāgarī, page 124, lines 9-10).

Now consciousness has been proved to be self-revelatory by the series of arguments which conform to the definition of accredited logical discussion. The arguments are advanced only to eliminate the wrong preconception and prejudice of the opponent in order to enable him to realize this simple and obvious truth. So far as the Vedāntist is concerned all this is a redundant procedure. He is convinced of this truth by means of his own realization.

SECTION 2 : BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY AND VEDANTA : A COMPARISON AND CONTRAST

Śrīharṣa, the paragon of Vedāntists and the protagonist of the doctrine of logical indeterminacy (*anirvacanīyatā*) of the phenomenal world, has met the challenge of the opponents that the Monistic Vedānta as propounded by Śaṅkarācārya and elaborated by his followers is only a reinstatement of the Buddhist doctrine of Voidity of all things (Śūnyatā-vāda). As a matter of historical fact, Śaṅkarācārya has been dubbed a crypto-Buddhist by his critics. Śrīharṣa admits that there is a large measure of agreement between the Vedāntist and the Buddhist regarding the unreality of the phenomenal world. But the difference between them is fundamental and most pronounced. So far as the Śūnyavādin is concerned, he does not believe that consciousness is the ultimate principle. He also attacks the theory of self-revelation of consciousness and we have already expounded the position of the Śūnyavādin regarding this important problem. The logical justification of the concept of self-consciousness has engaged our serious attention and we have given the critical discourse of Śrīharṣa in the preceding section. The Vedāntist and the Buddhist idealist emphatically protest against the Śūnyavādin's repudiation of consciousness. Let us examine the argument of the Śūnyavādin to disprove the reality of consciousness. Consciousness is not intelligible without reference to the content. If the content be false, cognition cannot be true, because it must by its very nature be cognition of something. A cognition without a content is not encountered and so it must be dependent upon the content for its very existence. The Buddhist idealist thinks that the relation of cognition and content is one of identity, since no other relation is conceivable. The content again has no reality apart from consciousness, and so as an extra-

mental fact it is nothing better than a fiction. But if the content be false and unreal, the cognition which is identical with it cannot have a better status. They must sink or swim together. If one goes, the other cannot remain in the field. So the Śūnyavādin concludes that both cognition and content are unreal and no better than deceptive appearance. It has been affirmed in the Laṅkāvatāra "If subjected to critical examination all things (including consciousness and its content) are found to have no intrinsic reality. All things subjective and objective are logically indeterminate and indefinable and devoid of self-existence."

The Vedāntist on the other hand and so also the Buddhist idealist (Vijñānavādin) demur to accept this conclusion which leads to unrelieved negativism. The Vedāntist affirms that the reality of consciousness is undeniable. The unreality of all things can be contemplated or asserted only on the evidence of awareness of it. So the assertion of the universal negativism which is the corollary to the universal denial of all reality is riddled with self-contradiction. As regards unconscious facts, the Vedāntist is in agreement with the Śūnyavādin. He denies ultimate reality to unconscious matter on the ground of its unamenability to logical tests. Things that have existence in a determinate space and time and are non-existent in other places and times cannot claim intrinsic existence in their own right. A thing that has existence as an inalienable part of its nature can never be supposed to become defunct. But the whole order of phenomena, both psychological and physical, internal and external, is found to be nothing more than a series of events and as such is subject to the law of causation. It has been proved by demonstration that whatever is subject to the causal law has no reality in its own right.

The phenomenal world so far as it consists of ephemeral things cannot be real and existent in their own right. As regards the so-called eternal entities such as space, time, atom and the like, they also have been proved by incontrovertible logic to be figments of the imagination, as they cannot stand critical understanding. They have been proved to lack the characteristics of reality. But they cannot be dismissed as downright fictions. A fiction like a barren woman's son or a square circle cannot appear as real, but a phenomenon is a perceived fact and this demarcates it from fiction. It must, therefore, be conceded

to have a provisional and contingent existence. All theoretical and practical activities, in other words, thought and conation are made possible and necessary because the world of appearance is there to reckon with. Even ethical and spiritual disciplines have their significance because there is a world consisting of good and evil forces. But this provisional existence is not the guarantor of its ultimate reality. Though the apparent existence of the material and psychical entities envisaged in experience cannot be dismissed as fictitious, they cannot on that account lay claim to ultimate reality. The logical contradictions that are found to vitiate the nature of things demonstrate their hollowness. The position of the Vedāntist thus differs from the Mādhyamikas not in the metaphysical plane but in logical characterization and assessment, so far as the world of plurality is taken into account. The world of phenomena is neither real nor unreal, but logically indeterminable and unjustifiable; in other words, their existence is not ultimate but provisional. This is called the doctrine of undefinability (*anirvacanīyavāda*). It is un-definable because it is not logically determinable either as existent or non-existent or both or neither. It is not real because it is liable to sublation; it is not unreal because it possesses causal efficiency, theoretical and practical; it is not both because of the law of contradiction which makes the combination of two contradictorily opposed characters repugnant to the logical thought; and it cannot be characterized as neither existent nor non-existent, because the Law of Excluded Middle makes it imperative that the denial of one contradictory must end in the affirmation of the other. Since it defies all the laws of logical thought it is declared to be illogical and irrational.

This indeterminacy of the phenomenal world, though it appears to posit an other to consciousness, is not logically distinguishable from what Nāgārjuna calls Śūnyatā. Nāgārjuna also does not deny that the appearance of the plurality is a fact. That it has no logical justification only proves that it is not ultimate. There is perfect agreement between the school of Nāgārjuna and that of Śaṅkarācārya in so far as the world of appearance is taken into consideration. The difference regarding consciousness is however fundamental. The Buddhist idealist and the Vedāntist will not capitulate on this point. The Vedāntist, however, resents the cheap and uncharitable condemnation

of the opponents who dub him as a Buddhist in disguise. In philosophy, there may be points of contact between one school and another. But that does not annul their individuality. The philosophy of Kṇmārila bears close resemblance to that of the Jainas in so far as the doctrine of identity in difference is sponsored by both. The Naiyāyika too would have to accept his kinship with the Buddhist logician of the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, because he agrees with the latter regarding the problem of truth and validity of judgement so far as it is asserted to be constituted and determined by external factors. All philosophers would have to be painted with the same brush with the materialists of the Cārvaka's school because they all agree regarding the validity of perceptual cognition. If a point of agreement is magnified to the extent of merger of identity, all schools of philosophy would have to be lumped into one school. The Vedāntists' agreement with the Buddhist Mādhyamikas does not justify this sarcastic and malicious appellation of the Vedāntist as a crypto-Buddhist.

It has been seriously urged against this position that the doctrine of indeterminacy is only a strategem of scepticism. If the current definitions are found to be inadequate or vitiated by logical fallacy that is all the more reason for deeper scrutiny and strenuous endeavour to get at a truer appraisal. Mere fault-finding only betrays a captious spirit and betokens intellectual indolence. If the Vedāntist cannot devise a correct definition of things either from intellectual weakness or slackness of curiosity let him betake himself to the study of the problems under the direct guidance of a competent teacher. If love of truth be a necessary prerequisite of a philosopher, he cannot rest content with shifting the burden on to other persons. If the failure to hit upon a right definition be a defect, the Vedāntist too cannot escape the censure implied in it. He only plays the role of a shirker and escapist by taking refuge in the plea of indefinability of things and ceasing from carrying on an indefatigable investigation into the innermost core of reality. There is every likelihood that other definitions may be more successful. The defects of the definition ought not to be construed as proof of the impossibility of a fact, but rather they would connote the ignorance and limited knowledge of the propounder of the definitions.

But the Vedāntist and the Mādhyamikas are of the opinion that if the human intellect fails to make a full appraisal of the nature of things and if the attempts of the best intellects have failed to make a reasonable account of any problem, it ought to indicate that it is rather inscrutable or logically indefensible. The latter presumption is strengthened if the analysis of a fact in all its bearings and implications unfolds the inherent contradictions and inconsistencies in it. The condemnation of the human intellect of inherent bankruptcy and imbecility is not a commendable attitude. If the nature of an object is found to reveal blatant inconsistencies and to offend against the fundamental laws of logical thought, it must be considered as unjustifiable appearance and not reality. It is an unavoidable postulate that the human intellect is capable of infinite progress and expansion. Whatever be its limitations the truth of the fundamental laws of logic and particularly the law of contradiction as an unerring organ of truth cannot be impugned. The full nature of reality may not be accessible all at once; yet it cannot be made an argument for commandeering our reason to accept a self-contradictory proposition as truth.

It has, however, been contended by the opponent that the allegation of indefinability and indeterminacy cannot be logically sound and tenable, because the parties concerned to prove either existence or non-existence are definitely persuaded of the truth of their position and their persuasion is derived from the assessment of facts by accredited logical criteria and approved sources of knowledge. But this protestation of the professional logicians does not affect the absolutist. He has showed that the nature of things that appear to posit a plurality and numerical and qualitative differences is not capable of being accepted either as real or unreal. They are on a par with the illusory data that appear in the place where they do not exist in reality. The appearance of silver in the mother of pearl does not warrant its acceptance as real, because subsequent scrutiny reveals the non-existence of silver in it. The non-existence of a thing in which it is found to appear as existent is the proof of its intrinsic unreality. This proof is found to invalidate all the categories of the realist and this shows that the assertion of the reality of these things is due either to a bias or intellectual inertia which prevents them from carrying the probe further or both.

But the logician regards these objections as frivolous sophism (*jāti*). A sophism (*jāti*) is defined to be a fallacious argument which contradicts the position of the arguer himself. The assertion that everything is indeterminate and, therefore, unassertible also makes his own assertion to be so. The invalidity of all things will also make his own assertion invalid and this will deprive it of all truth-claim. An untrue assertion cannot prove or disprove anything. It is a suicidal argument. The upshot will be that the absolutist will fail to prove his thesis that things are indeterminable. This charge of self-contradiction does not affect the absolutist. He is not concerned to prove the reality of indeterminacy. The exposure of indeterminacy in the nature of things only refutes the realist's presumption that things are capable of being determined as true or untrue, real or unreal, existent or non-existent. As regards the absolutist, he is not interested in proving the ultimate truth of the doctrine of indeterminacy. His assertion of indeterminacy is not exempt from the defect which affects all objective facts. As for the assumption of the realist that the arguments of the absolutist are themselves indeterminate and hence incapable of disproving the reality of things, it will suffice to observe that causal efficiency is rather the symptom of appearance and unreality. Causal efficiency does not presuppose ultimate reality as its basis. The appearance of silver also inspires volition and activity and yet this does not invest it with ultimate existence. The silver in so far and so long as it appears has a definite status in the history of events. This status marks it out from unreal fiction. The absolutist does not deny that the world of causes and events has got a provisional reality of its own. What he seeks to emphasize is that provisional reality is compatible with ultimate unreality. The charge of sophism therefore falls to the ground simply because it does not invalidate the fundamental position of the absolutist. It only affects one side, *viz.* the realist's position and leaves the absolutist, who advances these arguments, in the cold. The argument is not suicidal because it is fatal only to the opponent's position.

But the realist is a staunch believer in the canons of formal logic and his logical scruples do not allow him to acquiesce in the concept of the indeterminate. The position of the absolutist is that the affirmation of existence or non-existence is found to be incompatible with the

canons of logic and the fundamental laws of logical thought. This logical incompatibility compels the conclusion of indeterminacy. The logician poses a question; (1) 'Does this incompatibility lead to the doubt of the existence or non-existence of things, or (2) does it compel the acceptance of the conclusion that empirical facts are to be placed outside the pale of existence and non-existence both?' If the first alternative be adopted, one of the two alternatives is to be accepted to be the truth. Though there are two alternatives in doubt, both of them cannot be wrong. Either of them must be the real predicate. And this is necessitated by the verdict of the Law of Excluded Middle. The two alternative predicates in doubt are of necessity contradictory opposites and both cannot be true or false. One of them must be true. Such being the situation, the alleged defects pertaining to one of the alternatives must be fallacious. Now, between existence and non-existence we have to admit that the logical defects alleged against existence must be specious and false, since we cannot dismiss existence as an unreal chimera. Non-existence can be known only against the background of and with reference to existence. If there were no such thing as existence, non-existence would have no *raison d'être*. The latter necessarily presupposes the former, as only a fact existent in some other context can be affirmed to be non-existent in some place and time. A non-existent fiction such as a square circle can neither be affirmed nor denied. The affirmation of it will involve self-contradiction and denial absolutely redundant. So non-existence is capable of being understood if it is of an existent fact in an existent spatio-temporal context. The concept of non-existence is dependent on that of existence. So in the choice between existence and non-existence, we are forced to vote for the former. If existence is to be accepted, the defects alleged to pertain to it must be set aside as fallacious.

As regards the other alternative—non-existence, this cannot be posited as the essential nature of things. This will only entail the non-existence of everything and as such the logical defects also must transpire to be non-existent and unreal. So the so-called indeterminacy affirmed by the absolutist cannot lead to doubt and scepticism. As regards the second grand alternative of the externment of things from the jurisdiction of existence and non-existence, it is to be scouted

as a self-contradictory proposition. Between two contradictory things, one of them must be true. As the combined affirmation of two contradictory predicates is unacceptable on account of its infringement of the law of contradiction, so exactly their combined negation involves a preposterous issue, because it runs counter to the Law of Excluded Middle. The negation of existence and non-existence, which is involved in its expulsion from both the alternatives, is logically unthinkable. Nothing can be supposed to have a status outside the spheres of existence and non-existence taken together¹. The upshot is that the so-called indeterminacy is only a word without a meaning. It is a hoax no better than a magical formula devised to lull the natural curiosity and inquisitive spirit into the slumber of dogmatism.

The charge-sheet is a formidable one. But the absolutist is not perturbed by this array of logical opposition. What does the logician seek to establish by this series of reasonings? Does he mean to repudiate the existence of the concept of indeterminacy or the truth of it? The first alternative is out of the question, since according to the dictum of the logician there can be no negation of an impossibility. If indeterminacy be an impossible concept, no negation of it is logically conceivable according to the dictum of the logician himself. The negation is always affirmed to be a real fact though in another context. If the logician intends to prove that the concept of indeterminacy has no status of reality, he has only wasted his ingenuity in vain.

The absolutist does not claim genuine reality for indeterminacy, though he makes it the characteristic of all that appears to exist, as another to consciousness. Thus the whole accusation proceeds from a lamentable misunderstanding of the absolutist's position. The absolutist does not seek to make out that indeterminacy is only a form of doubt or ends in it. His position is that the logical inconsistency

¹ Parasparaviruddhayos sadasatvayoravidhyisamuccaye yathā virodhas tathā nisedhasamuccayep'e virodhasyā' dvaitabhaktimata'pi tvayā nivārayitum aśakyatvādityartah. *Kusumāñjalāv Udayayanoktavyāghātam evo-papadayati—paraspati'.* "naikatā'pi viruddhānām uktimātravirodha-tāḥ" ityuttarārdham iti yathā nityatvānityatvayoranyataranisēhdhe' nyatarasyaiva praptir na tu nityatvānityatvavyatirikarrūpāntarāpattis tathā sadasattvayor api bhāvābhavayoh sākṣādvirodhas tadanuśāngād anyatreti sthitē sadasattvani śedhāv ekopādhau na sambhavato bhāvābhāvanisēdhatvaān nityatvānityatvaniśedhavat ityarthah—*Vidyāsāgarī* on *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, pp. 130 (lines 19-25), and p. 131 (lines 1-4).

and inherent absurdity of all that appears to exist convict it of being a false pretender to reality. He only shows that its pretension cannot withstand the onslaught of logical thinking. The canons of logic are endorsed by the logician and if by the application of these tests the hollowness of the phenomenal world is brought out in strong relief, the absolutist cannot be arraigned of disloyalty. It is for the logician to make a defence of his position. If he is to blame anybody, he must blame himself and his logical commitments. When the absolutist proves by the approved logical canons that the nature of things does not permit them to be determined either as real or as unreal or both or neither, he does not claim that they have some other status. He is not interested in establishing the reality of indeterminacy. The indeterminacy itself is also indeterminate being incapable of determination as real or unreal. It does not require any argument. If a person affirms 'All things are real', it follows that he admits the reality of things, and also the reality of this reality and this does not require an express statement, still less an argument. Similarly when the absolutist affirms that things are indeterminate in their character, the indeterminacy of this indeterminacy along with that of things follows as an obvious deduction without requiring an explicit assertion. The charge of unreality of this indeterminacy made out by the realist does not affect the absolutist. It is not claimed that indeterminacy is a real character of unreal things.

As regards the complaint of the logician that the denial of both existence and non-existence is impossible, the absolutist is only to observe in reply that this is also not his position. He only shows that neither existence nor non-existence can be affirmed to be the character of things in deference to the laws of thought. According to the logical tests, the world of appearance has no justification, just as a moral lapse cannot have a moral justification. But notwithstanding the demand of logic and ethics the possibility of the world appearance is not capable of repudiation, just like our moral failures. The characterization of the world of appearances as an indeterminate fact is only the consequence of logical thought and is offered only as a corrective aid to the realists. So far as the absolutist is concerned, he is not interested in establishing the reality of the world. He maintains an attitude of perfect indifferentism and takes his stand upon the

firm rock of the reality of the Absolute *Brahman* which is consciousness compact. There is no room for any plurality and diversity in it. The Vedāntist would shake hands in friendship with the followers of Nāgārjuna if they affirm the reality of a spiritual Absolute as the background behind the enigmatic appearance of the world of plurality.

SECTION 3: THE POSITION OF THE VEDANTIC ABSOLUTIST

The subject of the present monograph is assessment of the position of the absolutist in logic. The challenge of the logician, who has consistently taken up the position of the realist in metaphysics, is that the absolutist who does not believe in the reality of the phenomenal world and consequently in the validity of logical concepts, judgement, propositions and definitions, is barred out by his own conviction and confession to take part in or initiate a debate. The upshot will be that he cannot establish his position or refute that of the opponent. He must impose a gag upon himself and maintain absolute silence. This inaction which is the result of his metaphysical position will only end in the proof that he has no philosophical opinion of his own or even if there be any, it will remain unknown and unknowable to others. But he has in flagrant contradiction of his conviction engaged in debate and this only shows that he is either insincere or self-inconsistent. This challenge of the realist has been met by Śriharṣa adopting the standpoint of the Śūnyavādin.

But the repudiation of the reality of consciousness, along with that of its contents, by Nāgārjuna and his followers, militates against the position of the Buddhist idealist and the Vedāntist that consciousness with its self-revelation is the ultimate reality. The logical difficulties alleged in the concept of the self-consciousness by Nāgārjuna, if left unanswered and unaccounted for, would have made the position of the idealistic philosopher untenable. The idealistic Absolutist also shares with Nāgārjuna in the conviction of the invalidity of the logical concepts. So both of them have to answer the objections of the logician regarding the justification of their title and right to participation in logical discourse. But the Vedāntist absolutist, as represented by Śriharṣa, felt called upon to engage in the discussion of the epistemological problem of self-consciousness. This has necessarily interposed

a digression. Whether this digression is justifiable or not, we also felt that the gravity of the problem demanded a discussion of it. This is our apology and we now propose to recur to the logical problem following in the footsteps of Śriharṣa.

Śriharṣa practically has no difference from Nāgārjuna's standpoint in the defence of the absolutist's behaviour in logic. The Vedāntist does not believe in the ultimate validity of the logical categories and the traditional methods and modes of formal logic. But he accepts them as necessary devices and with their help demonstrates the absurdities involved in the arguments of the logician. Their pragmatic validity and provisional utility are not denied. The logician has propounded a scheme of fallacies as defects of arguments. The absolutist employs these fallacies as instruments of debate and shows that these very fallacies sponsored by the logician convict their reasonings of absurdity. The logician can justify his reasonings only if he can succeed in proving that the fallacies are not present. But, if instead of attempting this task he merely picks a quarrel with the absolutist regarding the metaphysical convictions, that will only convict him of irrelevancy. The fundamental assumption of the logician that the assertion or refutation of a proposition presupposes an inescapable faith in the validity of the logical categories has been shown to be unwarranted and uncalled for in the exposition of Nāgārjuna's standpoint. It has also been shown that the logical discussion does not presuppose any such conviction. It is on the contrary a formal procedure which is wholly independent of metaphysical convictions. The insistence on the metaphysical validity of the formal reasonings and the propositions as a prerequisite will only end in *cul de sac*. This will make the discussion of the logical categories and their metaphysical validity inevitable and its justification, being necessarily couched in the form of an argument, will necessitate a separate discussion for its validation. There will be no end of the process and the result will be that no initiation of debate will be possible. This has been made clear with abundance of detail in the exposition of the logical standpoint of the Mādhyamika. The same line of defence is availed of by the Vedāntist absolutist. They are perfectly at one in the field of logic, their metaphysical differences notwithstanding.

It has however been seriously contended that the infinite regrees

alleged by the absolutist is only a hypothetical assumption. A logical discussion does not presuppose a previous one for its coming into existence. A discussion is initiated when there is a necessity for the adjudication of a thesis, when another person challenges its authenticity. In other words, it is resorted to in order to rebut a misconception or to set at rest an honest doubt. So there is no occasion for an infinite regress, since a subsequent discussion does not stand in causal relation to a previous one or conversely. But it may be thought that one discussion necessarily occasions another discussion for the determination of its validity. A discussion becomes effective provided it is known to be valid and this can be accomplished only by the application of proper tests, that is to say, by another discussion. But the latter is also exposed to the same fate. Thus the pursuance of the quest of validity must lead to an infinite series. This has been the objection of the absolutist. In defence, the logician pleads that the validity of one discussion does not stand in need of the evidence of another because the long series of previous discussions have established a norm and settled its validity. So there is no *raison d'être* for doubt of its validity and hence no necessity for a digression into another discussion.

But this defence is not regarded as absolutely convincing by the absolutist. He maintains that the discussion has no meaning apart from its content and its validity is determined by the truth of the subject-matter. If a particular discussion is supposed to be validated by the previous discussions, that will mean that its subject-matter also has been established by the previous arguments. If so, the present discussion will have no occasion and necessity. It may be maintained that the general matter of debate has been established by previous arguments and a fresh argument is needed for the proof of specific issues involved in it. The argument seems plausible. But this amounts to a confession that there was no previous discussion in which these issues had been settled and ascertained. The question of the validity of such an unprecedented discussion would of necessity require another and the latter also will necessitate a third and the infinite regress would not be avoided. This will only confirm the thesis of the absolutist that one should not press for the metaphysical validity of the logical conventions. They are to be used as necessary expedients for the transaction of ordinary proceedings in the empirical plane.

The standpoint of the absolutist in logical procedure is that metaphysical considerations and conclusions must not be introduced to assess the value of arguments adduced for and against a particular thesis. The validity or invalidity of the arguments is to be adjudged only by appeal to the accepted canons of logic, the infringement of which constitutes a fallacy. If the absolutist cannot be accused of violating the rules of the debate and thus no fallacy can be detected in his argument, it should be accepted as authentic and binding. The attempt to refute the argument by questioning the credentials of the arguer and the metaphysical tenets that are adhered to by the parties is not only irrelevant but also unwarranted. If the procedure adopted by the absolutist conforms to the standard and rules, the condemnation of it will only be tantamount to the condemnation of logic. If on the other hand the value of the arguments is impugned by the pursuit of the dialectics sponsored by the absolutist, that will end in proving the soundness of the position of the absolutist. So there is no possibility of condemnation of the absolutist's conduct in logic when he is found to observe the rules of logical debate. If the validity of these rules is questioned, that will only end in the repudiation of logic. The logician can hope to achieve success only if the arguments advanced by the absolutist can be shown to contain logical flaws. But so far the logician has given a wide berth to it. The conclusion becomes irresistible that the absolutist's position in logic is perfectly sound and unimpeachable.

SECTION 4 THE DEFENCE OF EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE NYAYA SCHOOL

The Mādhyamika's criticism of validity of cognitive organs provoked strong opposition from the Nyāya school and we come across certain sections in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣapāda, which are entirely devoted to the evaluation of the negative standpoint advocated by the Mādhyamika school. It has been quite naturally supposed that it was Nāgārjuna's theory that is criticized in the *Nyāyasūtra* and so that latter work is subsequent to Nāgārjuna's date. But this chronological assessment seems naive and hasty. From the *Vaidalyaprakarana* of Nāgārjuna which exists in the Tibetan version, it is evident that Nāgārjuna quotes the aphorisms of the *Nyāyasūtra* and subjects them

to criticism.¹ This shows that Nāgārjuna was not the first promulgator of the Mādhyamika philosophy, but a powerful exponent and systematiser. The previous work or works from which the author of the *Nyāyasūtra* derives his information of the sceptical position are evidently lost and the criticism in the *Nyāyasūtra* of the Mādhyamika's position evoked a reply from Nāgārjuna and we find traces of it in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* also. Mahāpaṇḍita Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana surmises that the *Nyāyasūtra*, in these aphorisms, only gives a reply to Nāgārjuna's criticism.² The position, however, seems to be just the reverse. The chronological question will not engage us in the present context, since our interest is purely philosophical.

The validity of the sources of knowledge beginning with perception was impugned on the ground that they could not effectively function in any of the three divisions of time—past, present and future. The cognitive organ can neither be antecedent or subsequent to nor synchronous with the objects. This position is clarified by Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimīśra. Uddyotakara observes that the sūtrakāra proposes to examine the nature of the cognitive organs as to whether they are existent or non-existent facts. Of course, this examination seems to be uncalled for on the ground that every thinker who has any position of his own can hope to establish it only by means of a cognitive organ. If there be no cognitive organ available to prove this position, he will have no occasion to maintain his theory. One has to adduce proofs in support of his position and refute that of the opponent which controverts it. This shows that a proof is possible and that again is due to the unquestionable testimony of sources of knowledge accepted by all. These sources of knowledge are organs of proof. We propose to call them 'cognitive organs' for the sake of brevity. It is apparent *prima facie* that the existence of such cognitive organs is not open to doubt and in the absence of doubt, which is its *raison d'être*, a philosophical enquiry cannot be justified.

But these cognitive organs have been called in question by the

¹ Prof. Y. Kajiyama, who worked in the Nava Nalanda Mahāvihāra for over two years, is engaged in the restoration of the Sanskrit text of the *Vaidalyaprakarana* from the Tibetan version and my information is derived from this work.

² Preface to Vv—by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana.

Mādhyamika. That we are under the necessity of employing cognitive organs in our discussion does not constitute, in the judgement of the Mādhyamika, the evidence of their ultimate reality or validity. Entities or non-entities are equally objects of cognition and so the fact that we are cognizant of them does not by itself prove that the cognitive organs are real entities and valid in their own right. The position of the Mādhyamika is summed up by Vācaspatiśīra as follows: "The Mādhyamika asserts that the whole world of appearance, including the subjects and objects, is found to evaporate into nothingness, when they are subjected to critical examination. Such being the truth, the Mādhyamika cannot be an advocate of the validity of the cognitive organs. But they are recognized and employed by him to prove his thesis that things are not capable of philosophical justification. As regards the so-called cognitive organs, which are supposed to furnish the ultimate proof, they too are found to be controverted by their own evidence, when subjected to serious examination. The instruments of our examination are no doubt the same cognitive organs, but their absurdity and unreliability are exposed by their self-contradiction. If they are convicted of self-contradiction, the Mādhyamika cannot be held responsible for this uncomfortable situation. He only performs an unpleasant task, because his love of truth makes it inescapable for him."

According to the Mādhyamika, the relation of cognition and cognitum is not intelligible. If the cognition precedes the cognitum, in other words, if the former is an antecedent event and the latter subsequent to it, then the assertion that perceptual cognition is produced by sense-object contact will stand contradicted. The sense-object contact is possible if the object and sense are already in existence and come into relation, and this contact is supposed to result in perceptual cognition. But, if the supposed result were an antecedent event, neither the sense, nor the object, nor their contact will have any bearing upon it. This will not only contradict the previous assertion, but also make the postulation of cognitive organ and cognition and also its object absolutely superfluous. A thing can be called a cognitive organ, if it has a bearing on the cognition to be produced and this can be supposed to be effected if cognition and cognitum stand in relation to each other. So the antecedent existence of the cognitive organ or cognition

makes the postulation of the relation between the cognitum and cognition or its organ an unintelligible hypothesis, like putting the cart before the horse. Let us then suppose that the cognition and the cognitive instruments follow the cognitum as subsequent events. This will avoid the charge of contradiction as set forth above. But this supposition will give rise to another difficulty. The object, though it may exist as a brute fact, will not be capable of being designated as object of cognition. It is known to be the object, only when it becomes the object of cognition. Its previous existence will make it independent of the cognition or its organ.¹

This aphorism has been interpreted in a different way by Viśvanātha. He explains the issue in the following way. If cognition be an antecedent event and the cognitive instrument be supposed to come into operation after its occurrence, the object would be already known as such and then the cognitive instrument will not be responsible for the emergence of cognition or the revelation of its object.

The purport of the contention of the Mādhyamika seems to be that the relation of cognitive organ and the object as cognitum is not capable of being determined as one of before and after. The two concepts are correlative and one cannot be understood without the other, just like father and son. A cognition can be understood only in reference to something as its object and the latter again can be known by means of the former. It has been supposed that the object can exist independently of cognition and so the subsequent occurrence of the latter may have a significance and purpose in so far as it serves to reveal the former. But the Mādhyamika's contention seems that the object *qua* cognitum cannot be an antecedent event, because it can derive this character of being cognitum only from the act of cognition and its relation to it.

Let us suppose that the two occur together. In other words, let the cognition and cognitum be synchronous events. But this again gives rise to another equally unacceptable consequence. Cognitions come into being having necessary reference to their relevant objects. When the objects and their cognitions are existent facts, they must occur together. In other words, we must have all cognitions of all sorts of

¹ Vide Vv,

objects at one and the same time. But this is against the evidence of experience. Our cognitions occur in regular sequence, and this has been made the reason for positing the existence of the mind as a separate organ. An earthen jar possesses colour, shape, odour, taste, and the like. If cognitions of all these data were to synchronize with their objects, the felt sequence of these cognitions would be unaccountable. So it is not possible to contend that cognitions and cognita are synchronous events.

The upshot of this critical examination of the temporal relation between cognitions and their data brings out the startling fact that there cannot be any such relation between them. They must, as a consequence, be accounted as independent facts coming into being from causes and conditions which are equally independent. The inescapability of this conclusion knocks out the fundamental thesis of the realist that a cognitum is proved by a cognition which is the basis of the classification of the different cognitive organs in epistemology. This consequence proves the futility of the attempts of the logicians and philosophers to construct a system of valid cognitions and their bases and organs.

The Naiyāyika, however, is not prepared to accept the alleged consequence as a true estimation of the nature of the relation between cognitions and their data. The contention that there is no fixed temporal relation between cognitions and their data is not rebutted. But the deduction of the consequence of the futility of the scheme of logic and epistemology is considered neither true nor inevitable. The temporal relation is to be determined in conformity with the verdict of experience. Thus, for instance, the existence of the cognitive organ or the condition of knowledge is seen, in some cases, to precede the occurrence of the cognitum, just as the sun's light comes to illuminate the facts that occur long after its emergence. It is not necessary that the cognitive organ should take cognizance of data which come into being simultaneously with it. It will be shown that this absence of synchronism does not affect the status and relation of cognition and its datum. Again, it is observed that the datum is in possession of previous existence and a particular cognitive organ subsequently occurs to illumine it. Thus, for instance, the light of a lamp reveals the objects that are already in existence, though not visually perceived

before. In some cases, the condition of cognition and its datum are found to be synchronous. Thus smoke and fire are co-existent events and the latter is known by means of the former.

It is thus observed that the relation between cognition and the condition on the one hand, and the cognitum on the other *sub specie temporis* is not determinable in exclusive terms. It is to be determined in conformity with the verdict of experience. Thus the whole animadversion of the sceptic proceeds from *a priori* considerations which are absolutely inapplicable to empirical facts.

Uddyotakara criticizes the Mādhyamika's contention in a different way. The proposition of the sceptic 'Perception and other cognitive organs are invalid' is vitiated by self-contradiction. It means, perception and the like do not prove and take cognizance of any object. This is nothing but a contradiction in terms, just like the proposition 'This is not perceived'. The subject and predicate are mutually contradictory. 'This' means what is perceived and so the proposition would mean what is perceived is not perceived. Likewise, perception and inference have always a necessary reference to some objective fact. If perception be not cognizant of perceived fact, it will not be perception. The very meaning of these words—perception, inference and the like—is not intelligible unless they signify some cognitive act. They may either be cognitions or conditions of cognitions, and if the latter are not cognizant of some data, they will be reduced to unmeaning nonsense. It may be supposed that these cognitive organs are proved to be uncognizant by inference. But inference is also a part of the subject and thus it has to prove itself and the other conditions to be insignificant and abortive. How can an inference which is not significant and not cognizant of a datum, be supposed to prove its own futility? To say that it is not cognizant and at the same time that it cognizes futility by way of proof or *qua* condition of it is tantamount to saying that it is both cognizant and non-cognizant of the same thing.

It may, however, be asserted that the negation of cognition or of its condition only amounts to the negation of their validity and so the proposition is not nonsensical. But this would imply that the existence and possibility of perception and the like is endorsed by the sceptic. This admission will not only be suicidal, but also self-contradictory. As has been remarked, the perception and so on would have no exis-

tence, unless they are known to be perception, or inference of something else. But the sceptic may rejoin that this is an unfair interpretation of his position. When he denies the validity of these cognitions, this denial necessarily affects the very cognitions themselves, since the validity is a property of the cognitions and the denial of this property enforces the denial of its substratum. So the sceptic's position that perception and the like are not only invalid but non-existent, stands unassailed. But this defence is no better than a jugglery of words. The non-existence of valid cognition is asserted without any reservation and this necessarily involves the non-existence of any condition of valid cognition. Though the position by itself does not involve self-contradiction, the assertion of it necessarily amounts to absurdity. An assertion carries with it the claim that it is true and how can its truth be asserted or proved without the help of a condition of valid cognition which is denied by it? It could be proved only by perception or inference and the like. The assertion of their invalidity makes them incompetent to serve as proof. So the proposition that perception and the other cognitive organs are non-existent either as instruments of proof or as cognitive facts is found to be vitiated by self-contradiction.

However, the proposition may be interpreted to stand for the negation of particular species of cognitions or their conditions and not of the whole genus of valid cognition. So the charge of self-contradiction will not arise. But the denial of one species will necessarily entail the admission of others. Perception, inference and the like are no doubt the different species of cognition and they may not exhaust by themselves the whole genus. In that case, the denial of these species will involve the admission of other species as possessed of validity. The onus of the proof of such unrecognized species of valid cognition will lie on the sceptic. If he succeeds in proving the existence of such undetected instances, he will not fundamentally differ in his logical attitude from the professional philosophers. He will no longer be an advocate of universal scepticism. If, however, he fails to prove the existence of any such species of valid cognition, his procedure of denying the different species of cognition, will be methodologically unsound and misleading. He ought to assert that there is no such thing as valid cognition and consequently any condition or instrument of it.

This will be a straightforward and forthright procedure.

The sceptic may agree that this is the import of his assertion. If he frankly accepts the implication of his denial and plainly and forthrightly asserts that there is no valid cognition and its proof, he will save himself from the criticism of methodological inaccuracy. But this cannot be regarded as a sincere and honest attitude. If there be no valid cognition at all and as such if all attempts to prove its possibility, or its reality be foredoomed to failure, then the sceptic's assertion of this proposition will prove that he is insincere or contradicts himself. An assertion is always made to prove some proposition or fact and is accompanied by the belief that it is true and it is offered for its acceptance as truth. This implicit assertion of validity is in contradiction with his unqualified denial of all valid cognitions.

So universal repudiation of validity must be condemned on the score of self-contradiction. If, however, this denial of validity be restricted to the recognized species of valid cognition and leaves open the possibility of some other species, the sceptic will not also escape the charge of self-contradiction. The admission of another species of valid cognition will be subject to the same dialectical difficulties as have been alleged against the recognized species of valid cognition—perception and the like. The question of the temporal relation of cognition and its object is liable to be raised against this unwonted species and the supposed impossibility of such a relation will again convict it of invalidity.

The Mādhyamika may reply that he is not interested in proving the existence of unrecognized additional species of valid cognitions. He does not make any assertion regarding this possibility and so all the charges of self-contradiction only amount to assaults on empty space. He only analyses and dissects the character of the so-called species of valid cognition and exposes the hollowness of their claim to validity. He does not deny that perception and the like are the usual kinds of cognition, but he is constrained by the very logic which is propounded by the realist that their validity cannot be accepted. But the realist may ask 'what is that nature of these cognitions minus their validity?' His assertion that the different species of cognition are invalid, because they cannot take stock of their objects at any division of time—past, present or future, is bereft of any logical force. The sceptic does not

assign any reason for his assertion. The so-called reason that these cognitions cannot cognize their objects, because they fail to cognize them in the past, present or future time, is only a tautologous repetition of what is stated in the premise. When it is asserted that these cognitions fail to apprehend their objects, it is implied that they never succeed in their mission. And for the proof of this, it is expected that the sceptic should give his reason; but this he does not elect to offer. He only repeats *ad nauseam* that cognitions are not capable of proving anything, because they are incapable of doing so at any period of time. If this be the only reason for his denial of validity in all cognitions, it is evident that he has no reason in his support and he makes only a dogmatic statement.

As regards his charge that there can be no temporal relation between cognition and its datum, because the existence of the cognizable datum before and after the occurrence of the cognition will make it independent of the cognitions, it is found on scrutiny to be based on deliberate distortion or lamentable oversight of the nature of cognition and its organ. The organ of cognition is that which is the condition of cognition and the cognizable is nothing but what is the object of cognition. Now the character which makes a thing a condition of cognition is present in it for all times and so also that of the cognizable objects. There is no logical or psychological discrepancy involved in the consideration that a cognitive organ did cognize its object in the past or will cognize it in the future or does cognize it in the present. It is not necessary that it should function only in the present, and not in the past or future. The justification of the designation of a fact as a cognitive organ or a cognizable object is due to the intrinsic nature of the facts in question, which enables them to discharge the functions when other circumstances supervene. These circumstances rather give the occasion and setting and by no means superinduce these functional characteristics as accidents. The question of their functioning as such can be decided only by the consideration whether they possess the capacity for such. If it is found that a particular fact possesses the capacity for proving another fact, the former should be regarded as the cognitive organ. This capacity must not be confounded with the actual exercise of it. That this is the real nature of a cognitive organ has been shown by the

examples adduced by Vātsyāyana and we have already made use of them. But it cannot be gainsaid that a cognitive organ being of the nature of an instrument, and the cognizable being an object and as such a condition of cognition, they can have their significance and existence only in so far as they actually produce the cognition. A fact cannot be regarded as an object until it is actually cognized and the cognitive organ cannot be regarded as the condition until it produces the act of cognition. As for the plea of capacity or the nature of things, it can be proved only by the result produced by it. There is no *a priori* necessity for the supposal that a fact will be an object of cognition. It is quite possible that it may become extinct before it is cognized by any person or even if it persists it may be buried in the bottom of the earth and thus for ever remain inaccessible to any cognition. To call such facts the objects of cognition will only be tantamount to the abuse of a respectable linguistic expression. It will be again an idle and unwarranted assumption to believe in future possibility. At any event to make such wishful thinking an instrument of philosophical speculation will make all our conclusions precarious and result in deception. The Buddhist philosophers of the school of Dignāga do not believe in power held in abeyance. Power, according to them, is synonymous or concomitant with actual exercise ending in the production of the result. From this standpoint the belief that anything will be a possible object of cognition or will function as a cognitive organ in future is not capable of being justified as valid. The contention of the sceptic is based on the honest recognition of this weakness of such beliefs and forecast.

In reply to this contention, Vātsyāyana observes that the condemnation of possibility and capacity for future results is inspired by an unrealistic attitude and abstract considerations which are belied by the universal behaviour of mankind. It condemns all future planning and preparation as playful fancy and wishful thought. If we are to believe only in the present, and the future behaviour of things be entirely unpredictable and undependable and the past be only a defunct nullity, the result will be a hopeless scepticism and absolute deadlock. No theoretical and practical activity will be possible. We indent labour for harvesting and engage cooks and servants and invite tender for the execution of our planned enter-

prises. This presupposes our *beliefs* in the capacity of persons and things, which are confirmed by the successful culmination of the enterprises inspired by them and it is only in exceptional circumstances that these beliefs prove to be false. The exception rather proves the rule by pointing to the presence of an obstructive factor or the absence of a necessary condition. A man is called a tailor if he follows his profession and does not cease to be a tailor, when he takes rest and ceases from tailoring work. A teacher is not expected to justify his professional status by teaching his pupils for all the time. A man is called a teacher not only when he teaches but also for his future work.

Such being the case, the sceptic's refusal to believe in the accredited organs of cognition, when they are not in operation in spite of their past services, and his hesitancy to make use of them for prospective acquisition of knowledge will only result in physical and intellectual suicide. In fact, the most important part of human life is concerned with the future and all successful activity is inspired by a careful appraisal and estimation of the possibilities and potentialities of men and things. So the sceptic's doubt of the approved organs of cognition is only academical, which is not warranted by the nature of things, or calculated to be accepted as a practical counsel of wisdom.

The denial of validity of all cognitive organs and cognitions is not capable of being understood even as a formal logical proposition. What after all does the sceptic seek to achieve by this negative assertion? Is it intended to annul the existence and validity of cognitions? This will be only self-contradictory. Only an existent fact can be negated and if cognitions and their conditions are denied in an absolute reference, it will only prove that a real is unreal and an existent is non-existent, which is a downright contradiction in terms. If, on the other hand, this negation is used to prove the impossibility of these facts, it will be necessarily given the status of a cognitive organ. So all arguments and assertions for proving the unreality and invalidity of cognitions and their instruments will only end in the admission of the validity of other kinds of cognition. The negation of validity at any rate must be believed to be valid or it will end in a fiasco. As regards the dialectical difficulties on the score of temporal relation, they will also apply in full force to this negative

proposition and the admission of the validity of negation or the denial of it will make the unqualified assertion of invalidity and impossibility of cognitive instruments end in unabashed self-contradiction.

It is emphasized by the Naiyāyika that the existence of things is not dependent on their cognitions or their status and role which they come to acquire in their relation to cognition. Judged by the standard and standpoint of grammarians, cognition is only an act in the production of which objective entities play different roles and make different contributions. When a fact executes a thought to execute an act of cognition in its independent capacity and employs the different conditions as subordinate auxiliaries, it assumes the role of the cognizer (*pramātā*). When again it is made the object of it, it comes to be called the cognizable (*prameya*). When a fact is found to act as an instrument such as a sense-organ, it is called the cognitive organ (*pramāṇa*). These functions and the accruing functional characteristics are accidents which occur when the requisite conditions are present. That it is called a subject or an object is due to its relation to the act of cognition. A thing by itself is not the subject or the object or the instrument; nor does the act assume these characters. But it is when an objective real comes to be associated with the act in one capacity or another, the former acquires these functional characteristics. Such being the case, there is nothing peculiar or strange if a fact becomes the subject of one cognition and object of another. A person becomes knower when he knows an object, and again becomes the object of self-cognition. This is illustrated in the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya* by the example of weights and measures. A weight of tested gravity and capacity is employed to assess the weight of other commodities and thus it plays the role of an instrument. But if any officer or customer calls in question the genuineness of the weight, the suspicion is eliminated by weighing the very weight in a balance against another weight of accredited capacity. In the latter case, the original weight becomes the object of the act. Such is the case with the cognitive organs and their objects and agents. There is nothing inherently repugnant in the fact that a cognition serves as a cognitive instrument and again, in another situation and capacity, itself becomes the object of another cognition. So also does a fact play the role of

subject and object in relation to different acts. These are relational characteristics and though they are mutually incompatible, they can vest in one and the same thing alternately in relation to the same act, or simultaneously in relation to different acts.

The objection of the sceptic is that the same thing cannot be a cognitive organ and object of cognition both, and as such the cognitive organ, being unrecognized, cannot be supposed to have a proved existence. The cognitive organ, therefore, cannot be regarded as the proof of another, when its own existence is unproved and as such subject to legitimate doubt. It has again been complained that it cannot be known by itself, as the subject-object relation always presupposes numerical difference. It cannot be known by another whose existence and validity are equally liable to doubt. The pursuit of the examination of the validity of different acts of cognition would lead to an infinite regress. This scepticism is regarded by the Naiyāyika as the outcome of an unrealistic appraisal of the nature of cognitive acts and organs. The example of weights and measures shows that in case of doubt the validity of one cognition is capable of being tested by another.

The sceptic has pleaded that the admission of the necessity of one cognition being tested by another inevitably leads to an infinite regress. An if in order to avoid this absurdity, it is supposed that a cognition does not necessarily require another cognition to prove it or make it effective as an instrument of revelation, that will make the position so much the worse. If cognitions can be known independently of the service of another cognition, there is no reason why should the so-called cognizables stand in need of another cognition and cognitive organ for their proof. If cognition can be self-proved or remain unproved and thus may not stand in need of a proof, a cognizable also may likewise remain unproved or be self-proved. Thus the whole epistemological structure erected by the philosopher will have no necessity and may be thrown overboard without any loss. There will be no need of proof and so the so-called cognitive organs will be *functus officio*.

The Naiyāyika, however, does not think that these two consequences are inevitable. The epistemological system is not devised as an intellectual sport. There is felt need for it, because nothing can

be accepted without proof as truth. If no proof were necessary or available, there will be no distinction between truth and error and everything would pass muster. But such is not the case. We believe because we have a reason for it, and this reason is nothing more or less than tested cognition. So the existence of an unproved fact cannot be accepted. This is the *raison d'être* of our epistemological enquiries. As regards the cognitive organs, which necessarily play the role of proofs or conditions of proof, their existence and validity also cannot be accepted without the evidence of another cognition or cognitive organ, since they are neither self-proved nor unproved or unprovable. An unproved fact, be it a cognition or an object, is as good as non-existent. It is endorsed that an instrument of cognition is also susceptible of another cognition as its proof. It has already been shown that a cognitive instrument can be an object of proof and at the same time be a condition of proof of another thing. This proposition is proved by a commonplace example. The light of a lamp is a condition of the perception of perceptible objects hitherto obscured by darkness. But this light is again an object of visual perception. Thus, it alternately serves as an instrument as well as an object. Such is also the case with the accepted cognitive organs, perception and the like. Take the case of perception. The sense-organs, for instance, are inferred on the evidence of the apprehension of objects. A visual perception is made possible only if there is an unimpaired and unobstructed organ of sight functioning behind it. The sense-object contact, which is the condition of perceptual cognition, is also not asserted without the warrant of a proof. The proof of it is found in the absence of a barrier between a sense and an object. If there is a barrier, the sense-perception does not materialize and on the elimination of the barrier the perception takes place without a hitch. This is the ground for the inference of sense-object contact which is intercepted by a barrier standing between them. As regards the perception produced by such contact, it is also proved by mental perception. So everything is believed, because it is proved and capable of proof. But so far as cognition and its object are accounted as existent facts, there is no difference between them in respect of existence. But their functional difference makes one fact an organ of cognition and the other an object of it; that is to say, what is an organ may also

be an object. It is not necessary, as the sceptic has supposed, that the proof of an organ should be a different species of cognition apart from the recognized varieties. Thus, sense-perception as an organ may be perceived and proved by mental perception. The number of cognitive organs as endorsed by the Naiyāyika is adequate to the proof of all facts, cognitions and their objects included.

We have observed that there is a functional difference which makes the same fact serve as an organ and an object. Now what is the nature of this functional difference? In one word, we can explain the difference to lie in the role played by the cognition and the object in their mutual relation. When a fact becomes the condition of cognition, it is called a cognitive organ (*pramāṇa*) and when it becomes the objective datum of another cognition, it is called the object of it (*prameya*). The example of the light has shown that the light is both an instrument as well as an object. It may be argued, on the analogy of light, that the light helps the visual organ to apprehend its objects and thus, as a co-operative auxiliary of the visual organ, it may be considered to play the role of an instrument. But it requires for its revelation the service of the visual organ of a competent subject. It is not revealed either by itself or by any other instrument homogeneous with it. If perception and the like were to be known, they could not be known by themselves or by a homogeneous member of the same class, but by another organ different in kind. This would involve the admission of additional cognitive organs which the Naiyāyika refuses to concede. The number of cognitive organs is fixed and put under four kinds. There cannot be an additional kind according to the Naiyāyika's scheme.

The Naiyāyika, however, does not find any difficulty in accounting for the cognition of cognitive organs. A perceptual cognition may be known by another perceptual cognition, though not by itself. Thus sense-perception, we have observed, is known by mental perception. It should be borne in mind that perception, as a species of cognition, embraces a pretty number of sub-species, each of which stands for a large number of individuals. There is no inherent impossibility in one species of perception being perceived by another or one member of the species being perceived by another member. Though the individuals and sub-species differ from one another, they are compre-

hended under the genus of perception, because they share in a common character and the definition applies to them irrespective of their numerical and other quantitative difference. This also holds good of other species of cognition. Thus, for instance, a sample of water from a tank or a well, when chemically examined, becomes the ground of inference of the same properties in the remaining quantities of water. Here the sample of water is not the same as the rest of the water, but only similar to it. So the properties discovered in the sample of water are inferred to exist in the residual quantity of water. Here, there is the numerical difference between the two, but not of kind. It is not even necessary that one cognition should be known by another cognition of the same species. It is not also necessary that the cognitive organ and cognitum should be numerically or generically different.

The self is known by the self itself and this is apparent from the propositions 'I am happy' or 'I am unhappy'. Here the subject knows himself to be happy or unhappy and thus there is numerical identity between the subject and the object. The existence of the mind as an organ is again inferred on the ground of the impossibility of the simultaneous emergence of different cognitions, though the senses and the objects are present and there is contact between them. This presupposes the intervention of some other organ as the condition of cognitions. All the possible cognitions do not come into being at one and the same time, because some other organ is not functioning in regard to them. This organ is called 'mind'. The mind is by its very nature capable of association with one organ in one moment and it is because the sense-organ produces the resulting cognition only when it is associated with the mind, and also because the mind cannot be associated with all the organs at one time, the different cognitions take place one after another and not all at once. The mind is accordingly regarded in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school as possessed of atomic magnitude which makes it incapable of being associated with more than one organ at a time. Now the contact of the mind with the knowing self is the universal condition of all cognitions. Such being the case, the inferential cognition of the mind can possibly be achieved only with the help of the mind as an organ. Thus the mind is the organ as well as the object of its own cognition.

These cases, in which the same thing is found to play the part of the subject and the object or an organ and its object, prove the fact that a cognitum and its organ or its subject need not even be numerically different. It has, however, been urged that though the subject and the object and the object and its organ appear to be the selfsame, there must be some kind of difference between them. It is not conceivable that the same thing *qua* subject or organ can operate upon itself as its object. The functions of the two are by their very nature mutually incompatible. The unqualified self knows itself as an object when it is associated with and qualified by some specific quality such as pleasure, pain or cognition or will, and thus the two are not entirely identical. It is this qualitative difference which makes the same thing function as subject and object. The case of the mind also is not found to lack this qualitative difference. The mind is no doubt the object and organ of its own cognition. But it functions as its organ by its mere presence. It is not known as the object of the cognition when it functions as an organ. If it were necessarily the case that the mind could play the part of an organ regarding its own cognition only so far as it was known, the charge of split of identity would become an insurmountable difficulty. But this is not necessary. The mind *qua known* and *qua an unknown* existent fact are functionally and qualitatively two different things. These examples, therefore, cannot be supposed to afford any evidence for the contention that cognition is known by itself or by another of the same kind.

This objection does not seem to possess any cogency. It has been made clear that it is not necessary that cognition and its cognitum should be generically or numerically different. Thus, there is no absurdity involved in the fact that a cognition is known by another cognition, thought not by itself. A cognition as an existent fact has got no generic difference from a cognizable datum and, by virtue of this character, it can become also the object of another cognition. The Naiyāyika denies the possibility of a cognition being known by itself. He also denies that a cognition is proved or known without the help of another cognition. What he maintains is that a thing can be proved to be existent if there is a cognition to operate upon the datum as its object. This is not found to be wanting in the case of cognition itself. A cognition is known or capable of being known by

another cognition and the latter is the proof of the former. Though there is no generic or qualitative difference between the two, there is no logical bar to one functioning as cognizant and another as cognizable. It is again maintained that the cognizant organ falls necessarily under one or the other of the four recognized types of cognitive organs. The upshot is summed up in these momentous issues. (1) A cognition *qua cognitum* is capable of being cognized like all other cognizable facts. (2) It is cognized either by a homogeneous cognition belonging to the same species or by one belonging to another. (3) It is not possible that a cognition should cognize itself. But, at the same time, it cannot be regarded as uncognizable. It is the fundamental position of the Nyāya School that nothing can be accepted to be existent without the evidence of a cognitive organ, and so cognitions or their organs must be susceptible of proof by other cognitions. The attesting cognitions are not generically different from the recognized types of authentic cognition and so there is no force in the contention of the sceptic that additional types of cognition are to be postulated for the proof of cognitions or in default a cognition is to be accepted as an unproved fact.

We now propose to advert to the issue raised by the opponents that a cognition should be regarded as self-cognized or by rejecting this possibility one must be prepared to face the music of infinite regress. It has been argued that the example of light adduced by the Naiyāyika should have persuaded him to accept the proposition 'Cognitions are self-cognized'. A light does not stand in need of another light to illumine itself. So also a cognition should not stand in need of another for its cognition. But this argument by analogy is not accepted by the Naiyāyika as proof of self-cognition. There is also a perceptible analogy between a cognition and cognitum in so far as they are existent facts. It might also be argued on the basis of this common character that cognizables also need not require cognition for their proof. The consequence will be the sabotage of the whole epistemological scheme. Besides, this analogical argument is bound to be absolutely ineffectual, unless cognition as an organ is proved to differ fundamentally from cognizables. It is found that the colour of a kettle requires light for its cognition in darkness. It has to be proved that an organ of cognition is not like the colour of the

kettle, but like the light. "But we cannot bring ourselves to accept", so argues the Naiyāyika, "that the point of resemblance between light and a cognitive organ is much more pronounced and vital than that subsisting between colour and cognition." Until the parallelism can be proved to be more essential and fundamental between light and cognition than that between cognition and the cognizables, it (the parallelism) cannot be made the ground for the independence of cognition in the matter of its proof. The theory of self-cognition, therefore, cannot be warranted by mere analogy. Even if it be supposed that the analogy of cognition with light is more pronounced, that also will not lend countenance to the theory of self-cognition. The independence of light is not also absolute. It is true that one light does not require another light for its revelation. But it is dependent upon the visual organ for the purpose. So the so-called independence is not absolute but relative. The visual organ also does not require another visual organ for its functioning. But that does not make it self-revealing. The evidence of the proposition 'I know myself' has further been adduced in support of the theory of self-revelation. But it has been shown that there is a vital difference between the knowing self and the known self, and unless there can be found such a difference between the self-same cognition *qua* cognizant and the cognition *qua* cognized, the analogy will not hold good. But no such qualitative difference is discoverable in the cognition in its role as the agent and the accusative.

As regards the contention that the theory of self-revelation of consciousness is enforced by the absurdity involved in the infinite regress as the only possible alternative, that also does not seem to have a stable foundation. If experience be any proof, we have no warrant to suppose the existence of more than two cognitions, *viz.* (1) the cognition of an object and (2) the second cognition of the first. Thus the deliverance of our experience always takes the form 'I know it by perception or by inference or by analogy or by verbal authority.' All these have reference to the objects cognized. And as for the awareness of cognitions, we have the evidence in such judgements as 'I have perceptual cognition or inferential cognition and so on.' No other judgement is encountered which can make the pursuit of a series of cognitions inevitable. There are found to be two varieties of

cognitive organs. In inference and the rest, the cognitive organ becomes effective only by being cognized. Smoke is the organ and condition of the cognition of fire and it gives rise to the cognition of fire only when it is known to be such. Smoke is made known either by perception or other kinds of cognition. But there is another kind of cognitive organ which does not stand in need of a prior cognition in order to be effective. Such is for instance the case with our sense-organs. They function with success only by their mere presence. This is also the case with cognitions. There is no necessity that a cognition can operate upon its object only when another cognition is brought to bear upon it as its evidence. An unrecognized cognition actually reveals the object. Of course, if there be any doubt or enquiry regarding the cognition itself, it is certainly liable to be cognized by another cognition. But that does not lead to an infinite chain of cognitions, because doubt or enquiry arises only occasionally owing to the interest of the knowing subject.

As for the plea that volitional activity is generated by prior conviction of the validity of the cognition, that also is inspired by a presupposition which is not supported or warranted by the verdict of experience. In regard to empirical ends and objects, the volitional activity is inspired even by presumption and sense of probability. The successful termination of the activity proves the authenticity of the belief. As a matter of fact, human beings are not found to be too fastidious or too critical regarding the credentials of their belief. They are guided by the considerations of probability and in their venture they are prepared to run the risk of disappointment. It may, however, be urged that this may be the more or less correct assessment of the springs of activity in the plane of mundane affairs. But in matters of religion and ethics one requires absolute conviction of the authenticity of the belief. Pious people are found to spend their whole fortune in religious ceremonies. They build temples and religious establishments and hospitals out of religious motives. Certainly, it is too much to believe that these immense sacrifices are made possible by tentative belief or sense of probability or presumption. People are known to have died for their religious convictions. They are martyrs of history. Certainly, their activities cannot be explained except by the theory that they were absolutely

sure of the truth of their beliefs. Any attempt to explain them away will only smack of frivolity or cynicism.

The consideration of these facts should incline an honest lover of truth to the acceptance of the theory of self-revelation and self-validation of cognition. The appeal to religious authority will also be unavailing unless the conviction of the truth of the assertions in the scriptures is strong enough to be proof against doubt. This unfaltering and undoubting cognition can be secured only by the belief that the scriptural utterances are infallible. If a further proof of the infallibility is demanded and the existence of the conviction be made subject to doubt there will be no end of the process. The conclusion becomes irresistible that these beliefs are self-certified and self-validated.

But the Naiyāyika does not think that the validation of these beliefs and of their contents presupposes the theory of self-revelation. Our religious convictions are confirmed by realization of the expected results of religious practices in the empirical plane. It is a matter of almost common knowledge that the successful practice of religious vows for fulfilment of some temporal needs confirms the faith in the assertions regarding the results which are attainable beyond the present life. So such beliefs also are confirmed by verification like ordinary beliefs and they do not presuppose the necessity of self-revelation or self-validation of knowledge. The charge of infinite regress, alleged to be inevitable by the sceptic or credulous believer, is destitute of a logical necessity. The Naiyāyika thus strikes the middle course between excessive credulity and academical scepticism.

SECTION S: A RESUME

We have discussed at length a logical problem which assumed tremendous importance in the philosophical academies of India. This problem was naturally discussed with vigour and enthusiasm which did not fail to create heat. The stout and stubborn denial of plurality and the consequent rejection of the logical categories, concepts, judgements and inferences as void of validity, were resented by the orthodox logicians as unnatural and insincere logomachy. The

absolutist reacted to this criticism with an attitude of injured innocence. He complained that the opponent did not try to understand his standpoint with the sympathy and attention that it deserved. The Absolutist's point of view is not inspired by an academic or sportive spirit. His difficulties are sincere and honest. He complains with every show of justice that the countercharges of the logician proceed from a total misunderstanding. The absolutist is blamed for what he does not deny. He does not disagree with the logician regarding the necessity of the employment of the logical canons and cognitive organs and the whole epistemological apparatus in the investigation of problems. His difference is on the issue of metaphysical truth of the categories of formal logic. He (the absolutist) will concede as much validity and authority to these categories as is demanded by the logician in the empirical plane. But he asserts without reservation that they are incompetent for adjudging metaphysical issues and every attempt to smuggle them into the metaphysical field will end in delusion and mockery. The absolutist, therefore, propounds two types of truth, *viz.*—(1) empirical and (2) metempirical. The empirical truth holds sway in the conventional plane, which rests on untested postulates and presuppositions. An examination of these presuppositions by the very logical categories endorsed by traditional logic only manifests their inherent contradictions and inconsistencies.

Of course, the logician cannot subscribe to the division of truth into two unrelated hemispheres. He does not think that truth is of one kind in the empirical plane and totally different in the metempirical. He condemns the absolutist on the score of insincerity and inconsistency for his use of the logical categories without believing in their unconditional validity. The absolutist, in his turn, regards these arguments as useless waste of energy. He does not disbelieve their cogency in their own jurisdiction. What he seeks to prove is that a proposition cannot be accepted as truth, if it is riddled by self-contradiction. The absolutist finds a real hurdle in the coincidence of incompatible characters in the conventional cognitive organs. A cognitive organ is active and instrumental in its function whereas the cognizable object is more or less a passive datum. The identity of the active and passive characters is repugnant to logical thought. The

logician's plea that these are functional characters, which are relative to the different roles played by them, is not disputed. This, on the contrary, is regarded by the absolutist as proof of his thesis. Apart from these functions which are exercised only as the occasion arises, the so-called cognitions and cognizables have no determinable status in the logical scheme. The absolutist emphasizes the fact that these functional characters are not predictable outside the sphere of relativity. A cognition has a necessary reference to a cognitum and so also the latter to the former. Divorced from this mutual reference, the two are unintelligible. It is inconceivable that a cognitive organ and the character by which it functions as such are absolute facts. When the absolutist points out the incompatibility and the impossibility of the combination of these traits as absolute properties, he is not uncognizant of their actuality in the relative sphere. The absolutist too regards these logical conventions as no better than the conventions of grammar. They are useful devices in their own field, but the pragmatic success is not regarded as proof of metaphysical validity. A fact *qua* cognizable is not intelligible without relation to cognition and its organ. The latter too is equally unintelligible without reference to the former. These characters are rather accidental in that they are not conterminous with the *reality* of the data, if it is conceded beyond this relativity. The objection of the logician that the denial of their validity will make all theoretical and practical activity impossible does not assail the absolutist, because he does not dispute this obvious fact. What the absolutist affirms with iteration and reiteration is that metaphysical invalidity does not involve pragmatic invalidity. On the contrary pragmatic validity is perfectly compatible with metaphysical invalidity. This has been made abundantly clear in the exposition of the absolutist's standpoint in the foregoing chapters.

The charge of infinite regress levelled by the absolutist against the logician has been rebutted by Vātsyāyana and subsequent exponents on the ground that psychologically no such series of cognitions is encountered. But this is interpreted by the advocate of self-revelation of cognitions as proof of his contention. There is no necessity felt for going beyond the introspection, because the latter is not subject to doubt. The absence of doubt is due to the

fact that the existence of a cognitive act does not remain unknown. This absence of unknownness of a cognition without involving the aid of another cognition is proof of the fact that a cognition is known by itself. This point has been elaborately discussed in the fourth chapter. As regards the philosopher who does not believe in the possibility of self-revelation and yet insists on the inevitability of the infinite regress, he would regard the psychological evidence adduced by Vātsyāyana as only the outcome of the natural inertia of the human mind. The ordinary man is not worried over the philosophical issues and is, therefore, left undisturbed by doubt or inquisitiveness. But the philosopher, who imposes upon himself the burden of pursuing a relentless and a restless enquiry into the essential nature of things, cannot rest satisfied with the behaviour adopted by average men. The need of the enquiry into the proof of the introspective cognition may not be felt by an average man who is actuated by practical interest. But the philosopher cannot desist justifiably from this pursuit, however tiresome and unprofitable it may be. A philosopher, who justifies his intellectual inaction or excuses himself on the score of its redundancy, only plays to the gallery. The belief in an unrecognized cognition is as unwarranted as the belief in an unknown and unknowable fact. It is, philosophically speaking, no better than mere fancy or wishful thinking.

The absolutist is rather suspicious of the 'possible' and the 'potential'. That an entity may develop a characteristic when other circumstances supervene and be bereft of it when left to itself is the assumption of the realist. A cognition, however, always emerges into being with its objective reference to a cognizable. So far as the actual situation is taken into consideration, a cognition always involves a cognizable datum and the latter also is not intelligible without reference to the former. The two thus are bound to sink or swim together. To believe in a datum which is not the actual object of a cognition but will be so in future is not capable of strict logical justification. It rather anticipates the relation between a possible cognition and a possible datum, and this anticipation can be warranted if the intrinsic nature of things can be reasonably believed to accommodate these characters. A cognition which is only a possibility necessarily presupposes the cognizable without which it would not be a cognition.

So also does the cognizable presuppose its relation to a cognition. Whether possible or actual, the two are essentially bound up with each other. And this is emphasized by Nāgājuna and the defence of the independence of cognition or cognizable on the basis of possibility does not carry conviction, since one concept necessarily presupposes the other. Again, the two characters of being cognizant and cognizable are not identical and as such incompatible in one substratum. The argument that the incompatibility is removed when their relation is different can be accepted as a true appraisal of the nature of the cognizable and cognizant only on the supposition that they do not pertain to the intrinsic nature of the things. A cognition is necessarily related to a cognizable and if the former becomes a cognizable in its turn and these two attributes are supposed to be integral to it and derived from its intrinsic nature, the opposition between the two characters must be overcome in some manner which is not intelligible. If these data, which are supposed to induce these characters by virtue of relation, are to remain external to the cognition, these characters must be supposed to be relative and thus accidental. But it is difficult again to concede how can an accidental attribute belong to a thing without entering into its constitution. We have either to regard them as internal adjectives or external determinations which appear to qualify the substantive. Nāgājuna emphasizes that the coincidence of opposite characters and adjectives is only an appearance and not a part of the reality. The defence of the Naiyāyika, on the basis of external relation of adjectives, merely amounts to a confession of their accidental character.

As regards the charge of infinite regress involved in the theory of one cognition being known by another, it seems that the defence of the Naiyāyika against the possibility is entirely pragmatic. However much the philosophers of different persuasions and convictions may debate among themselves, it seems obvious that they have not been able to convince one another. Unless the fundamental attitude of the mind is changed, there can be no hope of reaching unanimity. But the differences of the philosophers have been narrowed down to a few fundamental issues and this is the result of the incisive examination of problems. An honest enquirer of truth will be in a position to make his choice before his preferences and attitudes have become crystal-

lized into articles of faith. We have, however, endeavoured to give faithful exposition of the positions of the rival philosophers on a problem which will not cease to have an interest of its own. Whatever be the reaction of a modern student, it is not too much to expect that he will have ample material to exercise his reasoning faculty and thus be in a position to pronounce his judgement upon a philosophical issue which has been put in a clear perspective divested of the confusions and misconceptions which seem to befog it.

PATICCASAMUPPĀDA

(Causation in Pāli Buddhism)

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PATICCASAMUPPĀDA

(Causation in Pali Buddhism)

I. INTRODUCTORY

1. *Paṭiccasamuppāda* stands for causation in Buddhist literature. We propose to undertake a critical exposition and searching analysis of the concept of *paṭiccasamuppāda* and bring out its points of contact and departure with other theories. In general, it means the origination of effects on account of the preceding events called causal conditions. The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* formulates the following characteristics¹ which throw light upon the nature of the concept of causation. Thus the characteristic of *tathatā* (regularity of sequence) expresses the fact that specific effects come into existence on account of specific conditions and that they are fixed and the diminution or excess in the number of the factors is not capable of bringing about the effects in question. This is the positive characteristic of the causal law. The second characteristic of *avitatthatā* (absence of irregularity) consists in the lack of failure of the emergence of the effect in the compresence of all the causal factors and conditions. And this is the negative aspect of causation. The third characteristic of *anaññatathatā* is the absence of promiscuity, that is, the absence of the emergence of effects from factors other than its proper conditions. The fourth characteristic of *idapaccayatā* is determinacy. The relation of cause and effect is determinate. This precludes the possibility of the plurality of causes. For every determinate set of effects there is one determinate set of conditions. This law of determinism would be abrogated if any effect could come out from any antecedent event.

2. THE FOURFOLD NAYA

2. *The Fourfold Naya*. The following fourfold characterization, due to the difference of *naya* or attitude and appraisal, of causation also deserves notice.

2 (i). The absence of lapse of continuity of the concatenation of causes and effects, viewed in its proper perspective, precludes the

¹ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 5-6.

fallacy of the abrupt end of the series and thus of the process of worldly career. The uninterrupted career of individual existence through the stages of cause and effect is realized by a seeker of truth as an inevitable consequence of the causal law. The presence of the cause must entail the emergence of the effect. What is the effect of the preceding event becomes the cause of the succeeding one. Thus ignorance (*avijjā*) gives rise to conative dispositions (*sankhāra*, *kamma*-forces), and the latter again are the cause of the rebirth of consciousness (*vīññāna*, resultant consciousness), and so on. This unending process is interpreted by the Buddhist in terms of cause and effect. And this interpretation is regarded as the correct appraisal of the individual's career. The want of discontinuation has however been interpreted by others as the proof of a unitary soul-substance. This is regarded by the Buddhist as a wrong appraisal which leads one to the fallacy of eternalism (*sassatadidhīhi*). The correct appraisal avoids the fallacy of annihilationism (*ucchedadidhīhi*). This characterization and appraisal of causation as the absence of the lapse of continuity is called *ekatta-naya* (literally, 'the continuity-view').¹ The unity of the continuum however is an ideal construction. To erect this ideal and conceptual construct into an ontological unity entails the fallacy of abstractionism which is the besetting sin of all believers in substance as the abode of the changing attributes and states.

2 (ii). The numerical and attributive difference of the cause and effect, if realized in their proper perspective, will preclude 'the view of an eternal unchanging soul-substance as the underlying unity' (*sassatadidhīhi*). The cause disappears when the effect comes into being, and so there can be no underlying unity running through the process. The Buddhist adduces this pluralism as proof of the absence of eternal unity. But this pluralism has been interpreted by a wrong assessment as the proof of extinction of the career of cause and effect. The materialist, for instance, finds in the cessation of the previous event the proof of the extinction of individual soul-life after physical death. There is no doubt that the cause ceases when the effect comes into being. But the cessation of the cause does not leave an unoccupied vacuum.

¹ *Vm*, XVII. 310.

The effect invariably and inevitably brings up the rear. Thus there is uninterrupted continuity of the chain of causes and effects in the psychical plane. There is continuity and at the same time a plurality. The continuity is not of one unit, but of a plurality of units. If one loses sight of continuity, and focuses one's attention upon the plurality, one will be landed in the false doctrine of absolute extinction. This has been the conclusion of the materialist. Thus the correct appraisal, which may also be called the dynamic view, of causation as entailing the origination of a new order of things out of the old rejects the static view of eternalism (*sassatadīṭṭhi*), and the wrong appraisal, which implies the same kind of difference between the cause and its effect as between a cause and what is other than its effect, leads one to the fallacy of annihilationism (*ucchedadīṭṭhi*). This view of causation as involving a specific numerical difference of cause and effect is known as *nānatta-naya* (literally, 'the plurality-view').¹ The plurality of the units in one causal series is governed by the causal law and thus the continuum is ensured. Every existent fact is necessarily possessed of causal efficiency, and this precludes the emergence of vacuum.

The materialist repudiates the causal law because he lays emphasis upon the divergence of the two events. He considers the sequence to be accidental and unrelated. There is also sequence between a preceding event in one series and a succeeding event in another. But there can possibly be no nexus between them. The events are as divergent in one series as one is in relation to another in a different series. It is an accident that one event is followed by another, and there is no *a priori* necessity that one should be succeeded by another. It could be maintained with some plausibility if there was an underlying identity between the events. The materialist therefore does not think the continuity of the causal series in the psychical plane to be a logical or ontological necessity. The exclusive emphasis on disparity leads to the conclusion of annihilationism.

The Buddhist regards this interpretation as a dangerous heresy, not only because it lays the axe at the root of moral life but also because of its failure to account for the uniformity and regularity of sequence.

¹ *Vm*, XVII. 311.

This regularity of sequence can be accounted for only by the theory of causation which posits that an event *qua* cause must lead to the emergence of subsequent event *qua* effect. As the last consciousness-unit is not bereft of its causal efficiency, it must lead to the emergence of the next consciousness-unit, and the association of the physical organism is only an accident. An impure volition must produce an impure psyche. The moral and spiritual discipline enjoined by the Buddha in the formulation of the eight-fold path enables an individual, by its inherent causal power, to get rid of the limitations of imperfect life.

2 (iii). The Buddhist theory of causation rejects the interpretation of causality as an exercise of activity. The regularity of sequence does not presuppose an active agent. It cannot be supposed that the cause consciously exerts an activity with a view to the production of the effect. Thus, in the twelve-termed chain of causation, ignorance (*avijjā*) is followed by conative dispositions (*sankhāra*); but there is no conscious motivation in the former to the effect 'I shall produce conative dispositions'. Nor is there any conscious realization on the part of the effect that it is produced by the former. The teleological interpretation of causality unnecessarily introduces a conscious agent. If the purpose is followed by satisfaction of it, it is due to the causal efficiency of the preceding event. It does not require an efficient cause over and above the event in question. The efficiency is inherent in the act itself which is independent of the actor. This appraisal of causation, which does not recognize any activity over and above the causal event, is called *abyāpāranaya* (literally, 'the non-activity-view').¹

The wrongful interpretation of the absence of activity has led a class of thinkers to formulate the doctrine of inaction or the absence of moral responsibility (*akiriyadītti*). When the so-called cause is bereft of activity and as such cannot exert any influence upon the succeeding event, the postulation of causal relation is an unwarranted assertion. Causation minus activity is an unintelligible formula. If it could be shown that the cause brings into existence the effect by exertion of an activity, the causal relation between them would be quite intelligible.

¹ *Vm*, XVII. 312.

The lack of activity, which is endorsed even by the Buddhist inspite of his vehement advocacy of the causal law, proves that there is no cementing bond between events. It is therefore idle to suppose that by exertion and exercise of effort one can bring about a change, physical or moral, in the sequence of events. The belief in causation therefore is only a superstition of the animistic bias which, in its extreme form, leads to the belief in a conscious active agent.

The Buddhist criticizes this extreme view on the ground of its deliberate oversight of the necessary regularity of sequence. Causality has nothing to do with activity. It (causality) only presupposes that a preceding event is by its natural constitution productive of the subsequent event and this is confirmed by the uniformity of the succession of the two events in all circumstances. Activity is an irrelevant factor if it is regarded as an external determining force. The Buddhist is fully alive to the irrelevancy and redundancy of this conception and he therefore relentlessly explodes the superstition of an external activity or an active agent as a determining factor. If activity is regarded as an inherent characteristic of the nature of an entity, immanent in its being and nothing external to it, the Buddhist would have no objection to this nomenclature. The cause may be said to act if its action is identical with its being. If activity be something additional, the Buddhist would emphatically deny it. The denial of such external and additional activity does not lead to the abrogation of the causal law, because the being of the cause by its inherent constitution brings about the effect. The negation of causality would on the other hand make the regularity of sequence an unaccountable phenomenon.

2 (iv). The specific nature of the cause and of the effect presupposes a relation of entailment. A specific cause entails a specific effect, and there is no deviation from the norm. The realization of the impossibility of promiscuous origination of effects precludes the fallacy of non-causality (*ahetukadīpti*), and the appreciation of the fact that the nature of the effect is determined by the nature of the cause falsifies 'the heresy of inactionism or the repudiation of moral responsibility' (*akiriyadīpti*).¹

¹ Cf. sabbato sabba-sambhavābhāva-dassanena ahetukadīptih, hetu-anu-rūpameva phalati passanto akiriyadīptih ca pajahati—*Vmt*, p. 646.

Let us now see how a false appraisal of this nature of causality can lead one to formulate the doctrine of non-causality (*ahetukadīṭṭhi*) and a heresy which replaces causality by determinism (*niyatīvāda*).

The fact that a specific effect comes out of a specific cause, which is a presupposition of the causal law, is made, by some thinkers, an argument for the doctrine of non-causality (*ahetukadīṭṭhi*). An effect is numerically different from the cause. This means that an altogether different event comes out of another event. If so, any thing can come out of any other thing. And this certainly is nothing short of accepting the doctrine which repudiates causality.¹ Similarly, the fact that a determinate effect succeeds a determinate cause may be falsely interpreted as only a sequence of two unrelated events. Of course, the sequence is regular. But this need not mean, in the absence of any internal necessity, that it is causal, or that the preceding event is the cause of the succeeding one. The sequence can at best be called mechanical, if any such term be wanted. This is how mechanical determinism (*niyatīvāda*) is the conclusion of a wrong assessment of the said aspect of causality.²

The fallacious doctrine of non-causality (*ahetukadīṭṭhi*) is the outcome of the non-recognition of the *peculiar connexion* between the events called cause and effect, which is not found between events differently related. This connexion is most apparent in the case of volition and voluntary movement. The bodily movement following an act of volition can be directly observed to be caused by that act. Such observation is not possible in the case of purely physical phenomena. The two events, *viz.* 'the act of volition' and 'the consequent bodily movement' are undoubtedly two different and discrete facts, but this is no bar to their causal relation.³ Similarly, the falsity of the notion

¹ Cf. *yadi afiñasmā afiñassa uppatti siyā, vālikato telassa ucchuto khīrassa kasmā uppatti na siyā. tasmā 'na koci kassaci hetu atthi'* ti ahetukadīṭṭhim upādiyati.—*Ibid.*

² Cf. *avijjamāne pi hetumhi niyatatāya tila-gāvī-sukkasotitādīhi tela-khīrasarīrādīmi pavattantīti niyatīvādañ ca upādiyati.*—*Ibid.*

³ Cf. "To say that a person has a volition to move his arm involves saying that he has an idea of his arm (and not of his leg or his liver) and an idea of the position in which he wants his arm to be. It is simply silly in view of this fact to say that there is no closer connexion between the desire to move my arm and the movement of my arm than there is between this desire and the movement of my leg or my liver. We cannot detect any analogous

of determinism (*niyatīvāda*) can also be shown by pointing out the internal necessity observable between the two events mentioned above.

This appraisal of the causal law as implying the production of a specific effect from a specific cause on the positive side and the absence of promiscuity on the negative is called *evamidhammatā-naya* (literally, 'the determinacy-view').¹

3. IMPLICATIONS OF PATICCASAMUPPADA

3. *Implications of Paṭiccasamuppāda*.² The term stands for the doctrine of causation, and as such is also a criticism of those philosophical views which repudiate the essential characteristics of causality.

3 (i). Thus the clause *paṭicca* ('dependent upon causal conditions') rejects eternalism or the static view of reality (*sassatavāda*) because change which is a fundamental characteristic of causality is incompatible with staticity.

3 (ii). The doctrine of causation implies that the effect owes its existence to a condition. No production is unconditional. According to the Buddhist view, the existence of anything is always conditional upon something else. The doctrine of eternalism involves the existence of a self-sufficient entity which is not conditioned by anything else. This is tantamount to the doctrine of uncaused existence (*ahetuvāda*) which is regarded as a heresy.

3 (iii). Again the causal relation is determinate and not promiscuous. So the doctrine that any antecedent or any other event is the cause of another event (*visamahetuvāda*)³ is not legitimate.

connexion between cause and effect in causal transactions which we view wholly from outside, such as the movement of a billiard-ball by a cue. It is therefore by no means unreasonable to suggest that, in the one case of our own voluntary movements, we can see without waiting for the result that such and such a volition is a necessary condition of such and such a bodily movement." Dr C. D. Broad: *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, pp. 102-3.

¹ *Vm*, XVII. 313.

² *Vide Vm*, XVII. 21-4.

³ The *VmT* (p. 557) gives an interpretation which is cryptic and unilluminating. The Sāṅkhya theory makes *Prakṛti* (Primordial Matter) consisting of three diverse principles—*sattva* (characterized by lightness and transparency), *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (inertia)—the cause of physical and psychical orders of phenomena. The rationale of this causation is said to be constituted by the consideration that each product is made of the triple principle with

3 (iv). Similarly the causal relation is intrinsic. The cause determines the effect by its intrinsic nature. So there is no occasion for the *deus ex machina*. Causation is natural and so the doctrine of supernatural agency (*vasavattivāda*) is to be rejected.

3 (v). Now we come to the implication of the clause *samuppāda* (invariable origination). In view of the natural and intrinsic determination of the effect by the cause, it follows that the cause will not, from the nature of the case, fail to be attended with an effect, unless there be frustrating conditions at work. But the frustrating condition is also a cause and so there can be no break in the causal chain of condition and effect. The doctrine which holds that the causal chain is snapped arbitrarily is not amenable to logic. The existence of the cause will necessarily imply the existence of the effect. The position of the materialist that our moral career will come to an end automatically is easily controvertible by the consideration that a cause cannot be abortive. When the cause of suffering, *viz.* ignorance (*avijjā*) and its consequences, is in existence and operation, there is no reason why the other end, that is, the effect should not materialize. Thus there is no reason for the abrupt cessation of the causal chain and thus of the wheel of transmigration. Unless the cause is made to disappear, the effect will not fail to come into being. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of *ucchedavāda* or the doctrine of total unconditional and automatic annihilation, sponsored by the materialist, of the individual career.

one or the other characteristic predominant. The causal position is rather based upon homogeneity. Udayana, the author of *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (1.7) styles it the homogeneous cause. His objection to this theory rests on the consideration of impossibility of heterogeneous phenomena being produced by a homogeneous principle. The *Vme* makes the Sāṅkhya theory an example of heterogeneous causation. The atomic theory is again given as an instance of this heterogeneity. The doctrine which makes Time the prius and primordial cause of all things is also regarded as an example of heterogeneity. In the absence of a detailed exposition the idea of the author of the *VmT* is not easily apprehensible. It might be the case that one homogeneous principle is made the cause of heterogeneous plurality. But this is inapplicable to atoms which are heterogeneous in character. It seems plausible that the author of the *VmT* was out of touch with the philosophical speculations of India and was guided by only hearsay. The remarks of Buddhaghosa himself regarding the theories of different schools are also not always based upon firsthand knowledge.

3 (vi). This also gives the lie direct to the doctrine of nihilism (*nathikavāda*) and inactionism (*akiriyavāda*), that is, the doctrine which holds that all action is fruitless, since everything is determined by fate. Inactionism is a necessary correlate of fatalism. The Buddha combated these views which were preached by some of his contemporaries as dangerous heresies.

By the doctrine of causation in the moral field, Buddhism lays stress upon the continuity of the chain of events and avoids the twofold fallacy of personalism and vicarious or promiscuous distribution of responsibility. By laying emphasis upon the continuum of cause and effect, it does not commit itself to a continuous abiding self. It is the stream of mental events that gives rise to the superstition of an abiding personality. The denial of personality again does not involve the fallacy of moral promiscuity in the sense that A performs deeds, meritorious or unmeritorious, and B reaps the consequences of them. Moral responsibility is satisfied by the doctrine of consciousness-stream, and does not presuppose the existence of an abiding *agent*. Though the *agent* is not literally the *enjoyer* and the two are numerically different, the causal law which governs the particular consciousness-continuum ensures that the cause produces the effect in *one* such particular continuum and not *another*. This *oneness* is not literally numerical but causally determinate. It is comparable to the unity of a river in which the particles of water, though different, form a coherent whole distinct from other streams and rivers. It is the unbroken succession of the particles which gives rise to the idea of unity. The personal identity is also analogous to this stream-identity. This is accounted for by the doctrine of causation which regards the subsequent event as standing in a determinate relation to the antecedent. The Buddha has called this relation *paticcasamuppāda*, that is, the origination determinable by another, *viz.* the cause. It is also rendered as 'dependent origination'. But the concept of *dependence* is resolvable into that of determination, which again boils down to 'regularity of sequence'.

The Buddha had to expound his theory by means of popular terms. But he and his exponents gave a clear and distinct interpretation of their contents. The designation of *oneness* and the concept of *dependence*, applied to causality, are necessitated by deference to popular

usage which could not be entirely ignored or entirely accepted. The Buddha subscribed to the dictum "One should neither be attached to the popular speech, nor entirely be disregardful of it."¹ In the words of Dr C. D. Broad "In philosophy it is equally silly to be a slave to common speech or to neglect it."²

4-7. SOME FEATURES OF CAUSALITY

4. Causality is an empirical law discovered by the study of the causal phenomena and their behaviour. It was discovered long ago that only a combination of several factors gives rise to an *Effect* which again is a complex of several factors. It is never found that one single unaided event, however important and outstanding, is capable of producing another event as its effect. It should therefore be borne in mind that a *Cause* is always a combination of conditions, which in later terminology is called an assemblage of conditions (*pratyayasāmagrī*). In the interest of precision of expression and exactitude of thought, it deserves to be noted that the *Effect* also should be regarded as a totality or a complex of several succeeding events. In the Buddhist analysis of the causal relation, this complex character of *Cause* and *Effect* has been stressed. It has been propounded as a dictum that no single effect is produced by a single condition. It is implied that the effect is as much a complex as the cause. It is for the sake of convenience and easy understanding that the causal relation is stressed between *two* individual facts. But this is only a methodological device and should not be interpreted as an exhaustive ontological analysis. In the scriptural statements of the causal chain, one single fact has been laid down as the cause, and another individual event as the effect. But this is inspired by practical interest and consideration. Buddhaghosa lays down the following three considerations for such statements: preponderance (*padhānatta*), explicit manifestation (*pākaṭatta*) and uncommonness (*asādhāranatta*).³ These three characters may coalesce

¹ janapadaniruttim nābhiniveseyya, samaññam nātidhāveyya.—*Majjhima Nikāya*, Part III.230 (PTS). Vide also *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, 142, with *Sphutārtha*.

² *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 148.

³ *Vm*, XVII. 107.

without conflict. They are not mutually exclusive. Ultimately it is the interest of the observer, which determines the characterization as one or the other. This has also been pointed out by Buddhaghosa. Sometimes the interest of the speaker and sometimes that of the auditor or both, or the importance of the subject determines the preference of the one or the other. It is logically difficult to single out one factor to the exclusion of the rest as the most important or essential condition when the presence of all the factors is necessary for the eventuation of the effect. And the absence of any one of them frustrates the causal operation. After all, the importance of one factor is only relative to the interest, inclination and the capacity of understanding. So these are only methodological devices and their value is more or less pragmatic.

5. Now another important feature of causality has been drawn out in the *Visuddhimagga*. The problem is posed as to how *avijjā* (ignorance) which is vicious by its nature and is productive of all evil can be set down as the condition of good, manifest and unmanifest.¹ The solution offered is characteristic of the empirical standpoint. The causal relation is not determinable *a priori*. One has to accept it as it is found to be. It is not the rule that the cause and effect will be homogeneous. The effect may be the opposite of the cause in respect of temporal position, characteristic attribute and function. The antecedent cognition produces the subsequent cognition though the two as *past* and *present* are opposed to one another. Impossibility of compresence is a characteristic of opposition as is found in the case of being and non-being. This holds good of temporal non-compresence also. The effect is found again to manifest a character opposite to that of the cause. Thus a moral act (*kamma*), good or bad, is a mental entity, but it produces a non-mental effect in the form of the physical organism. Similarly curd is produced out of milk and they are different in character. Light is a condition of visual perception, and molasses produce intoxicant liquor, though they are obviously opposite in function. The cause and effect may be similar and dissimilar. A paddy grain produces paddy and a barley grain produces barley.

¹ *Vm*, XVII, 109.

Here the two are homogeneous. Matter produces an immaterial effect (*viz.* cognition) and *vice versa*. In the material plane, the wool of the cow is believed to be the cause of *dūrvā* grass. It is a case of heterogeneous causation. But the origination of *dūrvā* from the *dūrvā* seed is a case of homogeneous causation.

From the examples cited above, it follows that the relation of causality is to be understood in the light of experience. It is always empirical in character and is as ultimate as the nature of things.

6. Buddhaghosa¹ introduces another problem which brings out a very interesting feature of causation. How can the moral *kamma* of the previous life be the condition of the succeeding life? The intellectual and moral habits and tendencies of the past life are supposed to determine those of the next. The relation between the two is necessarily causal in character. But how can the causal relation be explained unless there be contact between them, both in time and space? The past consciousness does not migrate to the present birth, much less the moral and intellectual tendencies and dispositions inherent in it. The conscious life that is manifested in the present birth is altogether a new phenomenon supposed to be conditioned by the conative dispositions of the past conscious life. Buddhaghosa does not consider it to be a puzzle at all. It is not necessary that the cause should continue bodily into the present. There is a nexus between cause and effect. But it is not necessarily a case of persistene in space-time continuum. The sound produces the echo which is not the reproduction of the former. A figure produces its reflection in the mirror. One model can produce a number of like phenomena. There is no continuity or migration of one in the other. But there is no room for doubt that the predecessor determines the successor. The causal relation between them is not disputed by anybody in spite of the spatio-temporal hiatus. So there is no particular difficulty in tracing the causal relation between the past and the succeeding birth.

It may be urged that the examples cited are not quite analogous. In the causal relation between a sound and an echo, and the orginal and the image, the successor is not believed to be identical with the

¹ *Vm*, XVII. 164-7.

predecessor. They are numerically different. But in the case of rebirth, it is the same personality which is supposed to undergo rebirths. The living person in the present is supposed to experience the results of his past acts, good or bad. Thus there is continuity and how can this be explained in the face of the break of spatio-temporal continuum?

Buddhaghosa offers a solution of the problem by an argument of the logic of indeterminacy. He admits that there is a continuity of the psychical complex which functions as a personality. But this continuity does not mean the identity of the past with the present. Each succeeding moment is determined by the preceding moment in the series. There is the continuity of the causal relation in the sense that A is the cause of B, B is the cause of C, and C is the cause of D, and so on. There is a continuum, though not spatio-temporal, but causal. This continuum constitutes the individuality of the psychical complex and marks it out from others. Thus the good or bad action in the past produces a result in the present or the future in the same continuum and not in another. It is comparable to the continuity of rivers and streams. Though each particle of water is different from others, there is a continuum which differentiates one river from another. Such is the case with the consciousness-continuum. It is also like a stream in which the successor follows the predecessor without break. This continuity is not a case of absolute identity or absolute otherness. When the milk turns into curd, there is a causal continuity. The curd is certainly not identical with the milk from which it is produced. But it is not absolutely different either. The milk in the house of A does not produce the curd in the house of B. There is no such thing as substance in the sense of an underlying and abiding identity. But the causal continuity is not denied. Thus there is no special difficulty in the case of personality which is neither identical with nor different from its predecessor and successor.

The problem of rebirth does not offer a difficulty which requires special solution. It is the same with the continuity of personality in one life. Here the preceding psyche is not the same as the succeeding one, nor is it different. This absence of numerical difference accounts for the continuity of the psyche in different births and stations. The

absence of numerical identity precludes the fallacy of the sole identity.

7. Now we address ourselves to another problem raised by Buddhaghosa.¹ The past act is admitted to be the condition of the subsequent consequence. Does the past continue bodily up till the time of the consequence, or not? If it does not continue, how can it produce the effect? If the absence of the condition can produce the effect, it could do so before its occurrence and after its cessation. This supposition would take away the entire ground for the belief in the law of *kamma*. If the existence of the condition were necessary for the production of the effect, it would have produced the effect at the time of its occurrence, which is very seldom found to be the case. Buddhaghosa answers this question as follows. The past act is the condition of the present simply because it was a factual event. Its existence after its occurrence is irrelevant. This is illustrated by Buddhaghosa by the example of suretyship. A person stands surety for the redemption of a loan or the honouring of a pledge. The act of standing surety is a momentary event, and though it does not bodily continue, it does not cease to be effective until the pledge is redeemed. Its effectiveness does not continue after the satisfaction of the loan or pledge. Such is the case with the past acts. Their very occurrence in the history of the person at some moment is the sufficient guarantee of the future occurrence of the outcome. There is no further occurrence of singular consequences on account of the past act after the relevant consequence has once materialized.

This theory of causation is comparable to the theory of Mnemic Causation as propounded by Mr Russell and interpreted by Professor Broad.² Russell does not believe in trace or disposition. If a man has experienced an event in the past, he remembers it at some future date by dint of the past experience though it has long ceased to exist and is not represented by any trace. Professor Broad has however taken strong exception to this theory. He has given the example of blowing of hooter both at Liverpool and at London at the same time. The sound of hooter is followed by the exit of the factory workers at both

¹ *Vm*, XVII, 173-4.

² *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, pp. 440 ff.

the places. Yet the Liverpool hooter is not regarded as the cause of the departure of the workers in London. How can this be explained except on the basis of some sort of spatio-temporal continuum? The theory of Buddhaghosa also would be subject to the same question. He does not believe in spatio-temporal continuum and yet regards the past event as the condition of the future consequence. The past event is asserted to determine the future simply by dint of its occurrence. The later Buddhist philosophers demurred to accept this hypothesis. The Sarvāstivādins believed in the bodily presence of the condition and the Sautrāntikas believed that the continual recurrence of the condition produced the change in the future history of the thing-continuum. In the mental plane they posited the continuity of the trace.

Whatever may be the merit of the theory, it is a remarkable coincidence that two thinkers separated by a gulf of centuries should think alike. Buddhaghosa undoubtedly anticipated Russell and the likeness of the two theories is remarkable.

8. TYPES OF CAUSAL CONDITIONS

8. *Types of causal conditions.* We now propose to take up the different classifications of causal conditions (*paccaya*) as defined and illustrated in the *Visuddhimagga*. We shall see that the conception of causality in the old Theravāda is very wide and comprehensive in its scope and includes not only antecedent conditions but also co-existent and co-efficient factors. The conception of cause of the Sautrāntika school as elucidated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and his followers is remarkable for its resemblance to the conception of cause in science and philosophy in modern thought. We shall however give our independent views based on the criticism of the varieties of causal relation set forth in the school of Theravāda. We shall show, in dealing with the Sarvāstivāda school, that the latter is profoundly influenced by the Theravāda conception of causation. This of course is reserved by us for future treatment.

That, depending upon which, a fact arises is a causal condition (*paccaya*). In other words, when one fact determines another the former

is the causal condition of the latter. Dependence and determination are to be understood as nothing but inseparability of the terms. A fact which is conceived to be indispensable for the origination (*uppatti*) and continuance (*thiti*) of another is also to be regarded as a cause in respect of the latter.

Pāli Buddhism has recognized twenty-four types of causal conditions, a short account of which is given below.

8 (i). *Hetu-paccaya* (root-condition). The principal interest of Theravāda is the determination of psycho-ethical phenomena as they are determined by the ethical factors. The *hetu* is one such factor. It is an untranslatable word and has been rendered 'root-condition' only tentatively.

The term *hetu* stands for the six moral factors, viz. greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*), delusion (*moha*), unselfishness (*alobha*), love (*adosa*) and insight (*amoha*). These factors help to consolidate the material and psychical factors co-existent with them even as the root (*mūla*) of a tree helps the consolidation of the other parts of the tree (and this is also the reason why we have rendered *hetu* as 'root'). A *hetu* moreover contributes towards the determination of the nature of the aggregates of *rūpa* originating from the mind (*citta*)¹ which the *hetu* is associated with.

As the mind is a complex of a number of psychic factors inseparably associated with one another, it goes without saying that a *hetu* is only one of the factors constituting the mind even as the root of a tree is only one of the constituents of the tree. In other words, the relation between a *hetu* and the associated psychical factors together with the material aggregates originating from them is the same as the relation between the root and the other parts of the tree. And obviously this is an instance of relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (ii). *Ārammanā-paccaya* (epistemological condition)² *Ārammanā* means an 'object of cognition'. Even as a weak man can neither get up nor stand erect without the help of a stick, so the mind and the psychical factors can neither arise nor continue without an object of

¹ For an idea of the aggregates of *rūpa*, originated by mind, *vide infra* 10 (iv).

² *Vide The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 443.

cognition. As the stick is a support (*ālambana*) of the weak, so is an object (*ārammāna*) the support of the mental event. It is in view of this important contribution of an object towards the origin and continuity of the mind that the former is regarded as a causal condition of the latter.

Now, as Buddhism believes in the possibility of omniscience, it is admitted that everything—past, present or future—can act as an epistemological condition of the cognizing mind.

8 (iii). *Adhipati-paccaya* (dominant condition). What stands out as a dominant force over the rest of the associated factors is *adhipati*. This *adhipati* is twofold according as it is (a) a psychical factor 'dominant over the rest of the factors co-originating with itself' (*sahajātādhipati*) or (b) an epistemological condition which overrides other epistemological conditions (*ārammāṇādhipati*).

8 (iii) (a). *Sahajātādhipati* (what is dominant over the co-originating factors). Any of the four factors—viz. desire-to-do or intention (*chanda*), energy or effort (*viriya*), will (*citta*) and reason or intellect (*vīmaṇsā*)—can be dominant over the rest of the factors, psychical and physical, co-originating with it (*sahajātādhipati*).

"These above four factors", in the words of Ledi Sadaw, "form the bases of the accomplishment of great things. A sufficiently powerful intention will, sooner or later, achieve its object, however great, whether that be meritorious or otherwise. An equally supreme effort which surmounts all obstacles and difficulties in labour and hardship will certainly carry its object through. A sufficiently strong will is equally bound to effect its object. Intellectual reason which gets the upper hand cannot fail to accomplish its ends, either in the acquisition of knowledge or in the solution of intricate problems."¹

The instances given above illustrate the relation as obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (iii) (b). *Ārammāṇādhipati* (dominant epistemological condition). *Ārammāṇā*, as already stated, means an object of cognition, and when this *ārammāṇā* dominates over the cognizing consciousness by attracting its undivided attention towards itself, it is a case of *ārammāṇā-*

Vide JPTS, 1915-16, p. 36.

dhipati. "In this causal relation", says Ledi Sadaw, "certain objects of great regard may dominate the percipient mind, as when a person who seeks gold is possessed and obsessed by the dominant idea of that precious metal."¹

8 (iv). *Anantara-paccaya* (immediately antecedent condition). A phenomenon which conditions another phenomenon by virtue of its immediate antecedence to the latter is an *anantara-paccaya*.² Thus the *cakkhu-viññāna* (visual sensation) which is immediately followed by the *manodhātu*³ is an *anantara-paccaya* of the latter. Similarly the *manodhātu* also stands to the *manoviññāṇadhātu*⁴ which immediately follows the former in the same relation.

This relation is strictly restricted in its application to the sphere of psychical states originating in unbroken succession.

It goes without saying that this is a relation obtaining between terms which occur in succession.

8 (v). *Samanantara-paccaya*. The *samanantara-paccaya* is identical with the *anantara-paccaya* in meaning, there being difference only in respect of nomenclature.⁴

Buddhaghosa refers to ancient masters who interpreted the *anantara-paccaya* as concerned with the succession of states of consciousness (*atthānantaratā*) only, and the *samanantara-paccaya* as concerned simply with their temporal sequence (*kālānantaratā*). He, however, repudiates the authenticity of this distinction by quoting a scriptural text⁵ which runs counter to this interpretation. This text states that the last *moment* of the last stage of the *ariūpajjhāna*, which is followed by an absolute suspension of consciousness for the desired period of time, is the *samanantara-paccaya* of the *moment* of fruit-consciousness which is attained immediately after the termination of the period of suspension. Now, if temporal sequence (*kālānantaratā*) had been the only criterion of a *samanantara-paccaya*, the above moments ought not to have been

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-7.

² anantarabhāvena upakārako dhammo anantara-paccayo.—*Vm*, XVII. 73.

³ *Vide infra* 10 (iii).

⁴ Cf. yo anantara-paccayo s'veva samananta-rapa-paccayo. vyāñjanamattameva h'ettha nānāñ. attatho pana nānāñ nathī.—*Vm*, XVII. 74.

⁵ The text is: nirodhā vutthahantassa nevasaññā-nāsannāyatana-kusalāñ p halasamāpattiya samananta-rapa-paccayena paccayo.—*Vide Vm*, XVII. 75.

regarded as standing in this relation, inasmuch as the intervening period of suspension clearly proves the absence of temporal sequence (in the sense of immediate antecedence of the cause to the effect). On the contrary, the case under consideration is an instance of a close succession of two states of consciousness (*athānantarātā*) inasmuch as there is no other state of consciousness intervening between the moment of *arūpajjhāna* and the moment of fruit-consciousness, the period of suspension being nothing but pure and uncharacterized flow of time absolutely free from any effect on the moments of consciousness at its two termini.¹

It is, of course, possible to draw a line of demarcation between the two *paccayas* with reference to the two different aspects of the selfsame situation, to which they respectively refer. Thus the *anantara*-relation refers to the aspect of succession only while the *samanantara*-relation refers to the aspect of the absence of any gap (*sañthānābhāva*) between the two states of consciousness occurring in succession.² This distinction however is only verbal and not ontological.

8 (vi). *Sahajāta-paccaya* (the co-originating condition). What renders service by effecting the co-origination of others along with its own origination, even as a light produces illumination simultaneously with its origination, is a *sahajāta-paccaya*. Thus (a) the four mental aggregates of *vijñāna* (consciousness), *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (conceiving) and *saṅkhāra* (dispositions) are mutually related in this *sahajāta*-relation, because all of them originate together and each one is the condition of the other three in the sense that it is impossible for the three to arise without the remaining one. Similarly, (b) the four primary material elements (*mahābhūtas*)³ as well as (c) the *nāma* or mind (which is but a term standing for the four mental aggregates) and the *kamma*-born *rūpa* (material aggregates) at the moment of rebirth⁴ are also mutually related in the

¹ Vide *Vm*, XVII. 75-6.

² Cf. natthi etesai antaraṁ ti hi anantarā, sañthānābhāvato suṭṭhu anantarā ti samanantara.—*Vm*, XVII. 76. Also *JPTS*, 1915-6, pp. 37-8.

³ Vide *infra* 10 (iv).

⁴ *Nāma* and *rūpa* at the first moment of rebirth (*okkanti* or *paṭisandhi*) originate together and hence they stand to one another in this relation. From the second moment onward the relation does not hold good because *rūpa* lasts for more than one moment and thus the synchronism is disturbed.

same way. Again, the same is the relation between (d) the psychical factors and the material aggregates originating from them (*cittasamutthāna-rūpa*)¹, (e) the primary elements and the secondary aggregates arising from those elements, as also (f) the heart-base (*hadaya-vatthu*) and the relevant mental aggregates at the moment of rebirth.² In the last three cases the relation is asymmetrical while in the first three it is symmetrical, the two terms of the relation being interchangeable.

The *sahajātātā* is obviously a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (vii). *Aññamañña-paccaya* (reciprocal conditions). The factors which assist one another in respect of their origination (*uppādana*) and continuance (*upathambhana*)—like the three legs of a tripod, supporting one another—stand to one another as *aññamañña-paccaya*.

This relation is symmetrical and obviously a species of the *sahajātā*-relation. It holds good only in the first three cases enumerated under the *sahajāta-paccaya*.

8 (viii). *Nissaya* (stay, support, basis). What is of service by being a locus (*adhiṭṭhāna*) or a supporting medium (*nissaya*)—as the earth is to a tree or the canvas to a portrait—is called a *nissaya-paccaya*.

A *sahajāta-paccaya* (and *a fortiori* an *aññamañña-paccaya* also) is necessarily a *nissaya-paccaya*, because a *sahajāta* functions also as a support for the factors co-originating with it. But a *nissaya* is not necessarily a *sahajāta* inasmuch as a *purejāta* (pre-originated)³ factor also can function as a *nissaya* (base). Thus the sense-organ of eye, which has originated beforehand, serves as the *nissaya* (base) of the posterior visual sensation together with the psychical factors associated with it. The same relation holds good also between the remaining sense-organs and their respective sensations (together with their psychical associates). As regards the *hadaya-vatthu* (heart-base), it is also the *nissaya* (base) of the *manodhātu*⁴ and the *manovinnāṇadhātu*⁵ which depend upon the *hadayavatthu* (though arisen beforehand) for their origination.

The *nissayatā* is evidently a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

¹ *Vide infra* 10 (iv).

² *Vide supra* footnote 4, p. 197.

³ *Vide infra* 8 (x).

⁴ *Vide infra* 10 (iii).

⁵ *Vide infra* 10 (iii).

8 (ix). *Upanissaya-paccaya* (a powerful condition). What is of service by virtue of its intrinsic power is an *upanissaya-paccaya*.¹ The distinction between an *adhipati* and an *upanissaya* appears to lie in the fact that the former derives its predominance from the interest and inclination of the person, while the latter is possessed of an intrinsic power and importance. An *upanissaya* can be of three kinds, *viz.* *ārammaṇūpanissaya*, *anantarūpanissaya* and *pakatūpanissaya*, as described below.

8 (ix) (a). *Ārammaṇūpanissaya* (a powerful epistemological condition). There is no ontological difference between an *ārammaṇādhipati*² and an *ārammaṇūpanissaya*, and hence the latter does not require separate elucidation. The distinction, if any, between the two is but formal—the former referring to the aspect of domination of the object over the percipient mind on account of its special interest in the object, and the latter to the aspect of intrinsic power of the object in attracting the percipient mind.³

8 (ix) (b). *Anantarūpanissaya* (a powerful antecedent condition). The *anantarūpanissaya* is ontologically identical with the *anantara*.⁴ A formal distinction between the two can however be drawn. *Anantaratā* refers to the aspect of 'immediate antecedence' while the *anantarūpanissayatā* stresses the aspect of 'intrinsic power' of a consciousness-unit to give rise to a similar unit in the immediately succeeding moment.

A consciousness-unit cannot arise in the absence of the immediately antecedent consciousness-unit, and it is this indispensability of the antecedent that is responsible for its being called an intrinsically powerful condition (*blava-paccaya*).⁵

8 (ix) (c). *Pakatūpanissaya*. Buddhaghosa gives two different derivations of the term, *viz.* (a) *pakata+upanissaya* and (b) *pakati+upanissaya*—*pakata* meaning *nipphādita* (what is acquired, referring to such virtues as *saddhā* 'faith', *sīla* 'moral vows' and the like), or *upasevita* ('what is enjoyed', referring to *utu* 'temperature', *bhojana* 'food' and the like);

¹ blavakāraṇabhāvena upakārako dhammo upanissayapaccayo.—Vm, XVII. 80.

² Vide supra 8 (iii) (b).

³ Vm, XVII. 81.

⁴ Vide supra 8 (iv).

⁵ Vide Vm, XVII, 82-3.

and *pakati* meaning 'nature'. Thus a *pakatūpanissaya* is a powerful virtue acquired, or a powerful thing enjoyed, or a factor which is powerful by nature. But this is only an attempt at etymological derivation. In fact, whatever *upanissaya* does not fall under the other two kinds belongs to this.¹ Thus, when a person inspired by *saddhā* (faith) gives alms, or takes a moral vow, the *saddhā* stands to those acts as a *pakatūpanissaya*.

8 (x). *Purejāta-paccaya* (pre-originated condition). What having arisen beforehand renders service by its presence is a *purejāta-paccaya*. The five sense-organs (*vatthu*), the five objects (*ārammaṇa*) and the *hadaya-vatthu* (heart-base)—all these eleven material aggregates stand to the cognitive functions appertaining to them as *purejāta-paccaya*.

A material aggregate continues to last normally for seventeen thought-moments² which is also the maximum length of a process of cognition from its beginning to end, seventeen being the maximum number of states of consciousness arising in succession and in a fixed order.³ A sense-organ (*vatthu*) cannot condition sensation, nor can a material object be sensed, nor can the heart-base (*hadaya-vatthu*) condition the *manodhātu* and the *manovīññāṇadhātu* until at least one (the first) thought-moment of their total duration of seventeen thought-moments has expired. And hence they are conceived as standing to their cognitive functions as *purejāta-paccayas*.

It is obviously a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent, although the first term comes into being earlier.

8 (xi). *Pacchājāta-paccaya* (posterior causal condition). The psychical factors which render service to the material (physical) aggregates originated beforehand by way of maintaining their continuity, even as the hope (which is a psychical factor) for future acquisition of food

¹ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 84.

² One thought-moment (*cittakkhaṇa*) again has three phases, viz. origination, continuation and cessation.—*Vide CP*, p. 125.

³ *Vide CP*, pp. 26-30. The purpose (as also a justification) of assigning a maximum duration of seventeen thought-moments to the material aggregates perhaps is to establish harmony between matter and the cognitive process of mind. Unless such duration is assigned to matter, it will ever remain unrelated to mind, the matter sensed being quite different from the matter presented, the matter received (in *sampaticchana*) being quite different from the matter sensed, and so on.

(āhārāśācetanā) maintains the physical organism of young vultures who cannot procure food for themselves, constitute a *pacchājātā-paccaya*. The continuum of physical organism which is an effect of past volitions would last only seventeen thought-moments from the moment of origination unless its continuity were kept uninterrupted on account of the psychical factors (volitions) originating in the second and the following moments. It is by virtue of their capacity for maintaining the continuum uninterrupted that the psychical factors originating in the succeeding moment are regarded as rendering service to the physical organism originated beforehand.

The *pacchājātā* is a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent, although the first term arises later on.

8 (xii). *Āsevana* (repeated practice). What, on account of its repetition, renders service to the immediately succeeding moment by reinforcing the latter's intensity, even as each preceding study augments the student's capacity for the succeeding one, is an *āsevana-paccaya*. It is a relation obtaining between two *javana* (active, volitional) moments occurring in succession, the preceding moment being responsible for the added strength of the succeeding one.

8 (xiii). *Kamma* (volition). What is of service by virtue of its activity in the form of a volition (*cittappayoga*) is a *kamma-paccaya*.¹ This *paccaya* falls into two categories—the first category consisting of those moral and immoral volitions which give rise to their effects at moments other than their own, viz. the moments of rebirth (*patisandhi*), and the second one consisting of the moral and immoral volitions and the volitional aspect (*cetanā*) of all types of consciousness (*citta*) including the non-moral, all of which give rise to their effects simultaneously with themselves.² Thus the past moral and immoral volitions stand as *kamma-paccaya* to their effects which arise in later times in the form of *vipākakkhandhas*³ and the physical organism, at the time of rebirth, while the other moral and immoral volitions together with the volitional aspect (*cetanā*) common to all forms of consciousness stand in this

¹ cittappayogasāikhātena kiriyabhāvena upakārako dhammo kammapaccayo.—Vm, XVII. 88.

² so nānākkhanikāya ceva kusalākusalacetanāya, sahajātāya ca sabbāya pi cetanāya vasena duvidho hoti.—Ibid.

³ The *vipākakkhandhas* are four, viz. *viññāna*, *vedanā*, *saññā* and *sankhāra*.

same relation to the associated psychical factors and the physical organism co-originating on account of those volitions.

The *kamma-paccayatā* is obviously a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent as well as between terms which occur at different moments of the same continuum.

8 (xiv). *Vipāka* (resultant). The resultant psychical factor which, by virtue of its own unenergetic and ineffective character, renders service to others in maintaining a similar character is a *vipāka-paccaya*.¹ The first term of this relation necessarily consists of one or more of the four *vipākakkhandhas*, the second term consisting of the remaining *vipākakkhandhas* together, at the moment of rebirth (*patisandhi*), with the accompanying physical organism originating on account of past *kamma*, the material aggregates originating from the *vipākakkhandhas* themselves being included from the second moment onward.

The *vipāka-paccayatā* is a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (xv). *Āhāra* (nutriment). The four kinds of nutriment (*āhāra*)² which sustain both the physical and the psychical factors constitute the *āhāra-paccaya*. The material (*kabalikāra*) nutriment stands to the body nourished by it as *āhāra-paccaya* while the mental nutriments stand to the associated psychical factors as well as to the physical organism as nourished by those nutriments in this relation.³

It is a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (xvi). *Indriya* (faculty). The *indriyas* (faculties) are powers which determine our various capacities. Thus the faculties (sense-organs) of (i) eye, (ii) ear, (iii) nose, (iv) tongue, and (v) body (skin) determine our capacity for sense-perception; those of (vi) femininity and (vii) masculinity determine the sex capacity for reproduction; the faculty of (viii) vitality (*jīvita*), which is twofold according as it refers to the forces sustaining (a) the physical or (b) the psychical life, is the power determining the continuity of existence; that of (ix) mind (*manas*)

¹ *nirussāhasantabhbhāvena nirussāhasantabhāvāya upakārako vipākadhammo vipākapaccayo.—Vm, XVII. 89.*

² For the four kinds of *āhāra* vide Nyanatiloka: *Buddhist Dictionary* s.v.

³ In the *Pāñhāvāra* however the *vipākakkhandhas* are further regarded as standing to the physical organism, originating, at the moment of rebirth (*patisandhi*), on account of past volitions (*kamma*), in this relation of *āhāra*.—Vide *Vm*, XVII. 90.

determines the power of comprehension; the faculties of (x) pleasure (*sukha*), (xi) pain (*dukkha*), (xii) joy (*somanassa*), (xiii) grief (*domanassa*) and (xiv) indifference (*upekkhā*) determine the nature of our feeling (*vedanā*); the faculties of (xv) *saddhā*, (xvi) *viriya*, (xvii) *sati*, (xviii) *saññāhi* and (xix) *paññā* respectively determine one's capacity for faith in, energy for the pursuit of, mindfulness of, meditation on, and insight into the truth of emancipation; the faculty which impels one to know the unknown (emancipation) is the (xx) *anaññātataññāsāmītindriya*. the process of knowing the unknown is the faculty called (xxi) *aññāndriya*, and the consummation of such process is the faculty called (xxii) *aññātāvindriya*.

Of these twenty-two *indriyas* (faculties), the first seven are exclusively physical while the eighth, viz. the *jīvita* (vitality), can be, as indicated, either physical or psychical, the remaining fourteen being exclusively psychical.

Each one of these faculties (*indriyas*), except the two relating to sex, can function as a *paccaya*. The *indriya-paccayatā* is a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent and as such only those faculties which are invariably accompanied by their correlates should be regarded as *indriya-paccaya*. The function of such *paccayas* is consequently denied to the faculties of sex in view of the fact that although these faculties form the very basis of the corresponding sex-organs, there is complete absence of the latter (which are the expected correlates in this case), during the primary stages of the formation of the foetus, in spite of the presence of those faculties at the time.

The *indriya-paccayatā* thus obtains (i) between the first five faculties which are physical in nature and the cognitions, due to those faculties, together with the psychical factors associated with those cognitions; (ii) between the faculty of physical vitality (*rūpajīvita*) and the physical organism originating on account of past *kamma* (*kaṭattārūpa*); and (iii) between the remaining faculties, which are all psychical in nature, and the associated psychical factors together with the material aggregates originating from those factors.¹

¹ In the *Paññavāra* however the *vipākābyākata indriyas* or the faculties, inherited as the resultant of past *kanūts* at the moment of rebirth (*patisandhi*), are also regarded as *indriya-paccaya* to the associated psychical factors and the physical organism, originating from past *kamma*.—Vide *Vm*, XVII. 91.

It is a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (xvii). *Jhāna*. There are certain psychical factors which are essentially present in the meditative states of mind. Such factors are known as *jhānaṅgas* or the constituents of meditation and their total number is seven, viz. (i) *vitakka* (initial application), (ii) *vicāra* (sustained application), (iii) *pīti* (pleasure), (iv) *ekaggatā* (concentration), (v) *somanassa* (joy), (vi) *domanassa* (grief) and (vii) *upekkhā* (indifference).

A brief reference to the following facts will not be irrelevant in this connection. The factor of *ekaggatā* in the sense of 'attention' is common to all forms of consciousness,¹ and as such *ekaggatā* as a property of the meditative mind is to be understood as 'sustained attention' or 'concentration' as distinguished from the former. The three factors of *somanassa*, *domanassa* and *upekkhā*, being but the different forms of *vedanā* (feeling), are sometimes referred to by the single term *vedanā*. Now *vedanā* (feeling), like *ekaggatā*, is also a common property of all forms of consciousness,¹ and as such *vedanā* as a property of the meditative mind is also to be understood as 'sustained feeling' as distinguished from the former.

Vitakka or the initial application of the mind to its object is the basic condition of meditation and so the five (or ten, if the distinction of *kusala-vipāka* and *akusala-vipāka* is taken into consideration) forms of sensation (*vñññāṇa*)², which are incapable of such application, cannot *ipso facto* possess any of the seven constituents of meditation.³

The factor of *domanassa* (grief), which is absolutely immoral, can be found only in the two forms of immoral consciousness rooted in repugnance (*patigha*). The other six factors can be found in all classes of consciousness—moral, immoral or non-moral.

The *jhānaṅgas*, inasmuch as they render service to the meditative states of mind, stand as *jhāna-paccaya* to the meditative states together with the material aggregates originating from those states.⁴

¹ *As*, II. 2.

² *Vide infra* 10(iii).

³ *Vide AV*, p. 128 (206).

⁴ In the *Paññavāra* however the *vipākābyākata jhānaṅgas*, inherited as the resultant of past *kamma*, at the moment of rebirth (*patisandhi*), are also regarded as standing as *jhāna-paccaya* to the associated psychical factors and the physical organism, originating from past *kamma*. *Vide VM*, XVII. 92.

It is obviously a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (xviii). *Magga* (path). What leads either to an evil form of existence, or to a good form of existence, or to *nibbāna* (emancipation) is a *magga* or path and the possible constituents of such path are known as *maggāṅgas*. There are twelve such *maggāṅgas*, viz. (i) right view or approach (*sammā-dītti*), (ii) right will or intention (*sammā-saṅkappa*), (iii) right speech (*sammā-vācā*), (iv) right action (*sammā-kammanta*), (v) right living (*sammā-ājīva*), (vi) right energy or exertion (*sammā-vāyāma*), (vii) right mindfulness (*sammā-sati*), right concentration (*sammā-samādhi*), (ix) perverted view or approach (*micchā-dītti*), (x) perverted will or intention (*micchā-saṅkappa*), (xi) misdirected energy or exertion (*micchā-vāyāma*), and (xii) misdirected concentration (*micchā-samādhi*). The third, fourth and fifth *maggāṅgas* are the three abstentions (*virati*), viz. abstention from faulty speech, abstention from faulty action, and abstention from faulty living—all of which, being conscious efforts at avoiding faults, are moral.

The *magga* is a voluntary exertion and hence its constituents must necessarily be psychical in nature. Thus the first eight *maggāṅgas* are respectively the moral factors (*kusala-cetasikas*) known as *paññā*, (*kusala-*) *vitakka*, the triple *virati*, (*kusala-*) *viriya*, *sati*, and (*kusala-*) *ekaggata*; the last four being respectively identical with the immoral factors (*akusala-cetasikas*), viz. *dītti*, (*akusala-*) *vitakka*, (*akusala-*) *viriya* and (*akusala-*) *ekaggatā*. We can ignore the immoral factors corresponding to the triple *virati* and *sati* inasmuch as *avirati* (as opposed to *virati* which is moral) and *micchā-sati* involve little voluntary exertion. In fact, *micchā-vācā*, *micchā-kammanta* and *micchā-ājīva* are composites of the psychical factor of *micchā-saṅkappa* plus one of the three material factors of physical activity—vocal (in the case of *vācā*), bodily (in the case of *kammanta*), or a combination of the two (in the case of *ājīva*); and the *micchā-sati* is, to be exact, the absence of *sammā-sati*, and hence something negative.

It should be noted in this connection that the essential condition of a psychical factor being a *maggāṅga* is its association with a *hetu*¹, and,

¹ For the meaning of *hetu*, *vide supra* 8(i).

therefore, none of the *maggāṅgas* occurring in an *ahetuka-citta*¹ are *maggatigas* proper.² A *maggā*, as stated, is a voluntary exertion. And as an exertion must have an impelling force as its source, it is but proper to admit that a *maggāṅga* is necessarily associated with a *hetu* which is a force, determining the moral or immoral character of the mind.

The *maggāṅgas* stand as *maggā-paccaya* to the factors composing a *maggā-citta* together with the material aggregates originating from them.³

This is obviously a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (xix). *Sampayutta* (associated). The psychical factors which render service to one another on account of their mutual association in the form of having a common physical base (*ekavatthu*), a common object of cognition (*ekārammaṇa*), simultaneous origination (*ekuppāda*) and simultaneous cessation (*ekanirodha*), are known as standing to one another as associated conditions (*sampayutta-paccaya*). Thus the four psychical aggregates of *viññāṇa* (consciousness), *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (conceiving) and *saṅkhāra* (dispositions) stand to one another in this relation.

This is a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (xx). *Vippayutta* (dissociated). The physical factors rendering service to the psychical ones are related to the latter as *vippayutta-paccaya*; and similarly the psychical factors rendering service to the physical ones are related to the latter in the same way. In one word, the *vippayutta-paccayatā* is a relation obtaining between terms which are mutually opposed in nature—the one being psychical and the other physical—and yet render service to one another. This *paccaya* recognizes the unbridgeable gap between mind and matter, appreciating at the same time the necessity of causal relation between the two.

¹ For the eighteen forms of *ahetuka-citta* vide *As*, I. 7-10; also *infra* 10 (iii).

² cf. *atthārasāhetukesa hetuvirahato maggāṅgāni na labbhanti; hetupacchimakam maggāṅgan'ti hi vuttam*.—*AV* p. 128. (206).

³ In the *Pañhāvāra* however the *maggāṅgas*, inherited as the resultant of past *kamma*, at the moment of rebirth, are also regarded as standing as *maggā-paccaya* to the associated psychical factors and the physical organism, originating from past *kamma*.—*Vide Vm*, XVII. 93.

The first term of this relation can be *sahajāta* (co-originated), or *pacchājāta* (post-originated), or *purejāta* (pre-originated). Thus the co-originated psychical factors stand in the relation of dissociation to the physical factors originating simultaneously from those psychical factors; the post-originated psychical factors stand in the same relation to the physical organism (*kāya*) serving as the basis of the former; the pre-originated eye-organ stands in the same relation to the eye-consciousness, the former being the base of the latter; and so on.

The *vippayutta-paccayatā* is a relation obtaining between terms which are co-existent.

8 (xxi). *Atthi* (co-present). The *atthi-paccayatā* (relation of co-presence) is a relation obtaining between those causally related terms which are co-present. In the *sampayutta*, both the terms are necessarily psychical, and the *vippayutta* is a relation between the psychical and the physical. But in the *atthi-paccaya* no such restriction is made and merely the causal co-presence is stressed upon. In brief, the *atthi-paccaya* includes in itself the *sampayutta* and the *vippayutta*, and further applies to the relations obtaining between the physical and the physical.

8 (xxii). *Natthi* (non-presence). The immediately preceding psychical factors stand as *natthi-paccaya* to the immediately succeeding psychical factors, by virtue of their giving the latter an opportunity to arise (*pavatti-okāsa-dānena*). There is no essential difference between this *paccaya* and the *anantara* and hence further elucidation is unnecessary.

8 (xxiii). *Vigata* (past). The *vigata-paccaya* is essentially the same as the *natthi-paccaya*, the former recognizing the character of 'pastness' of the first term while the latter stresses upon the character of 'non-presence' of the same.

8 (xxiv). *Avigata* (non-past). This *paccaya* is essentially the same as the *atthi-paccaya*, the former recognizing the 'non-pastness' of the first term while the latter stresses upon the 'co-presence' of the same.

9. PATICCASAMUPPADA ILLUSTRATED

9. Now, after an exposition of the nature of causality and a brief account of the types of causal conditions, we quote in this section,

by way of illustration, the well known causal chain of twelve terms, embodied in eleven propositions, and in the subsequent sections shall attempt to understand the meanings of the terms and specify the nature of the causal relations in which each of them stands to the succeeding one.

THE CAUSAL CHAIN

"On account of (i) ignorance (*avijjā*) there arise (ii) conative dispositions (*saṅkhāra*); on account of conative dispositions there arises (iii) resultant consciousness (*vijñāna*); on account of resultant consciousness there arises (iv) mind-body (*nāma-rūpa*); on account of mind-body there arise (v) six sense-organs (*sal-āyatana*); on account of six sense-organs there arises (vi) sense-impression (*phassa*); on account of sense-impression there arises (vii) feeling (*vedanā*); on account of feeling there arises (viii) craving (*tāṇhā*); on account of craving there arises (ix) clinging (*upādāna*); on account of clinging there arises (x) process of becoming (*bhava*); on account of process of becoming there arises (xi) rebirth (*jāti*); on account of rebirth there arises (xii) decay-death (*jarā-marana*)."¹ This is the complete chain in its usual order which may be called *positive* as distinguished from the *negative* one wherein it is shown that on the cessation of the preceding factor the succeeding one does not arise any more. In some texts, however, the chain starts from the middle—say from the seventh proposition—and proceeds up to the last. In yet others, the chain starts from the last and proceeds in the reverse order up to the first proposition. The fourth mode of statement is to start from the middle—say from the eighth proposition—and proceed in the reverse order up to the first.¹

The different forms of the causal chain are necessitated by the requirements of the disciples. Thus for those who are deluded about the conditions of origin of the manifold factors of the world process, the complete chain in its usual order is a desideratum. Similarly for those who have, uppermost in their mind, the problem of birth and death and universal suffering, the third method which proceeds in the reverse order from the last to the first proposition is of supreme im-

¹ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 28-32.

portance inasmuch as it starts with what is so dominant in their mind and gradually leads them to penetrate into the ultimate source of all suffering. The fourth mode which proceeds from the middle towards the beginning is meant for penetrating into the past to explain the present while the second which proceeds from the middle towards the end serves the purpose of penetrating into the present to find conditions for the future.¹

It should be noted in this connection that, although ignorance (*avijjā*) is here given as the ultimate cause, it is not an 'uncaused cause' like the Primordial Matter (*Prakṛti*) of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, because such scriptural statement as 'There is the rising of ignorance (*avijjā*) on account of the rising of the effluences (*āśavas*)'² unambiguously reveals that ignorance itself has a cause for its arising. Ignorance can, however, be regarded as an 'ultimate cause' (*mūla-kāraṇa*) inasmuch as it is one of the two fountainheads—craving for existence or simply craving (*bhavataṇhā*) being the second—of the worldly process.³ Both 'ignorance' and 'craving' are beginningless, though not uncaused. One is essentially associated with the other and the two can never be separated. Both swim or sink together. The two can, however, be distinguished in respect of function. Ignorance is a specific condition of such volitions (*kamma*) as are responsible for 'bad form of life' while 'craving' is a specific condition of the volitions leading to a 'good form of life'.⁴ An attempt at grasping this functional distinction more fully will not perhaps be irrelevant.

'Ignorance', being a perverted belief, is an aspect of knowing, while 'craving', being a kind of hankering, is a phase of willing. But as knowing and willing are two distinct, though inseparable, functions

¹ Cf. *Vm*, XVII. 34.

² The effluences (*āśavas*) are so called because they flow out (*āśavanti*) as it were towards the things of the world in order to create an attachment for them. Thus it is on account of the existence of the *kāmāśava* that one gets attached to the objects of enjoyment (*kāma*). Similarly the *bhavāśava* keeps one attached to the different forms of existence (*bhava*), the *dithāśava* to wrong views (*dithi*) and the *avijjāśava* to ignorance (*avijjā*). The *āśavas* therefore are the basic defilements or depravities that are responsible for the evils of life, *avijjā* being one of those evils. For further details *vide Vm*, XXII. 56.; *DS* 1096-1100 with *AS*; *AV*, pp. 123-4.

³ *Vm*, XVII. 36.

⁴ Cf. *Vm*, XVII. 37-41.

of the mind, ignorance and craving can also be similarly distinguished. Now of the two—ignorance and craving—when ignorance reigns supreme the mind becomes practically an automaton having no hold upon the course of its own development and the result is a process of unrelieved suffering and misery; when, however, the hold of ignorance slackens and the will *qua* craving grows dominant, the mind becomes free to guide its own destiny. The chain of causation is said to be headed by ignorance when the perverted belief lies dominant at its root, and by craving when a hankering for higher life reigns supreme at the source. The dominant determines the weak and as such can be regarded as a condition of the latter. It is in this sense that ignorance and craving can be said to condition each other. Ignorance, as said, is not 'uncaused' because—(1) it is, like other psychic factors, dynamic; (2) it is conditioned, as shown, by the effluences (*āsavas*); and (3) it is eradicable unlike an uncaused entity.

10. THE TWELVE TERMS EXPLAINED

10 (i). *Avijjā*—(ignorance). *Avijjā*, in the *Sutta* tradition, is ignorance about the four truths of suffering, cause of suffering, cessation of suffering and the pathway leading to that cessation. In the Abhidhamma tradition, however, the ignorance about the beginning in the past, the end in the future, the beginning-cum-end, and causality including the things caused is also regarded as falling under it. The chief function of *avijjā* is to delude the mind. It is felt as covering the truth and is itself conditioned, as stated above, by the 'effluences' (*āsavas*).

In brief, *avijjā* is a wrong assessment, based on the static view of reality, of the values of things, and also a wrong attitude giving rise to a number of absurd metaphysical theories concerning the beginning and end of the universe, the existence of a Creator God, and uncaused eternal entities like self and matter. Scepticism about the moral law and its purpose is also a product of this *avijjā*.

10 (ii). *Saṅkhāra* (volitions; conative dispositions; *kamma*-forces). *Saṅkhāras* are volitions (*cetanā*)—meritorious (*puñña*), demeritorious (*apuñña*) and 'steadfast' (*āneñja*), the first and the last being moral and

the second immoral. The forces resulting from these volitions and blossoming, in due course and in accordance with those volitions, into a particular conglomerate of psychic factors, are also to be included under *sañkhāra*. It is in view of this wide connotation of it that the term has been rendered as 'kamma-forces'.

The volitions actuated by the *hetus*¹ of self-sacrificingness (*alobha*), love (*adosa*) and insight (*amoha*) are moral while those actuated by greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*) are immoral. In the domain of meditation, the mind concentrated on form (*rūpāvacara*)² and also the mind concentrated on the formless (*arūpāvacara*)³ are moral although the latter is regarded as *āneñja* 'steadfast' in view of the absolutely detached equilibrium attained in such concentration.

Volitions manifest themselves through the actions of the mind or the vocal organ or the body, and hence those actions also are regarded as moral or immoral in accordance with the nature of those volitions. Concentration, however,—whether it be on form or the formless—is exclusively an action of the mind, and as such is always mental, and never vocal or physical.

10 (iii). *Viññāna* (resultant consciousness). *Saṅkhāras* (kamma-forces), as already suggested, blossom into particular psychic conglomerates or rather moulds. These moulds are called *viññāna* (resultant consciousness). The function of such *viññāna* is twofold, *viz.* (1) to cognize the objects presented, and (2) to constitute the subterranean 'stream of consciousness' (*bhavaṅga*) which is the basis of individuality.

Thus when an agreeable (*ittha*) or a moderately agreeable (*itthamajjhatta*) thing presents itself to the visual, the auditory, the olfactory, the gustatory, or the tactile sense-organ, the *viññāna*⁴, resulting from the moral kamma-forces, does the function of sensing that object. Similarly, when a disagreeable (*aniṭṭha*) or a moderately disagreeable (*aniṭṭhamajjhatta*) object presents itself, the function of sensing it is done by the *viññāna*⁴ resulting from the immoral kamma-

¹ For an acquaintance with the nature of *hetus* and the types of moral and immoral consciousness, *vide CP*, pp. 81–93. Also *vide supra* 8 (i).

² *CP*, pp. 88–90.

³ *CP*, pp. 90–91.

⁴ This *viññāna* is *ahetuka* (without *hetu* 'condition'). *Vide CP*, p. 84, fn 2. The reason for this *viññāna* being called *ahetuka* is probably the fact that it is a very feeble resultant of the moral or immoral acts done in the past.

forces. Objects appear as agreeable or otherwise according as the cognizing consciousness has inherited a sympathetic, neutral or hostile predisposition towards them, the predispositions being nothing but the resultants of the moral or the immoral *kamma*-forces of the past life. In one word, the inherited psychic make-up determines the relation between the cognizer and the cognized.

The two stages of mental cognition, which follow in the wake of the sensations mentioned, are respectively the functions of (1) the twofold *viññāṇa*¹ known as *manodhātu*—resulting from the moral or the immoral *kamma*-forces according as the object sensed is (i) agreeable or (ii) disagreeable—whose function is the reception (*sampaṭicchana*) of the entire background of the sensation, and (2) the threefold *viññāṇa*¹ known as *manoviññāṇadhātu*—resulting from the moral *kamma*-forces if the object is (i) very agreeable or (ii) even moderately agreeable, and from the immoral *kamma*-forces if the object is (iii) disagreeable—whose function is investigation of or enquiry into (*santiṣṭana*) the object received.

We had so far been dealing with the first function of *viññāṇa*, viz. the cognition of the objects presented. Now let us consider the second, viz. the constitution of *bhavaṅga* (subterranean stream of consciousness) which is the result of past actions, moral or immoral. This *bhavaṅga* comes into existence at the very first moment of a 'rebirth' (*patisandhi*) and is continually succeeded by moments, similar to itself, throughout the span of that birth. Its character is determined by the types of actions of which it is the resultant. Thus there are twelve types of immoral actions² which give rise to a *bhavaṅga* forming the basis of a life which is mainly ruled by instincts and is more or less irrational. This *bhavaṅga* is *ahetuka* and is of two kinds corresponding to the last two types, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, of *manoviññāṇadhātu*, viz. (1) resulting from the moral *kamma*-forces when the object is moderately agreeable and (2) resulting from the immoral *kamma*-forces when the object is disagreeable. There are again the eight types of moral actions³ which give rise to the corres-

¹ *Vide* fn. 4, p. 211.

² *Vide CP*, pp. 82-84. Here 'action' means the volitional consciousness inspiring the 'action'.

³ *Vide CP*, pp. 86-7. *Vide* fn 2 for the meaning of 'action'. Also see *As*, 1. 12.

ponding eight kinds of *bhavaṅga*. These ten kinds of *bhavaṅga* belong to the plane of *kāma*.¹ Similarly there are five kinds of *bhavaṅga* in the plane of *rūpa* and four in the plane of *arūpa*—all these being the resultants of the different grades of attainments in meditation. These, in brief, are the seventeen (nineteen minus the two *ahetuka bhavaṅgas* corresponding to two *manoviññāyadhatu*s already counted under the first function) forms in which the second function of *viññāna* (resultant consciousness) finds its expression.

The above forms of the twofold function of *viññāna* are classified under six heads—the five sensations, *viz.* visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and the tactile, falling respectively under the five heads of *cakkhu-*, *sota-*, *ghāna-*, *jivhā-*, and *kāya-viññāna*, and the rest, *viz.* *manodhātu*, *manoviññāyadhatu* and the various kinds of *bhavaṅga*, falling under the sixth head of *manoviññāna*.² The total number of these forms is thirty-two, *viz.* the ten forms of sensation (five of agreeable and five of disagreeable objects), plus the two forms of *manodhātu*, plus the three forms of *manoviññāyadhatu*, plus the seventeen forms mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

10 (iv). *Nāma-rūpa* (mind-body). The term *nāma* here refers to the three conglomerates (*khandhas*) of feeling (*vedanā*), conceiving (*saññā*) and dispositions (*saikhāras*)³ while the term *rūpa* here stands for the four primary material elements (*mahābhūtas*), *viz.* extension (*paṭhavī*), cohesion (*āpo*), heat or temperature (*tejo*) and motion (*vāyo*),⁴ together with their derivatives, so far as they form parts of a living organism (and hence also the rendering of *rūpa* as 'body').

The *nāma-rūpa* is given rise to by *viññāna* which is not, in this context, restricted to its aforesaid connotation of *vipāka-viññāna* (resultant consciousness), but is taken in a wider sense including volitional consciousness as well. This interpretation of the term *viññāna* is necessitated by the fact that, beside the *vipāka-viññāna* giving rise to the physical organism deserved by itself, the volitional

¹ For the meaning of the term *kāma*, *vide CP*, fn. 2, p. 81.

² Cf. *Vm*, XVII. 120.

³ *Vm*, XVII. 187. It should be noticed that *viññāna* is not counted in this connection under *nāma* inasmuch as the *viññāna* is the common source of all these factors.

⁴ *Vide CP*, pp. 154-5.

consciousness also gives rise to bodily humours in conformity with those volitions.¹ The term *nāma-rūpa* also does not stand only for *nāma* and *rūpa* blended together, but severally for *nāma*, *rūpa* and *nāma-cum-rūpa*. This extension of the meaning of the term is necessary because the *viññāna* sometimes (e.g. in the *arūpa*-plane) gives rise to *nāma* alone, sometimes (e.g. in the case of an *asaññasatta* of the *rūpa*-plane) to *rūpa* alone, and sometimes to both *nāma* and *rūpa* blended together (e.g. in the *kāma*-plane).²

An attempt at giving an idea of the different parts of the physical organism, denoted by the term *rūpa*, will not perhaps be irrelevant.

Rūpa qua a purely ‘unorganized’ material object is an aggregate (*kalāpa*) of at least eight material factors, viz. the four primary elements mentioned above, together with colour (*vapṇa*), odour (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*) and nutritive essence (*ojā*). From this it obviously follows that *rūpa* qua a part of a living organism must also of necessity consist of at least these eight factors, and it is worth noting that, although there is no such pure octad (*suddhatthaka*) originating from past actions (*kamma*), there constantly originate pure octads incorporated in the physical organism (of the *kāma* and *rūpa* planes) on account of the influence of mind (*citta*), temperature (*utu*) as well as food value (*āhāra*).³ Among the five sense-organs, the eye is composed of a decad (*dasaka*) consisting of the above octad plus vitality (*jīvita*) and a material factor susceptible to visual sensation, the ear is composed of a decad consisting of the same factors replacing only the last one by a factor susceptible to auditory sensation, and so on regarding the remaining sense-organs of nose, tongue and body (*kāya*). Similarly are composed the female-decad, male-decad and the heart-decad. The possible number of organs in an organism varies according to the plane of life to which it belongs. In the case of those organisms which do not possess the body-decad (*kāya-dasaka*), there is a nonad (*navaka*) composed of the pure octad plus vitality (*jīvita*). All these nine aggregates (eight decads plus one nonad) are originated by moral or immoral actions done in the past.⁴

¹ Cf. *Vm*, XVII. 198-9.

² Cf. *Vm*, XVII. 197.

³ For an idea of the four origins of *rūpa*, viz. *kamma*, *citta*, *utu* and *āhāra*, vide *CP*, pp. 161ff.

⁴ Vide *CP*, p. 164.

The aggregates of *rūpa* originated by mind (*citta*) are : (i) pure octad; (ii) a nonad composed of the pure octad plus the factor of gesticulation (*kāya-viññātī*); (iii) a decad composed of the pure octad plus the two factors of vocal articulation (*vaci-viññātī*) and sound (*sadda*);¹ (iv) a undecad (*ekādasaka*) composed of the three factors of lightness (*lahutā*), pliancy (*mudutā*) and adaptability (*kammaññatā*) added to the pure octad; (v) a dodecad (*dvādasaka*) composed of the preceding undecad plus the factor of gesticulation; and (vi) a tredecad (*terasaka*) composed of the same undecad plus the two factors of vocal articulation and sound.

The material aggregates originating from temperature (*utu*) are : (i) pure octad; (ii) a nonad composed of the pure octad plus sound (sound-nonad), (iii) a undecad composed of the three factors of lightness, pliancy and adaptability added to the pure octad; and (iv) a dodecad composed of the preceding undecad plus sound.

From the food value (*āhāra*) originate the two aggregates of (i) pure octad and (ii) a undecad composed of the three factors of lightness, pliancy and adaptability added to the pure octad.

Of these twenty-one aggregates, the two, viz. the pure octad and the sound-nonad, originating from temperature, are found as components of as well as outside the living organism, while the remaining nineteen are obtained only as components of such organism.

The number of aggregates arising in a particular organism varies according to the plane (*loka*) and 'birthplace' (*yoni*) of that organism.² Generally speaking, the streamlike succession of the aggregates originated by past actions (*kamma*) starts from the very first moment of 'rebirth' (*patisandhi*), that of those originated by mind (*citta*) from the second, of those originated by temperature (*utu*) from the static phase of 'rebirth', and of those originated by food value (*āhāra*) start from the moment of assimilation of the nutritive essence (*ojā*) by the organism.³ This unbroken succession continues till the death of the organism, only to be immediately followed by the succession of another set of

¹ This decad may be identified with the sound-nonad, mentioned in the *Vm* (XVII. 193), as originating from mind (*citta*). The vocal articulation is perhaps left out because of its being an *anipphanna rūpa*.

² *Vide CP*, pp. 165ff.

³ *Vide CP*, p. 166.

aggregates, except when the 'rebirth' occurs in the *arūpa*-plane where there is no physical organism at all.

10 (v). *Sal-āyatana* (six sense-organs). The term *sal-āyatana* refers to the six sense-organs, *viz.* eye, ear, nose, tongue, body (skin) and 'mind'.¹

In the proposition 'On account of *nāma-rūpa* (mind-body) there arise *sal-āyatana* (the six sense-organs)', the terms *nāma-rūpa* and *sal-āyatana* have specific meanings. Thus the term *nāma-rūpa* here stands severally for *nāma* (consisting in the three aggregates of *vedanā* 'feeling', *saññā* 'conceiving', *sankhāra* 'dispositions'), *rūpa* (consisting in the four primary elements, the six *vatthus* 'physical bases of the sense-organs', and the *jīvitindriya* 'vitality'—so far as they are included in one's own continuum), and *nāma* plus *rūpa* jointly. Similarly the term *sal-āyatana* stands severally for 'the sixth sense-organ (i.e. mind)' and 'the six sense-organs in general'. These interpretations are necessitated by the fact that (i) in some cases the *sixth sense-organ only* is given rise to by *nāma* alone, (ii) in others the *six sense-organs in general* are given rise to by it, (iii) in yet others the *sixth sense-organ only* is given rise to by *rūpa* alone, (iv) in still others the *six sense-organs in general* are given rise to by it, (v) in yet others the *sixth sense-organ only* is given rise to by *nāma* and *rūpa* jointly, and (vi) in still others the *six sense-organs in general* are given rise to by them. The specification of these causal relations in terms of different *paccayas* will be undertaken in the eleventh section dealing with the determination of the causal relations obtaining between two successive terms of the causal chain.

10 (vi). *Phassa* (sense-impression). *Phassa* is the 'contact' of a sense-organ (*āyatana*) with its object. This 'contact' is not physical but sensual² and hence the term *phassa* has been rendered as 'sense-impression'. There are six sense-organs and accordingly the sense-impression is also of six kinds. But if the kinds of sense-impression are to be deter-

¹ For a clear idea of this 'mind' (*manāyatana*), *vide CP*, pp. 256-7. It usually stands for all the eighty-nine types of consciousness. Also compare *Vm*, XV. 14. In this place however it should be interpreted as standing for only the thirty-two *vipākavīññānas* enumerated in section 10 (iii). The reason is that mind *qua* the product of *nāma-rūpa* is the subject matter of discussion in the situation under review.

² Cf. *Vm*, XIV. 134.

mined by the forms of *viññāya* associated with it, thirty-two kinds of sense-impression can be distinguished inasmuch as there are thirty-two¹ such forms.²

In the proposition 'On account of *sal-āyatana*, there arises *phassa*', the term *sal-āyatana* is to be explained in two ways according as the proposition is interpreted as laying down the relation between *sal-āyatana* and *phassa* belonging exclusively to the same continuum, or between the two belonging to the same continuum as well as to two different continua.³ In the first way the term *sal-āyatana* is taken to stand for the six sense-organs only, thus referring to the *sixth* alone (as in the case of the *arūpa*-plane) or the *six in general* according to the context. In the second way, the term is taken to stand for all the twelve *āyatanas*—the six sense-organs (referring to the *sixth* alone or the *six in general* according to the context) plus the six objects sensed by those organs. The justification of the second way of explanation lies in the fact that the external objects are as much the condition of the origination of the sense-impression as the internal sense-organs.

It can be noted in this connection that the origination of a single sense-impression is dependent upon a number of *āyatanas*.⁴ Thus a single visual sense-impression is dependent upon the following *āyatanas* (i) the *cakkhāyatana* (the sense-organ of eye), (ii) the *rūpa-āyatana* (the visible form), (iii) the *manāyatana* represented by the faculty of visual sensation, and (iv) the *dhammāyatana* represented by the relevant psychical factors associated with the visual sensation.⁵

10 (vii). *Vedanā* (feeling). The *vedanā* (feeling), as it originates from *phassa*, is, like the latter, either of six or of thirty-two kinds. Although it is, like *phassa*, a common factor of all the eighty-nine types of consciousness, we are here, as in the case of *phassa*,⁶ concerned only with the *vedanā* *qua* a factor of the *vipākaviññāna* which is,

¹ *Vide supra* 10 (iii).

² *Vm*, XVII. 221. *Phassa* is of course present in all the eighty-nine types of consciousness. But as we are concerned here only with *phassa* *qua* a factor of a *vipākaviññāna*, only thirty-two kinds of it are recognized. *Vide also p. 38, fn. 1.*

³ Cf. *Vm*, XVII. 223.

⁴ This reference is to the category of twelve *ayatas*.

⁵ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 225.

⁶ *Vide fn. 2.*

as enumerated above¹, of thirty-two kinds, and this is the reason why only thirty-two kinds of *vedanā* are recognized in the present context.² This *vedanā* leads to *tanhā* (craving) and hence its nature will be determined under the next head which deals with the latter.

10 (viii). *Tanhā* (craving). *Tanhā* is craving for or hankering after the objects of enjoyment. It is of six kinds inasmuch as the objects which it craves for fall into six different categories, *viz.* the visible form (*rūpa*), sound (*sadda*), odour (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*), the 'tangible object' (*phottabba*) and the 'congizable object' (*dhamma*).³ Each of these six kinds of *tanhā* is again threefold because each of the categories of the objects mentioned can be craved for with three different motives. Thus when an object is craved for with the motive of *kāma* or sensual gratification, it is an instance of *kāmatanhā*. Similarly, when the *tanhā* for the object is accompanied with a belief in eternalism (*sassataditthi*), it is called *bhavatañhā*. *Bhava* here means 'rebirth'. Those who are convinced of eternalism cannot get rid of the *tanhā* for the perpetual renewal of births in the world and hence are under the dominance of *bhavatañhā*. In the same way, when the *tanhā* is accompanied with a faith in annihilationism (*uccheda-ditthi*), it is known as *vibhavatañhā*. *Vibhava* means 'annihilation'. Those who believe in absolute annihilation and consequently the absolute negation of the moral order are eternally haunted by a *tanhā* for whatever is near at hand and are never at rest. Such *tanhā* is *vibhavatañhā* inasmuch as it is inspired by a faith in *vibhava* or 'annihilation' of things. The number of the kinds of *tanhā* thus comes to six multiplied by three, that is, eighteen. Each of these eighteen can again refer to either an internal (subjective) or an external (objective) object of craving, and hence the number is doubled and becomes thirty-six. Similarly if the three temporal determinations—*viz.* the past, the present and the future—of each of these thirty-six are taken into consideration, the total number comes to thirty-six multiplied by three or one hundred and eight.⁴

¹ *Vide supra* 10 (iii).

² Cf. *Vm*, XVII. 230.

³ *Vide CP*, pp. 184-5 for the meaning of *dhamma*. *Vide also As III. 19-20,* and *infra* ii (v).

⁴ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 235.

The fountainhead of this *tayhā* is *vedanā* (feeling) inasmuch as it is only after one has felt the pleasure (*sukha*) conditioned by an object that one desires to own it. Here a pertinent question arises as to whether the pleasurable (*sukha*) feeling alone is the source of *tayhā* or the feelings of pain (*dukkha*) and indifference (*upekkhā*) also are to be accepted as giving rise to it. Buddhaghosa admits the possibility of the origin of *tayhā* from all the three kinds of *vedanā* and gives an explanation in support. The painful feeling creates a desire for pleasure, which is nothing but a form of *tayhā*, and hence it should be admitted that *tayhā* can be given rise to by a painful feeling. The feeling of indifference (*upekkhā*), being of the nature of peaceful calmness, is a form of pleasure (*sukha*), and hence its claim to give rise to *tayhā* is as legitimate as that of the feeling of pleasure (*sukha*).¹

Vedanā (feeling) however—whether pleasurable, painful or indifferent—is not, by itself, capable of giving rise to *tayhā*. It is only when it is accompanied with the firmly rooted ‘latent biases’ (*anusayas*)² that the *vedanā* produces *tayhā*, inasmuch as a *vedanā* without these ‘biases’ is innocuous and passes away without producing any sequel.

10 (ix). *Upādāna* (clinging). *Upādāna* (clinging) means firm grasping (*dahī-gahana*). It is of four kinds, viz. *kāmupādāna* (clinging to the objects of sensual enjoyment), *dīttupādāna* (clinging to false views), *sīlabbatupādāna* (clinging to false rituals and disciplines), and *attavāhi-pādāna* (clinging to false notions about the self).

Buddhaghosa quotes a scriptural passage³ to show that *kāmupādāna* is nothing but the *tayhā* (craving) grown firm and strong. He also records another opinion which identifies *tayhā* with desire for what remains unachieved just like a thief’s groping in darkness for a booty, and *upādāna* with the grasping of the thing just like the thief’s

¹ *Vm*, XVII. 238.

² These ‘latent biases’ are seven in number, viz. sensual passion (*kāmarāga*), lust for life (*bhavarāga*), aversion (*patigha*), conceit (*māna*), error (*dītti*), perplexity (*vicikicchā*) and ignorance (*avijjā*). —Vide *CP*, p. 172. The ‘latent biases’ are so called because they lie latent, in the sense of ‘not being rooted out’, in each individual (*aptahīṇathena anu anu santāne sentīti anusaya*). This is however only the etymological meaning of the term, which applies to all the *kilesas* in general. What distinguishes these biases or *anusayas* from the other *kilesas* is, in fact, their firm-rootedness (*thāmagata-tā*).—Vide *AV*, p. 125.

³ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 242.

taking possession of the booty. The opposite of *taṇhā* is *appicchatā* (attenuation of desires) and that of *upādāna* is *santuṣṭhi* (contentment). *Taṇhā* is the source of our strife and struggle for the search of objects of enjoyment while *upādāna* leads to cares and anxieties for the preservation of those objects.¹

The other three *upādānas* are in essence only the different forms of 'wrong views' (*micchādiṭṭhi*) about the self and the world. Buddhaghosa quotes scriptural passages² to show the different varieties of these *upādānas*.

The *attavādupādāna* or clinging to false views about the self or the ego is the ultimate source of all other *upādānas*. As soon as one has developed an ego-centric attitude, one automatically falls a prey to the false notions of eternalism and annihilationism (*sassatuccchedābhinivesa*), which constitute the *dīṭṭhipupādāna*. The notion of eternalism, that is, the belief in the eternity of the self, in its turn, leads to the invention of false rituals and disciplines for the purification of the self, and this is nothing but *silabbatupādāna*. The notion of annihilationism, that is, the belief in the absolute destruction of the self at death, on the other hand, instigates one to seek the objects of sensual gratification unscrupulously and relentlessly in order that one might enjoy all the good things of the world here and now, there being, for him, absolutely no chance of enjoying them after death. This is obviously *kāmupādāna*.

The removal of all these *upādānas* is essential for the attainment of the supreme perfection of *arahatta-phala* (*arhat* hood). The removal of *kāmupādāna* is possible only when the other three have been removed by the attainment of the *sotāpatti-magga*. And it is at the moment of the attainment of the *arahatta-magga* that the *kāmupādāna* is removed.³

10(x). *Bhava* (the process of becoming, or simply 'becoming'). *Bhava* (becoming) is the process of life. It is twofold, viz. (1) *kamma-bhava* or the volitions—meritorious (*pūñña*), demeritorious (*apūñña*) and steadfast (*āneñja*),⁴ and (2) *upapatti-bhava* or life *qua* the resultant

¹ *Vm*, XVII. 242.

² *Vm*, XVII. 243.

³ *Vm*, XVII. 245.

⁴ *Vide supra* 10 (ii).

of these volitions. Etymologically, 'life *qua* resultant of volitions' is *bhava* proper.¹ But the volitions also are called *bhava* inasmuch as they are the conditions of it. Such usage of the effect for the cause is very common in scriptural texts.

The *kamma-bhava* or 'volitions' have already been studied.² The *upapatti-bhava* alone would therefore engage our attention in this place. *Upapatti-bhava* consists in life constituted by the mental and material aggregates resulting from the volitions (*kanīma*), and can be distinguished in nine ways, *viz.* (i) *kāma-bhava* or life of the *kāma* plane, which is constituted by five aggregates, *viz.* *viññāpa* (consciousness), *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (conceiving), *saṅkhāra* (dispositions) and *rūpa* (material forces); (ii) *rūpabhava* or life of the *rūpa*-plane, which is also constituted by the same aggregates; (iii) *arūpabhava* or life of the *arūpa*-plane constituted by the first four aggregates only; (iv) *saññā-bhava* or life of the plane where *saññā* (conceptual thought) is possible, and which is constituted by the five aggregates mentioned; opposite of this is (v) the *asaññābhava* or the life of the plane where no *saññā* (conceptual thought) is possible and which is constituted by only one aggregate, *viz.* *rūpa* (the material aggregate); (vi) *nevasaññā-nāsaññā-bhava* or the life of the plane where distinct conceptual thought is absolutely impossible, there being possible only an indistinct conceiving and which is constituted by the first four aggregates only; (vii) *eka-vokāra-bhava* or the life of the plane where only one *vokāra* (-*khan-dha* 'aggregate'), *viz.* *rūpa*, is possible; (viii) *catu-vokāra-bhava* or the life of the plane where only the first four aggregates are possible; and (ix) *pañca-vokāra-bhava* or the life of the plane where all the five aggregates are possible.³

The distinction of *bhava* from *saṅkhāra* is to be clearly understood. *Saṅkhāra* refers to volitions of a past life, leading to the present one, while *bhava* *qua* *kammabhava* consists in volitions of the present life, leading to the origin of a life hereafter; *saṅkhāra* further refers to willing (*cetanā*) pure and simple while *bhava* stands for willing as well as the other psychic factors associated with it; moreover, *saṅkhāra*

¹ Cf. . . ettha ca upapatti, bhavati'ti bhavo.—Vm, XVII. 250.

² Vide supra 10 (ii).

³ Vide Vm, XVII. 253-5.

includes in itself only such volitions (*kamma*) as can lead to *vipāka-viññāya* (resultant consciousness) while *bhava* includes, in addition to these, also such *kamma* as can lead to the *asaññābhava* mentioned above; and lastly in the proposition 'On account of *avijjā* (ignorance) there arise *saṅkhāras*' the term *saṅkhāra* refers to only the moral (*kusala*) and immoral (*akusala*) volitions, which are either meritorious (*pūñña*) or demeritorious (*apūñña*) or 'steadfast' (*āneñja*), while the term *bhava* qua *upapattibhava* in the proposition 'On account of *upādāna* (clinging) there arises *bhava*' stands also for the *abyākata* (non-moral) factors, viz. the *vipāka-viññāya* (resultant consciousness) and the *rūpa* (material aggregate) incorporated with it.¹

Upādāna (clinging) leads to *bhava* (becoming). Now the problem arises as to whether each of the four kinds² of *upādāna* can lead to any one of the different forms of *bhava*, or a definite kind of *upādāna* can lead only to a definite form of *bhava*. Buddhaghosa rejects the latter alternative and illustrates the former by a number of examples.

Any kind of *upādāna* can lead to any form of *bhava*. The uninitiated person (*puthujjana*)³ is like a mad man. He does not distinguish the good from the evil, and does whatever he likes, under the influence of any of the *upādānas*, with the desire to attain any of the *bhavas*.⁴

Thus, under the influence of *kāmupādāna* 'clinging for the objects of sensual gratification' one may perform immoral acts, prescribed by false persons for the attainment of those objects, and be born in hell on account of these acts. In this case the immoral acts are *kammabhava* and the mental and material aggregates making up the birth in hell constitute the *upapattibhava*. Here the *kāmupādāna* is found to lead to hell which is a lower type of the *kāmabhava*.

Similarly, under the influence of the same *kāmupādāna*, one may perform moral acts, prescribed by genuine prophets, for the attainment of the objects of sensual gratification, and be born in the divine or the human plane on account of those acts. In this case the moral acts are *kammabhava* and the mental and material aggregates making up

¹ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 256-7.

² *Vide supra* 10 (ix).

³ *Vide CP*, p. 68.

⁴ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 261.

the divine or the human birth constitute the *upapattibhava*. Here the *kāmipādāna* is found to lead to higher types of *kāmabhava*.

In the same way, a person, under the impression that the successful practice of the various *samāpatti*s (forms of concentration of mind) leads to the still higher types of sensual gratification and hence under the influence of the same *kāmipādāna*, may attempt at attaining those *samāpatti*s and be born in the *rūpa* or the *arūpa*-plane. Here the *kāmipādāna* is found to lead to *rūpa* and *arūpa-bhavas*.

Similarly, the other *upādānas* can also be shown to lead to the different forms of *bhava*.¹

10 (xi). *Jāti* (birth). The term *jāti* has a number of meanings such as *bhava* (becoming, rebirth), *nikāya* (religious community), *saṅkhata-lakkhana* (a general characteristic of mutable things), *patisandhi* (rebirth), *pasīti* (production), *kula* (race), and *ariya-sīla* (moral character). Here however the term refers either to the mental and material aggregates (*khandhas*) originating and developing, from the moment of conception (*patisandhi*) up to the moment of delivery from the womb, as in the case of uterine beings, or to the aggregates just at the moment of that rebirth, as in the case of other beings who originate fullfledged at the very moment of rebirth (*patisandhi*)². To speak in one word, *jāti* means the first appearance of the mental and material aggregates, constituting beings (*satta*) taking birth in the different planes of life.³

The term *bhava* of the proposition ‘On account of *bhava* there arises *jāti*’ is to be interpreted as *kammabhava* (moral and immoral volitions), because the latter alone can be a condition of birth and not the *upapattibhava*.

The logical necessity of the doctrine of *kamma* deserves consideration in this place. Why should we accept that *kamma* is an essential condition of rebirth? Buddhaghosa argues in favour of the doctrine by referring to the fact of the peculiarities of each individual in respect

¹ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 262-7.

² In the case of uterine beings, *patisandhi* is conception in the womb, while in the case of other beings not born of womb, *patisandhi* is identical with rebirth, there being no necessity of conception in a mother’s womb.

³ nippariyāyato pana tattha tattha nibbattamānānam ye ye khandā pātubhavanti tesam tesam paṭhama-pātubhāvo jāti nāma.—*Vm*. XVI. 33.

of intrinsic merits and demerits in spite of the presence of identical external conditions. It is well known that even twin brothers—although their external conditions such as parents, semen, blood, food and the like are identical—show a hundred and one peculiarities, mental and physical. These peculiarities cannot be without cause, because what is without cause should occur always and equally in all persons. And nothing else than the *kammabhava*, or simply *kamma*, can be the cause of such peculiarities, because we do not find any other cause working in the psychical make-up of beings, which can be responsible for them. This finding of reason is also corroborated by the scriptural text “It is *kamma* that divides beings into high and low”.¹ Now, as rebirth is an embodiment of the peculiarities effected by the *kammabhava*, it is but plausible to regard the *kammabhava* as an essential condition of rebirth.

10 (xii). *Jarā-marana* (decay-death). *Jarā* (decay) is of two kinds. The *jarā* or decay which necessarily accompanies the origination of each and every thing of the world constitutes the first kind. Origination, decay and disappearance of things are simultaneous and constitute the very nature of those things. The second kind of *jarā* is the gradual process of aging of the mental and material aggregates which steadily move towards death and disappearance. It is in this latter sense of ‘process of aging and moving towards death and disappearance’ that the term *jarā* is used in the proposition ‘On account of *jāti* there arises *jarā-marana*’.²

Similarly *marana* (death) is also of two kinds. The natural disappearance of things as soon as they originate constitutes the first kind of *marana*. The second kind of *marana* is constituted by the total cessation of the continuum of the vitality sustaining the life of an individual. It is this latter kind of *marana* that is meant in the present context.

Jāti (birth) is an essential condition of *jarā-marana* (decay-death) inasmuch as in the absence of the former the latter cannot arise. Nor can *soka* (lamentation), *parideva* (wailing), *dukkha* (physical suffering), *domanassa* (mental agony) and the like arise in the absence of *jāti*, and hence the latter is an essential condition of all these factors.

¹ Vide *Vm*, XVII. 271.

² Cf. *Vm*, XVI. 44-5.

II. paccaya-RELATION BETWEEN TWO SUCCESSIVE TERMS SPECIFIED

II. A *paccaya* is a causally related term, or simply, a 'cause' in its widest sense. To state briefly, whatever gives rise to a phenomenon—psychical or physical or a combination of both—is a cause; even an unreal phantom which gives rise to a cognition is a cause known as *ārammaṇa-paccaya* (epistemological condition), although the effect must necessarily be real, because, being an actual product, it cannot be unreal. Each preceding term of the causal chain stands in causal relation to the succeeding one, and the purpose of the section is to specify this relation. This specification is obviously the work of later scholars and our sole authority is the *Visuddhimagga* which is also the main source of the whole dissertation. It should be noted in this connection that the causal chain of twelve terms was originally formulated for explaining the worldly existence in general and the genesis and development of the subjective continuum in particular. Many of the following specifications would appear irrelevant, if viewed in the context of the original formulation. The next section on *bhavacakka* would throw light on the original plan, and the present section should be taken as a systematic exploration of all possible causal aspects of the terms.

II (i). *Avijjā* (ignorance) : *Sankhāra* (conative dispositions; volitions; *kamma*-forces). This falls under three subheads according as the *sankhāras* are (a) meritorious (*puñña*), (b) demeritorious (*apuñña*) or (c) 'steadfast' (*āneñja*).

II (i) (a). Relation between ignorance and the meritorious *kamma*-forces or volitions. When, in the *kāmāvacara* plane, one contemplates on the nature of ignorance in order to get rid of it, the resultant meritorious volition is obviously conditioned by ignorance as the epistemological condition (*ārammaṇa-paccaya*) of that *kāmāvacara* volition. In the *rūpāvacara* plane, the same causal relation holds good between ignorance and the volitional cognition when a person, by means of an extraordinary power induced by meditation on form (*rūpāvacara*), cognizes the ignorance of another person's mind.

When however a person, in the *kāmāvacara* plane, performs acts of charity and the like in order to get rid of ignorance, or when a person, in the *rūpāvacara* plane, practises meditation for the same

purpose, the ignorance does the function of a driving power (*upanissaya-paccaya*) in respect of the volitions representing the act of charity and the practice of meditation. Similarly, when a person, being deluded on account of ignorance, hankers after the glories of the *kama*-plane or the *ripa*-plane and performs the act of charity and the like or practises meditation, the ignorance stands to the relevant volitions in the same *upanissaya*-relation. In the former case, ignorance *qua* an object to be got rid of does the function of an *upanissaya-paccaya* (driving power), while in the latter the same is done by ignorance *qua* a deluding agent.

II (i) (b). Relation between ignorance and the demeritorious *kamma*-forces or volitions. Ignorance can be conceived as related to demeritorious volitions in as many as seventeen ways. Thus when a man enjoys greed (*qua* an epistemological condition) which is accompanied by ignorance, ignorance stands to the demeritorious volition representing the enjoyment as an (i) *ārammaya-paccaya*. Similarly, when in the case under consideration, the ignorance becomes a dominant object or a driving power, the relation becomes an instance of (ii) *ārammañādhipati* or (iii) *ārammañūpanissaya*. When however a person, being deluded on account of ignorance, commits the immoral acts of killing and the like, the ignorance as a driving power stands in (iv) *upanissaya*-relation to the demeritorious volition representing the act of killing. Each of these volitions being a succession of a number of moments, each preceding moment of ignorance stands to the succeeding one in the following relations, each of which has the causal characteristic of 'immediate antecedence to the effect' as a common factor: (v) *anantara*, (vi) *samanantara*, (vii) *anantarūpanissaya*, (viii) *āsevana*, (ix) *natthi* and (x) *vigata*. In all acts of demeritorious volitions, ignorance is necessarily there and as such it stands to the volitions concerned in the following relations, each of which has the causal characteristic of 'co-presence with the effect' as a common factor: (xi) *hetu*, (xii) *sahajāta*, (xiii) *aññamāñña*, (xiv) *nissaya*, (xv) *sampayutta*, (xvi) *atti* and (xvii) *avigata*.

II (i) (c). Relation between ignorance and the 'steadfast' (*āneñja*) volitions. *Upanissaya* is the only relation obtaining between ignorance and the 'steadfast' volitions. This can be illustrated in the same way

as in the case of meritorious volitions explained in section 11 (i) (a) above.

11 (ii). *Saṅkhāra* (volitions): *Viññāna* (resultant consciousness). The volitions fructify into resultant consciousness whose function is twofold, *viz.* (i) to constitute the subterranean stream of consciousness (*bhavaṅga*) and (ii) to cognize objects presented. The volitions are technically known as *kamma* and hence they are said to stand in *kanuma-paccaya* to the resultant consciousness. The priority of fructification of a particular *kamma* is determined by its relative strength or power, and so the fructifying *kamma* is also regarded as an *upanissaya-paccaya* (powerful condition) of the resultant consciousness. A volition thus stands as *kamma-* as well as *upanissaya-paccaya* to the resultant consciousness whether cognizing the object presented or constituting the subterranean stream of consciousness.

11 (iii). *Viññāna:Nāma-rūpa* (mind-body). It has already been stated under section 10 (iv) that *viññāna* in this context is not restricted to *vipāka-viññāna* (resultant consciousness) alone but is taken in a wider sense including volitional consciousness (*abhisankhāra-viññāna*) also. Both these aspects of *viññāna* should therefore be kept in mind while specifying the relations between the terms under consideration.

The *viññāna* (resultant consciousness) stands (a) to *nāma* qua the remaining resultant psychical aggregates (*vipākakkhandhas*, *viz.* *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṅkhāra*) in the following nine relations, each of which has the causal characteristic of 'co-presence with the effect': *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *sampayutta*, *vipāka*, *āhārā*, *indriya*, *atti* and *avigata*; (b) to the *hadaya-vatthu* (heart-base), at the time of rebirth (*patisandhi*), in the same nine, only replacing *sampayutta* by *vippayutta*; and (c) to the other physical aggregates (excluding the *hadaya-vatthu*) in eight, excluding only the *aññamañña* from the nine enumerated under (b).

The *abhisankhāra-viññāna* (volitional consciousness) however, according to the *Suttanta*, is related to the physical aggregates of the *asaññasatta* and the *kamma*-born physical aggregates of other kinds of *satta* in the relation of *upanissaya*. This relates to the moment of rebirth. The determination of the relation between *viññāna* and

nāma-rūpa in the subsequent moments forms the subject matter of Paṭṭhāna and cannot be taken up here.

A reference to the description of the *paccayas* under section 8 is sufficient to show the propriety of the postulation of the above relations, as also of those that will follow, and hence a justificatory exposition will be redundant.

II (iv). *Nāma-rūpa: Saṭ-āyatana* (six sense-organs). The treatment of the topic falls under the following three subheads:

II (iv) (a). *Nāma: Saṭ-āyatana*. In the *arūpa*-plane, at the moment of rebirth (*paṭisandhi*), *nāma* qua *vipāka* is related to the sixth sense-organ (qua thirty-two *vipākavīññānas*)¹, in the following seven ways in the minimum: *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *sampayutta*, *vipāka*, *atthi* and *avigata*. Besides, the *nāma* qua an *abyākatahetu* (viz. morally neutral *alobha* etc.) stands as *hetu-paccaya* to the said sense-organ, and similarly the *nāma* qua psychical nutriment (*arūpi-āhāra*) stands to the same as an *āhārapaccaya*. And also during *pavatta* or the process of continuity, including that of cognition, the *nāma* qua *vipāka* has the same relations with the sixth sense-organ. The *nāma* qua volition however bears to the said organ all the above relations excepting the *vipāka* which is possible only between terms which are resultants (*vipākas*).

In the other planes, viz. *kāma* and *rūpa*, at the moment of rebirth (*paṭisandhi*), *nāma* qua *vipāka* is related, through the heart-base, to the sixth sense-organ in the same seven ways mentioned above. To the other five sense-organs however it is related, through the four primary elements, in six ways, viz. *sahajāta*, *nissaya*, *vipāka*, *vippayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*. The relations of *hetu-* and *āhāra-paccayatā* are also possible in the same way as in the case of the *arūpa*-plane. And also during *pavatta* or the process of continuity, including that of cognition, the *nāma* qua *vipāka* has the same relations with the sixth sense-organ qua *vipāka*. The *nāma* qua volition however bears to the said organ all the above relations excepting the *vipāka* for the same reason as was given in the preceding paragraph. To the remaining five sense-organs, during the process of cognition, the *nāma* qua *vipāka* is related, through the corresponding five sense-bases (*cakkhuppasādādi-vatthu*),

¹ *Vide supra* 10 (iii).

in four ways, *viz.* *paccājata*, *vippayutta*, *attihi* and *avigata*. The same relations also hold good between *nāma* *qua* volition and the five sense-organs.

We have so far been dealing with the relations between *nāma* and *saṭ-āyatana*. Now let us study those obtaining between *rūpa* and *saṭ-āyatana*.

II (iv) (b). *Rūpa: Saṭ-āyatana*. There is no *rūpa* in the *arūpa*-plane, and so the question of determination of relation between *rūpa* and *saṭ-āyatana* in that plane does not simply arise.

In the other planes however, the physical base of heart, at the moment of rebirth (*patiṣandhi*), is related to the sixth sense-organ in the following six ways: *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *vippayutta*, *attihi* and *avigata*. The four primary material elements however are related, at the moment of rebirth as also during the process of continuity, to the remaining five sense-organs according as they arise, in the following four ways: *sahajāta*, *nissaya*, *attihi* and *avigata*. The faculty of material vitality (*rūpa-jīvitindriya*) is related to the five sense-organs, at the moment of rebirth (*patiṣandhi*) as well as during the process, in three ways, *viz.* *attihi*, *avigata* and *indriya*. Material nutriment (*āhāra*) is related to the same five sense-organs, during the process, by way of *attihi*, *avigata* and *āhāra*. The five sense-organs are related, during the process, to the sixth sense-organ *qua* fivefold sensation (*viz.* visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile) by way of *nissaya*, *purejāta*, *indriya*, *vippayutta*, *attihi* and *avigata*. The heart-base (*vatthu-rūpa*) is related, during the process, to the remaining forms of the sixth sense-organ by way of *nissaya*, *purejāta*, *vippayutta*, *attihi* and *avigata*—the *indriya* of the preceding list having been excluded on account of the non-inclusion of ‘heart-base’ in the list of twenty-two *indriyas*¹.

II (iv) (c). *Nāma-rūpa:Saṭ-āyatana*. A combination *mutatis mutandis* of the relations mentioned under II (iv) (a) and II (iv) (b) will give the clue to the specification of relations under this head. Thus, in the *kāma*- and the *rūpa*-plane, at the moment of rebirth (*patiṣandhi*), the *nāma* (consisting of three *vipākakkhandhas*, *viz.* *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṅkhāra*) and *rūpa* (*viz.* the heart-base, *hadaya-vatthu*) stand to the

¹ *Vide supra* 8 (xvi).

sixth sense-organ (*viz.* manāyatana or viññāna) in the following ways: sahajāta, aññamañña, nissaya, vipāka, sampayutta, vippayutta, atthi, avigata, etc. And so on.

II (v). *Sal-āyatana-Phassa* (sense-impression). The first five sense-organs are related to the respective sense-impressions in six ways, *viz.* nissaya, purejāta, indriya, vippayutta, atthi and avigata. The sixth sense-organ (*viz.* manāyatana) is related to the mind-impression (*mano-samphassa* which is a form of *vipāka* or resultant consciousness) in nine ways, *viz.* sahajāta, aññamañña, nissaya, vipāka, āhāra, indriya, sampayutta, atthi and avigata. Among the external āyatanas again, coloured shape (*rūpāyatana*) stands to the visual impression (*cakkhu-samphassa*) in the following four ways: ārammaṇa, purejāta, atthi and avigata. Similar are the cases of sound (*saddāyatana*), odour (*gandhāyatana*), taste (*rasāyatana*) and touch (*phottabbāyatana*). To the mind-impression (*mano-samphassa*) however, the coloured shape, sound, odour, taste and touch as well as a part of the *dhammāyatana*¹, *viz.* *pasādarūpa* and *sukhumarūpa*—when contemporary (*paccuppanna*)—are related in the same four ways. All these, when not contemporary, are related to the mind-impression only as ārammaṇa. And the remaining constituents (*viz.* citta, cetasika, nibbāna and paññatti) of the *dhammāyatana* are also related to it only by way of ārammaṇa-paccaya.

II (vi). *Phassa-Vedanā* (feeling). With reference to the five doors (*pacificadvara*), the visual impression (*cakkhu-samphassa*) is related to the feeling (*vedanā*) arising at the eye-base in eight ways, *viz.* sahajāta, aññamañña, nissaya, vipāka, āhāra, sampayutta, atthi and avigata; and identical is the case of the other four kinds of impressions, *viz.* auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile. To the corresponding feelings accompanying the processes of *sampaṭicchana*, *santirāṇa* and *tadārammaṇa*² in the *kāma*-plane, the visual impression and the like are related by way of *anantarūparanissaya* only.

With reference to the mind-door, the co-originating mind-impression is related to the feelings accompanying the process of *tadārammaṇa*

¹ It is identical with *dhammārammaṇa* which includes *pasādarūpa*, *sukhumarūpa*, *citta*, *cetasika*, *nibbāna* and *paññatti*. *Vide As*, III. 19–20.

² *Vide supra* 10 (iii) and *As*, IV. 8.

in the *kāma*-plane (there being no *tadārammaṇa* in the *rūpa*- and *arūpa*-planes), as well as to the feelings, in all the three planes (*viz.* *kāma*, *rūpa* and *arūpa*), accompanying the processes of *patisandhi* (rebirth), *bhavaṅga* (stream of consciousness) and *cuti* (dying consciousness) in the eight ways mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The mind-impression (*mano-samphassa*) accompanying the *mano-dvārāvajjana*¹ is related to the feelings, in the *kāma*-plane, accompanying the process of *tadārammaṇa* by way of *upanissaya* only.

All the above specifications of relations have been made with reference to the forms of resultant feelings (*vipākavedanā*).

II (vii). *Vedanā*: *Taṇhā* (craving). *Vedanā* (feeling) stands to *taṇhā* (craving) as *upanissaya* inasmuch as the former is a driving power conditioning the latter. The problem how all the three forms of feeling—*viz.* pleasurable, painful and indifferent—can condition craving has already been explained.²

II (viii). *Taṇhā*: *Upādāna* (clinging). The *kāmatāṇhā* is related to *kāmupādāna* by way of *upanissaya* inasmuch as the latter arises with respect to the objects of the former. In other words, *kāmatāṇhā* leads one to *kāmupādāna*.

To the other three *upādānas* however, the *kāmatāṇhā* is related in seven ways, *viz.* *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya*, *sampayutta*, *atti*, *avigata* and *hetu*. The relation of *upanissaya* would also hold good in this case, provided the *kāmatāṇhā* is not a co-originating factor.

II (ix). *Upādāna*: *Bhava*. *Bhava*, as has already been stated,³ is twofold, *viz.* (1) *kamma-bhava* or the volitions and (2) the *upapatti-bhava* or the life-continuum resulting from those volitions. We should therefore take both these kinds into consideration while specifying the relations between the above two terms.

All the four kinds of *upādānas* are related to the *rūpa*- and *arūpa-bhavas*, as well as to the *moral* volitions and the life-continuum of the *kāma-bhava* by way of *upanissaya-paccaya* only. To the accompanying *immoral* volitions of the *kāma-bhava*, they are related by way of *sahajāta-*, *aññamañña-*, *nissaya-*, *sampayutta-*, *atti-*, *avigata-* and *hetu-*

¹ *Vide As*, pp. 66-7.

² *Vide supra* 10 (viii).

³ *Vide supra* 10 (x).

paccaya or similar sets of relations according to the relevancy. In the case of non-accompanying (i.e. immediately preceding) volitions however only the *upanissaya*-relation would hold good.¹

11 (x). *Bhava*:*Jāti*. Here *bhava* refers to only *kamma-bhava* or volitions which are responsible for *jāti* or birth by way of being its *kamma-paccaya* and *upanissaya-paccaya*.

11 (xi). *Jāti*:*Jarā-maraṇa*. *Jāti* is the *upanissaya-paccaya* of *jarā-maraṇa* inasmuch as in the absence of *jāti*, *jarā-maraṇa* and its companions misery and the like are impossible, while on the occurrence of *jāti*, the latter invariably follow.

In this connection, it should be noticed that this specification of the relation as *upanissaya* is based on the *Suttanta* and the *Visuddhi-magga* mentions it as *upanissaya-koti* or a form of *upanissaya* which means concomitance in agreement and difference and is a characteristic common to all types of conditions.²

It should be remembered here that *soka* (lamentation), *parideva* (wailing), *dukkha* (physical suffering), *domanassa* (mental agony) and the like also follow from *jāti*.

12. THE BHAVACAKKA (WHEEL OF WORLDLY LIFE)

12 (a). *The Bhavacakka*. The *āsavas*³ give rise to *soka* and the like, and because on the rising of *āsavas* there arises *avijjā*, it follows that *soka* and the like are necessarily accompanied by *avijjā*. It is thus seen that the last link of the twelve-termed causal chain is followed up by *avijjā* which in its turn gives rise to the other links, and so on. Now, if we follow this round of causation towards its beginning, it becomes obvious that there is no beginning.

12 (b). If we take a comprehensive view of the twelve links of the causal chain, it becomes evident that there are two starting points in it—one is *avijjā* (ignorance) and the other *taṇhā* (craving). From the first point we can easily go up to the seventh link, viz., *vedanā* (feeling),

¹ For details *Vide VmT*, p. 634.

² *upanissaya-kotiyā* 'ti, *upanissaya-lesena*; *upanissaya-lesenā* 'ti attho. yo hi patthāne anāgato 'sati bhābhā asati ca abhāvā' suttantapariyāyena *upanissayo*, so *upanissaya-koti* 'ti yuccati. *paccaya-mahāpadeso* kir' eso yadidai *upanissayo* 'ti.—*Ibid.*, p. 635.

³ *Vide supra* p. 209, fn. 2.

and this may be taken to constitute a self-sufficient round for those whose psychical make-up is dominated by speculative confusions (*dīṭṭhicaritas*). For those who are dominated by attractions towards worldly things (*taṇhācaritas*), the starting point is obviously *taṇhā* (craving) which is followed by *upādāna*, *bhava*, *jāti* and *jarā-marana* and this also constitutes a self-sufficient round. As regards the philosophical value of distinguishing the selfsame worldly process into these two rounds, it can be said that the purpose of the postulation of the first round is to dispel, by showing the unbroken continuity of causes and conditions, the belief in annihilationism (*uccheda-dīṭṭhi*); and that of the second round is to dispel, by means of showing the inevitability of *jarā-marana* (decay-death), the belief in eternalism (*sassata-dīṭṭhi*).

12 (c). The causal chain can also be viewed as explaining the present by the past and the future by the present. Thus *avijjā* and *saṅkhāra* refer to the past, the eight links beginning with *viññāna* and ending in *bhava* refer to the present and the remaining two links, *viz.* *jāti* and *jarā-marana*, refer to the future. The past *avijjā* and *saṅkhāra* lead to *viññāna* (rebirth-consciousness) which together with the next seven links up to *bhava* constitute the present life. Of the last mentioned eight links, the last three, *viz.* *taṇhā*, *upādāna* and *bhava* condition *jāti* and its concomitant *jarā-marana* (decay-death) in future.

12 (d). We can also discern three fundamental joints (*sandhis*) in the chain. The first joint obtains between *saṅkhāra* and *viññāna* which are related as cause and effect (*hetu-phala*); the second is between *vedanā* which is an effect (*phala*) and *taṇhā* which is a cause (*hetu*) of the furtherance of the worldly life; and the third joint obtains between *bhava* and *jāti* (rebirth) which are related as cause and effect (*hetuphala*).

12 (e). These three joints divide the twelve links into four groups, *viz.* (i) *avijjā* and *saṅkhāra*; (ii) *viññāna*, *nāma-rūpa*, *saṭ-āyatana*, *phassa* and *vedanā*; (iii) *taṇhā*, *upādāna* and *bhava*; and (iv) *jāti* and *jarā-marana*.

12 (f). Of these four groups, the second contains five factors and each of the other three also can be shown to contain an equal number of factors. Thus if *taṇhā*, *upādāna* and *bhava*, which follow from *avijja*, are included in the first group, the total number of its factors

will be five *viz.* *avijjā*, *saṅkhāra*, *taṇhā*, *upādāna* and *bhava*. These five factors of the past life constitute the conditions which have led to the present life. The five factors of the second group constitute the present life ushered into existence by the five factors of the first group. Of the factors of the third group, *taṇhā* and *upādāna* include *avijjā*, and *bhava* includes *saṅkhāras*, thus giving the five factors, *viz.* *avijjā*, *saṅkhāra*, *taṇhā*, *upādāna* and *bhava*. These five, which belong to the present life, are responsible for the next birth represented by the fourth group consisting of *jāti* and *jarā-marana* which can be interpreted as identical with the five factors of the second group.¹

The twenty factors of the above paragraph constitute what are known as the twenty spokes of the wheel of worldly life.

12 (g). Of the twelve terms, *saṅkhāra* and *bhava* constitute the *kamma-vatṭa* (round of *kamma*); *avijjā*, *taṇhā* and *upādāna* constitute the *kilesavatṭa*; and *viññāna*, *nāma-rūpa*, *saṭ-āyatana*, *phassa* and *vedanā* constitute the *vipāka-vatṭa*; *jāti* and *jarā-marana* are included in the preceding five factors and as such they should fall under the *vipāka-vatṭa*. The wheel of worldly life has thus three *vatṭas*. The continuity or the cessation of the wheel however depends upon the presence or the absence of the *kilesa-vatṭa*.

13. A RESUME

13 (i). In section one, four essential characteristics of causality—*viz.* regularity of sequence, absence of irregularity, absence of promiscuity, and determinacy—have been stated, and it has been shown that the causal relation is necessary and determinate and plurality of causes is impossible.

13 (ii). In section two, the causal relation is shown to presuppose four aspects, *viz.* continuity, plurality (difference), absence of activity and ‘determination’. Non-recognition or wrong appraisal of these aspects is found to lead to a number of false doctrines. Thus the non-recognition of the causal continuity leads one to the fallacy of annihilationism and its wrong interpretation as identity to the belief in a unitary soul-substance and the doctrine of eternalism. Similarly,

¹ *Vide Vm*, XVII. 297.

the non-recognition of the numerical difference between cause and effect is responsible for the view of an unchanging soul-substance. A wrong assessment of this difference as absolute divergence gives rise to a materialistic view of life. The non-recognition of the aspect of non-activity leads to the postulation of an active agent as an intermediary between cause and effect. A wrong appraisal of non-activity as absence of causal efficiency, on the other hand, is responsible for the formulation of the doctrine of inactionism or the absence of moral responsibility. The non-recognition of the aspect of 'determination' of the effect by the cause (that is, the fact that there is necessary connexion between the cause and the effect) entails the repudiation of causality. The wrongful appraisal of 'determination' as mechanical succession (without any causal nexus) of two events leads to the conclusion of determinism (*niyati-vāda*).

13 (iii). In section three, a number of views which go against the fundamental conditions of causality are discussed. Change is a fundamental characteristic of causality and hence the static view of reality is inconsistent with the belief in causation and is a form of the doctrine of uncaused existence (*ahetu-vāda*). The causal relation is determinate and intrinsic and hence plurality of causes and the postulation of the *deus ex machina* are untenable. A cause must produce its effect and hence so long as ignorance and the consequential moral volitions are present, the consciousness-continuum and the worldly career must continue. This rejects the materialistic view of life, which accepts an abrupt end of the individual, synchronizing with the physical death. The unbroken continuity of the causal chain avoids the postulation of an abiding agent, over and above the mind-continuum, for the satisfaction of moral responsibility. The idea of oneness is to be replaced by a causally determinate continuum.

13 (iv). In section four, the fact that the *Cause* is an assemblage of conditions and the *Effect* a combination of a number of effects is stated, and the usual statements of two individual facts as causally related are explained as necessitated by the considerations of the following three characteristics of a particular factor among the assemblage of conditions and combination of effects: preponderance, explicit manifestation and uncommonness.

13 (v). In section five, it is shown that the effect may be unlike the cause and opposed to the latter in respect of time, nature and function. The causal relation is not determinable *a priori*, but is to be studied empirically.

13 (vi). In section six, the question of rebirth is taken up. Buddhism does not admit an abiding self which undergoes rebirth in order to satisfy the past *kammas*. But it admits that there is a causal continuity of the psychical complex which does the function of a personality. Each succeeding moment is determined by the preceding moment in the causal continuum, and rebirth-moment is one such moment succeeding the death-moment (death being concerned with the physical organism alone). Thus the explanation of rebirth is the same as that offered for the continuity of personality in one life.

13 (vii). In section seven, the problem of past action determining the present is discussed. The past does not continue and yet is the condition of the present. Buddhaghosa is in favour of Mnemic Causation which admits that a man who experienced an event in the past remembers it at some future date by dint of the past experience though it has long ceased to exist and is not represented by a trace.

13 (viii). In section eight, the nature of a causal condition is defined and its types are described and illustrated. The types are conceived mainly in order to explain the psychical continuum as a moral and knowing subject. Thus the (1) *hetu-paccaya* (root-condition) is the moral root of the worldly career, and the (2) *ārammanā* is the epistemological condition of knowledge. The (3) *adhipati* is a causal condition that dominates over the rest of the co-existent factors. The (4) *anantara-* and the (5) *samanantara-* aspect of the consciousness-moment are responsible for the unbroken continuity of the subject, and the co-origination of the psychical and the material factors, severally and jointly, is explained by the causal condition of (6) *sahajāta* which affiliates the (7) *aññamañña* as a particular species which is concerned only with those *sahajāta* factors which are primary and basic. The (8) *nissaya-paccaya* (supporting condition) includes the last two and can also function as a *purejāta*. The causal condition which is very comprehensive in scope is the (9) *upanissaya* which includes all such factors which are possessed of an intrinsic power to give rise to the effect.

The (10) *purejāta* is necessarily a material factor while the (11) *pacchājāta* is necessarily a psychical one and presupposes a kind of mechanical teleology. (12) *Asevana* means repetition and is restricted to the psychical sphere. The (13) *kamma* is a volition which gives rise to its effect either simultaneously with or subsequently to itself. The (14) *vipāka-paccaya* is a technical term which refers to the causal character of the *vipākakkhandhas*. The causal aspects of (15) *āhāra* and (16) *indriya* are explicit by their very names. The (17) *jhāna* refers to the seven constituents of meditation, and similarly the (18) *maggā* refers to the *maggāṅgas*. The (19) *sampayutta* is necessarily a psychical factor. The (20) *vippayuttatā* is a relation obtaining between terms which are mutually opposed in nature—the one being psychical and the other physical. The (21) *attihi* includes the *sampayutta* and *vippayutta* and can furthermore be a physical factor giving rise to another physical factor. The (22) *vigata* and the (23) *nattī* are essentially the same as the *anantara*. The (24) *avigata* is identical with the *attihi*.

It should here be noticed that the causal relation between two successive moments of a matter-continuum has not found place in the above *paccaya*-scheme. The Sarvāstivādins however have recognized the necessity of such relation and included it in their scheme of *hetu* and *pratyayas*.

13 (ix). In section nine, the twelve-termed causal chain in its different forms is quoted as an illustration of *paticcasamuppāda*. The mutual relation of ignorance, effluences and craving is also clearly stated, and it is shown that Buddhism does not believe in any 'uncaused cause'.

13 (x). In section ten, the twelve terms of the causal chain are explained in detail. (1) *Avijjā* is wrong assessment of the values of things, which is responsible for (2) *sankharas* or volitions leading to (3) *viññāna* or rebirth-consciousness which functions either as the cognizing subject or the subterranean stream of consciousness. The *viññāna* qua the source of its next term, viz. *nāma-rūpa*, however is to be taken in a wider sense including volitional consciousness. The necessity of this extension of meaning has been explained. The ascription of two different meanings to the same term in two successive pro-

positions of the same causal chain appears to be strange, and perhaps was not originally intended. The meanings of the terms of the causal chain must have been uniform in the original scheme, and the purpose of the formulation of the chain was apparently the explanation of the worldly life. And the life meant to be explained by the causal chain must have been of the plane where both mind and body are jointly present, and this hypothesis is made plausible by the next term (4) *nāma-rūpa* which *prima facie* means a combination of mind and body—and does not stand severally for *nāma*, *rūpa* and *nāma-cum-rūpa*, as suggested by the later exponents of the chain. Buddhaghosa's interpretation of the term (5) *saṭ-āyatana*, which *prima facie* stands for 'six sense-organs', given rise to by the *nāma-rūpa*, also points to the same fact. The sense-organ is a condition of (6) *phassa* which means sense-impression and this sense-impression creates (7) *vedanā* or feeling. Feeling is the cause of (8) *taṇhā* or craving which in its turn gives rise to (9) *upādāna* or clinging to sensual pleasures, false views, false rituals and false notions about the self. The *upādāna* leads to various forms of life known as (10) *bhava*. The term *bhava* has yet another meaning of 'moral and immoral volitions' which are responsible for (11) *jāti* or birth. Birth again is followed by (12) *jarā-marana*, that is, decay and death.

13 (xi). In section eleven, the precise specification of the causal relation between the two terms of each of the eleven propositions of the causal chain is taken up with reference to the scheme of causal relations expounded in section eight. This specification however is the work of later times,¹ and sometimes appears to be far-fetched and irrelevant. But it is a valuable instrument of exact thinking and clarifies our mind of all dimness about the connotations of the terms of the causal chain.

13 (xii). In section twelve, the terms of the causal chain are shown to explain the cycle of worldly existence. Suffering was conditioned by *avijjā* which again was conditioned by the *āsavas*. The *āsavas* in their turn have also *avijjā* as their source, and in this way the cycle of worldly life is found to have no historical beginning. The causal chain exhibits two starting points, viz. *avijjā* and *taṇhā*. It has also

¹ Cf. *As*, VIII, 3.

been viewed as explaining the present by the past and the future by the present. Three fundamental joints have also been discovered in the chain, which divide it into four parts which are shown to consist of five factors each. The twelve terms have also been shown to constitute the rounds (*vattas*) of *kamma*, *kilesa* and *vipāka*, the round of *kilesa* being regarded as the mainspring of the cycle of existence.

A b b r e v i a t i o n s

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| AS .. | Atthasālinī (Edited by Dr Bapat and Vadekar). |
| As .. | Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho with Navanītaṭikā (Banaras 1941). |
| AV .. | Abhidhammattha-Vibhāvanī (Sinhalese Edition), Colombo, 1933 |
| CP .. | The Compendium of Philosophy by S. Z. Aung. |
| DS .. | Dhammasaṅgani (Edited by Dr Bapat and Vadekar). |
| JPTS .. | Journal of the Pali Text Society. |
| Vm .. | Visuddhimagga (Edited by D. Kosambi, Bombay, 1940). |
| VmT .. | Visuddhimagga-Tikā, also called Paramathamanjusā-Tikā,
Sinhalese Edition. |

MAHAVAGGA MAHAVASTU AND
LALITAVISTARA
(A Comparative Study)

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MAHAVASTU AND LALITAVISTARA

The *Mahāvastu* is an important Buddhist Sanskrit work which throws a good deal of light on the different branches of the early Buddhist literature. According to the colophons of the text it claims to be the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the *Lokottaravādins*, a branch of the *Mahāsāṅghika School*. It has in its bewildering contents many important passages that are already known to us from the *Pāli Piṭaka* books, especially from the introductory portion of the *Khandhakas* of the *Pāli Vinaya Piṭaka* and some of the legendary portions of the *Khudaka-nikāya* of the *Pāli Sutta Piṭaka*. Misunderstanding arose from an introductory statement in the *Mahāvastu*, "which is based on the redaction of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* made by the noble *Mahāsāṅghikas*, the *Lokottaravādins* of the Middle Country."¹ According to Dr. E. J. Thomas,² it is the "Great Story (*Mahāvastu*) of the career of Gautama Buddha, as conceived by an adherent of the *Lokottaravāda School*. In order to tell this, he (the author) goes through the Vinaya and incorporates all the legends he can find. To what extent they were in his Vinaya we cannot say, but some of the poems, eulogies and ballads came from other parts of the Canon".

It would be clear from a minute observation of the contents of the *Mahāvastu* that it is a work which is derived neither from any Manuscript nor from any established tradition, but from sources such as were prevalent among the common mass at the time when the book was composed, because of the fact that the same *gāthā* (verse) or episode would be found to occur in different places and in different circumstances with a slight variation; repetition may be noticed in two, three or even more places. There is no unifying theme and object in view to illustrate the story. On the other hand, the introductory portion of the *Mahāvagga* begins and proceeds with the stories which have the definite object of stating the cause

¹ Mvt. Vol. I. p. 2. "Āryya Mahāsāṅghikānām Lokottaravādinām madhyadeśikānān pāṭhena Vinayapiṭakṣya Maha-(not Mahā) vāstuye ādi.

² *History of Buddhist Thought*, Appendix I, p. 280.

of prescribing the Vinaya rules. But in the *Mahāvastu* visible tendencies of relating stories are prominent. Its stories end with the remark: “—*Jātakam samāptam*” (herein ends —*Jātaka*).

To illustrate the stories the *Mahāvastu* does not confine itself only to the biographical or legendary portion of the *Mahāvagga*, but it includes many other parts of the Pāli *Tripiṭaka*, viz., the *Dhammapada*, *Suttanipāta*, *Khuddakapāṭha* and *Vimānavatthu*, etc.

The title of the *Mahāvastu* has been adopted, it seems to us, intentionally, to establish a connection with the Pāli *Mahāvagga*, the first of the five books of the *Theravāda Vinaya*. But the *Mahāvastu* has almost nothing of the Vinaya rules of the Buddhist Order nor the history of their formation, as the title “Vinaya” suggests. The contradiction between the title and the contents of the book raises a serious suspicion. In the three volumes of the *Mahāvastu*, each containing 350-450 pages, we seldom find any Vinaya rules except a mention or pronouncing of the four kinds of *Upasampadā* (ordination)¹ and a few others, in the style of the *Mahāvagga* or the other books of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. There are three kinds of procedure for the formation of the Vinaya rules, viz., *Uddesa*,² *Niddesa*³ and *Pati-niddesa*.⁴ Of the four kinds of *Upasampadā*, only the last one⁵ has been defined, and it is contrary to the legal procedure of the Buddhist Order.

In the *Khandhakas*⁶ as well as in the *Samantapāśādikā*⁷ and *Kaṅ-khāvitaraṇī*⁸ the commentaries of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* and the *Pātimokkha* respectively, eight kinds of ordination⁹ are mentioned. Of

¹ Mvt. I. p. 2. “Caturvidhā upasampadā: svāmupasāmpadā ehi bhikṣukāya upasāmpadā, daśavargena gaṇena upasāmpadā, pañcavargeṇa gaṇena upasāmpadā ca”.

² Pointing out or pronouncing a rule.

³ Giving a short description or classification of the *śikṣāpada*.

⁴ Coming back to the subject or *śikṣāpada* concerned to define it in detail.

⁵ Mvt. I. pp. 2-3. “Tatra svāmupasāmpadā nāma Upasāmpannā Bhagavanto ‘bhāyāse bodhiya mūle”.

⁶ Mvg. I. 6. 32. 34. 37. etc.; *saranā-gamana* — 12; 76; IX. 4.1; Clvg. X. 2.2; 22.1.

⁷ Singhalese edition, p. 124.

⁸ Singhalese edition, p. 20.

⁹ “ehi bhikkhu Upasampadā, saranāgamana upasampadā, ovāda paṭiggahana —, pañhā vyākaraṇa, atṭa-garudhammapaṭiggahana —, dūtena —, atṭa-vācika, ānaticatuttha kamma upasampadā”.

these eight ordinations, we can identify only two in the *Mahāvastu* viz., the first and the last. The *Upasampadā* of the Buddha, as referred to in the *Mahāvastu*, is, according to different Buddhist Schools not to be called *Upasampadā*. He is pure by supreme purification (*visuddho paramāya visuddhiyā*). The "come monk (*ehi bhikkhu*)" system was followed by the Buddha alone, and the saraṇa-gamana (taking refuge in the three *saraṇas*) system of ordination was introduced¹ when the bhikṣus began to draw from different directions people eager for ordination, which system was ultimately abandoned. The "*Natti-catuttha*" (No. 8) mode of ordination is the only system still prevalent among the *Theravādins*. As a matter of fact, ordination by "*daśavarga*" and "*pañcavarga*"² of the *Mahāvastu* is nothing but the *Natti-catuttha* system of upasampadā of the *Mahāvagga*.

We note another Vinaya rule in the *Mahāvastu*, viz., receiving a "meal in a body"³ (*gaṇabhojana*) was rejected by the *Tathāgata* for two reasons: (a) for safety, protection and comfort (-living) of the virtuous bhikṣus, and (b) to decrease the number of wicked bhikṣus, and so that the evil party should not group together by means of tempting with delicious food to disturb the peace of the Brotherhood.⁴ But in the Pāli Vinaya, "*gaṇabhojana*" still exists conditionally, i.e., on the right occasions.⁵

Though not in a systematic way, there is another Vinaya rule on the *Mahāvastu*. The procedure of initiation of the novice (*sāmaṇera-nāmī pabbajā*) of the *Mahāvagga* can be traced in the *Mahāvastu*.

There is not much difference between the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu* regarding the fundamental principle of the rules, and

¹ Mvg. I. 12.

² I. 28. 3.

³ Ibid. I. 28. 3-6; 76.

"*gaṇa bhojana*" means four or more bhikṣus when they go together to the same house for receiving a meal. Cf. Vinaya, Vol. IV. pp. 71-75.

⁴ Mvt. III. p. 48. 10-14. "Dve āyaśmānānanda arthavaśāmī saṁpaśyadmānenā-rhatā tathāgatena samyaksamibuddhena śrāvakānāmī gaṇabhojanam ca pratiksiptam trikabhojanam ca anujñātām: katame dve? yāvadeva kulānāmī (should be "kuśalānāmī" in contradistinction to "pāpānāmī") ca rakṣāye guptīye, phaśuvihārāye, pāpānāmī ca pakṣaparicchedāye, mā pāpā āmiṣeṇa gaṇamī bandhitvā sāṅghe kalaha, bhaṇḍanā vigraha vivādām adhikaranarh kaukrtyari utpādenu.

⁵ Vin. Vol. IV. p. 74. 8.

the procedure of conferring *pravrajyā* (initiation) on a man. In both cases he was required to shave off his hair and moustache,¹ put on yellow robes covering only one shoulder, sit with bended knees, salute the ordaining monks and then utter the three *śaranas* (refuges) with folded hands. Here the *Mahāvagga* shows a uniform and systematic way of introducing rules, while in the *Mahāvastu* it is scattered and anomalous. Regarding the introduction of this particular rule of initiation (*Pravrajyā*) the tendency of the author of the *Mahāvastu* to give a shape to the Vinaya is visible. But he fails to fulfil the systematic arrangement. The procedure for the *Pravrajyā* by *triśarana* (three refuges) is the same in both at the beginning, but at the second stage (lit. *dutiyampi* — for the second time) it differs, and at the third stage (lit. *tatiyampi* — for the third time) there is no similarity at all.² In the *Mahāvastu* the tendency of the author is to make the initiation more durable (than the *Mahāvagga* does) with the binding of words.³ In the *Mahāvagga*, simple utterances of the three refuges in the first place and repeating the same for the second and the third time is recorded. At the first stage the *Mahāvastu* coincides with the *Mahāvagga*, but the second time the wording differs from that of the former, and as there is no repetition of the former word occurring in the second, the particle “pi” (also) becomes useless here. In the third utterance, instead of “*śarana*” come five precepts.

Here, too, the author defies the usual system of wording of the judicial procedure, keeping no similarity among the three sentences or rather stages.

Out of the ten precepts (*daśa śikṣāpadāni*) to be observed by a novice,

¹ Mvt. III. p. 268. 18. “sthaviro (-śāriputra) dāni Rāhulasya keśānyotāretvā pravr̄ajetvā . . .” cf. Mvg. I. 12.3 “. . . paṭhamam kesamassuñ ohārāpetvā . . .”

² Ibid. II. p. 268. 8ff. “bhanāmi ahaṁ Rāhulo Buddhānī śaranānī gacchāmi, dharmānī śaranānī gacchāmi, saṅghānī śaranānī gacchāmi. Dvitīyānī pi ahaṁ Rāhulo Buddha me śarano ananya śarano, dharmo me śerāno, saṅgho me śāraṇo. (presumably *tṛtīyampi*) ahaṁ Rāhulo yāvajjivam prāṇatipātāt prativiramiṣyām; — adattādānāt; — kāmehi mithyācārāt; mṛṣāvādāt; — surāmaīrayamadya pramādasthānāt prativiramiṣyām. Cf. Mvg. I. 12. 4.

³ In addition to three “*śaranas*” and five “*śikṣāpadas*” the following lines occur: (Mvt. III. p. 268.14) “ahaṁ Rāhulo Buddhānī bhagavantam pravrajitamanupravrajāmi; dvitīyakam’pi . . . , tṛtīyam’pi . . . ”

only two¹ (the first and the last i.e. tenth) have been referred to here with the concluding sentence: "These are the ten *sikṣāpadas*".² But a full quotation of the ten precepts has been given in the story of the Ghaṭikāra and Jyotipāla.³ Though ten precepts were meant for the *Pravrajyā*, still, on the initiation of Rāhula (by Śāriputra) as well as of the young Brahmin Jyotipāla (by Kāśyapa Buddha), only five precepts were necessarily mentioned. The difference between the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu* is that while the *Mahāvagga* prescribes ten precepts for the novices, the *Mahāvastu* mentions "pañca *sikṣapadāni*" for the *Pravrajyā*. But it refers to "daśa *sikṣapadāni*"⁴ in connection with the episode of Ghaṭikāra, the potter, i.e. a lay disciple of the Buddha. Here the anomaly is distinct and against the Buddhist ecclesiastical rule. More especially is the difference apparent when we give minute attention to the third rule.⁵ The rule, preventing adultery, is meant for the *Upāsakas* (lay devotees), while the rule against immorality (*abrahmacariyā*, i.e., any kind of sexual pleasure) is meant for a novice or monk. The ordained monks are totally forbidden any kind of sexual pleasure, while a lay devotee is restricted to one wife, or to any who are legally allowed.

Except for some of the Vinaya rules mentioned above, and a few irregular and minor rules found here and there in the stories throughout the book, the *Mahāvastu* does not contain any principal Vinaya

¹ Mvt. III. p. 268.16. ahaṁ Rāhulo yāvajjīvāḥ prāṇātipātāprativirato vairā-
maṇāḥ śrāmaṇerasya *sikṣāpadāni* — yāvajjātarūpa-rajatapratī grahaṇa *sikṣā-*
padāni dhārayāmī.

² Ibid. ime hi daśa *sikṣāpadāni*.

³ Mvt. I. pp. 317-327.
Mvg. I. 56. 1.

⁴ Mvt. I. p. 326. 13-19. Ghaṭikāro, mahārāja, kumbhakāro yāvajjīvāḥ
prāṇātipātāto prativirato yāvajjīvāḥ nadattādānāto prativirato abrahmacar-
yāto. mṛṣāvādātpratihato . . . , nṛtyagītavādīta . . . , gandhamālyavarṇaka-
dhāranāt prativirato, yāvajjīvāḥ vikārabhojanāt prativirato, yāvajjīvāḥ jātar-
ūparajatapratigrahanāt tprativirato. Na khalu mahārāja Ghaṭikāro kumbha-
kāro sāmanī pṛthivīn khanati iti. In the pāli source, the rule prohibiting
the digging of earth is meant neither for a layman nor for a śrāmaṇera, but
only for a bhikkhu. cf. Vin. Vol. IV. p. 33. (yo pana bhikkhu pathaviṇ
khaneyya vā khaṇapeyya vā pācittiyān)

⁵ Mvt. III. p. 268; I. p. 231. Kāmehi mithyācārāt prativiramiṣyāḥ; and
Mvt. I. p. 326. Abrahmacaryātō prativirato. Cf. Mvg. I. 56. 1. abrahma-
cariyā veramāpi.

rule by which the book might be included in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, though it is referred to at the beginning as "the Vinaya Piṭaka of the *Lokottaravāda School*", which is the most important statement about the book itself. Though there are not many of the Vinaya rules which can be identified with the *Mahāvastu*, still the biographical portion of the *Mahāvagga* which illustrates the origin of the Vinaya rules of the Buddhist Order can be traced to almost similar passages in the *Mahāvagga*. From this point of view it is more justifiable to call it the beginning of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* than the *Vinaya Piṭaka* itself.

The biographical portion of the *Mahākhandhaka* or "the Great Division of the Pāli *Mahāvagga*" — from the Enlightenment of the Buddha to the Ordination of the two chief disciples, Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana, is divided into four "*bhāṇavāras*". These *bhāṇavāras* may be conveniently called 'chapters', because of the fact that this portion deals with the four main episodes at the very beginning of the Buddha's career, as well as with the coming into being of the Buddhist Order. During this time the Buddha was very busy in three different places: Uruvelā, Banaras and Rājagṛīha, continuously performing his various duties.

This period was a fairly long one, extending over about ten months. For the Buddha attained the Sambodhi on the full-moon day of the month of *Vaiśākha* (roughly April) and after two months he delivered the First Sermon on the full-moon day of Āṣāḍha at Rśipatana, where he stayed for three months of the first 'retreat' until the full-moon day of Āśvina (September-October). Mention has been made¹ in the *Jātaka* Commentary that the Master passed the next three months at Uruvelā with the Kāśyapas, during and immediately after their conversion. Then he proceeded to Rājagṛīha along with the thousand² converted *Jatilas*, to pay a visit to King Bimbisāra, where he met the two chief disciples. Here he lived for two months³ after converting and ordaining the two disciples and their 250 followers.

¹ E. J. Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, pp. 92-93.

² If the story of the Ordination of Upasena and his followers (Mvt. II. pp. 431-2) is true then the number increases to 1300.

³ E. J. Thomas — *Life of Buddha*, p. 97.

According to the account of the *Mahāvagga*, up to this time a definite number of at least 1312 people were ordained in the Buddhist Brotherhood, from Uruvelā, Banaras and Rājagriha. This number included the most influential and renowned people of the country concerned. The number of conversions and ordinations increased all the more with the recognition and appreciation by Bimbisāra, the King of Magadha, who heard the Buddha's preaching with the multitude of his subjects.

After the conversion of a vast number of ascetics of repute and sons of wealthy families of Uruvelā (Gayā), Banaras and Rājagriha, the young menfolk of those countries began to be attracted by the new doctrine. A class of young men felt the desire to take ordination. But this doctrine of renunciation preached by the Buddha could not pacify the people of Rājagriha, who offered hostile criticism¹ if not opposition. They regarded the Buddha not as a Saviour but as one who came there to create dissension by depriving wives of their husbands and well-known families of their sons, and this was more clearly felt after the conversion of the two chief disciples. Thus a prominent occurrence in the history of the Buddhist Order, the inauguration of the first Buddhist Vihāra at Rājagriha, donated by King Bimbisāra, was not loudly acclaimed but received coldly by the common people.

The *Mahāvagga* observed that the beginning of the disciplinary rules in the *Saṅgha* took place under the most unbecoming circumstances. The members of the Brotherhood failed even to observe the elementary principles of a life of renunciation. They went before the people asking them for alms in vessels which were not properly washed and did many things which were improper for bhikṣus. This is the reason why the rules of discipline had to be laid down for their guidance.

The 'śikṣāpadas' codified in the Prātimokṣa (i.e. the *Suttavibhaṅga*) might be looked upon as the *sīla* side of the Vinaya in contradistinction to the *Ācāra* side codified in the *Mahāvagga* and *Cullavagga*.

¹ Mvg. I. 24. 5. āgato kho mahāsamāno, māgadhanam giribbajañ, sabbe sañjeyyake netvā, karissu dāni nayissati.

Cf. Mvt. III. p. 90.

(i.e. *Khandhakas*). The rules of the *Mahāvagga* arose according to the exigencies of circumstances which the Brotherhood had to face from time to time.

BODHIKATHA

The *Mahāvagga* begins with the history of the Master's career after the attainment of his Enlightenment. "At that time Buddha, the Blessed One, was dwelling at Uruvelā, on the bank of the river *Nairājanā* at the foot of the Bodhi tree after attaining the perfect Enlightenment. And then the Blessed One sat cross-legged for seven days, enjoying the bliss of the perfect emancipation. Then the Blessed One was meditating on the chain of cause and effect in direct and reverse method, and at the end of the first watch of the night, realising thoroughly¹ the chain of cause and effect, he uttered this "*"Udāna"*"² (of the following lines):

When the real nature of Things becomes clear to the ardent meditating Brāhmaṇa, then all his doubts fade away, since he realises what is that nature and what its cause"³

According to the *Mahāvagga* the Buddha meditated on the chain of cause and effect in the same way both in direct and reverse methods at the end of the second and third watches of the night as well. The verse referring to the second watch differs from that referring to the first in the fourth line, viz., since he understood the cessation of causes⁴ and the verse about the third watch varies from that about the first in the third and fourth lines⁵, viz., "he stands, dispelling the hosts of *Māra*, like the sun that illuminates the sky". But both

¹ P. Steinthal — *Udāna*, I. p. 1.

² solemn utterance

³ Mvg. I. 1. 3. i. cf SBE. XIII, p. 78. "Yadā have pātubhadvantī dhammā,
ātapino jhāyato brāhmaṇassā
ath'assa kaṅkhā vapayanti sabbā
yato pajānāti sahetudhammā' ti.

Cf. Mvt. III. p. 416. 15-20.

⁴ Mvg. I. 5 — yato khayaṁ paccayānāṁ avedi.

Cf. Mvt. III. 417.3.— kṣayaṁ pratyayānāṁ avaiti.

⁵ Mvg. I. 7. — vidhūpayaṁ tiṣṭhati Mārasenāṁ suryo'va obhāsayamanta-likkham. Cf. Mvt. III. 417. 16. — vidharsitā tiṣṭhati mārasainyā sūrye-naiva obhāsitamanta rikṣam.

the sources of the *Udāna*¹ and the *Mahāvastu* agree in the important point of adopting the same method at each of the first and second watches of the night.² In these two accounts it is stated that the chain of cause and effect was meditated upon thoroughly in direct (*anuloma*) and reverse (*pañiloma*) methods during the first and the middle watches of the night respectively. The *Mahāvastu* is silent in respect of any method during the last watch of the night and simply says that the "Buddha uttered the following *Udāna*".

All the other existing accounts are agreed on the point of meditation of the cause and effect both in direct and reverse methods at the end of the last watch of the night when all obscurity and problems become clear to the Buddha as the sun "illuminates the sky" at the moment when it (the sun) begins to shine on the Eastern horizon.

In the first place³ "*meditation on the chain of cause and effect*" has been mentioned in direct and reverse, as well as both in direct and reverse methods respectively in detail⁴ during the three watches of the night. But unlike the *Mahāvagga* and the *Udāna*, no verse is referred to here at the end of any of them: on the contrary, another set of two verses⁵ has been introduced at the end of the last watch of the night: "The effect of virtue is pleasant. The desire of a virtuous person is fulfilled. He quickly attains perfect bliss leading ultimately to *Nirvāṇa*".

"The deities of the *Māra* heaven cannot stand in the way of (i.e. to obstruct) the person who is endowed with virtue".

Thereupon, a few lines follow to describe the result of performing good actions.

¹ P. Steinthal — I. 1 & 2. cf. Mvt. III. pp. 416-7.

² For the two verses cf. Mvt. 186.

³ Mvt. II. pp. 283. 13 — 285.21.

⁴ Mvt. II. p. 285.7 ff. . . . yadidam imasya sato idam bhavati; imasya asato idam na bhavati. imasyotpādādidadamutpadyate; imasya nirodhādidaṁ nirudhyate iti pi — avidyāpratyayāḥ saṁskārāḥ, etc., etc., Cf. Ud. I. 3. (p. 2. 28 ff.) — imasmīni sati. . . . idam nirujjhati, (the above lines cannot be identified in Mvg.).

⁵ Ibid. p. 286 (i) sukho puṇyasya vipāko,
abhiprāyacea ṛddhyati,
kṣipraṁ sa paramāṇi śāntim
nirvutim cādhigacchati.

(ii) purato ye upasargā — devatā mārakāyikā
antarāyaṁ na śaknonti — kṛtапuṇyasya kartu vai.

In the second place,¹ though, the *Mahāvastu* mentions the "chain of cause and effect" at the end of each of the first two verses, thus:

"ayāni arulomo pratītya samutpādah"² and "ayāni pratilomah pratītyasamutpādah"³, in fact the *Pratītyasamutpādah* is not quoted here. Regarding the third verse no mention is made as to whether it is in direct or in reverse method, except the following introductory line: "atha khalu bhagavāntāye velāye imān udānamudānaye".⁴ Immediately after the third verse continues the following sentence: "atha khalu bhagavān prathamasaṁbodhiprāpto tāye velāye idamudānamudānaye".⁵ Then continue two verses "sukho vipāko punyānām" etc. These verses are followed by three other verses describing the consequences of the life of a virtuous man.⁶

It is difficult to believe that these latter five verses, on the whole, are original ones, and uttered by the Buddha as the first '*Udāna*', because of the fact that these are not traceable in the Pāli *Tripiṭaka*, the most reliable source of information regarding the beginning of the Master's career.

In conclusion, it is our opinion that the presentation of the chain of cause and effect in its evolution, viz., first in the direct method, then in the reverse method, and lastly both in direct and reverse methods as represented by the *Mahāvastu* (*Udāna* as well) is more reasonable provided that the two accounts⁷ of the same are read together.

AJAPALA-KATHA

Then comes the *Ajapāla Kathā*. The story⁸ tells us that during the next (second or fifth) week⁹ after the attainment of his Buddhahood,

¹ Mvt. II. pp. 416-418.

² Mvt. II. 416. This is the chain of cause and effect in direct method.

³ Ibid. 417. This is the chain of cause and effect in reverse method.

⁴ Ibid. this at that time the Blessed One uttered this "*Udāna*".

⁵ Ibid. So for the first time after attainment of Buddhahood, the Blessed One uttered this "*Udāna*".

⁶ Mvt. II. pp. 417.18 — 418.3.

⁷ Mvt. II. pp. 284-86; and 416-18.

⁸ Mvg. I. 2. and Ud. I. 4. (p. 3).

⁹ Different accounts, such as the *Jātaka*, *Lalitavistara* and *Mahāvastu* extend the period to seven weeks, increasing the Buddha's stay at the Bodhi tree

the Buddha was dwelling under the banyan tree of *Ajapāla* (goat-herd) enjoying the bliss of perfect emancipation, when he met a Brāhmaṇa "of haughty temperament" (*huhuṅka jātiko* — Mvg. and Mvt.). He enquired of the Buddha "how one becomes a Brāhmaṇa and what his qualifications are, etc."

In the *Mahāvastu*¹ we identify only the verse similar to that of the *Mahāvagga* without its introductory lines in prose.

The Buddha replies to the Brāhmaṇa with the following verse:

The true Brāhmaṇa is one who is free from all evils; does not hate others and conquers his own self; and moreover, who knows all the Vedas, leads a pure life, (of a *Brahmacārin*) and delivers discourses of the Doctrine of Brahmanā according to the Law, and also who has no attachment to anything of the world.

In the *Mahāvastu* the third line is not identical with that of the *Mahāvagga*, and reads as follows: "who bears the last body destroying all human passions".²

According to the *Mahāvastu*, the name of the Brāhmaṇa is *Nādi*, who makes the dissenting sounds of "*humhum*". The place of meeting is Vaśala where the Buddha was accompanied by a large number of disciples on his way to Banaras. The place in question was situated between Gayā and Banaras, and not the banyan tree of the *Ajapāla*, as referred to in the *Mahāvagga*, because of the fact that the Buddha had already started for Banaras,³ and Vaśala was the third halting-place towards that destination. In the *Mahāvastu* *Nādi*, the Brāhmaṇa, does not put any question but expresses his scepticism with a peculiar sound. So the Buddha's solemn utterance (*Udāna*), here, is automatic because here he foresees in his mind a picture of future struggles with the existing Brahmanical faith. Unlike the *Mahāvagga* and other Pāli accounts, the *Mahāvastu* informs us that the Buddha spent the

itself to four weeks, the second week being at "*animisa*", i.e. gazing at the Bodhi tree without blinking, and at the third week being at "*Cāṅkama*", i.e. walking continuously to and from the Bo-tree, the fourth week being at *Ratanaghara* (Jewelled House) thinking of the *Abhidharma Piṭaka*. But the Mvt. (III. p. 300) informs us that it (*ratanaghara*) was the abode of *Kālā-nāgarāja*, the snake king. vide: Thomas — *The Life of Buddha*, p. 85.

¹ Vol. III. p. 325. Cf. Mvg. I. 2.3.

² kṣīṇāśravo antima-dehadhārī.

³ Mvt. III. pp. 324. 9. — 325.9.

sixth (or the third of the four) week under the *Ajapāla* tree, and does not include the story of the sceptic Brāhmaṇa.

MUCALINDA KATHA

At the end of the week the Blessed One went from the Ajapāla banyan tree¹ to the foot of the Mucalinda, the abode of the serpent king who bore the same name as the tree, Mucalinda (Mvt. and Lal. Mucilimda). The Master spent here one week protected by the serpent king from the great cold and wind.² At the end of the week the Blessed One uttered two *Udānas*³ expressing his utter satisfaction on the sublimity of solitude.

The story current in different sources⁴ does not have many variations. The main difference between the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu* is that they do not agree on the question of time: the *Mahāvastu* states that the Buddha spent the fifth (or second) week at the palace of the serpent king, whereas the *Mahāvagga* states that it was the sixth (or third) week. On this point the Tibetan Vinaya⁵ agrees with the *Mahāvagga*. Further, the Tibetan sources say that from the Mucalinda the Buddha returned again to Bodhimanda where he meditated upon the “*Paṭicca samuppāda*” and from there started for Banaras to preach the doctrine, having been persuaded to do so by Mahābrahmā. This it is evident that these sources do not include either of the four or the seven week theories.

The *Mahāvastu* does not contain certain verses that were uttered by the Buddha at the end of the week as the *Mahāvagga* and *Lalitavistara*⁶ do. But another set of two verses⁷ may be compared which have been quoted just after the three well-known “*udānas*” uttered under the Bodhi tree.

¹ The Mvt. says that the Buddha went to the Mucalinda from the abode of the serpent king Kāla (nāga).

² Mvt. III. pp. 300-301. Cf. Mvg. I. 3.4; Ud. II. i. (p. i).

³ Mvg. I. 3.4; Ud. p. 10. Cf. Lal. (Cai. 1877 ed.) pp. 492-3.

⁴ Lal. p. 491; J.I. p. 80; S.I. 124.

⁵ Rockhill — *Life of the Buddha* — p. 35.

⁶ Mvg. I. 3.4; Lal. pp. 492-3.

⁷ Mvt. II. pp. 286; 417.

RAJAYATANAKATHA

At the end of the week the Buddha went from Mucalinda to Rājāyatana¹ and spent there the last seven days of the seven (or four) weeks. During this period (49, or 28 days) after his Enlightenment the Buddha was without food or drink. Here in this place he met the two merchants, Tapussa and Bhallika, who were returning from Ukkala (Sanskrit: Utkala)² after having been informed of the Buddha's presence by a deity related to them in a previous birth. Following the advice of the deity they offered the Buddha rice and honey cakes in stone bowl offered by the four *Great Kings*, who are the four guardian gods of the four quarters.

The *Mahāvastu* gives more or less the same account as that of the *Mahāvagga*. The notable difference is as follows: In the *Mahāvastu* it is *Kṣīrikā vanasanya* in the *Bahudevataka Cetiya*, or the Forest of milk in the temple of the many gods.³ According to the Vinaya Commentary⁴ this is a tree of that name situated at the south the Bodhi. The old Ceylonese traditional book *Pūjāvaliya*⁵ as well as the *Dīpavaṇīsa*⁶ confirms the same name as that of the *Mahāvastu*, with a slight variation, viz., Kiripalu or Khirapāla.

Further, the *Pūjāvaliya* informs us that the Buddha remained in this place until the seventh week (or 49th. day) and here Śakra, the

¹ According to the Lal. (Cal. 1877 ed.) p. 493, it is Tārāyaṇa. Probably it took its final shape through some phonological changes.

² Different opinions exist with regard to the identification of Ukkala or Utkal and the place of birth of the two merchants. Though phonologically Ukkala and Utkala (Orissa) have similarity, yet according to the evidences supplied by the *Mahāvastu*, *Lalitavistara* and the Chinese pilgrim *Hsiuen-tsang* (Watters, I, pp. 111-113) Ukkala should be identified with a place in Gāndhāra. Hsiuen-tsang informs us that he noticed in the course of his journey from Balkh (-Bhallika?) to Bamiyan remains of the two "Stupas" erected on the relics given by the Buddha to the merchants. Vide: Mvt. III, pp. 303, 310.

³ Mvt. III, pp. 103-4. tato ajapālasya nyagrodhamūlāto ṣaṣṭhasya sap-sātyena kṣīrikāvanasānḍe bahudevatake cetiyē nirāhāro prītisukhenas saptāhāni vīti nāmesi. Evari bhagavāñ saptaśaptāhāni ekūnaparīcāśaddivasañin nirāhāro.

⁴ *Samantapāśādikā*, Vol. I. 4. "Rājāyatanaṁ'ti-dakkhiṇa disābhāge rājāyatana rukkhamī".

⁵ Chap. 12. *Rājāyatana satya*, p. 197.9. This book was composed by Mayura-pāda who flourished during the regn of Parākrama Bāhu II (A.D. 1267-1301).

⁶ II, p. 50.

king of the gods offered him a nectarous myrobalam by which he regained his lost strength. Thereupon the Buddha went to the lake Anotta in the Himālayas to wash his mouth, and cleaned his teeth with a brush offered by Śakra.¹

The *Mahāvastu* differs slightly from the *Mahāvagga* in respect of the story of the two merchants. The *Mahāvastu* says that the merchants were travelling from south to north along the trade-route with 500 wagons of merchandise. When these merchants reached that part of the forest, the foremost carriage drawn by the two well trained bulls named Sujāta and Kārtika, was stopped by goddesses with their supernatural power.² When they were frightened by the sudden stopping of the caravan they heard the voice of the deities who appeared in the sky and asked them not to fear as they were not in danger.³ They informed them that the Buddha was without food or drink for the last 49 deys after his enlightenment and asked them to offer something eatable to him. They guided the merchants to the Buddha.⁴ They followed the goddesses holding rice and honey-cakes in their hands. They approached the Buddha and respectfully begged him to accept their offerings. The Buddha saw with his Buddha eyes what customs were followed by the previous Buddhas and saw that they accepted offerings in alms-bowls. When he had this vision, the four Great Protectors of the four quarters appeared in turn, with bowls made of different kinds of precious materials, but the Buddha accepted only the last ones, i.e., bowls made of stone. All the four bowls were transformed into a single one by the pressure of his fingers, and therein he accepted the rice and the honey cake.⁵

¹ See footnote 6, p. 255

² Mvt. III. p. 303.13. *atra Trapusa Bhallikānāmca vāṇijānām pūrvajñātisālo-*
hitehi devabhūtehi tahiṁ kṣirikāvanakhaṇde ṛddhiye nigṛhitā na śaknonti
gantum.

³ Ibid. teṣānte devatā — antarikṣagatā ghoṣamudīrayensuḥ — “mā bhāyatha
vāṇijā” tti. na bhavati vo upadravam.

⁴ Mvt. III. p. 304.3. te devatā teṣām vāṇijakānām purato gacchanti: “ito
āgacchatha”. Cf. Mvg. I. 4. 2-3.

⁵ Mvt. III. 304.8. saha cittotpādenaiva bhagavataḥ catvāri mahālokapālā
catvāri suvarṇapātrāṇyādāya . . . lohitaka mayāni, tānapi bhagavām
ratnapātrāṇiti kṛtvā na pratigṛhītā . . . bhagavatā sarvesām caturnām
lokapālānām catvāri (śaila) pātrāni pratigṛhītivā aṅguṣṭhena ākrāntā ekapā-
tro ca adhiṣṭhito.

BRAHMA-YACANA KATHA

The Blessed One once again went under the Ajapāla banyan tree from the Rājāyatana. Here the Buddha was deliberating within himself whether it would be proper for him to preach the doctrine gained after so many myriads of years', striving, it being so deep and so difficult to perceive: tranquil, transcendent and beyond the range of reasoning: subtle and to be realised only by the wise.

Fundamentally, there is not much difference between the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu*. The *Mahāvastu* repeats the “*Nidāna*” a few times, i.e. it quotes again and again the name of the place where this episode occurred¹ (Mvt. III. pp. 313. 18; 314.13; 316.12; 317.5).

Then also these verses, never heard before, naturally occurred (lit. “flashed up”) to the Buddha: “With great pain I have acquired it. Enough, why should I proclaim it? This doctrine will not be easy to understand to beings that are lost in lust and hatred”.

“Given to lust, surrounded by thick darkness, they will not see what is repugnant (to their minds), abstruse, profound, difficult to perceive, and subtle”. (S.B.E. XIII. p. 85)². Then begins the second “*Nidāna*” under the same banyan tree. After this “*Nidāna*” the Buddha’s mind turned to inaction. He was contemplating to live alone in the forest and not to preach the new doctrine. Mahābrahmā came to know the deliberation of the Buddha. Thereupon Mahābrahmā came to Śakra the king of the (3,) heavens, and along with him he went to such other kings as Suyāma, Sunirmita, Vasavarti and the “four great kings.” Mahābrahmā, along with these kings and their numerous followers, approached the Buddha. Mahābrahmā asked Śakra to pray the Lord, who ultimately prayed with the following verse: “Arise O victorious One your mission is fulfilled. Wander

¹ Bhagavān̄ uruvilvāyān̄ vihare nairamjanāyāstire ajapālanyagrodhamūle acirābhisiṇubuddho.

² Mvg. I. 5.3. Cf. Mvt. III. p. 314.7. imā ca gāthāyo bhagavato tāye veelāy pratiśrotagāminān mārgam gambhīram durdṛśam (mama) na rāgaratkā drakṣyanti alāndāni prakāśitūn. kṛcchreṇa me adhigato alāññā dāññā prakāśitūn anuśrotarāḥ hi vuhyanti kāmeṣu grāsita narāḥ” Cf. also: Lal. pp. 515-519. In addition to these two verses with slight variations, there are another set of 11 verses which cannot be identified either with the Mvg. or the Mvt.

through the world free from all debts. Your mind is pure as the Moon of the fifteenth (full-moon) night".¹

The Buddha remained silent. Knowing the Buddha's unwillingness Brahmā himself then appeared in the scene. He made (arranged) his upper robe on one of his shoulders raised his clasped hands to the Buddha and said in verse:²

"..... May 'he of auspicious fate' (*Sugata*) preach the doctrine. There will be knowers of it."³

But the Master kept silent this time too. There upon Mahābrahmā disappeared along with all the companions that followed him.

Then the third *Nidāna* begins, (Mvt. III. 316.12). This time Mahābrahmā appeared at the end of the night. Once again he prayed as before. This time the Master replied: "This way (of mine) against the stream, deep and subtle"....."⁴

This time too, having understood the Master's unwillingness, Brahmā disappeared after bowing down.

Now the fourth *Nidāna* begins (Mvt. III. 317.5) At the time, some misbelief (*pāpakāni akuśalāni dṛṣṭigatāni*) was prevalent among the people of Magadha, viz., the breeze could not blow, the current could not flow, pregnant women could not give birth to children, birds could not fly, the fire could not burn, the Sun and Moon could not shine, and the earth was covered with complete darkness.⁵ Finally

¹ Mvt. II. 315. 14-15. "utthehi vijutasamigrāma

Pūrnabharo tvāṁ anṛṇa vicara loke
cittarhī te viśuddham yathā candro paricadaśārātē."

Lal. p. 515. uttiṣṭha vijutasamigrāma
prajñākāṭrō vicara loke cittam hi te vimuktam
śāśrīra pṛṇorgrahavimuktah.

² Mvt. III. 316.2. Mahābrahmā ekāṁsamuttarāśatāgarām kṛitvā yena bhagavān tenānjalih prapāmetvā bhagavantam gāthāye dhyabhāse. Cf. Mvg. (I. 5. 6) adds: "dakkhinām jānumandalaṁ paṭhaviyām nihantvā, etc." Also, Lal. 515. "daksinām jānumandalaṁ pṛthiviyām pratiṣṭhāpya."

³ Mvt. III. 316.3. "Deśehi sugata dharmari, etc." Cf. Mvg. I. 5.7. "Desetu bhagavā dhammaṁ, etc." and Lal. 515, "Deśaya tvāṁ mune dharmari, etc."

⁴ Mvt. III. 316.21 "..... rāgaraktā na drakṣyanti alām brahme prakāśitum". Cf. Mvg. I. 5.3. "rāgarattā na dakkhanti-tamokkhandena āvuṭā" and Lal. 515. "Na tāṁ drakṣyanti rāgandhā alām taṣṭmat prakāśitum".

⁵ Mvt. III. 317. 6-16. Cf. Lal. 516, following 12 verses. In the Mvg. (I. 5.7) only the verse to be identified without any reference: "pātūrahosi Magadhesu pubbe sunantu dhammām vimalenānubuddhaṁ".

Mahābrahmā reappeared and begged the Master: "The doctrine hitherto manifested in Magadha is impure, because it was thought out by contaminated men. Open wide the door of the Immortal for them, so that they could hear the doctrine discovered by the Spotless One."¹

This time, Buddha, perceiving Mahābrahmā's request, also pitying the human beings, surveyed the world with his Buddha vision. Considering all the circumstances, the Master then addressed Mahābrahmā in verse: "O Brahmā, wide open is the door of the Immortal to all who have ears to hear; let them send forth faith to meet it. The *Dhamma* sweet and good I spake not despairing of the weary task, to man"² (S. B. E. XIII. p. 88).

Mahābrahmā being pleased with the consent of the Buddha to preach the doctrine, raised a sound of satisfaction which was followed through the length and breadth of all the heavens, followed by the inhabitants of the Brahma-world.

The *Lalitavistara* follows the *Mahāvastu* closely but not in style and presentation. The *Mahāvagga* and other Pāli sources³ explain the Buddha's unwillingness to preach the doctrine in different ways. The account of this episode in the *Mahāvagga* is a very abridged one. Here Mahābrahmā repeats his request to the Buddha to preach for the third time, and the verses are continued one after other without giving any reference to the context, though some of the verses themselves are self-explanatory. But the *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara* follow a different method. They give some reference in prose before verse is uttered, which makes the ideas clear.

THE MASTER'S JOURNEY TO BANARAS

After making his decision to preach the newly discovered Truth

¹ Mvg. I. 5.7. Cf. Mvt. 317, 15-19. "Prādūrahosi samalehi cintito, dharmo magadheśu pūrvatā' apāvṛtān te amṛtaṇi te mṛtasya' advārāṇi śr̄ṇontu dharmaṇi vimalānubuddham."

Lal. 521. śr̄ivanti dharmaṇi magadheśu satvāḥ.

² Mvg. I. 5.12. Cf. Mvt. III. 319. 3-7. "apavṛtāṇi me amṛtasya davārāṇi Brahme' ti bhagavantāṇi ye śrotukāmā, śraddhāṇi pramūlīcantu vihethasatiṣṭhāṇi vihethasatiṣṭhāṇi praguṇo abhūsi dharmo aśuddho Magadheśu pūrvatāi. Lal. 520-21. "... pravisanti śraddhā na vihetha sañjā...."

³ Mvg. I. 5. 1-7. Cf. *Samyuttanikāya* I. 136 seq. *Majjhimanikāya*, I. 169 *Dīghanikāya* II. 39.

the Buddha was inspired to propagate it. He deliberated at length and this critical question arose in his mind: to whom should he preach the doctrine first so that his first attempt might not be doomed to failure? He began to search for such people as possessed merits that lead them to the realisation of the Truth. He began to think of his numerous associates with whom he came into contact during the six long years of austerity and struggles. During this period he was associated mainly with two groups of people: the first group, under whose guidance he had lived as a pupil at the beginning, and the second group consisting of mainly his five ascetic companions, who shared his pain and sorrows constantly in his quest and striving. It would have been ingratitude on the part of the Buddha to ignore them.

So, from among the first group he thought of Ālāra Kālāma¹ because "this Ālāra Kālāma is wise, learned and intelligent, has not been defiled for long: what if I preach the doctrine to him? He will easily understand it". But the Buddha was informed by a deity that he had died seven days previously. Then the Buddha himself intuitively understood that Ālāra Kālāma had been dead seven days. Thereafter the Buddha thought of Uddaka Rāmaputra² but was informed in the same way that he had died the evening before.³

Then the Buddha thought of the second group: his *five ascetic companions*. He saw by means of his purified, superhuman and divine vision that they were dwelling at Isipatana, the *Deer-Park* on the outskirts of Banaras. He started for Banaras to meet his former associates. On the highway, between the Bodhi and Gayā he met Upaka, an Ājīvika ascetic, and an acquaintance of his who, being struck by his carriage and expression asked him: "My friend, you look fine, your face and eyes are radiant with joy, cheerfulness and resolution. What is the cause of this? Who is your teacher? Whose doctrine do you approve of?"

¹ M. I. 170 seq. D. II. 40.

² M. I. 170. sq.; D. II. 40.

³ Unlike the Mvg. (I. 6. 1-4) both the Mvt. (III. 322) and the Lal. (Cal. 542) mention Uddaka (Lal. Rudraka) Rāmaputra in the first place and Ālāra Kālāma in that of the second. But in this particular topic the Tibetan source (Rockhill, Life of Buddha) agrees with the Mvg. On the other hand

In reply, the Buddha said: "I have overcome all foes. I am all wise; I am free from stains in every way; I have left everything¹ and have obtained emancipation by destruction of all desire. Having reached the knowledge myself, to whom shall I point it out?"²

The episode of Upaka is more or less the same in the *Mahāvastu*, *Lalitavistara*, *Buddha-carita*³ and the Tibetan accounts.⁴ References are lacking in other sources as to the Buddha's previous acquaintance with Upaka except in the old Ceylonese tradition.⁵ But from their conversation one could assume that they were not unknown to each other. The account of their conversation has not been reported in the *Mahāvagga*. In reply to Upaka's first remark, the Buddha uttered the first four verses, and in reply to his second remark: "You are confessing to be the holy absolute *Jina* (conqueror)", the Master uttered the fifth verse: "All the *Jinas* (conquerors) are like me and have reached the extinction of the human passions. O Upaka, because I have overcome all states of sinfulness, that is why I am the Conqueror (*Jina*)".⁶

The *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara* give the systematic account of the conversation between the Buddha and Upaka, every verse being uttered after a certain remark or a question made by Upaka.⁷

The first verse⁸ common to both the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu* is lacking in the *Lalitavistara*. On the other hand, the *Lalitavistara*

differing from the Mvg. all the above 3 sources are agreed on the date of death of the two teachers, viz. seven and three days respectively.

¹ Mvg. I. 6.8. Cf. Mvt. III. p. 326.8. "...sarvajñōhanī trṣṇākṣaye vimukto aharī abhijñīyā kimuddiseyā". It should be noted here that the word "Sarvajñō (omniscient)" of the Mvt. instead of "Sabbañjali" (he who has given up everything) of the Mvg. makes a great difference in interpretation.

² The Buddha uttered this verse in reply to the remark made by Upaka that he was confessing to be an "anācaryo" (without having teacher) (Cf. M.I. 171; Dh. A. 353). Mvt. III. 326. "Na me ācāryo asti — kaścit sadṛśo me na vidyate, ekosmi loke saṁbuddho — prāpto saṁbodhi muttamāri". Cf. Lal. p. 527 "...eko'hamasmīmī saṁbuddhāḥ śītibhuto nirāśravāḥ".

³ Johnston, Chap. XV. 3-6.

⁴ Rockhill — *Life of Buddha*, pp. 35-36.

⁵ Mayurpāda Thera — *Pūjāvaliya* (Pānadura, 1930. ed.) p. 201. 8 ff.

⁶ Mvt. III. 326. "Jinā hi mādrā bhonti...." Here two more verses follow the former one. Cf. Lal. p. 527. "Jinā hi mādrā jneyā.... dharmā—stena-paga-jino-hyaham".

⁷ The name of Upaka is not referred to in the Lal. It is always "anyatamājīvako"

⁸ Mvg. I. 6.8. Cf. Mvt. III. 326. 5-8.

gives some more verses at the end of the topic describing the purpose of the Buddha visiting Banaras.

It is difficult to say why the Upaka episode is of such importance and occurs everywhere so elaborately in connection with the early history of the Life of the Buddha. It is in all probability because it is for the first time that the Buddha himself relates, his own sublime inner qualities after the attainment of "Sambodhi", to a human being, who from the beginning could grasp something new at the shining face of the Buddha.¹

During the conversation between the Buddha and Upaka, the former makes clear in detail the merits of a pure life (*Brahmacarya*), the conquering of all cravings and freedom from defilement, etc. In the second verse he relates the uniqueness. In the third verse the Buddha expresses his self-purification and complete emancipation attaining the final goal of *Nirvāṇa*. Replying to the query of Upaka as to where the Buddha was going and why, the latter told him that he now desired to turn "the wheel of the excellent law (*dhammacakkhām pavattetum*)". He was going to Banaras for the purpose of giving light to those who were enshrouded in darkness and to open the gate of immortality to men. Further, the Buddha said that as a lamp removes darkness and illuminates the interior of a house, so his doctrine would bring redemption to all mankind by removing ignorance.

Upaka being no longer able to bear patiently the arrogant pretensions of the Buddha, tauntingly said: "It might be so, friend", shook his head and went off by another road.² Thereupon, the Buddha, sojourning from place to place, came to Isipatana at Banaras, where the five ascetics were living.

The *Mahāvagga* does not deal with detailed accounts of the Buddha's journey to Banaras. But the *Mahāvastu*³ as well as the *Lalitavistara*⁴

¹ Mvt. III. pp. 325. 12,—326.2. "adrākṣit Upako ajivako bhagavantameta—duvacat: 'pariśuddho bhagavato Gautamasyacchavivarṇo paryavadāto viprasannāñ ca mukkavarṇāñ'. etc.

Cf. Lal. p. 526. This is more elaborate than the *Mahāvastu*.

² Mvg. I. 6.9. Cf. Lal. p. 528. The Mvt. is silent about this incident.

³ Mvt. III. pp. 327. ff.

⁴ Lal. pp. 528. ff. (Cal. ed.)

give an elaborate account of the places and different hosts who entertained the Buddha on his journey. The *Mahāvastu* mentions seven names¹ after the Buddha left Uruvilva, in each of which the Buddha spent consecutive nights at the invitation of the respective hosts. But the *Lalitavistara* refers to only five places, and in some of them the names of the hosts are mentioned. Some of the sources inform us that the Buddha stopped at Gayā in the house of a snake king, Sudarśana, and then crossing Rohitavastu, Uruvilva,² Anāla, Sārathipura, reached the banks of the Ganges.

According to the *Mahāvastu*³ Upaka met the Buddha on the third day of his journey between Vaśala and Candadvīla. But the *Mahāvagga*⁴ and *Lalitavistara* agree that their meeting place was between the Bodhi and Gayā.

THE FIRST SERMON OF THE BUDDHA

The most important topic dealt with in the introductory portion of the *Mahāvagga* is the *Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta* (Sutta of the Turning of the Wheel of the Law or Doctrine), traditionally known as the First Sermon or First Discourse (*pāthama dhammadesanā*) of the Buddha. The text of this discourse is to be found in the other Pāli sources.⁵ Along with this discourse a number of other discourses delivered by the Buddha at Isipatana, including the *Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta* (Sutta of the Marks of Non-Soul)⁶.

The *Sarvāstivāda* version is met with in the *Lalitavistara*,⁷ and the *Lokottaravāda* version in the *Mahāvastu*,⁸ and another poetical Sanskrit version is in the *Buddha-carita* of Aśvaghoṣa. Except for some additional legendary details, the text of the discourse is the same in all the versions.

¹ Gayā, Aparagayā, Vaśala, Candadvīla, Lohitavastu and Sārathipura.

² It is doubtful whether it is the same Uruvilva where the Bodhi was situated.

³ Mvt. III. 325. 11-12.

⁴ Mvg. I 6.7. Cf. Lal. 526. Atha Gayāyāṁ Bodhimandāṣya cāntarādanyatamo ājivako'drakṣittathāgatarāṁ dūrata evāgacchantam.

⁵ S. IV. 330; V. 421; M. I. 48; A. I. 177; PS. II. 147; Vibhaṅga. 101.

⁶ Cf. Mvt. III. 335. ff. S. III. 66.

⁷ Calcutta Edition. pp. 440. ff.

⁸ Sénart. III. pp. 331. ff.

In this particu Sutta we ralhave a Canonical exposition of the Four Noble Truths (*cattāri ariya saccāni*) and the Noble Eightfold Path (*Ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo*). The “Path” is described as “*Majjhima-pati padā*”, meaning the Middle Path or the Middle Way, which is contradistinct from the two extreme courses of life, viz., the one characterised by the enjoyment of sensual pleasures, and the other characterised by the practice of self-mortification (*attakilamatha*).

The *Noble Path* propounded by the Buddha envisages a mode of religious life in which the essentials of both the extreme courses of life become harmonised and significant. Be it noted that the coinage of the word “*majjhima patipadā*” is somewhat later than the earlier term “*majjha*.” In the expression of “*Majjhimapati padā*”, *majjhima*, or middle, stands as an adjective to *patipadā*, whereas ‘*majjha*’ is a substantive. In Aśoka’s *Separate Rock Edict I*¹ the word *majjha* is employed as a substantive and stands for the ideal of *Mean*.² Aśoka draws a sharp line between the two extreme courses of action, with actuated unwholesome mental states, as anger, cruelty and oppression (*issaya, kodhe, asulope, mithuliyē and tulana*) on the one side, and guided by such unwholesome states as non-application, indolence and weariness for exertion (*anāvuti ālasiye, and kilamatha*)³ on the other.

The principle of “*appamāda*” comprehending the idea of *utthāna, ussāha, ussolhi, vāyāma, viriya, viriyārambha*, and the like, stands opposed to that of lethargy. Gentle speech and dealings, self-restraint, equity, truthfulness, devotion to one’s duty, and the like, constitute a virtue which stands opposed to rashness, high-handedness and tyranny. According to the earlier political thinkers of India, the king should always keep his sceptre raised⁴. Thus it can always be shown that the Buddha’s doctrine of the *Middle Path* was not without its influence upon the subsequent development of political thought in India.

We propose to add a note of comparative studies of both the Sanskrit and the Pāli versions of this discourse in the following pages.

¹ B. M. Barua, *Aśoka and his Inscription*. Pt. II. p. 65.

² Cf. S.R.E. I. The expression “*madhan patipadayema*—We fulfil the ideal of the mean”.

³ *Vibhaṅga*, p. 357; and *Aśoka’s S.R.E. I.*

⁴ “*nityam udyata dandah syat*”.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
THE DHARMACAKRAPRAVARTANA-SUTRA :

We propose to note below the differences between the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara* of the Buddha's first discourse, the *Dharmacakrapravartana-sūtra*.

(1)

The *Mahāvagga* begins : "atha kho bhagavā pañca vaggiye bhikkhū āmantesi, dve'me bhikkhave antā pabbajitena na sevitabbā". The *Mahāvastu* begins : "tatra bhagavāñc āyuṣmantāñc pañcakāñc bhadravargīyāñc āmantresi bhikṣava iti bhagavan iti bhikṣū bhagavantāñc pratyasroṣit. bhagavā sānametaduvāca. dvāvimaū bhikṣavāḥ pravrajitasya antau", and the *Lalitavistara* begins : "tathāgata...rātrā paścime yāme pañcakāñc bhadravargīyāñc āmantraitadavocat. dvāvimaū bhikṣavāḥ pravrajitasya-tāvat kramau".

Fundamentally there is no difference between the essence of the *Sūtra*, nor does there exist any inequality of presentation among the available versions except a minor difference in the use of the sentence or an adjective or a particle and the concluding portion of the discourse.

(2)

Mahāvagga :— "katame dve : (a) yo cāyam kāmesu kama sukhallikānuyogo hīno, gammo, pothujjaniko, anariyo, anathhasamphito ; (b) yo cāyam attakilamathānuyogo dukkho anariyo anathhasamphito. ete kho bhikkave ubho ante anupagamima majjhimā paṭipadā tathāgatena abhisam-buddhā cakkhuikarañc, nānakarañc, upasamāya, abhiññāya, sambodhāya, nibbānāya samvattanti. *Mahāvastu* : katamā dvau : (a) yaścāyam kāmesu kāmasukhallikāyogo grāmyo prāthujjaniko nālamaryo nārthasamphito nāyatāñc brahmacaryāye na sambodhāye na nirodhāye na śrāmanyāye na nirvānāye samvartanti; (b) yaścāyam ātmā kilamathānuyogo dukkho anāryo anarthasamphito. *Lalitavistara* : (a) yaśca kāmśu kāmasukhallikāyogo

hīno, grāmyah, pārthagjaniko, nālamaryo nārtho 'pasamhito nāyat�āñi brahmaçaryāya na nivedana (?) na virāgaya, na nirodhāya, nābhijñāpana sambodhāye na nirvāñāya samvarttante ; (b) yāceyam̄ madhyamāpratipadātmakāyaklamathānuyogo duhkho 'narthropasamhito dṛṣṭadharmaścayatyāñica duhkho vipākāḥ.

In the *Mahāvagga* the first extreme is “*Kāmasukhaliikānuyogo*”, whereas in the *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara* it is “*kāmasukhaliikkāyogo*”. “*hīno*”, the first adjective of the first extreme in the *Mahāvagga* is lacking in the *Mahāvastu*, but is followed by other adjectives : “*nāyat�āñi brahmaçaryāye....na śrāmanyāye na samboshāye*, etc.” and the *Lalitavistara* eliminated most of the above but adds one more unlike the other two, viz., “*abhiññāyē*”.

The second extreme in both the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu* is “*duhkho anāryo*” and “*anarthasanhito*”, but in the *Lalitavistara* “*yāceyam̄ madhyamāpratipadāt kāyaklamathānuyogo nārthropasamhito dṛṣṭadharmaścayatyāñica duhkho vipākāḥ*”.

(3)

That which is “*abhisambuddhā* (enlightened independently)” in the *Mahāvagga*, is “*anusaṁbuddhā* [enlightened following the path of other (Buddhas)] in the *Mahāvastu*. But the subsequent passages adopt the word as “*abhisambuddhā*”. This singular adoption seems to be doubtful and might be due to incorrect copying.

Mahāvagga : “ete te bhikkhīave ubho ante anupagamīna majjhimā paṭipadā tathāgatena abhisambuddhā....katamā ca sā....sañvattā ti ? ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo : seyyathidam̄ sammāditīhi, etc.”

Mahāvastu : “imau bhikṣavāḥ dvau pravrajitasya antau, ete ca bhikṣavo ubhau anātvanupagamya tathāgatasyāryasmīm̄ dharmavinaye madhyamā prati padā anusaṁbuddhā....sañvartati. katamā.... ? yamidamārya-ṭhāṅgikā, sayyathidam̄ sañyakdṛṣṭib, etc.”

(4)

Then comes the introduction of the “*Four Noble Truths*”, into the *Sūtra*. The *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara* introduce this “*sūtra*” with a statement (of *uddesa* and *niddesa*)¹. But the *Mahāvagga* deals directly

¹ “*Catvā r Khalurimāni bhikṣavo āryasatyāñi*” and “*Katamāni catvāri*”

with the topic (*Paṭiniddasa*)¹ beginning to give a vivid description like the former two.

In the explanation of the first "Truth" *Mahāvagga* and *Lalitavistara* added the particle "pi" after "jāti, jarā, byādhī, maranam, apriya-samp-rayogam" and "priya-viprayogam" which is omitted in the *Mahāvastu*. The addition of "paryesanto" after "yamicchanto" is common to both *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara*. The *Mahāvastu* quotes all the five "Upādāna-skandhas", unlike *Mahāvagga* and *Lalitavistara*.

To explain the third "Truth" mention is made only in *Mahāvagga* of the three "tanhās (desires)", viz., "kāma, bhava" and "vibhava", but in the other two sources no particular reference is given to them. Besides, the explanation itself is a little different in the *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara*. *Mahāvastu* continues: "yo etaśyaiva tṛṣṇāye nandirāga-sahagatāye tatratastrābhinandināye, etc." (Lal. "janikāya, nirvartikāya) aśeṣa kṣayo, prahāno, pratiniḥsargo.

(5)

Mahāvagga and *Mahāvastu* have "anānuśruteṣu dharmeṣu" for *Lalitavistara*: "Aśruteṣu dharmeṣu" whenever this phrase occurs. *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara* are defective in representing the first repetition (*parivarta*) in all the four aspects (ākāras) viz: duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha and mārga without adding the word "ārya satya" to them, but it being added to all subsequent aspects (ākāras).

Two different modes have been adopted to divide and represent the three "parivartas" and the twelve "ākāras"—*Mahāvagga* is distinguished both from *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara*, but *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara* are identical with each other.

Mahāvagga (the first method)

1st. PARIVARTA.	2nd. PARIVARTA.	3rd. PRARIVARTA.
1. dukkham	pariñneyyam	pariññātām
2. samudayam	pahātabbam	pahīnam
3. nirodham	saccikātabbam	saccikatam
4. maggam	bhāvetabbam	bhāvitam

Mahāvastu and Lalitavistara (the second method)

1st. parivarta (1) duḥkha (2) samudaya (3) nirodha (4) mārga.

¹ See ante

2nd. *parivarta* (5) *parijñeyam* (6) *prahātavya* (7) *sāksātkartavya* (8) *bhāvitavya*. 3rd. *parivarta*. (9) *parijñātam* (10) *prahīna* (11) *sāksātkṛta* (12) *bhāvita*.

But *Mahāvastu* omits Nos. 7-10. Probably the omission is due to an error of the scribe or the printers.

In the conclusion the sentence runs:

Mahāvagga: “*yāvakīvañca me bhikkhave imesu catusu ariyaccessu evam tiparivattam dvādasākāram yathābhūtam nānadarśanam na suvisuddham ahosi, nevatāvāham paccañāsim.*

The same sentence is expressed differently in *Mahāvastu*: “*yāvaccaham bhikṣavaḥ imāni catvāryāryasatyāni evam triparivartam . . . nābhya-jñāsiḥ, na tāvadaham anuttaram samyaksambodhimabhisam̄buddho prajñeham*”.

But *Lalitavistara* follows the same system of the sentence as *Mahāvagga*, but the words are almost identical with those of *Mahāvastu*: “*iti hi blikṣavo yāvadeva me eṣu caturśāryasatyेषु manasi kurvato evam triparivartam . . . abhisam̄buddhosmīti pratijñāsitam na ca me jñānadarśanamutpadyate*”.

“*Yāvakīvañca*” seems to be an enlargement in the *Mahāvagga* for “*yāva*” or “*yāvadeva*” in comparison with “*yāva*” which is followed by both *Mahāvastu* and *Lalitavistara*.

Mahāvagga has: “*suvisuddham ahosi*” for *Mahāvastu* “*pratijñēhāḥ*” and for *Lalitavistara* “*pratijñāsim*”.

In *Mahāvagga* the sentence concludes: “*nānañca me dassanam udapādi akuppā me cetovimutti ayamantimā jāti na'tthi dāni punabbhavo*”: for *Mahāvastu* “*jñānāñca me udapāśi . . . prajñāvimukti sāksikertā*”: and for *Lalitavistara* “*jñānadarśanam me udapādi kṣīṇā me jātiruśitam brahmacyakṛtam karaṇīyam nāpraasmādbhvam pratijānāmi*”.

Comparing all the above three quotations we arrive at the conclusion that the Buddha's remark regarding his enlightenment and last birth is clearer in *Mahāvagga* and *Lalitavistara* than in *Mahāvastu*.

Lalitavistara ends here with the conclusion of the *Dharmacakra-pravartana-Sūtra* summarising the whole Sūtra into ten verses.

The main Sūtra being concluded the *Mahāvagga* goes on: “*idamavoca bhagavā attamanā pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū bhagavato bhāsītam abhinandanti*” but in *Mahāvagga* this “*attamanā*” or the joyful repetition of the

Blessed One's discourse by the Five Ascetics occurs at the end of the Buddha's *Udāna* of "aññāsi bho Koṇḍañña" and acclamation by the gods from the earth (*bhummādevā*) to the Brahma heaven.

The sentence of the *Mahāvagga*: "tena khaṇena tena muhuttēna, etc.", has been totally omitted in *Mahāvastu*.

Mahāvagga has "ayañca dasasahassilokadhātu saṃkampi, sampakampi, sampavedhi" for *Mahāvastu*: "iyañca mahāpṛthivī atiriva sañvikāraṇi kampe chinnamiva patraṇi vedhe, sampravedhe, purastimāśca anto unnamati paścimaśca anto oname: "paścimo" vice versa: "dakṣiṇo—uttaro—madhyo — anto" vice versa.

Mahāvagga has only "atikkamma devānām devānubhāvām" for *Mahāvastu* "atikeramyeva devānām devānubhāvām, nāgānām etc.", also "yā pi tā lokantarikā, andhakārapitā, tamisrā, etc."

Mahāvastu does not give any reason how Kauṇḍinya becomes Ajūñāta-kauṇḍinya as *Mahāvagga* explains in its last sentence concluding: "iti hidam āyasmato koṇḍaññassa aññātakonḍaññotveva nāmamahosi" (i.e., from the Buddha's utterance of "aññāsi bho koṇḍañña".)

CONVERSION OF YASA

There is a great difference between the accounts of the *Mahāvagga* and those of the *Mahāvastu* regarding the story of Yasa, the second convert of the Buddha. The *Mahāvagga* deals with this particular story just before the renunciation of Yasa with special reference to his luxurious life and his residences in three palaces. On the other hand, the *Mahāvastu* deals with the story from the point of view of Yasa's previous life. On one occasion¹ a *Jātaka* story is narrated about Yasa's performance of merits in the past life leading to Arhatship in his present existence.

It is to be noted that Yasa is always referred to as Yaśoda² in the *Mahāvastu* and Yaśada in the Chinese account.³ The story of Yasa's previous life runs as follows:- There was a big *Nyagrodha* (banyan) tree at the bank of the river Varanā near Benares. This tree was famous for its beautiful growth. It was an object of worship and

¹ Mvt. III. Yaśoda Jātakāni pp. 413, ff.

² Mvt. III. 405.4

³ Beal — Romantic Legend of Sakyā Buddha.

veneration to all classes of people around it, as it is said that whatever a devotee prayed for¹ to the tree his desire was fulfilled. Now the tree-goddess being alarmed at the threat of danger to her abode by a childless couple who had prayed for a male child, went to Śakra, the king of the gods, and related to him her wretched plight. Śakra consoled and assured her that he would find some way of relieving her of her distress. On making enquiries he learnt that a "devaputra" of the *Trayastrīśa* heaven was about to be reborn on earth in his last existence. This devaputra had resolution under the previous Buddhas to become an Arhant at the time of Gautama Buddha. He consented to the request of Śakra to enter the womb of the merchant's wife, being assured by Śakra that he would be able to renounce the world and the luxurious life of a rich merchant's son.²

The *Mahāvastu* reveals that Yasa was informed about the Buddha and persuaded to renounce the world by a merchant who had returned from a business tour in the eastern countries. The merchant, who was second³ in rank to Yasa's father was sent for to see the influence of the meritorious and pompous life of his son.⁴ But the Chinese source⁵ informs us that Śakra himself remained Yasa of the time of his renunciation. Besides, it recalls the typical episodes that occurred before the Great Renunciation of the Master— Yasa's visit to the pleasure garden. Śakra's transformation into an old and decrepit woman, the dead body from which worms came out and their feeding on the carcass, etc. But instead of Yasa's meeting any pravrajita he met the Buddha on his way to the garden, the Master having gone out to beg his meal at Benares followed by Aśvajit. It is said that the Buddha predicted there and then Yasa's renunciation.

The circumstances and the odd scene that led to Yasa's renunciation in disgust are almost uniform in the *Mahāvagga*, the *Mahāvastu*,

¹ Cf. *DhA*. I. p. 1. ff.

² Mvt. III. 404.II. Śakra tamāha: prapidhchi tuvarū tatra śreṣṭhikule cittam upapattiye, ahaṁ tathā kariṣyām yathā tuvarū tataḥ śreṣṭhikulāto abhiniṣkramitvā bhagavato sāsane pravrajīṣyasi.

³ Ibid. p. 405. 18. *dvitīyakuliko*.

⁴ Ibid. ff.

⁵ Beal—*Romantic Legend of Sakyā Buddha*.

the Chinese and the Tibetan sources.¹ The *Mahāvagga* relates that Yasa was assisted on his retreat from the palace and the city by non-human beings who opened gates for him. The *Mahāvastu* as well as the Chinese and the Tibetan sources inform us that Yasa met the Master at a leaf-hut (*pāṇṇasālā*) after crossing over the river² and having left his golden slippers on the bank. But the *Mahāvagga* does not corroborate this information and states that Yasa met the Buddha at the Deer Park, Isipatana, just at dawn when the latter was walking up and down in the open air. This seems to agree, because the Master was still living at Isipatana and neither of the sources informs us that any monastery was offered to the Buddha before the Venuvana Vihāra was dedicated by King Bimbisāra.

The discovery of Yasa's flight from the palace was made, according to the *Mahāvagga* (I.7.7) by his mother, to the *Mahāvastu* (III.409) by his wives, and to the Tibetan (p.38) by his maid-servants.

Being informed by his mother, the merchant sent house-messengers in four directions and himself went to the Deer Park, Insipatana, following the track of the golden slippers left on the ground.³ The Buddha saw the merchant coming from afar and decided to exercise such a miraculous power that the merchant seated there could not see Yasa, sitting there on the spot. Then the merchant approached the Buddha and enquired if Yasa had been seen by him. The Buddha asked the merchant to sit down and told him: "Well, merchant, perhaps sitting down here you may see Yasa sitting here also".

The fundamental difference is obvious between the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu* regarding the performance of the miracles. It is said that in the *Mahāvastu*⁴ that Yasa himself performed the miracles so that his parents and other people assembled there might not see him.

¹ Mvg. I.7. 1-3; Mvt. III. p. 407; Beal — *Romantic Legend of Sakyā Buddha*, p. 263, Rockhill — *Life of Buddha*, p. 38.

² According to the Mvt. and the Chinese sources it was the Varanā, and that of the Tibetan, Naśi.

³ Mvg. I. 7.7 But the Mvt. (III. p. 409) informs us that both his parents proceeded to Isipatana and were grieved to see his golden slippers left on the bank of the river.

⁴ Mvt. III. p. 409. ff.

Unlike the *Mahāvagga*, the *Mahāvastu* further reveals that Yasa was mentally induced by the Master¹ to show his miraculous power to his parents and the big assembly of people. Yasa then rose in the air up to the height of a palm tree² and exercised "the miracles of the pair" in various ways.

According to the Pāli tradition³ no other person than the Buddha himself, and in very rare cases Mahāmoggallāna, could perform this miracle. It is a new item of information to the Pāli sources and it sounds strange to attribute such a powerful miracle to Yasa, who according to the *Mahāvagga* even then did not attain Arhatship. On the contrary, he attained that stage only when the Buddha delivered religious discourses to his father. It is stated, of course, in the *Mahāvastu*⁴ that Yasa attained Arhatship together with the power of miracles at the first meeting with the Master. In this particular case the *Mahāvastu*'s information regarding Yasa's power of the miracles of the pair is unique and has not been supported by any other sources.

The story of Yasa and his renunciation is identified with that of the Buddha. The notable point in this connection is that the circumstances under which Yasa renounced the world were very similar to those under which the Buddha's renunciation took place. This similarity seems to prompt Professor Rhys-Davids to draw the conclusion⁵ that the account dealing with this portion of the Buddha's life was based on or took shape after the legend of Yasa. To us it does not appear that either of the legends were modelled on one or the other. On the contrary, it is quite possible to suppose that both the clans or families being supreme in their respective sphere of life, were capable of providing all comfort and amenities to their children, whom they had obtained after much prayer and cherished desire. At best

¹ Mvg. III. p. 409. 17-18. "atha khalu bhagavām yaśodam śreṣṭhiputram manasādhyabhāse: ṛddhiprātiḥāryam vidarśchi".

² Ibid. "... yaśodo tālamātram vaihāyase saṃsthito anekavidhām ṛddhipratiḥāryam vidarśayanto . . ."

³ Jātaka (I. p. 77 and 88 etc.) says that in the whole of the Buddha's career this miracle was performed only 4 times.

⁴ Mvt. III. 409. 1-2. "atha khalu yaśodo śreṣṭhiputro tatraivāsane niṣāṇo tisro'bhijjāvidyā ṣaḍabhijjā balavaśibhāvam sākṣikaroti anekavidhām ṛddhiṁ pratyanubhavati.

⁵ S.B.E. XIII. p. 102. fn. 2.

it may be inferred that in those days under review, men of high positions used to maintain, generally, three categories of residence (built for them) for three different seasons, and that their youthful days were mostly spent among the dancing and slave girls, and they were seldom in contact with their male friends.

Another obvious distinction between the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu* is that, according to the *Mahāvastu*, Yasa was ordained at the request of his parents who after the admonition of the Buddha¹ became lay disciples under the formula of "Three Refuges". This is contrary to the information of the *Mahāvagga*, which states that on the first day of Yasa's initiation his father became a lay disciple who extended an invitation to the Buddha along with Yasa for the next morning at his house,² with a special request to Yasa to pity his mother³ who was upset at the flight of Yasa. It was on the following morning that Yasa met his mother, and both Yasa's mother and former wife became lay woman devotees under the formula of "Three Refuges".

After Yasa's ordination, the *Mahāvastu* observes complete silence and indicates nothing regarding Yasa's further movements in respect of his four chief friends or of his fifty householder friends. There is only a brief reference to the thirty Bhadravargiya bhiksus which will be dealt with later.

The Tibetan and the Chinese accounts coincide with that of the *Mahāvagga* in connection with the above topic.

The Buddhist Saṅgha was still not established in the true sense of the term, and therefore these newly ordained bhikkhus had no common purpose in view. They existed merely in name with no particular mission to carry out. At that time there were sixty-one Arhants in the world (Buddha and five first converts and Yasa and his 4 urban friends

¹ Mvt. III. 413. "te punar yaśodasya śreṣṭhiputrasya mātāpitaraū bhagavan-tametadavocat: pravrājehi. upasaṁpādehi bhagavām yaśodām śreṣṭhiputraim.

² According to the Tibetan source (Rockhill, *Life of Buddha*, p. 39) yasa returned to his home along with his father. According to the Pāli tradition (*Therī gāthā commentary* p. 141) this is absurd, for those who had become Arhants would have either to be ordained or to attain "parinibbāṇa" before dawn.

³ Mvg. I. 7.12. mātā tetāta yasa, paridevasoka samāpaṇñā dehi mātū jīvitam'ti

and his 50 householder friends). The Buddha therefore thought it fit to explain to them what mission they should follow for the benefit of mankind.

He asked them to go forth to the various quarters singly, and to help mankind to obtain relief from suffering, because the Buddha considered himself as well as the disciples equally emancipated from all fetters, whether they were heavenly or human.¹ On this occasion the Buddha pronounced his great and historic proclamation to his disciples to "Go forth to different lands for the benefit of many, and for the welfare, benefit and happiness of gods and men; and to preach the doctrine which is good in the beginning, good in the middle and good at the end."

At this particular occasion we note at least three different opinions held by the *Mahāvastu*, as well as the Tibetan and the Chinese accounts.

According to the *Mahāvastu*² the Buddha addressed this proclamation to the five ascetic bhikkhus, though this episode is recorded to have occurred after the ordination of Yasa.

The Tibetan account³ informs us that the Buddha sent his missionaries out two by two. But this information does not tally with other accounts.⁴ On the other hand, the Chinese account states that he forbade Yasa to follow him at all for the time being, saying: "Dear Yaśoda, I wish you now to remain here and not to follow me, for you are but young and ill prepared to bear the toil and privations which the life of a travelling mendicant will require of you; remain, then, I pray you, in this place and receive the nourishment and necessities you require at the hands of your father and mother, who will care that you want nothing."⁵

The Buddha gave assurance to his disciples that at least there would be people to appreciate them. After exhorting the bhikkhus, the

¹ Mvg. I. 11.1. Cf. Mvt. III. 415. "tatra khalu bhagavām āyuṣmantām pañcakām bhadravargiyānāmāmantrayati; mukto'harī bhikṣavaḥ sarvapāśehi ye divyā ye ca mānuṣa. Caratha bhikṣavaḥ cārikām."

² Cf. above quotation.

³ Rockhill — *Life of Buddha*, p. 39.

⁴ Mvg. I. 11.1. "mā ekena dve agmittha; and Mvt. III. 415. "mā ca duve ekena agamittha."

⁵ Beal — *Romantic Legend of Sakyā Buddha*, p. 268. This statement is very doubtful.

Buddha expressed his desire to go back to the township of soldiers (*senānigama*)¹ situated near Uruvelā's idyllic wild charms. But his journey had to be postponed owing to the advent of the rainy season, and this became, later on, a customary rite (*varsāvāsa*) to be observed by the Buddhist Sangha.

In the meantime, the bhikkhus sent in different quarters went on preaching the new doctrine and brought to the presence of the Buddha numerous candidates for "Pabbajā (initiation)" and "Upasampadā (ordination)" to be performed personally by the Buddha himself. This incident led to the pronouncement of a very important rule which empowered the bhikkhus to confer the initiation and ordination on people desirous of joining the Buddhist Saṅgha.

This rule eventually changed the whole outlook of the government of the Community of monks making it democratic in every sphere of activities. The bhikkhus themselves henceforth could confer *Pabbajā* and *Upasampadā* on the future members of the Saṅgha, in the name of the Buddha, the Doctrine and the Brotherhood on behalf of the Buddha.

For whoever became ordained, became virtually a disciple of the Buddha though his education was given by the teacher converting him. The Buddha, however, continued as before, to confer the *Upasampadā* by the "ehi bhikkhu" formula.

BHADDA VAGGIYAS

When the retreat (*varsāvāsa*) was over, the Buddha exhorted his disciples, who could then be considered as the nucleus of his Saṅgha, and after giving them his admonitions he started on his journey towards Uruvelā. On the way he met in a grove (*Bhaddavaggiyas*) thirty friends who were all disporting themselves with their wives except one who had no wife and who was in the company of a courtesan. When the party was searching for this woman who ran away with their valuables while they were asleep, they found Buddha under a tree, where he sat resting. All of them subsequently became Arhants after the delivery of the Buddha's discourses.

¹ Mvt. III. 415. *senāpatigrāmaka*. Lal. p. 311. *senāpatigrām*, i.e. the village of the chief soldier or the general.

All the sources are uniform regarding the accounts of the thirty friends, except the *Mahāvastu*, which gives some vague information about thirty men belonging to clans. This account is inconsistent and is difficult to identify with the same story of the *Bhaddavaggiyas* of the *Mahāvagga*.

These may be considered as fragments of the two stories which might together form the major portion of the story. The first one is called the initiation of the thirty clansmen¹ and deals with that portion of the *Bhaddavaggiya* story which concerns the courtesan.

The second part of the story which is the first paragraph of the story itself and deals with the preliminary portion of the *Bhaddavaggiya* story, which states that the Buddha sat down beside the road for the benefit of the thirty persons passing by.

The second part of the story which is the first paragraph of the story of *Maitrayāniputra*² has no connection with the story itself and deals with the preliminary portion of the *Bhaddavaggiya* story, which states that the Buddha sat down beside the road for the benefit of the thirty persons passing by.

The details of this story are interesting, since they show the transference, changing and mixing of motives of the original Buddha-legend in the degree that the memory of the first composition of the narrative had faded in consequence of the gradual diminution of its religious importance and historical truthfulness. The popular traits outweigh the historical ones, and yet the link with the great reservoir of accumulated folk—lore and ballads of the Buddha-life can be traced.

The same process can be observed in the *Yasa* story and to an even greater extent in the intricate detail of the *Vinaya* stories of the Gilgit MSS., e.g. *Jivaka*, *Sona*, *Viśakhā*.

THE KASSAPA BROTHERS

Gradually the Buddha arrived at Uruvelā and became the guest of Uruvelā Kassapa, a fire-worshipper ascetic, in his hermitage. At the

¹ Mvt. III. 376. “trimśa goṣṭikānāmī pravrajyā”. 30 *Bhaddavaggiyas* as 30 *dhūttā* in *Tundila-Jātaka* (No. 388). Cf. 30 *Sūkārā* in *Muniśukara-Jātaka* (No. 285.)

² Mvt. 377.2. ff. apare dāni pana trimśa janā R. śivadanasya nātidūrena mārgena gacchanti. bhagavāṇi dāni teṣāmanugrahārthāya mārgasya samipe niṣāṇo.

request of the Buddha, Uruvelā Kassapa somewhat half-heartedly pointed out to him his fire house, for halting there that night only, because it was infested by a dragon. However, the Buddha gratefully accepted the offer and stayed at that house and subjugated the dragon. During the course of his stay there, which lasted nearly two months, he performed a series of miracles for the edification and conversion of his host and his disciples. During this period, it is stated in the *Mahāvagga* that the Buddha showed more than 350¹ miracles. These miracles may be classified into fourteen catagories:

The first among the 14 categories is the subjugation of the Snake-king in the sacrificial house. But the *Mahāvastu* informs us that this subjugation is the last miracle (*pacchimapāṭihāriya*) performed by the Buddha. Moreover, the *Mahāvastu* does not give any detailed or systematic picture of the performance of miraculous powers.²

In comparison with the *Mahāvastu*, it is clear that the *Mahāvagga* gives a systematic classified account of the Buddha's activities during this period in the following order:

- (1) Subjugation of the Snake-king in the Fire House³
- (2) Causing the arrival of the four Guardian kings
- (3) Causing the arrival of Śakra
- (4) Causing the arrival of Mahābrahmā
- (5) Disclosure of the thought of Kassapa who wanted the Buddha to stay elsewhere during the celebration of the Annual "yajña" to be presided over by him.
- (6) Causing the creation for the Buddha's own benefit of (i) a pond, (ii) a stone for laying his robes on, (iii) the bending of a tree-branch required for his rising up from the pond, (iv) placing a big slab of stone for dyeing his garments. (these works undertaken and performed by Śakra who understood the requirements of the Buddha.)
- (7) Presentation of the fruit of the Jambu tree to Uruvelā Kassapa.

¹ "adduḍḍha pāṭihāriya satāni".

² Mvt. III. 428 . . . evam bhagavām uruvilva kāśyapasya sammukkhā trayo bhrātaram saparivārām pañcahi prātihārya-śatēhi vinayesi. (Difference of number in the above two should be noted.)

³ Mvg. "agyāgāra." Mvt. "agnisāraṇo".

- (8) Bringing down the “*paricchattaka*” flower (i.e. *parijāta*, the heavenly flower) from heaven.
- (9) Placing “*āmalaka*” and “*harītaka*” fruits (myrobalams) before the Jatilas.
- (10) Causing, the breaking of the faggot which the Jatilas could not split with their axes.
- (11) Causing the ignition of the faggot which the Jatilas failed to set fire to.
- (12) Causing the extinction of fire which the Jatilas failed to extinguish.
- (13) Creating 500 vessels of fire for warming the Jatilas individually on a wintry night.
- (14) Walking up and down on a dry spot encircled by a flood on the same level.

In the *Mahāvagga* this episode has been introduced naturally in a simple manner for the propagation of the new doctrine in which the Kassapas could be of great service if converted. Miracles had always been the popular and convincing test for the value of a specific doctrine and in this teaching the Buddha is no exception. Though the *Mahāvastu* obviously tries to create a supernatural atmosphere in the whole of the episode. Supernatural power is attributed not only to both the Buddha and Kassapa but in some places to his disciples as well.

The *Mahāvastu* informs us that the Buddha arrived through the sky to the hermitage of Uruvelā Kassapa with a thousand¹ created disciples whereas Kassapa had only 500. Now it so happened that Uruvelā Kassapa, along with his followers, were afraid of being deprived of his influence over his (lay) followers who were to be assembled the following morning. But Buddha realising his mental uneasiness withdrew his supernatural power and assumed the original appearance and stood before him all alone.²

This incident is not mentioned in the *Mahāvagga*. The Fifth (No. 5 as mentioned above) appears as the second in the *Mahāvastu* and the

¹ According to the *Romantic Legend of Sakya Buddha* p. 293, the number of the Buddha's disciples also was 500. However this is a new information as no Pāli account refers to it.

² Mvt. III. p. 424.

Buddha goes to "Senāpati grāmaka" under the Ajapāla banyan tree and not to Uttarakuṇḍa to beg alms, nor does he take his meal at Anavatatta Lake, but he returns to the Jāṭila hermitage at the mental invocation of Uruvelā Kassapa to partake of his food.

The second, third and fourth miracles are not mentioned in the *Mahāvastu*, No. 11 of the above is placed as No. 3 in the *Mahāvastu*, indicating that Uruvelā Kassapa and his disciples were trying to light the sacrificial fire from above the sky. Nos. 6-9 are lacking in the Mvt.

In the fourth miracles of the *Mahāvastu*, the Jāṭilas were prevented from offering "āhuti" and ultimately fell in the proper place as soon as the miracles were withdrawn. In the fifth miracle they were prevented from descending from the sky but subsequently they were allowed to do so. In that of the sixth they could not trace their palanquin.

In the seventh miracle they could not trace their pitchers and when they found them they could not fill them. In the ninth miracle they were prevented from taking food. But all these preventions were removed at the recognition of Gautama's great power.

There is no reference to the above four miracles in the *Mahāvagga* as prevalent in the *Mahāvastu*. At least there is one similarity between the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu*, i.e. the tenth miracle: causing the breaking of faggots which the Jāṭilas could not split with their axes.

Even when these miracles were performed Uruvelā Kassapa's mind remained unsettled as to whether or not he should become a follower of the Buddha who finally effected his conversion by gentle remonstrance overcoming all his apprehension and creating a sense of security in him. Along with Uruvelā Kassapa, his 500 disciples; following their examples Nādi Kassapa with his 300 disciples and Gayā Kassapa with his 200 disciples¹ embraced the new doctrine. With these disciples, numbering 1000, who were highly cultured and had a system of doctrine and discipline akin to those of Buddhism, the Tathāgata formed his first Saṅgha. The Jāṭilas who composed

¹ According to the Tibetan accounts both Nādi and Gayā Kassapas each had 250 disciples. (Rockhill—*Life of Buddha*) p. 41.

this premier body were very cultured and extremely devoted to their spiritual heads. The Buddha, therefore, did not need much philosophy in converting them. But he had recourse to practical methods for winning them over for the formation of the first Saṅgha and codification of his Vinayas, especially the *Pātimokkha*. The Buddha's creation of fire at his own mere will and his causing it to serve the ends of the Jāṭilas undoubtedly dealt a heavy blow to the faith they entertained in it. They therefore threw away all their belongings kept for the worship of fire, and followed in the footsteps of their Master, Uruvelā Kassapa¹ and became followers of the Buddha.

Taking his cue from a bush fire that was raging on the opposite hill, the Buddha discoursed to them on the abandonment of the sensual fire, after which they all became Arhants.

The record of Upasena, the nephew of the three Kassapas in the *Mahāvastu*² as well as in the Chinese accounts³ it is most important and throws some important light on the following topics of the two chief disciples of the Buddha. It is said that on observing the hermit utensils were floating down the river after having been thrown away by his three maternal uncles and their thousand followers, Upasena feared that some misfortune had befallen them owing to robbers, fire, flood, etc., and hurried to their *Āśrama* with his three hundred disciples.⁴ On enquiring, his uncles told him that this was the supreme method of delivering one's own self from worldly sufferings. He was subsequently conferred ordination upon by the Buddha by the "ehi bhikkhu" method of ordination. So the total ordination in this place, according to the *Mahāvastu*, is 1300 and according to the Chinese source 1250.⁵

According to the *Mahāvastu* the first Assembly⁶ of the Buddha's

¹ Though Uruvelā Kassapa was a 120 years old ascetic of vast reputation and a teacher of thousand disciples he did not hesitate to accept the truth which he felt at the core of his heart.

² Mvt. III. p. 431.

³ Beal, *Romantic Legend of Sakyamuni Buddha*, p. 304.

⁴ Beal, *Romantic Legend of Sakyamuni Buddha*, p. 305. Here the number of followers is 250.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ "idam bhagavato prathamam śrāvaka sannipatam ardhatarayodaśa bhikṣuśatāni"

disciples was held only after the ordination of the Kassapa brothers and their nephew Upasena.

CONVERSION OF KING BIMBISARA

With the conversion of the Jatilas, numbering about 1000, the first Buddhist Saṅgha was formed.¹ Then the Buddha decided to go to Magadha, one of the most prosperous kingdoms of the time, consisting of 80,000 villages.² Rājagaha, the capital of Magadha, was a centre of attraction not only for the people of commercial interests but it was the meeting place of religious and cultured men of different views. The six heretics (*tītthiyas*) also selected this city for the propagation of their doctrines.³ The Buddha also realised the importance of Rājagaha from the point of view of missionary activities. He himself had been a disciple there at the hermitage of Uddaka Rāmaputta before the attainment of Enlightenment, while Rāmaputta enjoyed the income from a village given to him by King Bimbisāra. Religious teachers and wandering mendicants used to assemble there accompanying the merchants who took care of them during their journey. Further, the city was an important junction of several trade routes. This made it extremely important for the propagation of the "truths" that the Buddha wanted to preach. Moreover, Rājagaha provided other facilities essential for an organiser of a mission for the propagation of doctrine such as entering into disputation with the different schools of mendicants and establishing the superiority of the religion by defeating them, setting the organisation on a sound footing by which the bhikkhus could pursue their ideals, etc. But the immediate cause of his decision to go to Rājagaha was, first, to fulfil his promise⁴ that was given to King Bimbisāra by the Buddha before his austerities, that in the case of his attaining Enlightenment he would communicate it to the king. Secondly, the Buddha knew that no doctrine can prosper and be accepted by the general

¹ Cf. DhA. I. p. 96. It differs here and reveals that the Council was held after the ordination of the two chief disciples.

² Mvg. p. 29.

³ D. I. p. 47. ff.; M. II. p. 2. ff; and the famous *Divy.* (Chap. XII) pp. 143-166.

⁴ *Jātakattha-vappanā*, I. p. 66; & *Pabbajā-suttam*.

mass however excellent may be its teaching, without the support of the ruling power and the nobility. As a matter of fact the King accorded the Buddha a very warm welcome on his arrival at Rājagaha. Unlike the *Mahāvagga*, the *Mahāvastu* records a vivid description of this episode.¹ The king was mentally prepared for this reception before the Buddha visited Rājagaha on hearing the pleasant chanting of the praises of the Buddha's "32 distinguished marks of the Great Man"² by his Brahmin priest in the early hours of the morning.³ On hearing this chanting, the happy memory of the first meeting with the Buddha arose in his mind and his eagerness increased all the more to see the Buddha once again.

Unlike the Mvt., the Mvg. does not give any indication of such depth of feeling on the part of Bimbisāra though his readiness to help the Buddha is mentioned: the donation of the Veluvanā Garden to accommodate the Buddhist Saṅgha, the wide publicity given to the new doctrine, the acceptance of the Buddha — all these indicate his earnestness and recognition of the dynamic power of the new doctrine.

It is said that King Bimbisāra opened his mind to the Buddha immediately after his conversion that he cherished five wishes when he was a prince, which according to him were fulfilled to his satisfaction. These five were:

that he might be crowned in the kingdom,
that the Buddha might visit his kingdom,
that he might pay homage to the Buddha,
that the Buddha might preach his doctrine to him, and
that he might understand the doctrine of the Buddha.

The *Mahāvastu* as well as the Tibetan Vinaya, do not agree with some of these points. The first of the above five wishes is lacking in

¹ Mvt. III. p. 441 ff. . . . "bho bhaṇe amātya bhagavato Buddhasya pratyud-gamanam̄ gamiṣyāmi. Rājgr̄ham̄ alam̄kārāpachi, bhadrāni ca yānāni yojāpehi. Sarvehi ca Rājagr̄hikehi brahmaṇa-ghapati-kchi sarvehi ca śilpāyatanehi sarvehi ca śrenīhi mayā saha bhagavato Buddhasya pratyudgamanam̄ ganta-vyan̄ti".

² "dvātrimśanmahāpuruṣalakṣaṇāni".

³ Mvt. III. p. 437. "rājño . . . Bimbisārasya brāhmaṇa purohito . . . upari prāśādatalagato rātrā pratyuṣakālasamaye dvātrīṁśanmahāpuruṣalakṣaṇāni vācā vistarena svādhyaśayān̄ karoti".

both sources mentioned above. The five wishes as quoted in the Tibetan Vinaya¹ are as follows: that he might see the Buddha; that the Buddha might visit the kingdom; that he might learn the truth from him; that he might understand the doctrine; and that he might follow its teachings. On the other hand we count six "wishes" in the *Mahāvastu*² the extra wish appearing as the third one, that "I (the king) might be delighted to see (*pravṛtte prasādeya*) the Buddha". As a matter of fact, these wishes in the *Mahāvastu* are nothing but the mental resolves of the king on hearing the praises of the Buddha by the royal priest. It does not give any indication that they were ever told to the Buddha by the king, as the *Mahāvagga* maintains.³

As the Blessed one was accompanied by his Jāṭila disciples, there was a confusion among the people and the king present there, as to whether Uruvelā Kassapa was the teacher of the Buddha or the Buddha that of Kassapa, as Uruvelā Kassapa was also a well-known figure in the whole of Magadha and was highly venerated by all classes of the people for his austerities. This confusion was perceived by the Buddha. Therefore, he asked Kassapa why he had given up the fire-worship. Kassapa understood the motive of the question and replied: as a result of the sacrifice, one is supposed to get all one's desires fulfilled—desires of wealth, power, women and progeny. Through your teaching, my Lord, I have realised that desire is the real cause of all our miseries. And unless we have self-control we cannot attain bliss and contentment of mind. That is why I have given up the sacrifices." Then Kassapa saluted the Buddha as his teacher.³ This served as a proof to the whole assembly including the king, and the majority became lay devotees. The event was far-reaching and of great consequence. Its significance was the acceptance of the Ārāma for the residence of the Saṅgha by the Buddha, since as yet there was no Vihāra for the accommodation of the bhikkhus.

In the meantime the sixty disciples who had been sent in sixty

¹ Rockhill — *Life of Buddha*, p. 42.

² cf. Mvt. III. p. 434.

³ *Mahānārada-kassapa-Jātaka* (No. 544). The Tibetan account records here that Uruvelā Kassapa performed various miracles before the assembly after having been induced by the Buddha. Rockhill — *Life of Buddha*.

different directions were, no doubt, making converts under the “*Trīśarana*” formula. The question, therefore, of having a place of rest for the Śākyā-disciples “*Sakyaputtiyā*” became uppermost in the mind of the Master.

It is said that the place for the *Veluvāṇa* Vihāra was selected by the king and approved and accepted by the Buddha because of the fact that it possessed the six characteristics which a Vihāra must possess according to the Buddhist literature,¹ viz.,

- (1) that it should be situated not too far from the village and not too close to it,
- (2) that it should be easily accessible to the people who wished to go there,
- (3) that it should be free from disturbance by day and from the noise of (wild) animals by night,
- (4) that it should not be windy,
- (5) that it should be fit for human habitation, and
- (6) that it should be conducive to meditation.

The *Veluvāṇa* garden satisfied all these conditions and was therefore, accepted by the Buddha from King Bimbisāra, who dedicated it to the Saṅgha by sprinkling or pouring water (a performance symbolising a dedicatory gift) from a golden pitcher.²

The *Mahāvastu*, however, contains no record of the dedication of the *Veluvāṇa* Garden. Its story ends with the detailed accounts of the Buddha's discourses delivered in the Yaṣṭhivāṇa Garden (Pāli: *Lathivāṇuyyāna*) at Antagiri.³ There is no similarity between these discourses and those of the “*anupubbikathā*”, i.e., *dānakathā*, *sīlakathā*, etc.—the technique of discourses recorded in the *Mahāvagga*, for in the *Mahāvastu* the Buddha merely makes an introduction to the religious talks⁴ which are nothing but a summing up of the substance already delivered on different occasions, viz., the *Anattalakkhana-sutta*,⁵ the *Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta*,⁶ and the *Paṭiccasamuppāda*

¹ Mvg. I. 22. 16-17.

² *Jātakattha vaṇṇanā*, Pt. I., p. 85.

³ Mvg. I. 22.1. “*Lathivāṇa*” is situated at *Suppatīṭṭha-Cetiya*.

⁴ Mvt. III. p. 449.9. “*dharmaṁ kathāṁ praṇāmaya*”.

⁵ Cf. Mvt. III. pp. 446-447.

⁶ Ibid. pp. 447-8.

respectively,¹ and at the end illustrating the previous history of King Bimbisāra which ultimately connected him with the Buddha in this existence.

SARIPUTTA AND MAHAMOGGALLANA²

The story of the conversion of the two chief disciples of the Buddha is the concluding episode in the introductory portion, i.e. the first twenty-four topics of the *Mahāvagga*.

At Rājagaha there was an assembly of 250 *paribbājakas*, of which Sañjaya, one of the then six chief *Titthiya* teachers, was the head. Sāriputta and Moggallāna, along with their 500 companions, were ordained in his hermitage and placed at the head of his disciples. These two disciples not being satisfied with Sañjaya's teaching, both came to an understanding that henceforth they would try to find a proper teacher separately, and as soon as they found one they would report the discovery to each other. Now it so happened that one day, Assaji, one of the five first disciples (*pañcavaggiyā*) and the companion of the Buddha, during his six years of austerity, arrived at Rājagaha at that time from his missionary activities. He was met by Sāriputta who was struck by his appearance of calm dignity. Sāriputta asked him whose doctrine he professed and who was his teacher. Assaji answered that he was but a humble follower of the Buddha's doctrine, and the Blessed One was his teacher. Asked again to explain the essence of the Buddha's doctrine he expounded it briefly: "Of all things which proceed from a cause the Tathāgata has explained the cause, and he has explained their cessation also. This is what the *Mahāsamaṇa* professes (lit. holder of this view).³

For further discussions Assaji advised Sāriputta to see the Buddha

¹ Cf. Mvt. III. pp. 448-9.

² In the Mvt. the personal circumstances of the two chief disciples are given in greater detail at the beginning and the story is related at another place (III. 56.6-67.6.) where it is coupled with the preceding description of the conversion of Mahākāśyapa, the third chief disciple of the Buddha.

³ Mvg. I.23. 5 & 10. Cf. Mvt. III. 62.8. "ye dharma hetuprabhava — hetun-tesām tathā teṣām ca yo nirodha — evamvādi mahāsamaṇo".

NB. This verse of the Mvg., is lacking in the corresponding section of the Mvt., and is put into the mouth of Sāriputta in answer to a question of Moggallāna's regarding the Buddha's doctrine.

who had been residing at the Veluvana Vihāra. He was sent to the Buddha probably because the sixty monks sent out by the Master for the missionary activities had hitherto no authority to confer ordination on desiring persons. They had to bring or send them with proper instructions from the different parts of the country to the place where the Teacher was staying at the time. However, charmed with the new doctrine, Sāriputta, accompanied by his friend Moggallāna, went to Veluvana to interview the Buddha. They were convinced by the Buddha's discourses and were ordained by him.

The episode of Sāriputta and Moggallāna is almost uniform in all accounts with slight variations. Buddhaghosa gives long and detailed accounts of them in the commentaries of the *Dhammapada*¹ and the *Jātaka*. Some of them at least seem to be the later inventions or recorded from some later legends that were prevalent in his time. According to the *Mahāvagga* they decided to go in search of the Immortal, being disgusted with the world. But according to the *Mahāvastu*, Moggallāna's case was different from that of Sāriputta. Moggallāna was disgusted at the sight of the bare teeth which produced him "asthi-sañjā (the perception of bones)" while people were laughing with joy in places of amusement. It made him think that the only elements in the world were bones devoid of any real substance.²

Sāriputta and Moggallāna were already advanced spiritually before they were ordained by the Buddha. Therefore the training imparted to them was of a higher order. Sāriputta attained Arhantship a fortnight after ordination, and Moggallāna after a week.

The most notable difference between the *Mahāvagga* and the *Mahāvastu* is regarding Sāriputta's introduction to the bhikkhu who ordained him. According to the *Mahāvastu*, Sāriputta was met and converted by one Upasena, the nephew of the Kassapa brothers. The same legend is prevalent in the Chinese accounts.³ According to these traditions the Kassapa brothers had a sister whose son, Upasena, became an ascetic wearing a spiral head-dress. He was dwelling with 300 disciples

¹ DhaA. I. pp. 83 ff.; J. I. p. 85.

² "maudgalyānasyā'pi janakāyasya tasya hasantavām . . . dantamālāni dṛṣṭvā asthi sañjā utpānnā.

³ Beal — Romantic Legend of Sakya Buddha, p. 304 ff.

on the bank of the same *Neranjanā* river. Now this legend throws a considerable light on the statement:¹ "I am, friend, only a young disciple; I have but recently received ordination; and I have newly adopted this *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*, etc." made by the bhikkhu who converted Sāriputta, for Assaji was by no means a newly ordained disciple; on the contrary, he was one of the first converts of the Buddha, being ordained on the same day of their meeting.

Of course, Buddhaghosa gives an explanation of it: "As these *paribbajākas* are antagonists of the Buddha's doctrine, I shall show my novice's state to prove the depth of the doctrine, etc."² This explanation seems to be insufficient, as an Arhant can on no account pretend or lie, not even to save his life.

On the other hand, the account of the *Mahāvastu* is more reasonable: Upasena being young in age as well as recently ordained. According to the *Mahāvastu* accounts he was the last convert among the Buddha's disciples who accompanied him to Rājagaha. This episode may be explained in another way: neither the *Mahāvastu* nor any other sources report that any of the 60 disciples, sent to different directions, were at Rājagaha since the Buddha himself was present there. The absence of Assaji or any of the 60 bhikkhus is evident from a verse that occurs in the *Mahāvagga* (I. 22. 13).

"dasavāso dasabalo dasadhammadidū dasahi c'upeto,
so dasasataparivāro Rājagaham pāvisi bhagavā'ti".

There is no doubt that these "dasasataparivāro" are no other than the three Jatilas and their co-converts.

Thus, there must be two independent accounts going back to a well-established tradition and the *Mahāvastu* cannot be dismissed lightly.

One may wonder why this story is given here at the end of the *Mahāvagga-nidāna*. Here the *Mahāvagga* neither gives a reason for it nor explains its significance. But it seems to be clear from a statement of Buddhaghosa that immediately after the ordination of the two

¹ Mvg. I. 23.4. "... ahamp kho āvuso navo acirapabbajito adhunāgato na tāvāham sakkomi vitthārena dhammam desetum, etc".

² DhA. Vol. I. pt. I. p. 92. Cf. Samantapāśādikā, Vol. V. p. 975: "ethha ca paṭisambhidāppatto thero na ettakam na sakkoti: atha kho dhammagāravam uppādēssāmī'ti, etc."

disciples the Buddha convened a Council of the disciples, when the shadows were lengthening (lit. under the extending shade — *vaddha-mānakacchāyāya*) in which they were announced as the "chief disciples", thereafter reciting the "Pātimokkha". This is the first record of a "Vinaya-kamma" after the Enlightenment of the Buddha, and may be defined as the beginning of the *Vinaya* proper — a very fitting end of the first chapter of the history of the Buddhist Saṅgha.

BHAVAVIVEKA AND THE PRASANGIKA
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INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF THE SVATANTRIKA
MADHYAMIKA PHILOSOPHY

THE problem as to whether the absolute is immanent in humanity or transcends humanity makes two fundamental standpoints which can divide religions into two forms. Although Buddhism, generally speaking, pursues the absolute as immanent, two attitudes to the problem still constitute two big branches even within Buddhism and furthermore two different schools in one of the branches. Among Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, the *Mādhyamika* school lays stress on the disparity or complete heterogeneity between the absolute and the phenomenal; and for them the only possible method of denoting the absolute is to negate every kind of definition of the absolute. The *Vijñānavādin*, however, searches the ground of delusive, relative knowledge and tries to find out the path from delusion to enlightenment; and the path consists in not simply transcending the relative knowledge but in converting the ground of delusion into that of the enlightenment, which latter ground is in substance not different from the former because the absolute is immanent in the relative. Among the *Mādhyamikas*, moreover, the *Prāsaṅgika* is apt to consider the *Paramārtha*, the absolute truth, as entirely transcendent; while the *Svātantrika*, partly due to influence of the *Vijñānavādin*, seems to pursue the *Paramārtha* as immanent at least logically. Although yearning for the absolute truth is naturally accompanied by negation of the relative and conditioned knowledge, another question should in this context be reflected on; that is, whether the system of the relative knowledge can be, so far as the phenomenal world is concerned, recognized as valid or not, though it is always delusive from the absolute point of view. This very problem seems to have become a fork which divided Indian Mahāyānism into the *Mādhyamika* and the *Vijñānavādin*, and the *Mādhyamika* itself into the *Prāsaṅgika* and the *Svātantrika*. When validity is granted for the conditioned knowledge, the absolute is considered in some meaning as the ground of the conditioned knowledge, the former being immanent in the latter.

On the other hand when the conditioned knowledge is considered as invalid or self-contradictory in itself, the absolute world is transcendently searched after apart from the relative world.

According to Stcherbatsky Indian Buddhism, during the golden age of Indian civilization under the prosperous rule of the national Dynasty of Guptas, began a reaction against scepticism or total illusionism of the *Mādhyamika* philosophy, which had been created by Nāgārjuna, and formed the idealistic philosophy of the *Vijñānavādins* as well as their Buddhist logic, which philosophy started from something in the kind of an Indian "Cogito ergo sum" and gave confidence to validity of introspection.¹ This new movement asserted, instead of the sceptic and negative philosophy which absolutely denied individual independent existence of every thing, existence of the consciousness and established on it a system of logic. It is not proper to presume, as sometimes done by scholars, that this new movement was a necessary consequence of logical development of scepticism into idealism, in other words that the *Mādhyamika* philosophy was the antecedent or lower stage of the *Vijñānavāda*. It seems that the movement was caused not by development of thinking, but merely by two types of attitudes for the absolute as pointed out above, both of which attitudes existed in the *Mādhyamika* school as well as the *Vijñānadin*, from their beginning up to the end. The fact that a tendency to idealism, which might have led to the *Vijñānavāda*, is found in philosophy of Nāgārjuna² and that the *Vijñānavāda* and Buddhist logic, in their developed forms, appeared after the *Mādhyamika* philosophy does not mean that philosophy of "mere consciousness having no need of reality of external objects" should be a logically more developed form of the philosophy of nonreality in general. From a certain point of view it is observed that the theory that an object of cognition does not exist outside mind is logically antecedent to the theory which asserts even the non-existence of mind itself.³ Furthermore the *Vijñānavādins* themselves had also developed the theory of non-reality of mind in the context of the three kinds of

¹ cf. Stcherbatsky: Buddhist Logic. pp. 11-12.

² cf. Susumu Yamaguchi: Nāgārjuna's Mahāyānaviṁśaka, Prefatory Notes (The Eastern Buddhist Vol. IV, No. 1, p.56-60)

³ cf. Randle: Indian Logic in the Early Schools, p. 78. note 2.

non-individuality,¹ and Bhāvaviveka, an eminent *Mādhyamika* philosopher somehow tended to recognize validity of the relative knowledge; these facts restrain us from understanding Indian *Mahāyāna* Buddhism by a diagram of development from scepticism or the theory of intrinsic unreality to idealism. It is both the *Mādhyamika* and the *Vijñānavāda* which were blamed by the realistic opponents for their opinion of nonreality of external object; and apart from the difference between the two *Mahāyāna* branches, the criticism against naive realism was already shown at the very beginning of Buddhism, that is, a kind of "esse est percipi" was one of the fundamental teaching of Buddha himself. When the pursuit after the absolute reality found out two worlds, the *Paramārtha* and the *Satīnvṛti*, the absolute and the relative, the problem of the alternative presented itself; whether the absolute should be transcendentally pursued after or immanently. It was the problem which confronted Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignāga etc., and Bhāvaviveka as well as Candrakīrti were to face the same choice. And the attitudes for the same problem separated the *Mādhyamika* from the *Vijñānavādin*, and the *Prāsaṅgika* from the *Svātantrika*. The two ways may eternally remain to all philosophers and they are not mere differences of stages of development of thought.

Buddha taught the middle path (*madhyamā-pratipad*) which is, as excluding the eternalism and the annihilationism, the same as the true causality. "That everything exists is one extreme; that everything does not exist is another extreme. Oh, Kātyāyana, Tathāgata gives up these two and preaches the law by means of the middle. From the cause of ignorance there arises volitions, from the cause of volition there arises consciousness—". But what is this middle, when it cannot be understood as mere indetermination fluctuating between existence and non-existence? He meant by the middle the negation of both of the two hostile extremes, that a thing can be either existent or non-existent and not otherwise. The middle should mean the aloofness from existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāvāntadvaya-rahitatva*), and consequently negates the law of excluded middle. Thus, the middle path must mean transcendence of the two relative

¹ Trividhasya svabhāvasya trividhāṁ niḥsvabhāvatāṁ
samdhāya sarvadhar mānāṁ desitā niḥsvabhāvatā (Trīśīka, 27)

extremes. Although literal expression of the middle did not expressly denote the absolute, it implied from the beginning a kind of duality or further more contradiction, which finally led to transcendence which is nothing but discovery of the absolute world. Similarly if a thing can exist only depending on causal relation, that is, if a thing cannot exist by its own self, it loses its individuality or character of pure existence and if there is no pure existence there is no pure non-existence. *Pratītyasamutpāda* which literally denotes causal origination transcends itself because origination loses its essential meaning when a thing originates only depending on others. Thus, the middle is not a definition of one standpoint called the middle, but it means transcendence of a definite attitude itself; and the causality, defying independent reality of causal elements themselves. Causal origination, non-individual existence and the middle path, all these are synonymous.¹ It was Nāgārjuna who expressly declared the contradiction which had been implicitly contained in "the middle" or "the causal or conditioned origination", and tried to sublimate the contradiction into the transcendence or absoluteness. "Causality of non-origination and non-annihilation", this expression at the very beginning of his *Mādhyamikakārikā* is nothing but absurd contradiction; but it pushed forward the truth that Buddha taught no other than the absolute world which is disparate from our world of conception. But it could not be done without finding out discrimination of two worlds or two truths, i.e., the paramārtha and the saṃvṛti which became the most important categories of Buddhist philosophy, that duality which had been contained in the middle and the conditioned origination was expressed in the form of clear contradiction and pointed out the transcendental truth. In our languages one concept necessarily denotes negation of its contradictory concept and negation of one concept, on the other hand, implies affirmation of its contradictory concept. So far as concepts themselves relatively exist, it is always in an absurd form to express the absolute which negates the world of concept and yet is

¹ Yaḥ *pratītyasamutpādaḥ* Śūnyatāṁ sampracaksmahe
sā prajñāptirupādāya *pratipatsaiva madhyamā* (*Mādhyamikakārikā*, XXIV, 18)

told of only by concepts. The absolute truth seems to me to be contradiction or absurdity.

The two worlds of the absolute and the relative, however, again offered an important problem. The contradiction which leads to the absolute does not mean mere illogicality. Illogicality is privation of logicality, but the contradiction implies the absolute reality which transcends logicality, or it implies the truth concealed in logicality itself. And if the contradiction is not illogical, we do not quit logic when we employ the contradiction as a method of expressing transcendentality of the absolute, for it is impossible to speak of the contradictory characteristics of the paramārtha, if we do not rely at all upon the validity of our knowledge. The contradiction of expression occurs in a case where our conditioned knowledge which is recognised as valid so far as practical utility is concerned comes in contact with the unconditioned or indefinite character of the absolute. If the Paramārtha and the Saṁvṛti are merely separated and have no relation to each other at all, what is the use of the contradictory expression itself in denoting transcendency. Though the Paramārtha negates the Saṁvṛti, can the former not be a kind of ground of the latter at the same time?

The whole system of our conditioned, practical knowledge is merely an interpretation of the absolute reality, based on utility to humanity which in its turn depends on our attachment. Our logical knowledge is, therefore of no use for transcendence which surpasses the limit of human utility. Nevertheless if the absolute reality is not the ground of our logical world and our knowledge is composed totally independently of the absolute reality, even our practical utility may not exist. The conditioned knowledge translates the absolute reality into cognizable aspects, and though the absolute is covered by human translation it cannot be entirely dissociated from the translated aspects. Our attachment is, so to speak, the formal cause of our conditioned knowledge and the absolute reality may somehow be the material cause of the same. If this is not wrong presumption, when our attachment as the formal cause of our delusion is removed, the absolute which has existed there as the material cause will present itself. The conversion of the ground (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) in the Vijñānavāda is principally based on such a kind of thinking method as this.

On the other hand that the absolute is incognisable, surpassing any definition and calm and silent seems to negate in every sense the possibility of its being immanent, as the ground of the conditioned knowledge, in the phenomenal world. Even if the conditioned knowledge has practical effect, what is the use of it to a man who seeks after the path of emancipation and enlightenment? Though it is true that even the Paramārtha cannot be taught without human words, the Paramārtha has nothing to do even with the words which express itself. Efficiency of the conditioned knowledge is fundamentally delusive and of no value. The Saṁvṛti-jñāna has, before it covers and impedes the Paramārtha, already been covered by its own delusion. Contradiction, in this case, seems to be included in the conditioned knowledge itself, and yet it shuts its eyes to the absurdity. To disclose contradiction of the conditioned knowledge and annihilate futile discussions is a means to the Paramārtha, but it is not the Paramārtha itself. The latter is an object of self-intuition of a sage and is attained through an absolutely different principle other than those of the conditioned knowledge. The negation of two antagonists' extremes by the middle path is established on the basis of transcendency of the absolute, and transcendency of the Paramārtha over the Saṁvṛti is non-opposition or non-relativity of the former to the latter, because opposition or relativity exists only in the Saṁvṛti. If the absolute is a kind of ground of the relative and the former can be manifested by means of negation of the latter, the two truths are still relative to each other. The Prāśāṅgika-mādhyamikas point out self-contradiction of the relative knowledge, and they do not negate it. Candrakīrti, who defines the Saṁvṛti as "the co-relatively existent, which mutually depend on each other,"¹ and who understands the Saṁvṛti to be caused by ignorance and void of individual quality,² does not want to deny it, because the Paramārtha transcends both the affirmation and negation of the Saṁvṛti, and utility of the Saṁvṛti is not harmed within its own domain, and lastly because he need not have attach-

¹ parasparsasambhavanam vā saṁvṛtir anyonyasamāśrayeṇa (Prasannapadā. p. 492)

² saṁvṛtisatyam hyajñānamātrasamutthāpitari nihsvabhāvam buddhvā— (ib. p. 495)

ment to non-existence of the Saṁvṛti when it has not existence apart from its own individuality.

Apart from the the problem of the Vijñānavādin school, the transcendence theory of the Mādhyamika school has made itself more complex. The discrimination of the two truths (*vibhāgāt satyayor dvayoh*) was the logical ground on which contradictory expressions of the Mādhyamika philosophy could get the transcendental meaning. But it had, at the same time, a role to distinguish the philospohy from merely sceptic or nihilistic theories. While nihilists negate causality between actions and results of actions, and logical identity, the Mādhyamikas, who assert difference of the transcendental world from the phenomenal world, need not destroy logicality, because their negation of logicality of the conditioned knowledge is done from the transcendental point of view and not from the same stand-point as the phenomenal world. When they define everything to be void of individual quality, it means that everything is neither existent nor non-existent, and does not argue of accidentality or nihility of everything as nihilists do. This method which succeeded on one side seemed, however, not to be able to stand criticism from logicians who attacked them as follows: — If the paramārtha transcends our knowledge, can any certainty of argument be granted for the Mādhyamikas who speak of the transcendental? The Mādhyamikas will moreover say that they do not assert any particular proposition; but if so, what do they want to mean by spending thousands of words? The discrimination of the two truths itself is an expression of the transcendental world; and evidence of the transcendental world cannot exist unless they recognize a logic. If they do not show any evidence and devote themselves to destroying our logic, they are open to attack for being sophists. The learned scholarly world of India which had much developed in logic since early ages did not, especially after appearance of Dignāga in the Buddhist world, permit illogical arguiment even on religious matters. Between the fifth and sixth centuries, the Mādhyamika school was divided into two sections owing to opposition of Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka. This split was due to criticism and reformation by a new movement in the Mādhyamika school which wanted to establish immanent relation between the absolute and the

relative knowledge even when transcendentality of the absolute was argued. Stcherbatsky touches this circumstance as follows: Every syllogism according to this school (the *Prāsaṅgika*) is a fallacy, because it entails a contradictory syllogism, called "entailed inference, or counter syllogism (*Prasaṅga-anumāna*)" of the same force. The school received from this feature its second name as a school of the counter-syllogism (*Prāsaṅgika*). Buddhist monism was thus established in the school of the Extreme Relativist (*Mādhyamika-Prāsaṅgika*) not on logical grounds, but on a wholesale destruction of all logic. However this utter disregard for logic soon gave way to another attitude in the same school. A new branch of it was founded by Bhavya (*Bhāvaviveka*), who maintained that it was impossible to escape from logical methods altogether. Even if you intend to establish that all syllogisms are fallacies you must do it by a sound argument thrown into the form of a correct syllogism (*svatantra-anumāna*).¹

According to the *Prāsaṅgika* that the conditioned knowledge is delusive does not mean that logic of the phenomenal world is illogical, for if there is no logicality at all there is no illogicality too. But it means that the conditioned knowledge is relative in itself and relative to human utility and has no absolute value. Non-existence is nothing but a kind of existence called non-existence or non-perception of the assumed existence ; that is, non-existence is available only in relation to existence. We say 'banyan is a tree' thinking that a species owes its ground to a genus, but at the same time a genus, tree, cannot exist without substantiality of a species and an individual, a banyan. Similarly an effect has its causal ground in a cause but at the same time a concept, cause, cannot be set forth without having its logical ground in a concept, effect. And interdependence (*pratītya-samutpāda*) or unpropertiedness (*nissvabhāvatā*) is voidness of individuality (*śūnyatā*) to the *Prāsaṅgika*. That knowledge is void of individual property is the most important ground for transcendentality of the *Paramārtha*, which cannot be referred to by relative knowledge. Does it, however, mean that every concept, every judgment and every inference is accompanied respectively by its contradictory concept, judgment and inference. There is a certain confusion here. The *Prāsaṅgikas* do not

¹ Buddhist Logic, by Stcherbatsky, Vol. 2., p. 344-345.

discriminate between logicality and existence. When a concept, tree, is said to be void of its property, contradiction does not exist in the concept itself, but in the relation between the concept and the existence. A proposition that a product has its cause is not necessarily accompanied by a counter proposition that a thing does not arise out of any cause. But the problem is concerned with human standpoint which understands or interprets the absolute reality by causality. A concept, fire, does not burn our lips. This naive doubt touches the fundamental problem of logic. The fire with which I cooked breakfast has existentially nothing to be related to the fire with which I burnt fallen leaves in the evening. We, neglecting this existential difference, give a concept of fire to the heat which is of practical use to human being. The beginningless series of human experiences has revealed to us only the utility of the unseen reality, and attachment to the utility is the ground of all concepts. When the ground is taken away, our cognition becomes meaningless, because the absolute reality is always quite aloof from our conceptual understanding. Nevertheless within the range of our logic, in other words, so far as the ground of our logic is approved and the limit of logic is not transgressed, our system is not self-contradictory. To Candrakīrti too, the *Saṃvṛti* is useful for accumulating those fundamental virtues which bring final deliverance to those who strive after it, even though its existence and shape is, from the transcendental point of view, founded on mere confusion and there is in no case any independent reality or individuality either of our cognitions and the objects cognized¹. In this case Candrakīrti's apprehension that logic is absolutely delusive is nothing but another side of one and the same wisdom, which was grasped by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, that is, the wisdom that logic should be applied only to the experiential world and not be concerned with the metaphysical problem. There could not have been any conflict between them in this meaning.

If the standpoint of the Prāsaṅgikas can be thus understood, even they would not find contradiction in logic itself, but stress the contradiction between the absolute reality and human attitude of understanding, which constitutes the ground of logic. The Vijnānavāda tried to

¹ cf. *Prasannapadā*, p. 69, p. 75.

convert the ground of our delusion, believing the same ground would, when converted, become the ground of revelation ; and the Svacāntrika-Mādhyamikas wanted to give a kind of logicality to the relation of the absoluteness and the ground of our delusion. When we argue the transcendental contradiction arises not from logic itself, but from the disparity between absoluteness and the ground of logic. The transcendentality of the Paramārtha is nothing but the contradictory relation of the Paramārtha and the Saṃvṛti. If this is granted, cannot we speak of the absolute reality through the *logic of contradiction*? The contradiction is not merely illogicality but the unique method which can reduce to the absolute reality our world, which is the human logicalization of the absolute. Nāgārjuna and the Prāsaṅgikas can be accused for their negating logicality without strictly showing the real contradiction. It is not efficient to condemn logic merely standing on transcendence of the Paramārtha. For Bhāvaviveka to use the logic of contradiction in the place where the Saṃvṛti and the Paramārtha meet together is methodological completion of the absolute negation of the Mādhyamika philosophy. Bhāvaviveka did not wildly fit in logical tendency of the age, but he did, observing the traditional method, the same exertion in the Mādhyamika theory as Dignāga did in the Vijñānavāda.

In the Vijñānavāda theory there exists the fundamental reality in the form of store consciousness, the Paratantra-svabhāva (*ālayavijñāna*), which converts itself from afflicted state into purified state and *vice versa*. Accordingly the ground of affliction is at the same time the ground of purification. Existence of consciousness as the fundamental reality makes it possible that the world of purity manifests itself when the ground of delusion is converted ; that is, the former is immanent in the latter. But the Mādhyamikas do not admit any real immanent ground as the Paratantrasvabhāva. Although the Vijñānavādin too negates reality of the three stages (*trisvabhāva*) when they speak of voidness as non-individuality of the three stages, reality of the Paratantra is once established as a means for logic of conversion which is the essence of the theory of *trisvabhāva*. But the Mādhyamikas negate existence of the assumed ground, and declare uselessness of establishing such double character of the ground. The existent is

like dream, like illusion and like mirage. It is enough to denote unpropertiedness of the existent and to point out transcendence of the Paramārtha by silence (*tūṣṇīṁbhāva*), for the transcendental refuses to be defined and to say that there is the transcendental is also not desirable. We said above that logic is of no use when the superexperiential thing is questioned, but it seemed to Candrakīrti that even the concept, the transcendental, the absolute, etc. would be demolished. The word, Paramārtha is unwillingly assumed simply because it is unavoidable. In this respect the transcendence theory can be said to have been developed to its perfection by Candrakīrti and the feat has given him an unperishable crown of wisdom.


However Bhāvaviveka, the founder of the Svātantrika Mādhyamika school, stepped up nearer to the Vijñānavādins. The fact that he criticises the Vijñānavādins accusing that they are following the method of the Mādhyamika¹ seems to show that he was himself conscious of similarity of thinking to the Vijñānavāda. He does, naturally as a Mādhyamika philosopher, negate the *paratantrasvabhāva* and does not recognize entity of the *Parmārtha*. But he has at least established the convertible logical ground which, having double character, mediates between the *Paramārtha* and the Saṁvṛti. The Saṁvṛti-Jñāna is, according to him divided into two classes ; one is the false knowledge (*mithyāsaṁvṛti*) which consists of attachment to the reality of the existent in the world, and is knowledge of unreleased people ; the other is the true logic (*tathyasamvṛti* or *bhūtasamvṛti*) which is the measure, true cognition of this world and is conceptual knowledge of the absoluteness. Similarly the Paramārtha is also classified into two; one is the non-conceptual absoluteness or the non-convertible (*anabhisainskāraparamārtha*,² *aparyāyaparamārtha*) which is beyond our world and surpasses any conceptual argument, the other is conceptual or convertible absoluteness (*abhisainskāraparamārtha*, *paryāyaparamārtha*) which has adapted itself to determinate concepts, being in substance the absolute wisdom. And the conceptual absoluteness is identical with true knowledge, thus becoming the mediating ground between the absolute and the relative. To

¹ For example, see *Prajñāpradīpa*, XXV, D. 245. a; 247 a etc.

² *anabhisainskāraka** or *sābhisaṁskāraka**?

Candrakirti the truth is only one, i.e. the *paramārtha*, and the *Saṁvṛtisatya* is called truth only from the phenomenal standpoint and actually, or from the absolute point of view it is not truth but delusion. But Bhāvaviveka recognises the truth of logic which is founded on wisdom of the absolute. In other words it is the absolute wisdom which manifested itself in concepts and identified itself with the phenomenal world (*kalpanā-ānulomika-paramārtha-jñāna*).
Candrakirti also divided the Saṁvṛti into two, viz., the true relative knowledge (*lokasaṁvṛti*, *Bhūta* or *tathyasaṁvṛti*) which is knowledge of those who have healthy and correct cognition and the incorrect knowledge (*alokasaṁvṛti*, *mithyāsaṁvṛti*) which is knowledge of those who have spoilt and incorrect cognition. But the *lokasaṁvṛti-satya* of Chandrakirti, which is healthy and correct, and can be recognised of practical use by people of this world, is not absolutely true knowledge, that is, actually not *satya*, because it is still false to the eyes of the sage who has realized unpropertiedness of the existent. Therefore Chandrakirti's *lokasaṁvṛti* is included in the *mithyāsaṁvṛti* of Bhāvaviveka, while Bhāvaviveka's *tathyasaṁvṛti* is a *satya* because it is manifestation of the *Paramārtha*. In this sense Bhāvaviveka can be said to have recognised two truths; the *aparyāyaparamārthasatya* and the *tathyasaṁvṛtisatya* which is the same as the *paryāyaparamārtha-satya*, or the absolute reality surpassing logic and that accompanied by logic.¹ The *paramārtha* is unmovable, inexpressible and aloof from the Saṁvṛti. But words and actions of a sage who has attained the *Paramārtha* is, though they are the Saṁvṛti so far as they are words and actions, different from those of ordinary people. And this kind of words which are based on the absolute reality should be the true knowledge of the world, that is, *tathyasaṁvṛtijñāna*. This *tathyasaṁvṛti* or the *paryāyaparamārtha* has double character because it is the absolute being manifestation of the *Paramārtha* and at the same

¹ *Candrakirti* Bhāvaviveka
paramārtha.....aparyāyaparamārtha



time it is the relative so far as it is the *Saṁvṛti*, that is, words and actions. If Buddhism is established as a teaching it should be in this *tathyasāṁvṛti*. For Bhāvaviveka this mediating ground is an inevitable means of the Mādhyamika philosophy. His philosophy begins with believing, not realistic, but logical immanency of the *Paramārtha* in the mediating ground of the two worlds.¹

The method to deny every proposition of the opponents while giving no proposition themselves, and to clarify unpropertiedness of every word and every theory is the unmoving tradition of the Mādhyamikas since Nāgārjuna has established it. It was the necessary consequence of the transcendence theory of the *Pāramārtha*. Bhāvaviveka too, quoting Devaśarman, declares that the Mādhyamikas only negate the arguments of others and do not establish their own theories. But what makes Bhāvaviveka differ from the other Mādhyamikas consists in certainty or logicality of the negation. Among arguments of Nāgārjuna there are some which might be considered fallacious.² When examined by strict application of Dignāga's logic, logic of the practical world and that of the Mādhyamikakārikā are fundamentally heterogeneous. But the age does not accept the Mādhymikas' position even if they stress only the heterogeneity. And yet the heterogeneity has a kind of logical relation to logic of the practical world and is not illogicality as we mentioned above. Bhāvaviveka's intention is that the Mādhyamikas should clarify, with certainty, how logic of the practical world confesses its nonsense under the light of the absolute reality, and accordingly should modify the traditional method of the Mādhyamika, which has already been condemned as a false application of *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga-vākya*, *prasaṅga-anumāna*) by logicians. He devoted himself to establishing the new logical methodology of the Mādhyamika demonstration, which Nāgārjuna and the Prāsaṅgikas did not care for.

¹ About classification of two satyas by Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka cf., *Prasannapadā* p. 493, *Madhyamakāvatāra* chap. VI. k. 24., *Tarkajvāla*, chap. III, p. 60, a-b; *Madhyamakārthaśaṅgraha*.

² *Prajñāpradīpa*, Walser edition (Bib. Indica, New Series, No. 1936), p. 42 Devoting themselves to destruction of other theories is called here *Gshūn mi gzugs pa* (*grantha-aropana*).

³ Cf. Dr. H. U: Toyo no Ronri (Logic of the East) p. 15. ff. A

His conviction that the *Paramārtha* can be manifested in a logical form and that only this kind of logic as founded in the absolute reality can be called true logic (*tathyasainvṛtijñāna*) leads him to the invention of a special kind of syllogism. His logicalization of the Mādhyamika philosophy, however, was possible only on the basis of the *Paryāyaparamārtha* or the *tathyasainvṛti* which was the ground where two *Paramārtha* and the *Sainvṛti* exist together.

Bhāvaviveka starts with criticising argument of Buddhapālita, the founder of the Prāsaṅgika school, for containing fallacies, and tried to constitute his own logic with unblamable validity even for the purpose of negating other's argument. But as the Mādhyamikas expound not the practical knowledge, but the absolute reality, the system of logic of the practical world cannot be adopted. He declares at first that his logic is established on the ground which mediates between the *Paramārtha* and the *Sainvṛti* or that his argument is done from the transcendental point of view. He does not argue anything without constituting syllogism which consists of three members, viz., proposition, reason, and illustration. Although this fact seems to collide with the traditional method of the Mādhyamikas which does not propose any own thesis, his conclusion which is always expressed in the negative judgment through the absolute negation (*prasajyapratisēdha*)¹ shows that the formally established proposition does not in substance set forth affirmation of contradictory ideas of the negated, but destroys the ground of logicality of the conditioned knowledge. Restriction that negation of a concept does not denote the contradictory concept means that the negated thing has not its counter-example, and accordingly that his reason need not have disparate relation between non-concomitance of the reason (middle term) and the counter example (the contradictory concept of the major term). Although it seems nonsense that universal concomitance of the middle and the major terms can exist without non-concomitance of the middle term and the contradictory concept of the major term, this restriction intends to negate the system of practical logic, which is to Bhāvaviveka

¹ Bhāvaviveka's *prasajyopratisēdha* is quite different from the ordinary simple negation which is contrasted to *paryudāsa-pratisēdha*. This will be treated in full later on.

nothing but *Mithyāśarīrvṛtijñāna*, as it is shown later. His logic is logic of the *Paramārtha*, which criticizes the ground of logic of the practical world, viz., the laws of identity, contradiction, excluded middle, causality, etc., and the criticism has been done through the peculiarities of his syllogistic form. The form of his syllogism may be denied by ordinary formal logic, but we should know that Bhāvaviveka's real purpose consists in criticism of the very formal logic, and that the peculiar form of his syllogism is the only rational way to reduce the illusion of conceptual world into the absolute reality. Bhāvaviveka thinks that the *Paramārtha* can be proved by this form, which is not illogical from the view point of the *Parāmartha*.

We can summarise the above mentioned characteristics of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism with the following four items;

- (1) A peculiar qualification "from the transcendental point of view (*paramārthata*)" is added in every conclusion (*pakṣa*).
- (2) He negates the *prasanga-vākyā*, which is the unique method of the Prāsaṅgikas.
- (3) Reason of his syllogism lacks "non-existence of reason in the counter example" or "negative concomitance" (*vipakṣa nāstītā*), one of three conditions of reason.
- (4) The conclusion of every syllogism is a negative proposition and yet the negation is qualified as an absolute negation (*prasajya-prativedha*) and is not a relative negation (*pariyudāsaprativedha*).

CHAPTER II

DOES BHAVAVIVEKA'S SYLLOGISM COMMIT FALLACY OF UNREALITY ?

With regard to Nāgārjuna's declaration at the very beginning of the Mādhyamikakārikā "I salute the perfect Buddha, the foremost of all teachers, who proclaimed the causality of non-disappearance, non-appearance, non-cessation, non-eternity, noncoming, non-going, non-diversity and non-identity, which causality is free from diverse conceptions and is blissful," one doubt took place among the Mādhyamika philosophers; whether those eight kinds of negations were done from the standpoint of phenomenal world or from the transcendental standpoint—it seems to be a starting point of one of the most important subjects of the Mādhyamika philosophy, that is, if the absolute is immanent in the phenomenal world of transcends it, in other words, if the two worlds are absolutely disparate or can have any kind of logical connection. If they are negated, in this case, from the phenomenal satandpoint it is contradictory to the fact which is approved by the common world (*lokaprasidhavirodha*); on the contrary, if they are negated from the transcendental point of view, it is contradictory to the teaching of Buddha (*āgamavirodha*) that some of these eight cannot be approved even in the phenomenal world. Some Mādhyamika philosophers, intending to solve the difficulty, proposed an interpretation that four of them, disappearance appearance, diversity and identity, are negated from the transcendental standpoint; cessation and eternality from the phenomenal standpoint; and the rest, coming and going from both view points (cp. *Prajñāpradīpa*, p.6). Bhāvaviveka, to them, asserted that all of these eight words and negated from the transcendental standpoint, and this fact does not contradict the world-approval, nor the teaching of Buddha, the reason being (1) that here the transcendental negation should be accentuated, (2) that among two truths preached by Buddha, the *Paramārtha-satya* is intended as supreme, (3) and that there is no contradiction with the world-approval or the teaching in eight negations which, as adjectives, modified the causality as the profound intention (*abhiprāya*) of the

Prajñāpāramitā. Bhāvaviveka, therefore, had a special intention to stress that these eight negations are done from the transcendental standpoint. This is one of reasons why he put in his syllogism a peculiar qualification "it is not—from the transcendental standpoint *Paramarthataḥ*.

But why should it be a transcendental negation? The third of above mentioned reasons, "because the eight negations modify the causality which is nothing but the meaning of the *Prajñāpāramitā*" is in this connection of very importance. In the *Prajñāpradīpa* the opponent contends, just after the verbal meaning of the saluting verse is commented, that the causality of non-appearance, etc., is self-contradictory (ib. p.6). This contention is also a question about the causality which is modified by eight negations and is the meaning of the *Prajñāpāramitā*. It says; "How Could it be of non-appearance if it is causality? If it is, on the contrary, of non-appearance it cannot be causality at all." This attack is quite sensible against the fundamental standpoint of the Mādhyamika philosophy in general, and not only against the causality (*pratītyasamutpāda*) as one of their technical terms. When the Mādhyamikas say, e.g., that everything is void of individuality, the contradiction is pointed out in this way: How could it be void of individuality as everything exists as an individual? But this very contradiction from the realistic point of view is nothing but the profound intention of the *Prajñāpāramitā*. As Nāgārjuna always defines a concept in a meaning just contradictory to meaning approved by common sense, all his definitions and negations might be called self-contradictory. Even the age of Nāgārjuna logicians attacked contradictory expressions of the Mādhyamikas,¹ but the more strictly logicians formed as time went on, the severer opponents' criticism became. What made Dharmakīrti give, in his *Nyāyabindu*, definition of proposition (*pakṣa*) of syllogism, in spite of its being a dispensable factor, is that as there were some philosophers who considered wrong proposition (*Nyāyabinduśikā*, B.B., p. 55.11-3). It is quite likely that it was necessary to negate their misunderstanding by defining proposition (*Nyāyabinduśikā*, B.B., p. 55.1.1-3). It is quite likely that this criticism of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara was intended not only

¹ Cf. *Vigrahavyāvartanī* K. I. I. XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV.

against the Naiyāyikas but also against the Svātantrika Mādhyamika, who was supposed to assert invalid proposition to be valid, and the Prāsangikas, who negated even valid proposition (cf. Stcherbatsky, op. cit., 11, p. 153, note 3), Dharmakīrti defines : "A proposition is a statement which is permitted (by the arguer) as a fact to be proved (*sādhya*) and is not contradictory, "not contradictory (*anirākṛta*)" here intending to mean that a fact contradictory to perception, inference, conceptual identity, and self-word is not a proposition" (*arthah pratyakṣānumānapratītisvavacanair nirākṛiyate na sa pakṣa iti*) These qualifications, especially negation of self-contradiction. (*svavacanānirākṛta*) presuppose the Mādhyamikas. Examples quoted by Dharmottara, "inference is not a means of cognition," "I say everything is false" etc. are very similar to expression of the Mādhyamikas who say : "Everything is void," "appearance is not appearance" etc.

It is Bhāvaviveka's answer to the animadversion of self-contradiction that he asserts that eight negations are from the transcendental standpoint and that those do not contradict the world-approval and the teaching of Buddha (*Prajñāpradipa*, p.7). The two truths, he says, are discriminated in the expression of "causality of non-appearance." The Mādhyamikas do not consider causality as of non-appearance on the same standpoint in which they approve causality, and, *vice versa*, they do not assert causality on the same standpoint in which they negate appearance, etc. For example, generosity, morality etc. are from the transcendental viewpoint, not virtues, but they should be called virtues from the phenomenal standpoint (*sanivṛttih*) because of being helpful in this world. In the same way apparent contradiction of the causality of non-appearance disappears when we discriminate difference of the two truths, or two worlds. A man who is created through magic is not born as of true nature of man, just so our mental phenomena (*adhyātmikāyatarnāni*) etc., which exist like phantom or mirage, that is, exist phenomenally, do not exist in the absolute meaning of existence. The Mādhyamikas set forth their propositions with the very discrimination of the two truths which enables them to get rid of self-contradiction. On one and the same standpoint of the practical logic, or phenomenal logic, appearance and

non-appearance are contradictory to each other, and hence the expression "causality of non-appearance" is no more than self-contradiction. But when we say that the phenomenal appearance is not the absolute appearance, there is neither self-contradiction nor non-logicality. On the contrary it demonstrates the very logicality that the Paramārtha is contradictory to the Saṃvṛti and that the former expresses itself only through the latter's negation. That a special qualification "From the transcendental standpoint" is added to Bhāvaviveka's syllogism shows that his proposition, which is blamed for its fallacious appearance by ordinary logicians, should be admitted as valid because the two truths are discriminated in it.

Bhāvaviveka's solution of this animadversion of self-contradiction is, keeping his individuality, very logical. But the attitude of Candrakīrti was quite different. Dharmottara's criticism that some assert wrong propositions as valid, some valid as wrong, seems to clearly denote two contrary attitudes of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti for solving the same problem of self-contradiction. Candrakīrti denies logicality totally and absolutely. Self-contradiction is, according to him, attached not only to propositions of the Mādhyamikas, but also to every proposition, because it is necessarily followed by its own counter-proposition Candrakīrti, on the occasion of criticising Bhāvaviveka's syllogism, denies the latter's way of transcendental negation of appearance which is approved phenomenally, and expresses his own view saying that it is useless to add the qualification "From the transcendental standpoint" because "appearance out of self" cannot be admitted even phenomenally or from the relative point of view (*Prasannapadā*, p. 26, 1.4). To him, the phenomenal world is itself self-contradictory and illogical. It is negated by itself, not necessitating denial by the absolute. The Paramārtha is, on the contrary, nothing but "holy silence", which transcends self-contradiction of the phenomenal. This manner of thinking makes the basis of his method of "reductio ad absurdum" (*Prasaṅg-anumāna*, or *prasaṅga-vākya*). The abovementioned fact is one of the reasons why it is said that Bhāvaviveka recognised individual quality in the phenomenal world while Candrakīrti asserts non-individuality even in the phenomenal things.

We have in the Introduction considered that Candrakīrti pursues the absolute as transcendental whereas Bhāvaviveka as immanent. Negation from the transcendental standpoint is, to Candrakīrti, not possible. He says in one of his interpretations of the word “*Saṁvṛti*” that what is covered on every side is the phenomenal world”.¹ The relative knowledge, even though it is considered as healthy and valid and approved by the world, is itself totally covered by ignorance. Therefore the absolute transcends the relative without having any kind of relation to it, and this complete disparity does not allow even the most negative continuity in which the *Paramārtha* negates the *Saṁvṛti*, because even negation presupposes a kind of relation between the two. But it is for the purpose of showing that the *Saṁvṛti* can be denied only by the *Paramārtha* that Bhāvaviveka defines negation as transcendental; that is to say, the negative relation between the two truths owes its possibility to the logical continuity of the two. Avalokitavrata, the commentator on Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, say that the *Saṁvṛtisatya* which is cognizable and is non-perverted truth from the relative point of view covers the *paramārthasatya* which is incognizable.² The *Saṁvṛtisatya*, so far as it is a truth, is not perverted, but it is still not absolutely true. The relation between the two truths here reveals implicitly the immanency of the *Paramārtha* in the *Saṁvṛti*. Again says Avalokitavrata that the *Saṁvṛtisatya* is a means and the *Paramārthasatya* is a result of the means, that is, the *Paramārtha* is revealed by means of valid logic of the *Saṁvṛtisatya*.

The essential difference of the two truths were by Bhāvaviveka changed into the negative and contradictory relation upon which his logic of *Paramārtha* was established. But for that purpose the *Saṁvṛti* cannot be false in itself and the *Paramārtha* cannot be merely transcendental. In the *Tarkajvāla* (Chap. III, Peking ed., 60,a.) Bhāvaviveka defines, “the *Saṁvṛti* is so called in the meaning of investigating (*pravicaya* ?) all (*Samanta*) things like colour etc., it is true activity of the world. This very action is nothing but truth (*satya*), because of

¹ Samantād varanam samvṛtil, about etymology and discussion of *Paramārtha* and *Saṁvṛti*, cp. Prof M. G. Nagao: Fundamental Standpoint of the Mādhyamika Philosophy, Tetsugaku Kenkyū, No. 368. Chap. 3 & 4.

² *Prajñāpradīpikā*.

its being a means which leads to establishment of all things". The *Saiṇyṛtisatya* is here given the character of a means of true knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Although logic is itself of the relative world, it is at the same time a means by which we know the absolute. Therefore the logic of *Paramārtha* exists in a place where the *Saiṇyṛti* is in contact with the *Paramārtha*. The *Saiṇyṛti* is, in the stage of the *tathya-saiṇyṛti-satya*, admitted as the *Paramārtha* and the *Paramārtha* is, in the stage of the *paryāya-paramārtha-satya*, the *Saiṇyṛti*. "Of the *Paramārtha*. Bhāvaviveka says, "artha means the object to be known and hence the object which should be examined and understood. *Parama* means the most excellent. When they are combined into a compound, *Paramārtha*, it is so called because it is the object as well as the most excellent. Or, it is called the *Paramārtha* because the most excellent object is the object of the excellent non-discriminating knowledge (*parama-avikalpa-jñāna*) Or, it can be interpreted as the *paramārthaś* meaning that the *Paramārtha* exists in the knowledge of the *Paramārtha* which is conformable to discrimination (*kalpanā-ānulomika-paramārtha-jñāna*) (*Tarkajvāla*, Chap. III. p.64a.). This interpretation stresses knowability of the *Paramārtha* and finally admits existence of knowledge of the absolute which is with discrimination or logic and conforms to the relative. Bhāvaviveka's logic cannot be constituted unless and until such a common stage of the two worlds as this is not established.

Returning to Bhāvaviveka's solution of the problem of self-contradiction, is it possible that a proposition contains a subject and a predicate both of which spread over two fundamentally different standpoints? The judgment, "Generosity is non-virtue" gets rid of self-contradiction by virtue of discrimination of the two truths, meaning that generosity which belongs to the phenomenal world is not virtue considered from the transcendental standpoint. But if this judgment is expounded in a form of syllogism, which world does the reason, which would be put forward, belong to? When the reason belongs to the phenomenal world the connection between the reason and the major term is cut, resulting in invalid major premise; and if the reason belongs to the transcendental world, the connection between the reason and the minor term is impossible, which fact

makes the minor premise fallacious, that is, any conclusion is not possible in both cases. About fallacy of major premise which would arise in Bhāvaviveka's syllogism we shall see later on. With regard to Bhāvaviveka's minor premise all Indian philosophers, the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhyas, the Vaibhāṣikas, Buddhist logicians, up to Sthiramati and Candrakīrti, struck heavy blows on Bhāvaviveka. We should here notice that Candrakīrti, who follows the same self-contradictory expressions of Nāgārjuna and is in this respect as guilty as Bhāvaviveka, condemned, together with logicians and by just the same type of criticism as that of other logicians, Bhāvaviveka's methodology of syllogism which intends to logically prove the transcendental world.

The most important criticism by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā* 27, 1.7. ff.) is quite similar to the Naiyāyika's criticism which is blaming Bhāvaviveka's syllogism of "negating appearance of an effect out of other" for its fallacy of minor premise and which is quoted by Bhāvaviveka himself in the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Walleser ed., p. 14). All opponents, furthermore, including Candrakīrti, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, point out Bhāvaviveka's fallacy of thesis; but fallacy of proposition or conclusion does not actually exist by itself as validity of conclusion depends on two premises, and hence this criticism is, in the present case, possibly understood as attacking fallacy of minor premise. We can refer to fallacy of unreality as a representative,—especially *āśrayaṇa-asiddha* and *dharmaṇasiddha* (cf. *Nyāyabindu*, B.B., p. 64. 1.14; p. 65.1.16)—which is mentioned in the *Nyāyabindu* as fallacy caused from absence or doubtful presence of reason in minor term. Criticism of Candrakīrti as well as the Naiyāyikas is also made after having assumed the same fallacy of Bhāvaviveka. When Sthiramati, commenting on the *Mādhyamikakārikā*, blamed Bhāvaviveka for his committing fallacy of contradictory reason, he also was aware of the same problem of minor premise in Bhāvaviveka's syllogism.¹

Essence of this kind of criticism consists in argument that as the Mādhyamikas do not recognise existence of any mental phenomenon considered from the transcendental standpoint, the minor term (*dharmin*) in Bhāvaviveka's syllogism cannot have its existence, that

¹ Quoted in *Prajñāpradīpāṭīka*, Peking ed., 103a—104b.

is, the receptacle or substratum (*āśraya*) of the reason does not exist, which fact results in fallacy of unreality because presence of reason in the minor term is not ascertained.

(Proposition) Mental phenomena, if considered from the transcendental standpoint, are no new productions but of the same.

(Reason, Because they exist.

Minor premise)

(Example) Just as spirit (*caitanya*).

(Major premise) Whatsoever already exists is not a new self-production.

With reference to the abovementioned syllogism of Bhāvaviveka another syllogism negating appearance from other, which fact does not matter in substance for our present argument—mental phenomena like visual knowledge, auditory knowledge, etc. are not existent when considered from the transcendental standpoint. Candrakīrti censures Bhāvaviveka for this faulty expression in which “from the transcendental standpoint” might be understood as modifying mental phenomena, although Bhāvaviveka does not mean it. Fallacy of unreality occurs when the first of three aspects of reason, the condition of certain presence of reason in minor term, is lacking or doubted. If mental phenomena are not real, the reason “being existent,” which should be quality of minor term, mental phenomena, loses its substratum; and presence of reason in minor term is impossible. While fallacies of contray reason and uncertain reason (*viruddha-hetvābhāsa*, *anaikāntika-hetvābhāsa*) are fallacies of major premise which arise from violation of the second and third conditions of reason, fallacy against reality (*asiddhahetvābhāsa*) is fallacy of minor premise which is caused by violating the first condition. And the major premise is concerned with universal concomitance as logical principle, but it is individual existence and not universal law that is questioned in minor premise.

Bhāvaviveka's answer to this opposition is already found in his interpretation of the word “*Paramārtha*” as related above. In the *Prajñāpradīpa* he says that the Mādhyamikas too recognize a kind

or reality of mental phenomena in verbal activity (*vyavahāra—Sanivṛti*) and hence existence of the substratum of reason is also admitted (ib.p. 14). But this much of answer cannot solve the fundamental problem, whether it is possible or not that the subject of a judgment belongs to the phenomenal world, while the predicate belongs to the absolute. For this very purpose, however, Bhāvaviveka established a common logical standpoint where the two worlds are united into one and the same standpoint so that subject and predicate are on the same basis. He says, replying to the same criticism in the *Tarkajyāla* (Chap. III. p.64.1-b), that the *Paramārtha* is of two kinds. That is, the one if the *Paramartha* which is without volition and fruition, supermundane, devoid of mental impurity and is beyond conceptual differentiation (*anabhisamiskāralokottara-anāśrava-aprapāṇīca-paramārtha*), and the other is the *Paramārtha* which is with volition and fruition endowed with correct worldly knowledge conformable to moral and intellectual accumulation and conceptual (*abhisamiskāra-puṇyajñānagana-ourdhvulaukikajñāna-prapanca-anugata-paramārtha*); the former being the inconvertible absolute (*aparyāya-paramārtha*) and the latter the convertible absolute (*paryāya-paramārtha*). And he continues to say that the qualification "form the transcendental standpoint" in his syllogism means in the standpoint of the convertible absolute," and that it has the efficiency of valid argument. Even if mental phenomena are considered from the transcendental standpoint, that is, in the convertible absolute, they can be conceptually expressed and can have logical or conceptual existence, if not real existence. As referred above, mental phenomena are said in the *Prajñāpradipa* to be recognized as real in verbal activity which is still in the phenomenal world; and here in the *Tarkajyāla*, the same mental phenomena are interpreted as belonging to the convertible absolute. This can, as briefly stated in the Introduction, be explained in this way. Just as the *Paramārtha* is of two kinds, so is the *Sanivṛti*, which is divided into the faultless phenomenal knowledge (*tathya-sanivṛti-jñāna*) where only conceptual existence is approved and the faulty phenomenal knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*) in which realistic view is by mistake taken; and mental phenomena belong to the faultless phenomenal knowledge which is actually

nothing but the convertible absolute knowledge. The subject and the object in his minor premise thus are in one and the same standpoint, that, is, standpoint of conceptual existence (*prajñaptisat*), conceptual existence in this sense can be phenomenal as well as transcendental, because it is a kind of existence and at the same time not against non-existence, just as a man created by magic is existent because of its form, but at the same time is non-existent because of its being of non-individuality. This standpoint of conceptual existence made Bhāvaviveka's minor premise faultless.

However another question takes place here. Is any controversy possible between the realists, who do not recognize such conceptual existence, admitting no diversity of reality, and the Mādhyamikas who discriminate conceptual existence from real existence? As Dignāga proposes that controversy must be started from the common fact which both the parties admit, discussion is impossible unless such a common ground is established. Candrakīrti denies Bhāvaviveka's methodology by this very reason.¹ But Bhāvaviveka offered the standpoint of conceptual existence to be common to the both parties. Although it is, to the Mādhyamika, not real in the meaning the realists admit, it still has phenomenal reality. Even if they differ in special theories of essence of existence, they can stand on the common basis of "existence". Bhāvaviveka thought that it was the altruistic spirit of Buddhism to prove the truth of the *Madhyamā-pratipad* through discussion with other philosophers, the absolute transcendentalism of the Prāsāngikas being relinquishment of methodological altruism. He asserted conceptual existence for the sake of establishing logicality and at the same time he did not fail in protecting the theory of non-reality of the Mādhyamika tradition because conceptual existence is non-real in its individuality. The phenomenal things, according to his expression, are not absolutely non-real but exist with "individuality as of phantom or mirage".

Candrakīrti, nevertheless, does not admit this conceptual existence

¹ Cf. Stcherbatsky: Buddhist Nirvāna., p. 109. He points out the following sentence in the Nyāyabindu as denoting the same rule of Dignāga. "uktyā-pyasiddhau sarīdehe vā pratipādya- pratipādakayoh (NB. 58*)

² *Prasannapadā*, p. 28.

as a common base on which controversy can be carried on (cf. *Prasannapadā*, p. 28-29). He stresses that Bhāvaviveka cannot escape logical error of faulty thesis as substratum of his thesis is *unreal for the opponents*, who admit exclusively a really existing thing (*vastu-sat*), but not conceptual or nominal existence (*prajñapti-sat*). Bhāvaviveka is quoted in the *Prasannapadā* to say that inference would become quite impossible if the special views entertained in different schools were to be taken into account. How is discussion possible between two parties, if special theory of each school, e.g., that sound is product of four universal elements, that sound is quality of ether, etc. should be given consideration, when eternality or non-eternality of sound is to be determined? It is only the relation of subject and predicate or a thing and its property in a proposition that is necessary for inference and controversy. To insist on special theories of essence of existence is improper arbitrariness which hinders establishing a *bonafide* ground common to the both parties. His intention is that the standpoint of the convertible absolute, which is indicated in his syllogism by the qualification "from the transcendental standpoint" is the only common stand for both of the critical philosophers and the realists, and those who do not recognize this logical establishment should be censured.

Candrakīrti is not satisfied with this reply of Bhāvaviveka and pursues the latter's fallacy of unreality, pointing our fallacy of thesis due to reference to unreality and fallacy of reason, which appertains to an unreal substratum. But in order to make his criticism efficient Candrakīrti stresses that even though Bhāvaviveka's avowed aim is to deny causality, he at the same time denies its substratum (*Prasannapadā*, p. 29-30). This Candrakīrti's assumption, however, does not hold true, because Bhāvaviveka does not here aim at denial of existence of substratum, but on the contrary he wants to establish conceptual existence of the substratum. If we properly consider Bhāvaviveka's intention, this Candrakīrti's animadversion can be met with the same answer of Bhāvaviveka as related in the preceding paragraph. Bhāvaviveka's assertion that special theories of different schools should not be taken into account during controversy, and inference, in another respect, means that any term in a syllogism should not be interpreted in favour of any school. The proposition "sound is non-

“eternal” can get diverse meanings according to different interpretations of the terms sound and non-eternal. To the Mimāṃsakas, for instance, sound, which is manifestation of eternal substance, may be said to be eternal when the substance is accentuated, or to be non-eternal when manifestation is interpreted to be meant by non-eternity. Every term has a kind of versatility because it is an universal and by its nature cannot escape assignation of diverse ideas and casuistic interpretations. If reading of special theories is allowed in controversy or inference, any proposition is not settled because interpretations of terms would proceed *ad infinitum*.

Candrakīrti actually proceeds to differentiate meanings of terms used in Bhāvaviveka’s syllogism. He again condemns Bhāvaviveka’s reason to be uncertain on the basis that “being existent” can, to the Sāṅkhyas, denote eternal, changeless existence like that of Spirit as well as physical, changing existence which is exemplified by jars and the like (ib., p. 33, L. 4). Here Candrakīrti presumes that this Bhāvaviveka’s syllogism is proposed not in conformity with the Mādhyamika’s view but with the Sāṅkhya’s, which fact, he says, changes fallacy of unreality¹, which might have occurred when the syllogism had been stated from the Mādhyamika’s position, into fallacy of uncertain reason (*anaikāntika*). In the *Prajñāpradipa* the same criticism as Candrakīrti’s is held by the Sāṅkhyas themselves. They contend; What is the meaning of your proposition? By “self” do you mean the self of effect or the self of cause? If you mean “mental phenomena do not appear out of the same as effect” the argument is fallacious because we too already admit the fact; if, otherwise, you mean “they do not appear out of the self of cause” it is contradictory to the well-known fact that everything is produced from the self of cause” (ib., p. II). Furthermore they contend: “You negate the assertion which you arbitrarily imagined to be our proposition, just as negating that the world appears from hare’s horns, when nobody asserts such a proposition. We do not say that mental phenomena appear from the manifested existence, but our assertion is that mental phenomena exist in their potential state and that they are manifested out of the potential state” (ib., p. 12). Bhāvaviveka replies that he intends to

¹ *petitio principi: sadhyasama masiddha*, cp. NB., p. 62.

deny only appearance from self and does not form syllogism differentiating it into the self of cause or the self of effect ; that he denies appearance out of self as well as other; that there is no essential difference between the potential state and the manifested state because both of them are regarded as the self's own individuality; and that his intention is to make clear absurdity of appearance from its own self, having considered that every thing, if it is produced, is either from self, from other, from both of them, or non-cause. When Bhāvaviveka denies appearance out of other forming a syllogism; "mental phenomena do not appear out of causes which are other from them (theses), because they are other from their causes (reason), just as a pot (illustration,) the Vaiśeṣikas ask which of two meanings of the reason "other" Bhāvaviveka means, viz. either "other" as quality (*guṇa*) or "other" which is not quality. On the same occasion the Vaibhāśikas contend that it is fallacy of unreality of "other" which is void of possibility to produce other things, is meant by the reason, or it is fallacy of contradictory reason when "other" which has possibility of production is meant. Bhāvaviveka says that the reason denotes a general thing which, with reference to others, produces knowledge of "other" and which is approved by the Mādhyamikas, and that it is quite a different problem to differentiate the term in respect of detailed specialities (ib.p. 13, 14.). Bhāvaviveka states his syllogism in conformity with his own standpoint because he clearly says that terms in his syllogism are admitted by the Mādhyamikas and that negation of appearance from self is inferred to deny the Sāṅkhya's proposition but to negate one of four possible appearances. And Bhāvaviveka repeatedly prohibits the differentiation of a general term into special meanings. Those replies can meet Candrakirti's criticism, which in fact contains nothing other than what is already mentioned by Bhāvaviveka who is fully conscious of it.

GENERAL EXPLANATION OF BHĀVAVIVEKA'S METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY :

Bhāvaviveka says in the first chapter of his *Prajnāpradīpa* : 'It should be known that Lord Buddha taught that the existent does not appear out of four conditions, viz., its (*hetupratyaya*), its objects

(*ālambana-p*), its foregoing moment (*samanantara-p*) and its most dominant factor (*adhipati-p*). But Buddha, feeling pity for people whose wisdom was deranged by arguers who assert nihilistic and dogmatic views of conditions (*ahetuvatā* and *khetuvatā*), recognized four conditions only for the purpose of establishing the truth of verbal usage (*vyavahāra-satya; -saṁvṛti-satya*)' (*Prajnāpradipa*, ib.p. 27). This declaration implies that the first chapter of the *Mādhyamikakārikā* has, according to Bhāvaviveka, two intentions; (i) to establish the truth of verbal usage, having denied nihilistic and dogmatic views of conditions, and (2) to reveal the absolute truth (*Paramārtha-satya*) negating individual quality (*svabhāva*) of concepts in verbal usage, which is possibly existent only in the phenomenal truth (*saṁvṛti-satya*).

The first chapter of the *Madhyamikakārikā* contains, excluding the saluting verse, fourteen *kārikās*, of which the first *kārikā* is a general negation of causes and conditions, nine *kārikās* from the second upto the tenth have as their objects of negation four conditions of the *Vaibhāṣikas*, and the last four *kārikās* clarify the *Mādhyamika*'s stand-point. According to Avalokitavrata, the commentator on Bhāvaviveka's *Prajnāpradīpa*, the first *kārikā* intends to negate theories of philosophical schools other than Buddhism and the middle nine *kārikās* theories of the Hīnayanists (*Tikā*, D. 156,a) This Avalokitavrata's interpretation is attested by Nāgārjuna whose second *kārika* relates four conditions of the *Vaibhāṣikas* as the *Pūrvapakṣa* and by Bhāvaviveka who includes under the first *kārikā* almost all heterodoxies as chief objects of negation. But the first *kārikā* which, being a general demonstration of intention of the first chapter of the *Mādhyamikakārikā*, denies appearance of effect from cause and self, and other, as self and other and non-cause, includes as its objects of negation not only heterodoxies but also Hīnayāmists' theories of conditions. Twenty-four conditions of the Theravādin can be, according to Bhāvaviveka (cf. *Prajnāpra*, ib, p. 23), reduced into four conditions of the *Vaibhāṣika* which in its turn come under the cause as other, the second alternative of four causes. Therefore Nāgārjuna's purpose of negating Hīnayānist theories of conditions as well as those of the heretics is mentioned in general in the first *kārikā*.

Nāgārjuna's object is, as stated above, of two kinds, that is, to establish logicality of the verbal usage and to reveal the transcendental world, the former of which, now we infer, is attained by negation of heterodoxies and the latter by negation of Hinayānistic theories. This is clearly shown by Bhāvaviveka by means of differentiating the characteristic of negation of the heterodoxies from that of negation which has Hinayānistic doctrines as its objects. Bhāvaviveka interprets non-cause, the fourth alternative, which means 'without cause (*ahetu*)' as wrong-cause (*kuhetu*), as Buddhist convention allows to render prefix 'a' into 'ku'¹; and he enumerates under non-causes, almost all theories of the heretics like the Lokāyatās, the Vedantins, the Sāṅkhyas, those who assert time as the primary cause and who assert Nārāyaṇa, etc., all of which are considered as either nihilism (*nāstikatva*) or absurd dogmatism. We should note that he negates non-cause theories saying that mental phenomena *which are admitted* in the phenomenal standpoint do not appear from non-cause while the different qualification 'when considered from the transcendental standpoint' to the syllogisms negate the other three causes. This fact shows that the heretical views which are illogical even when considered from the phenomenal standpoint should be negated from the very standpoint; and the Hinayānistic views which are anyhow admitted in the truth of verbal usage should be negated from the transcendental standpoint. Although Bhāvaviveka refers for convenience's sake to many heterodoxies on refuting the first three alternative causes and to the Śrāvakas under argument of non-cause, his intention seems to be that condition, if it is approved by the phenomenal logicality, should be considered as, or is possible to be either self-, other, or both self-and-other to its effect, and Buddhism recognizes conditions which are different from them as veracious in the *Vyavahāra-satya*. This is why four conditions are specially treated with later under the second *Kārikā* and the following.

That Buddha established the verbal usage by admitting four conditions does not mean that they are absolutely real. The essence of the verbal usage depends on conceptual existence which is quite alien

¹Prajñāpra p. 16., cf. Abhidharmakośa; Prasannapadā attacks this interpretation.

to substantial reality of existence; and if four conditions are interpreted as existing really it goes far away from Buddha's intention. The Sarvāstivādins, e.g., consider four conditions as having their realistic individualities, which the Mādhyamikas deny so assiduously. Four conditions, even though they are admitted as true, are devoid of individual reality (*Svabhāva*) because they are merely conceptually existing. There the four conditions which are once admitted should be negated of their individualities if considered from the transcendental standpoint. But even if they are considered by the *Vaibhāśikas* as others to effects, they have possibility to be interpreted as self or both self-and-other in relation to effects as mentioned before. By this reason Bhāvaviveka equally negates all these three causes from the transcendental standpoint. Thus the logical implication of the first *kārikā* is this that Nāgārjuna, having denied at first under 'non-cause' illogical nihilism and dogmatism considering from the standpoint of verbal usage, proceeds to criticise under 'self', 'other' and self-and-other' causes the very verbal usage in regard to conditions from the transcendental standpoint. This is what Bhāvaviveka understood. What urged Bhāvaviveka to interpret Nāgārjuna in this way was his conviction that the Mādhyamika philosophy was fundamentally composed of two principles; causality (*Pratitya-samutpāda*) which was synonymous of voidness of individuality (*nिःsvabhāvatā, śūnyatā*) and discrimination of the two truths (*vibhāgaḥ satyayordvayoḥ*).

'Non-cause' which is here denied contains (1) appearance of phenomena without causes. So to speak, a kind of nihilism, and (2) appearance from wrong causes that is, metaphysical dogmatism. The former does not recognise any ground of the existent and the latter, on the contrary, assumes the real substance of the existent. Through mere subjective presumption, both of which are called non-causes (*ahetu*) because of their illogicality.

Those who, like the Lokāyatās, ājīvikas etc., do not recognize anything but objects of perception, or rather sensation, and consequently negate the necessary ground of the existent, relations causal as well as identical, come under the arguers of appearance without cause. Bhāvaviveka blames those who assert that everything does not appear out of its cause, but exists by its own nature (*Śarira-*

svabhāva) for their lack of reason to say so. And secondly when they try to constitute any syllogism to prove appearance without cause he attacks its absurdity by reason that it is nothing but contradiction to take advantage of reason or syllogism in order to deny causal and logical relations. In this context they may say that they use reason only because the asserters of causes and reasons do not recognise any argument without reason, just as it is necessary to speak non-Āryan languages to make non-Aryans understand. But Bhāvaviveka contends that universal relation between *probans* and *probandum* does not differ between Āryans and non-Āryans even if their languages are different, and that as it is not languages but this universal relation which matter now they have no excuse to avoid their own contradiction.

Bhāvaviveka himself proposes a syllogism denying their theory:

(Thesis) Mental phenomena which are recognised as existent from the phenomenal standpoint do not appear without causes.

(Reason) Because they have generic universality (*Sāmānya*) and specific difference (*viśeṣa*).

(Corroborative illustration) Just as a sprout. Non-existent things, e.g., horns of a rabbit have as ascertained peculiarity of quality, magnitude, shape, colour etc., which would define their species, nor generic characteristics whether they are horns or mere hallucination, eternal or non-eternal etc., In such a case only we can deny the causal relation and say that horns of a rabbit are produced without cause—except human imagination or eye disease etc. But in ordinary phenomena, so far as they have generic and specific characteristics which constitute the ground-work of human reason, we can't deny existence of causes of the phenomenon just as we can't deny our own reason. According to Bhāvaviveka characteristics of all things are of two kinds, viz., specific difference which is object of perception and generic aspect which is object of determined or inferential cognition; and the verbal usage or phenomenal knowledge is possible on the basis of these two characteristics (Cf. *Tarkajvala*, III, p. Sa,a; 60,a). That is to say, our knowledge presupposes perceptual and inferential cognitions as its basis, and as each of them requires, or depends on, the other, only one of them cannot constitute knowledge at all.

The Lokāyatas who do not admit necessity of universal concepts and inference cannot claim to have any kind of knowledge. Just as a man who has eye-disease sees a flower in the sky and argues that this flower appeared without causes, forgetting his own disease as the fundamental cause, just so deny the Lokāyatas causality failing to notice their own mistake in analysing human cognition. When we have determined cognition of 'a sprout of lotus', this perception has already generic characteristic called a sprout or non-eternality and specific characteristic called a sprout of 'lotus' or white in colour etc. Our knowledge and verbal usage are constituted on these two characteristics; and the assertors of non-causes who, standing on the very verbal usage, deny generic aspects or inferential cognition should be condemned for their non-confidence on human logicality.

Just contrary to the nihilists who, neglecting inferential knowledge, give primary to perception, the realists, place inferential knowledge to the dominant position in human knowledge. It tends to dogmatism because they confound concepts and relation which are surely logical with the externally and ontologically real. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas think that as perceptual and inferential cognition of a sprout of lotus is a result there should be external causes of cognition, that is, specific and generic substances. When Brahminism assumes reality of the universal Ātman and says that individual Ātmas are based on and are produced from the universal Ātman, they identify conceptual universality with universal reality or substance, and don't discriminate the ontologic causes from the logical ground.

The Vedāntins claim that Ātman is the cause of everything. But the word 'Ātman' is well known as denoting 'identity' 'selfness', and hence Ātman should always remain self-same and cannot transform. Bhāvaviveka proposes a syllogism:

(Thesis) Ātman of Devadatta is not the cause of the conglomeration of body and organs of Devadatta.

(Reason) Because it is Ātman.

(Illustration) Just as Ātman of Yajñadatta.

Just as Ātman of Yajñadatta cannot, as it remains always self-identical, be the cause of conglomeration of body and organs of Devadatta, just so Devadatta's Ātman also, owing to its self-identity, cannot

produce body and organs of Devadatta. The Vedāntins argue that Ātman is only one, which is made known as many just in the same way as one and the same other is found in this room and in that pot etc., and hence the example in Bhāvaviveka's syllogism, Yajñadatta's Ātman, actually cannot be a proper one. But either is, Bhāvaviveka contends, not a product and not existent; and the argument that either is only one is mere imagination or a hypothesis. There is nothing to substantiate unity in diversity, as individual Ātmans which only are admitted generally in this world. They may compose a syllogism 'Bound Ātman are not different from the Freed Ātman; because they are Ātman; just as the Freed Ātman'. But this is untenable because in the absolute *Nirvāṇa* (*Nirupādhi-nirvāṇa*) neither existence of nor oneness of Ātmans is possibly recognized. When Ātman is, just like a skyflower, not existent and of no activity, how can it be a cause of others. Here we should note that Bhāvaviveka's middle term in the above mentioned syllogism, 'Ātman', seems to be coextensive with the minor term 'Devadatta's Ātman', which case is condemned by Dignāga as *asādhāraṇa-anaikantika* (too narrow reason which makes inference uncertain) and which is called the *Kevalavyatirekyanumāṇa* by the Naiyāyikas. Bhāvaviveka admits this kind of reason as valid and quotes an example; 'Sound of praising hymn is not eternal; because it is sound; just as sound of a drum is, due to being sound, not eternal', Bhāvaviveka asserts that here the middle term is not co-extensive with the minor term but wider than the latter. This explanation seems to be untenable. Furthermore as he asserts, as will be shown later on, that his syllogism has no counter example, it may be said that his syllogism has got neither a similar example nor a counter example. Can it be called any kind of syllogism? This might denote frustration of Bhāvaviveka's intention to propound the Mādhyamika philosophy by means of logic. But about this we will fully treat later on.

The Sāṅkhyas proclaim the primary matter called '*Pradhāna*' as the cause of all phenomenon. Bhāvaviveka argues:

(Thesis) *Pradhāna* is not the cause of all principles of manifestation like moral, Buddhi, Ahaikāra etc.

(Reason) Because it is a non-manifested principle.

(Illustration) Just as the spirit (*Caitanya*) which is not a cause of other principles.

The Sāṅkhyas contend; "If the reason 'non-manifestedness' actually denotes *Pradhāna* which is in the non-manifested stage before its transformation, then the example *Caitanya* has no efficiency because it has no characteristic of *Pradhāna*; if, on the contrary, the reason actually means *Caitanya* by denoting non-manifestedness, the reason is fallacious of unreality because the minor term is not pervaded by the middle at all". But Bhāvaviveka rebukes them for their particularizing the general term. When non-manifestedness is used in its general meaning, it is nothing but camistry to change generality into particularity.

There are many arguers who claim as the primary cause of this world Iśvara, Kāla, Nārāyaṇa etc. They can be negated by a syllogism like this:

(Thesis) The worlds (Gati) have not unique God as the Primary cause or the creator.

(Reason) Because they are cognisable objects (*Prameya*).

(Illustration) Just as God himself (has, because of his cognisability, no creator of himself).

And furthermore these kinds of causes should be regarded either as self to effect, as other, or as both self-and-other, all of which are negated under examination of the respective items.

It is not necessary to introduce all of Bhāvaviveka's syllogism which deny non-cause theories. Briefly speaking, theories of appearance without causes are refutation (*apavāda*) of the true aspect of the world, while wrong-cause theories are imagination beyond the truth; and the former is, in logical respect, the result of emphasizing perceptual knowledge and the latter of attaching too much importance to inferential knowledge. The well-known classification of eternalism (*Śāśvatavāda*) and destructionism (*ucchedavāda*) corresponding in some respects to that of idealism and materialism or that of subjectivism and objectivism, denotes the same results of accentuating only one of the two means of human cognition, perception and inference. When Buddha proclaimed the middle path, he was fully aware of two extreme views which were spread at that time, viz.,

idealism which considered the world as manifestation of Brhma-Ātman, and materialism or nihilism which, denying spiritual principle, reduced everything into material substances like atoms. Both of these extremes committed the same mistake—to assume ideas as real. Ātman or atoms, which are imagined or postulated ideas are to them not different from reality, whether they believe more in inferential or in perceptual knowledge. Ideas which are constructed and assumed by such dogmatism do not clarify the truth of the world. The existent, contrary to human postulations, always falls off and causes suffering being non-eternal. Human knowledge is composed of the two means of cognition ; but even mere perception, when it is adopted as a component of our world of knowledge, is not independent of our conceptions or inferential knowledge. A simple perceptual judgment like 'This is a pot' combines the reality as is cognised by us with our ideal. At the same time our concepts and inference should be restricted within certain domain, where these ideas are based on reality, and more speculation free from reality is of no use for our practical purposes. So our perceptual and inferential cognitions can be components of our systematic world in so far as they are interdependent and conditioned by each other.' Because of this that exists ; because this arises that arises,' These formulae of *pratītyasamutpāda*, being quite relevant to the relation of perception and inference, show the limit where human speculation should not go beyond.

It is with the intention of establishing the true causality (*Pratītyasamutpāda*) of the phenomenal world that non-cause theories were denied as mentioned above. *Pratyaya* means a condition, and *Pratītyasamutpāda* conditioned origination. Therefore the *Pratītyasamutpāda* is, contrary to illogical interpretation of the phenomena, a strict causal pursuit of the existent. But the *pratītyasamutpāda* is not restricted to causality, but transcends it, as the former denotes voidness of individuality of the existent while causality consists in relation between the individually real factors. Our world of knowledge does not contain things in themselves, but consists only of things.

(Thesis) When considered from the transcendental standpoint, mental phenomena never appear out of the self.

(Reason) Because they exist.

(Illustration) just as the spirit (Caitanya) (does not, being on unchanging substance, arise from the self).

The word 'self' is employed to the same body of the existent, and hence it is meaningless and of no use to say that the existent is produced out of the same self. A pot which is already existent does not appear out of the pot itself. The Sāṅkhyas assert that every principle of manifestation (*tattva*), except the spirit, is produced out of the primary material cause, *pradhāna*, which is nothing but the self of the effects. However just as the spirit which is an external, unchanging entity does not newly arise from the self, so do not arise all the mental phenomena from the self because they exist. But the opponent contends; what is the meaning of the self; whether the self of effect which is manifested or the self of cause which has potentiality of the effect ? If it is the former we also admit negation of appearance of effect from the self ; but if it is the latter your argument destroys the well-known fact." But Bhāvaviveka says this rejoinder is futile because appearance out of self is generally denied here, and it is prohibited to particularize the word 'self' into the meaning of the self of cause, because whether the self of cause is self-same to effect or other is now examined and because if particularization is allowed in this way pursuit will be continued *ad infinitum*. Bhāvaviveka here notes several formal peculiarities of his syllogism, viz., qualification 'From the Transcendental standpoint, absence of reason in the counter example being not mentioned, negation being regarded as an absolute negation, refutation of the *Prasaṅga-vākyā* etc., which will be main subjects of succeeding chapters.

Bhāvaviveka's syllogism against the theory of appearance of effect out of other cause is as follows :

(Thesis) When considered from the transcendental standpoint, mental phenomena are not productions out of the conditions other to them.

(Reason) Because they are other, having no relation to conditions.

(Illustration) Just as a pot (does not arise out of semen blood etc. which are quite different from the pot.)

When causes and conditions of mental phenomena are other too, that is, not related to the effects, and mental phenomena are dissociated

totally from the conditions, how is causal relation possible between them ? In this context the Vaiśeṣikas ask whether or not the word 'other' means 'other' as a quality (*guṇa*) of a substance, thinking that if Bhāvaviveka uses 'other' as a quality he should be blamed for adopting the theory which is not admitted by his own school ; if not, he destroys the world-approval. Bhāvaviveka replies : It is quite a different problem to analyse a word in accordance with arguer's doctrines, and only general sense of a term should be adopted in a syllogism ; in regard to the world-approval, such blame is untenable as the Mādhyamikas do not, in the phenomenal standpoint, negate appearance of effect out of other cause but only from the transcendental standpoint. The Vaibhāṣikas also accuse Bhāvaviveka for his neglecting the difference between 'others' having potentiality of producing effect and 'others' having no possibility, but this is met by the same answer as done against the Sāṅkhyas under the negation of appearance out of self.

Thirdly some of the Sāṅkhya philosophers think that a sprout arises due to a seed which is not differentiated from the effect, sprout, and earth, water, fire, air etc. which are discriminated as other to the effect ; and the Nirgranthakas argue that a gold ring is made by gold and heat, that is to say, both by the self and the other to the effect. But these theories can be negated by the aforesaid two syllogisms because here 'self and other' is nothing but conglomeration of 'self' and 'other'. Both may denote, not conglomeration of the self as the other, but a condition which would be said neither self nor other, neither identical with the effect nor non-identical. In this case, however, it becomes meaningless to try to discriminate conditions from effects.

Bhāvaviveka interprets Nāgārjuna's negation, 'Everything does not appear from the same self' as an absolute negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*), because its purpose is only to negate. If, on the contrary, this is taken in the sense of a relative negation (*paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*), whose main purpose is to affirm the contradictory idea of the negated, the meaning of the sentence will be 'everything is a non-produced thing' and contradict the theory of the Mādhyamikas that if a man grasps non-producedness of matter etc. he does not observe the

Prajñāpāramitā. The meaning of Nāgārjuna's negation, if considered as a relative negation, would become 'Everything does not appear from the same self, that is, appears from the other' or 'It does not appear only from the same self, that is, appears from both the self and the other,' both of which are not the real intention of Nāgārjuna. Every syllogism of Bhāvaviveka has a negative conclusion and this negation should, he claims, be taken in a sense of an absolute negation. Any trial to understand it by obversion as denoting any positive meaning is strictly prohibited by him. So, when Bhāvaviveka says that anything is not produced by Iśvara, its meaning is that it is not produced not only by Iśvara, but also by Nārāyaṇa, Time etc. that is, it is not produced from any of wrong-or non-causes ; and furthermore, as it does not allow any affirmation, it points out negation of appearance out of cause in general ; that is to say, non-appearance and non-individuality of the existent. Criticism from the genuine phenomenal point of view proceeds to criticism from the transcendental view-point on account of the negation being an absolute one. This is substantiated by his another syllogism against the Nāstika (*Prajñā-P.* Chap. XVIII. D., 189,1) : 'If considered from the transcendental standpoint cognition that objects like matter etc. are not existent is not really tenable ; because it is cognition ; just as cognition that they exist is not really tenable'. While logically negating non-cause theories, he does not intend affirmation of common logicality, because this absolute negation belongs to quite a different logical system, logic of non-individuality or that of the *Paramārtha*. If considered from the transcendental standpoint, logic and human cognition in general should be denied. This might seem to contradict the fact that Bhāvaviveka negated nihilism and dogmatism from the standpoint of common logicality. But it has been done to establish the true phenomenal knowledge, the *Saṁvṛti-satya*, and not to admit common realistic interpretation of the phenomenon. I mean to say that Bhāvaviveka does not change his fundamental standpoint according as the opponent or objects of negation are of non-cause or of the relatively true causes, that is to say, the discrimination of the two truths is not two fundamentally opposing standpoints, but only different aspects of the same principle.

It may be contradictory from the realistic point of view to negate illogicality without absolutely admitting human logic. But the Mādhyamikas think that it is very contradiction that a true negation is done on affirmation of anything else, because a relative negation which is a kind of affirmation, cannot be absolutely negative. Since the time of Nāgārjuna the realists have questioned the Mādhyamikas : "If every thing is not real, your sound is also not real ; then it is not real to say with non-real sound that everything is not real, just as saying that all words are false is self-contradictory." Nāgārjuna as well as Bhāvaviveka replies : 'If we say that every thing is not real while sound is real, then it commits fallacy of proposition ; when we say, however, that every thing as well as sound which expresses it is not real there is no contradiction in saying so. A pot and a cloth which are not real on account of their existence being dependent on others, that is, void of individuality, have function of containing water or preventing cold. On the contrary if they are real of their individuality they must not have any efficiency, for a thing individually real (*svabhāvataḥ*) is '*quod in se est per se concipitur*' (*aparapratyaya*), non-product (*akṛtrima*), eternal and necessarily without function. Sound is void of individuality, and by this very reason it can have activity of negation.'

The common world is nothing but a system of realistic view ; it translates, the ephemeral, non-eternal existence into combination of eternal concepts and it does not notice contradiction of the translation, from which non-eternity of existence escapes away. For example non-existence, from which the non-cause theories assume everything appears, is a kind of existence in the shape of non-existence. In the realistic system existence and non-existence are contradictory—contradiction presupposes fundamental identity—but the transcendental negation of existence denies the hypothetical reality on which existence and non-existence are established. The negation is not identical with that of the realistic system. Verbal usage or our world of knowledge is not set up unless existence of concepts is established, because here we need existent concepts even to deny existence. But this assumed existence is not reality as the realists think. Nāgārjuna's declaration of voidness of sound means that concepts

are not real and everything which is constructed on the basis of concepts, or on the basis of human cognition is not real. By taking away the cover of concepts true aspect of the phenomenon is disclosed.

The existence does not arise either from the self, the other, or from both the self and other. Then the existence without having any individual quality, is not even the existent. There is only Śūnyatā and *tūṣṇimbhāva*; no, not even they. Such is the meaning of the absolute negation that the absolute reality (*bhūtakoti*) transcends every verbal usage. But it is our verbal usage, and not the *bhūtakoti* that is transcended. This is the reason why causality qualified with non-appearance and non-disappearance is, even though as again a kind of verbal usage, established. The logic of the Mādhyamika philosophy is also an assumption (*prajñapti*) and void of individuality; but it is in this non-individuality that the logic performs function of logic, as Nāgārjuna says : 'To whom non-individuality is established, to him everything is established' ¹


¹ *Sarvam ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yatya yujyate (Mādhyamikakārikā).*



KUMĀRILA'S REACTION TO STRICTURES ON
CERTAIN APPARENT GRAMMATICAL LAPSES

By

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The third section of the first chapter of the *Mīmāṃsā* darsana¹ concerns itself with the examination of the *smṛti* literature that deals with the traditional law, both sacred and profane, professedly based upon the Vedic text. After an elaborate discussion Jaimini comes to the conclusion that such texts of *smṛti* as derived their origin from the Vedic literature, known and unknown, are to be regarded as source of valid cognition and conduct. The science of grammar is treated on a par with other such *smṛtis* and Kumārila has devoted to it a considerable part of the section in his *Tantravārtika*, therein discussed at length the merits and demerits of grammar and at last came to the decision that this science is also a reliable source of knowledge.

In this connection it is to be observed that Kumārila, while seeking to find out the dependability of the science of grammar for correct knowledge and linguistic usage, takes into consideration only the Pāṇinian system and not others, although a number of other systems also may have existed at his time. It shows that no other system was deemed by Kumārila as worthy of investigation as that of Pāṇini and it is a well-known fact that barring a very few writers, no respectable author makes reference to or quotes from any system other than Pāṇinian in the discussion of grammatical problems. Referring to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* Patañjali says—“Beautiful is the construction of the *sūtras* of Pāṇini”² and “The Ācārya, the master, the acknowledged authority, took his seat in a sanctified place, holding a tuft of sacred *kuśa* grass in hand, with his face towards

¹ The system of philosophy that goes by the name of Jaimini.

² “Sobhanā khalu Pāñines sūtrasya kṛtih” (2-3-66).

east, and composed these aphorisms with extraordinary pains and attention.”¹

It is Pāṇinian system that has received this appreciation from Patañjali whose authority as an exponent of grammar is only comparable to that of Pāṇini. Such an appreciation the other systems could not dream of either Patañjali or any other authority of equal eminence. The unique character of Pāṇinian grammar accounts mainly for such splendid remarks. Kaiyatā's observation on the Pāṇinian school is also worth quoting here.

“The traditional Smṛtis hold their authority during specified periods and help in the determination of good and evil. Now-a-day it is the Pāṇinian system that holds good and therefore the correctness or otherwise of words is to be determined on the strength and authority of the system constructed by the three sages, (just as the matters, religious and social, are determined on the authority of the *Parāśarasamṛti* in the Kali age.”)²

Kumārila at first questions the authoritativeness of grammar, but finally he establishes the same with convincing and weighty arguments.

In the treatment of the position of the opponents of the grammatical discipline (which is called the first view because of its position in the discourse) Kumārila gives a survey of the stupendous researches which were made to repudiate the validity of the science of grammar. It is said in the first view —

- (1) “On account of the divergence of opinions among the three sages,
- (2) On account of its being contrary to the Vedas,
- (3) Owing to its lack of mooring in the Vedas,
- (4) and finally owing to the fact that it does not serve any practical or theoretical purpose, the rules of the science of grammar cannot be deemed as rendering any help in the determination of correctness or otherwise of words.³

¹ “Pramāṇabhūta ācāryo darbhapavitrāpiś śucāvavakāśe prānmukha upaviṣṭya mahatā prayāsenā sūtrāṇī prapayati sma”.

² “Niyatakālāśca smṛtayo vyavasthāhetava iti munītrayamatenādyatve sādhvā-sādhupravṛthāgah” (5-1-21). Here Nāgeśa adds “Kala pārāśarī smṛtiriti-vaditī bhāvah”.

³ Ato vigāṇabhūyiṣṭhād viruddhān mūlavarjitāt. Niśpalācca vyavasthānam sābdānāṁ nānuśāsanāt.

I DIVERGENT OPINIONS

It is maintained that the assertions of the three celebrated sages—Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali—are contradictory to each other.

It is the custom in all traditional works to mention at the very outset the object and use of the work in order to furnish the incentive to the study of the respective subjects. But Pāṇini, the author of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, does not express the benefit which the study of the science of grammar would confer. This omission implies that in his opinion the science had no use worth mentioning. Had there been anything like that he could not, and ought not to, have been silent over the matter. While the opinion of Pāṇini does not seem to support the view of attaching any resultant advantage, Kātyāyana, the author of the *Vārtikas*, seems to disagree with him by entertaining an entirely different view. He proclaims—

“The use of words being determined by the sense current in popular speech, the science of grammar enjoins restrictions (i.e. the use of correct words to the exclusion of corrupt forms) for religious merit”¹
(Dr. K. C. Chatterj)

The usage of words is guided by the desire to express the ideas of things. As there is the possibility of the use of both correct and incorrect words for conveying the intended meanings, the science restricts it to the correct words to the exclusion of the incorrect ones by declaring that *Dharma* or transcendental merit could be achieved only through the employment of the correct words. Consequently Kātyāyana feels the necessity of affirming explicitly the utility and benefit of the study of the science. As this is definitely an innovation, unendorsed by Pāṇini, the views of Kātyāyana and Pāṇini must be regarded as mutually contradictory.

Let us consider the opinion of Patañjali on this matter. Like Kātyāyana he also maintains that grammar has *Dharma* as the ultimate result of the study thereof, and in this respect he obviously holds a view which is far from intended by Pāṇini. Although Patañjali agrees with Kātyāyana so far as the utility of the

¹ “Lokatorthaprayukte śabdapravoge śāstreyā dharmaniyanamah” (*Paspāśāṅnika*)

science is concerned, he is not entirely at one with him. Patañjali asserts that *Dharma* is the result of the knowledge of correct words (*Sādhuśabdajñāne Dharmah, na tu tatprayoge*) and not of their mere usage. In Kātyāyana's opinion irrespective of the knowledge of correctness, by the mere chance utterance of the correct words the speaker will be crowned with *Dharma* and therefore his knowledge of grammatical purity of words would not be material. But Patañjali does not support this opinion. Even the uneducated peasant is sometimes found to utter a word which by fluke happens to be as pure as that of a person proficient in grammar. Kātyāyana would have to concede *Dharma* to the peasant also. But Patañjali demurs to allow him to share it with one skilled in the science of grammar. Accordingly the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* lays down that the knowledge of the correctness of words as imparted by the science of grammar is essential for obtaining the desired *Dharma*. In this respect the divergence of opinion between Kātyāyana and Patañjali is as pronounced as that between Kātyāyana and Pāṇini. The assertions, therefore, of the three sages are in conflict with one another.

(2) CONTRARINESS TO THE VEDA

Further, grammar offends against the Veda, for the derivation and meaning of certain words offered by Pāṇini's grammar are at variance with those given in the Vedic text. For instance the two words *Kāleyam* and *Vāmadevyam* are derived by Pāṇini from the bases *Kali* and *Vāmadeva* by adding the suffixes *Dhak* (eya) and *Dya* (Ya) respectively. The two rules *Kalerdhak* (4-2-8) and *Vāmadevāt dyad dyau* (4-2-9) are given by Pāṇini under the rule *Dṛṣṭam Sāma* (4-2-7) and therefore the words *Kāleya* and *Vāmadevya* mean respectively the *Sāman* seen by the sage *Kali*, and that seen by the sage *Vāmadeva*. But we find the words derived in the *Brāhmaṇa* in a different way. The meanings of the words are given as follows :—

"As gods drove away the *Asuras* by means of this *Sāman* it came to be known as *Kāleyam*.¹

¹ "Yadakālyat tat Kāleyasya Kāleyatvam".

"The wind-god pursued water-gods. From them came forth abundant riches in the form of this *sāman*. Mitra and Varuna saw that and said "O mortals! this desirable and obtainable wealth came forth to gods." *Vāmadevya* is derived from the conjuncition of terms 'Vāma' and 'Deva.' It is the name of the SĀMAN on account of its being *vāma* (covetable) to Devas."¹

It is clear that the derivation and meaning of these two words given by Pāṇini are different from and in direct opposition to those given in the *Brāhmaṇa* and therefore on this point Pāṇini's grammar stands in contradiction to the Veda. It is an acknowledged fact that a *smṛti* text repugnant to the *Śruti* cannot be authoritative, because the latter, being superior, prevails over the former and makes it ineffective and meaningless. It thus follows from the above that grammar is not a reliable source of valid knowledge.

(3) DESTITUTION OF BASIS (in the Veda)

It is agreed on all hands that a *Smṛti* text that has no mooring in the Vedas, known or unknown, is not regarded as an authority at all. So grammar can in no wise be deemed as a source of valid knowledge, for it cannot be proved to be founded on any of the Vedas. Instruction on the correctness of words is the business of the science of grammar. It is to be ascertained whether the science of grammar is affiliated to the Veda as its basis at all; and if so whether the basic affiliation is claimed in respect of (infinite number of) individual words or by reference to class character. The first alternative is out of the question, and in the second alternative to prove it by reference to class character will be of no practical value, inasmuch as the problem relates to specific words.

Further if it is proved in a general manner, there is no evidence of current *Śruti* bearing on the problem and therefore the relevant Vedic text has to be presumed or inferred (*Kalpanīya*) as the source. Even on the assumption that all tradition (*Smṛti*) has its source in the Vedas and as such the tradition of correct words (*Vyākaraṇa Smṛti*) will also derive

¹ Āpo ṛtviyam ārchan; tāśām vāyuḥ prṣhe vyavartata; tato vāmām vasu sama-bhavat; tan Mitrāvaraṇāpāśyatām; tāvabṛūtām "Vāmarimaryā idam Devebhyo Jauṣī, tasmād Vāmadevyanam" (T. Br. 7-8-1.)

its authority from the Vedas, we should have to presume the way in which the deliverances of the Veda might be given. It is possible to surmise that the Vedic Injunction would assume either a form of affirmation or negation. In the former alternative the Vedic text may be presumed to deliver its Injunction in the form "One should express one's thoughts by means of correct words". In the second alternative the deliverance might be in the form "One should not use incorrect words." The writers on grammar have preferred the first to the second alternative and sought the basis (of grammar) in the positive Vedic Injunction enjoining the usage of the right words. If on the other hand it were to be affiliated to the prohibitive Injunction, no science of grammar could be possible on account of the sheer impossibility of the task. One would have to assume innumerable Vedic prohibitions for each incorrect word, because the number of possible corruptions is without limit. If, to avoid this impossible task, it be presumed that the Vedic Injunction is positive on the use of correct words, that also will not help the grammarian in his mission. The supposed Vedic Injunction can possibly be fulfilled only on the clear understanding of the nature of correctness. What is the criterion of a word being correct? If correctness stands for expressiveness, then all words being equally expressive the injunction in the general form will be of no use whatsoever. It is undeniable that when an uneducated man uses a corrupt form, people understand the meaning even from such an incorrect word. Similarly the correctness cannot be said to consist in being used from time immemorial, in other words, in the sanction of tradition and custom, for, the incorrect words also can be said to have been likewise in use from an immemorable time. Thus it being impossible to define "correctness" we cannot assume the *Śruti* "All correct words should be used" as the basis of the science of grammar. Grammar, therefore, cannot be proved to have any mooring in the Veda either in regard to the individual words or by reference to class character. This position has been explained by Pārthaśārathi Miśra in his *Sāstradīpikā*.¹

The Injunction cannot be conceived to refer to specific words, simply because their number is without a definite limit, and this would

¹ Vide: *Sāstradīpikā*, N. Ed. p. 44.

on the other hand entail an infinite number of texts, which is not conceivably possible or useful. No human being could cultivate the knowledge of these infinite texts, even if they are supposed to be possible. The second alternative that they could have reference to such generic class characters as "One should use correct words" would also be of no avail, because of the impossibility of the criteria of correctness. Khaṇḍadeva and Jayantabhaṭṭa also have harped on the same tune and brought out the impossibility and inutility of such procedure.¹ But one may argue what is the necessity and obligation that the science of grammar should derive sanction from the Veda ? It is an independent discipline and should have an intrinsic validity of its own. So the difficulties alleged would only be hypothetical and not calculated to affect the validity and authority of the science. It can have a validity independent, intrinsic and self-contained.

But this contention cannot be accepted as valid, simply because a literary composition, made by a human being or beings cannot transcend the limitations of human intellect and the validity of the knowledge on which it is based is always liable to doubt and interrogation. Of literary works it is only the Veda that is admitted on all hands to be valid on its own account and in its own right. The science of grammar, therefore, or any other work of the kind can have authority for all times only in so far as it embodies the unquestionably correct tradition. But this character of unquestionability is only the exclusive quality of the Veda. Whether the science of grammar is regarded to have its utility either as an independent discipline or as an auxiliary to the Vedas, its validity must be derivative and not original. So the question of Vedic affiliation cannot be shelved.

(4) USELESSNESS

Finally, the science of grammar can have no utility whatsoever and this is evident from the silence of Pāṇini on this important issue. All the writers generally observe as a rule the custom of stating at the beginning the use and object of their work. And this custom has a

¹ Vide: *Mīmāṃsā Kaustubha* Ch. Ed. p. 108, and *Nyāyamañjari* Ch. pp. 376 and 378

logical necessity at its back. It serves the purpose of the warning post. Only those persons who are interested in the subject will be encouraged to undertake the study of it and others may not meet with disappointment. Of course every scientific treatise has a subject-matter of its own. But it can have interest and use only for those who are seekers of this knowledge. Useless and fruitless speculations are only waste of precious time. Human life is has so short and brief and so little leisure for idle pursuits that a sane man requires to be forearmed with the knowledge of the purpose, that the pursuit, academic or extra-academic, should help to subserve. The ends of human beings can be classified under four heads. (1) Religious and spiritual merit (*Dharma*), which adds to the inner strength of the man. (2) Economic self-sufficiency which enables him to meet the demands of physical existence and social life (*Artha*). (3) The prerequisite for the satisfaction of natural and acquired propensities and impulses for self-preservation and race-preservation, (*Kāma*). And (4) *Mokṣa*—ultimate freedom from all limitations. The science of grammar cannot be supposed to contribute to the fulfilment of any one of these ends. *Dharma*, that is moral and spiritual power, is acquired by the observance of the edicts of the Veda. The science of grammar cannot be a competitor in the field. As regards economic prosperity there are the specialist disciplines such as Economics or other professional sciences dealing with trade, commerce etc. Regarding the enjoyment of the objects of the senses and the satisfaction of elemental biological needs, such works of Vātsyāyana and others as the *Kāmasūtra*, are authority on it. As for *Mokṣa*, the ultimate emancipation, there are the *Upaniṣads* and the systems of philosophy which make this their special subject of study.

It is difficult to conceive, therefore, that grammar which deals with the linguistic forms can make its contribution to the fulfilment of any one of these objectives.

Writers on grammar however maintain *Dharma* to be the result brought about by the study of the science of words. But there is no unanimity about this among the grammarians themselves. Kātyāyana exhorted that 'use of correct words in strict accordance with the grammatical rules would accomplish the *Dharma*'. But Patañjali entertained a different view by declaring that only the

knowledge of the right words (not mere usage) as imparted by the science of grammar, would bring in the desired *Dharma*'. On account of this divergence, we do not know whether *Dharma* is the real result of the science or not.

Grammarians again cite however a Vedic text in support of their position¹ and uphold their usual declaration about the use of the science. They say that the Vedic passage means "A single word rightly learnt and used in strict conformity with the rules laid down in the science, accomplishes all desires in Heaven and on earth." By this they want to corroborate their stand in regard to the usefulness of grammar. But in fact the Vedic passage cited above has nothing to do with grammar and it is only concerned with the Vedic study itself. There is a general Injunction that "one should read the *Veda* every day" and "at least a single *Rk*, *Yajus* or *Sāman*.²" The passage instanced by the grammarians is only in praise of the study enjoined by the Vedic text and it means "If one cannot read even a single complete *Mantra* for some reason or other, it is enough if one can recite even a single word of the *Veda*, which would fulfil all his desires." So by this Vedic Injunction the usefulness of grammar cannot be established as expected by the grammarians.

SOLECISMS OF THE THREE SAGES

Pāṇini, Kātyāyena, and Patañjali are regarded by the grammarians as the highest authority. But even these celebrities are not free from error, as the following instances will prove.

PĀNINI

(A) i. We have the *sūtra* of Pāṇini 'Janikartuh Prakṛtiḥ' in which he (PĀNINI) committed two grammatical blunders. This *sūtra* prescribes that the source from which anything originates is the ablative case. "*Brahmaṇah prajāḥ prajāyante*" is the stock-example of this rule—"Living beings originate from *Brahman*". Here *Brahma*

¹ Ekaś śabdā samyak jñātaś ṣāstrānvitas suprayuktas svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati.

² Vide: *Tantravārtika*, Ānandaśrama Edn. p. 258, "Aharaḥah svādhīyāyama-dhīyūta, Apyekāṁrcam, Yajus, Sāma vā."

being the original cause of the living beings, the word *Brahman* becomes the ablative and has consequently the fifth case ending after it. But *Janikartuh* is not a happy expression, as it is grammatically wrong and cannot convey the intended meaning. According to the rule of grammar “*Ikṣtipau dhātunirdeśe*” a verbal root is stated by adding the suffix ‘*T*’ or ‘*TI*’ after it. Thus *Jani* (*Jan+i* and *Jāti* (*Jan+ti*) stand for the verbal root “JAN” and not anything else. But *Jani* has been used in the aphorism in the sense of the meaning and not in the sense of the root and this is obviously a mistake. The meanings are entirely different and to use a word for conveying a meaning, which it cannot, is certainly a grievous error. The gravity of the error is not less than the use of *Aśva* (horse) for ‘*Asva*’ — (a man without property.)

(A) 2. In the same expression there is another mistake committed by PĀNINI. The compound word *Janikartuh* is an instance of genitive-tatpuruṣa, and it is to be dissolved as *Janeḥ Kartā-janikartā*. Pāṇini has a rule ‘*Trijakābhyaṁ kartari*’ which lays down that a word in the genitive case should not be compounded with another ending either in the suffix ‘TR.C’ or ‘AKA’, which denotes the agent of the action (*kartā*). (a) *Vajrasya bhartā* — ‘the bearer of the thunder-bolt’ and (b) *odanasya pācakah* are examples. In these examples the compounding is not permissible. In the same manner, as the word *kartā* has at the end the suffix TR.C, which denotes the agent of the action and as the previous word is in the genitive case, we cannot have the compounded form as *janikartā*. By using it PĀNINI had violated his own rule and committed another grammatical error. Similarly he has *Tatprayojako Hetuśca* in which also the compound word *tatprayojaka* is wrong, because the compounding is prevented likewise by the same rule. This is another instance of his second error.

KĀTYĀYANA

B. (1) Kātyāyana, the author of the *Vārtikas* too has erroneous use to his discredit. In his *Vārtika* ‘*Dambher Halgrahaṇasya Jātivācakatvāt Siddham*’, he uses the compound word ‘*JĀTIVĀCAKATVĀT*’ which is in the same position with the above errors of Pāṇini.

B. (2) Again in his *Vārtika* ‘Ānyabhāvyam tu kālaśabdavyavāyāt’ he uses the word *ānyabhāvyam* which cannot be justified according to the rules of grammar. In the first place, the doubt arises as to what sort of compound it is. We cannot be certain whether it is a *Bahuvrīhi* or *Saṣṭhitatpuruṣa* or *Karmadhāraya*. Even when it is explained as some compound or other of these, it remains difficult to explain how and by what rule the *Taddhita* suffix ‘SYĀṄ’ is added. Here we have nothing but to invoke the aid of the rule “*Guṇavacanabrāhmaṇādibhyahṣyañ*” which prescribes the suffix after those forms which are GUNAVACANAS and after those which belong to the group of *Brāhmaṇādi*, in the sense of *karma* or *bhāva*. A word which connotes an attribute and denotes an individual is GUNAVACANA or in Mill’s terminology ‘Gunavacana is a connotative term’. The word ANYABHĀVA, though it may stand for a thing possessed of a quality cannot be regarded as *Guṇavacana* as has been pointed out by Patañjali (under 1-4-1)¹. *Jāti*, *Saṃjñā*, *Avyaya*, *Kṛdanta*, *Taddhīta*, *Samasta*, *Sarvanāma* and *Saṅkhyāśabda* are excluded from the category of *Guṇavacana*. But evidently Kātyāyana regarded ANYABHĀVA (which is a *samasta* or compound word) as *Guṇavacana* and so added the suffix ‘SYĀṄ’. This is certainly a bad lapse. As the word ANYABHĀVA is not found in the group of *Brāhmaṇādi* we cannot justify the use thereof (*ānyabhāvya*) even on that score.

We cannot, therefore, vindicate the position of Kātyāyana and find the way out of the difficulty.

PATAÑJALI

C. (1) Patañjali, the last of the three sages who is acknowledged by common consent as a master grammarian of the highest rank, is also not free from lapses. Even in his own work we meet with such instances as are not less erroneous than those of his two predecessors. It is not infrequently that we find the expression AVIRAVIKANYĀ-YENA in Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*. It is a compound form of

¹ cf. Nāgeśa under 1-4-1: *Evanicātra Śāstre Guṇavacanāśabdena Jātisamjñā ‘vyaya-kṛdantataddhīta samastasarvanāma Saṅkhyāśabda tāriktaśabdo grhyataiti bodhyam.*

ṣaṣṭhitatpuruṣa comprising within itself a DVANDVA compound. The dissolution of the compounds seems to be as follows :—

Aviśca Avikaśca=Aviravikau Aviravikayor nyāyah tena. The elision of the case endings in the component words of a compound is obligatory according to the rule of Pañini—*Supodhātuprātipadikayoh*, as well as custom. Accordingly the form should be AVYAVIKANYĀYENA and not AVIRAVIKANĀYENA as used by Patañjali. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, therefore, is also guilty of ungrammatical usage.

C (2) Again there is another example in which his neglect of the observance of a certain grammatical rule is evident. Not seldom we find his expression *Anyathākṛtvā Coditam*, *Anyathākṛtvā Parihārah*. It is not discernible how he had abandoned the correct form ANYATHĀKĀRAM, and had taken to the form ANYATHĀK-RTVĀ, although Pāṇini in his aphorism *Anayathaivamkathamitt-hamsu Siddhāprayogaścet* prescribes the suffix—NAMUL and tells that the form ANYATHĀKĀRAM is grammatically correct.

Thus it is clear that there are a number of incorrect and unidiomatic forms used even by the three celebrated sages who are regarded as the highest authorities and credited with the perfect mastery of the science of grammar. That the usages of these grammarians should run counter to the rules which they themselves had enunciated is as ludicrous as if a man seated on a horse forgot the horse itself. When even these authors used a number of incorrect usages violating their own rules, how can the grammatical system enunciated by them be regarded as an authority and a reliable source of valid knowledge?¹ The opponent, therefore, concludes that—

- (1) on account of the divergence of opinion among the three sages,
- (2) on account of its being contrary to the Vedas and
- (3) owing to its lack of mooring in the Vedas, and finally,
- (4) owing to the fact that it does not serve any practical or theoretical purpose, “the ruling of the science of grammar cannot be deemed as rendering any help in the determination of the correctness or otherwise of the words. These are the charges

¹ Vide: *Tantravārtika*, Ānandaśrama Ed. p. 260.

levelled against the science of grammar by the opposite school, which challenge the validity of grammar.

I now proceed to place the critical examination of these charges before the scholars for disinterested consideration.

Siddhānta OR CONCLUSION

The first objection to the validity of grammar, brought against by the opponent, is that "the assertions of the three sages are contradictory to each other". This can be obviated in the following manner. That there are contradictions between the assertions of the authors is not a tenable position. For, the Veda, which is regarded as self-sufficient authority, too seems to contain many a contradiction in itself. If the opponent's stand receives the unhesitating approval, then the Veda too would lose its authoritativeness and would have to be rejected on that score. But the authoritative character of the Veda is unreservedly accepted in spite of the apparent contradictions among its own statements. As a matter of fact, when two statements of the Veda are found to be contradictory to each other, both of them are regarded as optionally authoritative and none of them is, on the ground of *prima facie* contradiction, deemed as unauthoritative. The opponent's view is therefore hasty, if not frivolous. In point of fact there is perfect agreement among the sages on the point that 'the employment of right words secures religious merit and moral worth'. The charge advanced against Pāṇini that he did not mention the use of his work, only betrays the poor understanding of the disputant. The aim and object of the science of grammar are made known by the Vedas and *Smṛtis* and hence they do not really require any explicit restatement by PĀNINI. Further, the discrimination between right and wrong words helpful in the usage of the former and rejection of the latter, produces religious merit and saves the speaker from demerit. And this becomes evident after the completion of the study.¹

¹ *Vide Śāstradīpikā* :—*Phalaśāstraśāya śabdapāśabdavibhāgajñānamupāddānapārityāgopayogi dharmādharmapraptiparihārartham.*

N. Ed. p. 48.

The Injunction and Prohibition 'SATYAM VADA' and 'NĀNR-TAM VADET' are well known propositions of the Vedas. From such *śrutis* and *smṛtis* it is understood that speaking of truth brings happiness to the speaker and that of falsehood results in sin. And TRUTH is of two kinds — one consisting in the correctness of speech and the other in the correctness of the meaning. Just as the speaking of things as they are is conducive to merit, so also the use of correct words without deviation from the norm results in the emergence of merit. And just as the distorted statement of 'true things' is sinful, so also the distorted utterance of 'correct words' is equally productive of sin. As the knowledge and use of 'correct words' are stated to lead to happiness, the science of grammar imparting instruction on the 'correctness' of words also serves indirectly the purpose of bringing about happiness. As, thus, the purpose of grammar is known from *śrutis* and *smṛtis*, PĀNINI did not feel the necessity of repeating it. The contention of the opponent in this regard is therefore ineffective and the authority of grammar remains unaffected and unshaken.¹

¹ Intellectual lapses were in ancient times held to be as abominable as moral lapses. There is perhaps justification for this attitude. Both are ultimately due to the absence of vigil, weakness of attention and lack of disciplined will. Perfect conviction and intellectual mastery are concomitant with perfect control of will and impulse. Our moral drawbacks and weaknesses are no less traceable to weakness of understanding than weakness of the will. Intellectual lapses were thus regarded as symptomatic of and equivalent to moral lapses. There is no more justification for the one than for the other.

The ignorance of law is not regarded as an excuse, far less a justification, for legal offence. The logic underlying this principle of jurisprudence is that a normal person should cultivate the knowledge of the law and the failure is tantamount to moral imbecility, if not turpitude.

It may be thought that this standard adopted by the ancients is based on exaggeration or confusion of issues. But if we probe the question deeper the two issues of moral and intellectual imperfection need not be regarded as genetically opposed. Perfect realization of the truth is a necessary concomitant of perfect mastery of the will. The Socratic adage "Knowledge is power or Knowledge is happiness" is based on a correct realization of this fundamental truth. We need not, therefore, be surprised at the assertions of the ancient thinkers like KĀTYĀYANA and PATĀṄJALI 'that *lapsus linguae* is equivalent to a moral and religious lapse'. This has been made explicit by KUMĀRILA when he says "The truthfulness of speech is as material as truthfulness in thought and action". A wrong word is as much a lie as a wrong meaning. Both derive their genesis from the same fundamental source, namely, untrained and undeveloped will and intellect which go together.

I now propose to consider the views of Jayantabhaṭṭa. He considers the objection that the author of the *Sūtras* himself did not mention the use of the science is captious.¹ It is well known that grammar is a subsidiary science to the Veda. It therefore shares the same fate with the Veda. The validity and utility of the Veda are unquestionable and so also of grammar. What is a part has no status independent of the whole. If the whole has a purpose and meaning, the part will also have it, because the whole consists of and is bound up with the parts. To impugn the authority of grammar is therefore tantamount to the repudiation of the validity of the Veda. If the Veda were to be invalid and unauthoritative, the religion and cult of the non-Aryans would be triumphant over the Vedic religion. A person who professes his faith in the Veda lays himself under the obligation of acknowledging the authority of the grammatical discipline which is essential for the understanding of the Veda. The objection is, therefore, based on a superficial understanding of the implications of the science of grammar and the relation in which it stands to the Veda. Taking this fact into consideration the author of the *Sūtras*, PĀNINI, did not mention the purpose separately. But the commentators mentioned at length the direct and indirect benefit for the simple reason of increasing the enthusiasm of the readers. None of them, therefore, deserves the unwarranted censure of the critic.

Let us consider the next objection that there is conflict of views between Kātyāyana and Patañjali, though both of them had accepted *Dharma* to be the ultimate result of the science of grammar. Kātyāyana held that *Dharma* accrued from the proper use of the correct words, that is to say — if they conformed to the rules of grammar, whereas Patañjali declared it to follow from a conscious knowledge of the words. This is the gravamen of the charge of mutual conflict.

But the fact of the matter is this. Kātyāyana thought that if *Dharma* were the result of the knowledge of correct words, it went without saying that *Adharma* would be the result of the incorrect

¹ Vide: *Nyāyamanjarī* — Ch Ed. pp. 390-391

words, they being antithetically opposed. It being the position, a person who knows what right words are must also know what wrong words are according to the dictum "To know is to distinguish", and therefore he would be liable to incur the unwanted *Adharma* too. To avoid this unwelcome entanglement Kātyāyana had resorted to the decision that *Dharma* accrued from the use of right words and not from mere knowledge thereof.

Kātyāyana advances an opposite view when he alleges the unavoidability of *DHARMA* from the knowledge of wrong words, which is the presupposition of the knowledge of the right words. This consequence was avoided by Kātyāyana himself when he propounds the conclusion that proper use of words preceded by the knowledge of the rules, results in *Dharma*. But Patañjali now interposes a defence of the view rejected by Kātyāyana. He affirms that the *Dharma* may be the result of knowledge independent of actual usage. The advocacy of the view rejected by Kātyāyana implies opposition and conflict.

But this defence of Patañjali need not be taken at its face value. It is advanced more or less in a sportive mood in order to show that he can defend the previous position of Kātyāyana and avoid the alleged consequences of excess of demerit. This is more or less an argument which even the arguer himself is not serious and earnest to establish. It is only offered as an *obiter dictum*. As a matter of fact the result affirmed to accrue from mere knowledge irrespective of actual usage, is only for the sake of emphasis and inducement. It is on a par with the Injunction "A person who performs horse-sacrifice is exonerated from the sin of murdering a Brāhmin and even one who is aware of this as such." The supplement stated as an alternative is not to be taken literally. Were it literally true, it would lead to inactivity. Nobody would take the trouble to perform the sacrifice, if mere knowledge sufficed to secure the benefit of it. The present case is also exactly analogous. If mere knowledge of correctness of words were capable of securing the spiritual benefit, nobody would take the trouble to articulate them in the proper manner which necessarily involves extra labour. The assertion that even knowledge suffices to secure the result is to be interpreted in a

secondary sense. These figurative expressions are as much part of the corrent usage as the literal expressions. It is like the statement "The rain god showered grains of rice". The rainfall is the necessary condition of the growth of paddy plants which yield rice. The cause is here stated as the effect for the sake of emphasis. There are very many figurative usages like this, e.g. "Butter is life", "A thing of beauty is a joy for ever". The knowledge of correct words enables a person to use these words and it is for the sake of emphasis that the knowledge of the condition of the current linguistic usage is affirmed to be productive of the religious merit which actually results from the usage. Moreover knowledge only leads to the usage of the pure words and as such it serves a useful purpose. An additional benefit does not make it more useful. The statement of such additional consequences is only for the sake of emphasis and meant to be understood as an *obiter dictum*.

To the second objection that grammar is repugnant to the Veda inasmuch as it offered derivations and meanings quite contrary to those given in the *Śruti* (*Kāleyam* and *Vāmadevyam*) Pārthaśārathi gives a suitable reply in his *Śāstradīpikā*.

The *Mimāṃsā* system is principally occupied with the exegesis of the Vedic texts. The Vedic texts are not always clearly intelligible and do not rarely seem to be mutually inconsistent. Besides, the *SMRTI* texts, composed by persons of unchallengeable authority and entirely exempt from the baser passions and inclinations, are regarded as the source of the knowldge of what is good in the religious sense. The authority of these subsidiary texts is not the reflex of *argumentum ad verecundiam* or *ad hominum*. They are valid only to the extent of their fidelity and loyalty to the Vedic texts. Their authoritativeness is an illustration of shining in borrowed light. What creates a puzzle is that sometimes these *SMRTI* texts directly run counter to the express injunction of the Veda. What would be then the rationality of their authority? Will these exceptions whose number is not very numerous, invalidate the whole *SMRTI*? A class of *Mimāṃsists* has suggested a solution that the authority of the Vedic tradition as preserved in the *SMRTI* should not be impugned as a whole, but only the offending text should be subjected to excision.

This has been the solution offered by Pārthaśārathi Miśra¹. Regarding the grammatical tradition, where there are found rules contrary to the Vedic authority the same process of elimination should be followed. It might also be suggested that the grammatical speculations, which are not essential parts of Vedic injunction but only explanatory statements, need not be taken at their face value and so the charge of contradiction would not arise. This would however be a bad concession. So this easy explanation has not been adopted.

The stock-in-trade example of opposition of Śruti and Smṛti is the injunction regarding the pole made of fig tree. The Śruti enjoins that the priest should chant the *Sāman* while touching the post made of fig tree.² The Smṛti commands that the whole post is to be covered with cloth.³ The latter course would naturally leave no uncovered part and so would make direct touch impossible. The Smṛti text is therefore discarded as spurious. Other reasons are also given for discarding such Smṛti texts as that referred to above, where a motive for gain or securing some tangible personal advantage is discernible. The Smṛti injunction is evidently inspired by motive of gain, because the cloth would be acquired by the priest. Where no such motive is discernible and no reason for questioning the validity of the source of knowledge is discoverable, the Smṛti text must be accepted as valid, being supposed to be based upon some lost Vedic text.

Thus it follows from the above that although in a particular case the science of grammar, being contrary to the Veda, may be deemed to be unauthoritative, it cannot as a whole be regarded as such and therefore it remains, except in a few cases, really a dependable source of valid knowledge.

The third objection put forth by the opponent is that the science of grammar cannot be proved to have any mooring in the Veda. But we have to examine and see how far this contention is true.

With regard to all the Smṛtis it was decided in general that as their authoritativeness depended on their basis in the Veda the basic

¹ vide: Śāstradīpikā — “Vedaviruddhan kāmanī Bhavatvapramāṇam sarvavesṭanādismaranavat; natvetāvatā sarvāpramāṇyam” (N. Ed. p. 48).

² ‘Audumbarīnī sprṣṭvā udgāyet’.

³ “Audumbarī sarvā veṣṭayitavyā”.

Śruti texts, if not current, are to be assumed and the *Smṛti*s are thereby to be deemed as authoritative. Like other *Smṛti*s the science of grammar also can be shown to have the basis in the Veda. The general injunction of the *śruti* that 'one should use only correct words' naturally presupposes the criteria of correctness or otherwise, which are considered in systematizing grammatical works of Pāṇini and others. The tradition of Pāṇini is based upon previous works which must in the ultimate analysis be based upon the Veda. 'Correctness' of words also can be taken to mean "expressiveness". The argument that the incorrect words also are equally expressive cannot hold good, for the incorrect ones convey the meaning only through the right words and there it is only the right words that really express the meaning and not the wrong ones. Whenever an uneducated person is found to use a corrupt form, it immediately comes to our mind that the correct word was corrupted by the speaker either on account of his incapacity to pronounce correct words as they are, or on account of his mistake in taking the corrupt forms to be correct owing to his constant hearing of the same. Thus as it is only the correct words that are expressive and not the incorrect ones it becomes easy to assume the Vedic text in a general form in which the science of grammar can have the necessary basis and own therefore the authoritative character like other *Smṛti* texts.

Further, we find clearly the important statement in the VĀJA-SANEYA BRĀHMANA which is useful in the precent context. "Tasmāt Brāhmaṇens na mlecchitavai Nāpabhāṣitavai; mleccho ha vā esa Yadapaśabdah" (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 3-2-1-23;) "Therefore a Brahmin should not use incorrect words and should not behave like a MLECCHA; for a corrupt word is a MLECCHA".¹

This Vedic injunction can evidently be deemed as the basis of the science of grammar and therefore the unreasonable attitude of the opponent in this regard only shows his prejudice against the grammatical discipline.

The fourth objection urged against grammar is that the science has no use whatsoever.

¹ vide: *Mīnāśā Kaustubha*, Ch. Ed. -1-3-8, p. 128, and *Śāstradipikā*, N. Ed. I-3-9; pp. 46-47.

But on closer examination it will be found that the science has got a noble and valuable purpose to serve. As explained before grammar imparts instruction on the correctness of words and by discriminating between right and wrong words renders the precious help in the avoidance of the corrupt words and the employment of the right forms. This again makes it easy for the speaker to obey the Vedic prohibition and injunction¹ resulting in the obtainment of the *Dharma* and prevention of *Adharma*. As observed before truth has a formal and a material aspect. Fidelity to form is as much essential as fidelity to matter. In other words, word and meaning, form and the content, are integral factors of truth and deviation from either involves infringement of the law of truthfulness. A wrong word is not often misleading and thus amounts to falsehood. Truthfulness was to be observed as the cardinal tenet by the Aryans of India. In Brāhmaṇical disciplines and code of ethics truth has been made the basis of religious life. Rāma suffered exile for the vindication of truth and so also the Pāṇḍavas. The Rājput princes of the mediaeval period could not break the pledge even with the barbarous invaders of India and not infrequently did they suffer from treachery. In Buddhist, Jaina and Sāṅkhya *yoga* systems AHIMŚA was made the basis and truth was given the next best position in ethics. But speaking and acting falsely were regarded as forms of breach of trust which were believed to be concomitants of falsehood. The emphasis, therefore, upon the linguistic correctness and accuracy seems to spring from a deeper ethical attitude than ordinarily understood now-a-days. It has also been stressed that intellectual error is indistinguishable from moral delinquency, as they proceed from the same attitude.

The oft-quoted statement of Kātyāyana *Lakato'* *rthaprayukte Śabdaprayoge Śāstrena Dharmaniyanamah* (*Paspasāñhnikā*) gives out the purpose of the science in unequivocal terms and this I have already explained in the course of the reply to the first objection.

As the *Śāstradīpikā* has put it the two-fold injunction — (1) “one should use only correct words” and (2) “only the forms ‘Go’ etc.

¹ (a) *Na mlechhitavai, Nāpabhāśitavai*
 (b) *Nānūtam Vadet*
 (c) *Satyam Vada*

are correct" — having necessarily opposite implication is expounded by grammar. And there the grammatical discipline serves to prepare the foundation of correct living. As far as the first injunction is concerned the science of grammar has its basis in the assumed Vedic text.¹ and in the prohibitive ŚRUTI.² With regard to the second restrictive injunction — *Gavādaya eva Sādhavah* — the authoritative-ness of the science is explained thus. When a corrupt form is used it is at once known and found out as such by the elderly people who have gained their knowledge of correct words and experience. They can therefore distinguish between one that was deemed as correct and used for a long time by the people at large, and the other that was not so regarded and used. As elderly people remained at all times, the grammarians, at the time of the enunciation of their grammatical rules, could have availed themselves of the necessary opinions of the persons advanced in age and superior knowledge and recorded the facts of words of the language in their grammar. They could not have had any bad motive behind and could not have deceived the public by giving false information, for the public could not have kept quiet but on the other hand they would have hooted out and exposed the grammarians instantaneously. In fact grammar can have its beginning and existence only as a Natural Science by recording the facts of the language. While speaking of the science of grammar very often Patañjali declares with loud voice "This science imparts instruction (only) with regard to those words that are found in current use".³ And those that are not so found are unhesitatingly rejected by him.⁴ Also he urges vigorously "We must watch carefully and know what kinds of words people use and in what senses".⁵ Similarly BHARTRŪHARI who follows closely in the footsteps of Patañjali asserts "The science of grammar deals only with such

¹ Vide: Śāstradīpikā, N. Ed. p. 46; and Mīmāṃsā Kaustbha Ch. Ed. 1-3-8; p.128.

² "Sādhubhireva Bhāṣitavyam" "Tasmāt Brāhmaṇena na mlecchitavai Nāpa-bhāṣitavai".

³ "Prayuktānāmida manvākhyānam"

⁴ "Anabhidhānāt na bhavati".

⁵ "Avaśyāḥ Lokāḥ Prsthato' nugantavyāḥ keśvartheśu laukikāḥ kān śabdān prayunjata iti" (1-2-64).

words as are used in the speech".¹

The grammarians, therefore, must have correctly recorded the right words and pointed out the incorrect ones that might have passed current. The subsequent writers on grammar could have easily derived their knowledge about correct words from the previous grammars (*Pūrvapūrvavyākaranāt*) and the tradition could have been thus handed down without a break. Grammar should accordingly be regarded as reliable for the restrictive injunction that "only the words 'Go' etc are correct and not 'GĀVī' etc.," because the science has its basis in the previous works. Thus grammar has the purpose of explaining two kinds of restrictions as pointed out by Pārthaśārathi and therefore the objection that 'the science has no use whatsoever' lacks substance and deserves to be rejected forthwith.

Having thus obviated the four objections I now proceed to show that the usages of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali are correct and certainly in conformity with the rules of grammar enunciated by them.

CORRECTNESS OF THE USAGES OF THE THREE SAGES

Here I have to observe that Kumārila who quoted in the course of the *Pūrvapakṣa* the usages for illustrating the so-called aberrations of the sages, did not touch upon them in the course of the conclusion. Khaṇḍadeva too, though he quoted them in the *Pūrvapakṣa* kept silent and did not care to explain the correctness of the usages. Pārthaśārathi did not quote them either for objection or for justification. It would have been better if Kumārila himself had shown the correctness. But he passed them over with reticence. Hence I feel called upon to give the justification thereof so that the usages complained of may not be mistaken to be ungrammatical.

PANINI

First of all the disputant has quoted Janikartuh *Prakrtih* and *Tatprayojako Hetuśca* and described them to be incorrect, as they did

¹ "Prayuktānān ca śabdānāmanvākhyānamidam satām". (*Vākyapadīya* — 3
kāṇḍa, *Vṛttisamu*. 560).

not seem to be conformable to the rules of Pāṇini himself. Let us see how far his position is correct and how well it stands the test.

Ā (1) It is said that the word *Jani* is to be derived from the root JAN-(*Janī-prādurbhāve*) by adding the suffix 'I' (IK) prescribed by the rule '*Ikśtipau Dhātunirdeśe*' and that it can, in accordance with the prescription, mean only the root JAN and not its sense *Utpatti* (origination). The mistake of Pāṇini is alleged to lie in his having used the term in the sense of *Utpatti* and therefore it is a violation of the rule '*Ikśtipau Dhātunirdeśe*'. But this only betrays the deplorable knowledge of the questioner. Amarasiṁha says clearly in the line—“*Janurjananajanmāti Janirutpatrirudbhavḥ*” that the word *Jani* is a synonym of *utpatti*. So no fault can be found with Pāṇini for having used the term *Janiḥ* in the sense of *Utpatti*. This word is derived from the root JAN by adding not the suffix 'IK' as supposed by the opponent but the suffix 'IN' of UNĀDI as prescribed by the rule *Janighasibhyā-miṇ* (Unādi—4—130), and the term derived in conformity with that rule presents no difficulty whatsoever in denoting the sense of '*Utpatti*'. So the apprehension of the opponent is baseless and unwarranted. As Amarasiṁha informed, the term in question has the necessary convention behind it, and there is no reason to prevent Pāṇini from using it in the popular sense approved by the eminent and distinguished authorities.

In this connection it is to be noted that the opponent charged Pāṇini with the violation of the rule '*Ikśtipau Dhātunirdeśe*'. Even a cursory examination of the facts will show that the opponent is not quite conversant with the real position of the rules of grammar. The rule in question was composed by KĀTYĀYANA who wrote his *Vārtikas* and added them to the *Aṣṭādhyāyi* of Pāṇini. Pāṇini preceded Kātyāyana and it is proved incontrovertibly by TH. Goldsticker that the writers could not have been contemporary and that there must have been an interval of many centuries of years between them. (vide. PĀNINI and His place in SANSKRIT LITERATURE, p. 122). So at the time when Pāṇini composed the rule '*Janikartuḥ*' etc. and used therein the term '*Jani*' in the sense of *Utpatti*, the rule '*Ikśtipau Dhātunirdeśe*' could not have been in existence and therefore there is no point in the argument that Pāṇini violated the

rule cited. My own doubt is that the opponent had mistaken the rule 'Ikṣtipau' etc. to have been composed by Pāṇini himself, when he charged the latter with using the term 'Jani' against the perscription Dātunirdeśe.

Here it may be argued that though the rule 'Ikṣtipau' etc. was not composed by Pāṇini, he seems to have the same idea as that of Kātyāyana in regard to the suffixes 'IK' and 'STIP' as he used them in other places in the very same sense prescribed by Kātyāyana. 'Careṣṭah' 'Stambakarṇayo Ramijapoh' Ajervyaghāñapoh' 'Asterbhūli' and a number of other Sūtras are examples in which Pāṇini makes use of the suffixes and the sense which Kātyāyana formulated many centuries after Pāṇini. From this we come to know that though Pāṇini did not give specific rule for the purpose yet he must have had the same opinion about those suffixes as that of Kātyāyana. When this is accepted, it may be argued that Pāṇini cannot be exonerated from the charge of violation of the grammatical law.

But we are required by Pāṇini to note one more point useful for the purpose at hand. Just as he uses the suffixes 'IK' & 'STIP' to denote the form of root (Dātunirdeśe), so he also uses the same to denote the meaning (action) of the root to which the suffix is added. For instance the rules 'Tena dīvyati' 'Carati' 'Tarati' may be noted in which he uses the suffix, and in which only the meaning of the root (action) is useful and not the form of the root. We must, therefore, know that according to Pāṇini the suffixes can be used to denote both the meaning and the form alike. Not only Pāṇini but also Kātyāyana, the very framer of the rule 'Ikṣtipau' etc., uses the suffix 'STIP' to denote the meaning (action) of the root (and not the form thereof) in 'Pṛchhatau Susnātādibhyah' (Sausnātikah) and 'Gacchatau Paradārādibhyah' (Pāradārikah) by which he makes us understand that the suffixes can be used to denote both meaning and the form equally. Under Pāṇini's rule 3-3-108 Nāgeśa rightly remarks —

Dhātvarthanirdeśepyetau Bāhulakāt, Tena 'Ikṣaternāśabdām' Āhau
Prabhūtādibhyah 'Gacchatau Paradārādibhyah' iti Prayogās sañ
gacchante'

In that case there is no harm even if we derive the word 'JANI' by

adding the suffix 'IK' prescribed by the rule '*Ikṣipau Dhātunirdeśe'* and the term can denote the meaning of the root, i.e.UTTPATTI—origination. So it does not matter whether it is derived by adding the suffix 'IK' of '*Ikṣipau* etc. or '*Iḥ*' of "*Janighasibhyām Iḥ*" and in both cases it can denote the intended meaning (UTPATTI) and therefore the charge brought by the opponent is neither supported by reason nor evidence.

Pāṇini was also impeached for having used the compound word, which is alleged to be erroneous according to his own rule *Trjakābhyaṁ Kartari*.

Before coming to the direct answer to this objection, we have to consider a very important point and I invite the attention of the scholars to the same.

Under 6-1-37 *Na Samprasāraṇe Samprasāraṇam* Patañjali says.¹

"The intention of the masters is conveyed by gestures, movements, winking of the eyes or by the framing of the big rules."

On this Nāgeśa says—².

These gestures, movements etc. are helpful as communicative of the intention only to those who could come in personal contact with the master. In his absence entailed by his demise it is only his words embodied in the rules that can possibly be the source of knowledge of the meaning intended by him.

From this it is evident that Pāṇini and other such sages who wrote their works, did not always give out their opinion in the form of specific rules, but also sometimes indicated their idea by some other means. The science of grammar dealing with infinitely innumerable words, cannot discharge its duty by means of specific rules to the fullest satisfaction, and cannot have the required perfection in that way. It is impossible to deal with all the points necessary by means of specific mentioning, and that was why Pāṇini and others had recourse to ĀKRTIGANAS—illustrative word-groups comprising

¹ *Ia Ingitena, Ceṣṭitena, Niśiṣṭena, Mahatā vā Sūtraprabandhenā Ācāryānām Abhīṣṭiprāye Gamyate*

² *Ete Pratyakṣe Ācārye Tadabhiprāyagamakāḥ. Prakerte tu tādrśasūtrocāraṇameva Tādṛśarthaḥ śyakam Ācāryatātparyam Gamayati tyarthāḥ.*

an indefinite number of words and leaving room for such words as may have to be included therein later on. For the same reason they had also resorted to generous prescriptions like 'Bahulam' 'Ekeśām' and so on and so forth.

Under 6-3-14 Patañjali demands us to remember one important fact. "Mere general rules of grammar will not be of any use and a detailed list of all individual words is impossible. We must, therefore, necessarily take the help of 'Bahulam' etc. This Pāṇinian science is useful for all the Vedas and the classical language. Just as the Vedas contain peculiar expressions and usages, so also the science, which is subsidiary to them, has different methods for discharging its duty. There mere one method or the other will not serve the purpose."¹

When the specific mention of a particular form or meaning or grammatical operation is omitted, PĀṄINI accomplishes it by means of indication of some kind or other. Just as the specific rules of PĀṄINI are valuable for the purpose of determining the correctness of words, so also his indications. The indications hold good in the same way and with the same weight as the express statements do. If there be any contradiction between these two (indication and specific rule,) then both of them, being equally strong and weighty, take effect optionally. The maxim of the *Mīmāṃsā*—'Tulyabalavirodhe Vikalpah'—"Two contradictory texts (either of Śruti or Smṛti) of equal strength are regarded as optionally authoritative applies to our grammar also.

Bearing this fact in our mind, let us now see how far the view of the opponent is correct. The opponent said that 'use of the compound word, 'Janikartuh,' by Pāṇini involves an infringement of the rule *Trjakābhyaṁ* etc.' His contention is that 'the former is only an Ācāra or practice or usage, whereas the latter is a *Smṛti* it being a rule of the science of grammar.' The *Sūtra* 'Janikartuh etc.' is intended only for prescribing the Ablative case, and it has nothing to do with compounding of words, and therefore it is not a *Smṛti* as far as the compoun-

¹ "Kevalam laksanam kevalah prapanco vā na tathā kārakam bhavati; Avāśyam khalyasmābhīridam vaktavyam Bahulam, Anyatarasyām Ubhayathā, Ekeśām Iti. Sarvavedapāriṣadām hi Idam sāstram; Tatra Naikah Panthāś Śakya-āsthātum".

ding is concerned. But the rule '*Trijakābhyaṁ* etc' is directly connected with 'compounding' prescribed by a general rule. So, for the purpose of compounding, the latter (*Trijakābhyaṁ* etc.) is a rule and a *Smṛti*; the former is only an *ācāra* usage. According to the *Mīmāṁsā* maxim the *Smṛti* overrides the usage (*Smṛtir ācāram bādhate*) and therefore, the use of '*Janikartuh*' cannot be taken as authoritative for justification of the compound. Thus as it infringes the *Smṛti*, the compound word is ungrammatical. This is the argument of the opponent.

In fact, according to the declaration of Patañjali, which I have already explained, the masters convey their intention by different ways, and as the context is one of the words, the usage of Pāṇini also should be taken to deal with the correctness of words whenever necessary. So the usage of Pāṇini is to be regarded, in the context of correctness of words, as a *Smṛti* and not as a mere blind custom as supposed by the *Pūrvapakṣin*. Thus, the usage of Pāṇini in question being a *Smṛti* should have the optional authoritative character, in accordance with the well-known maxim of *Mīmāṁsā* — '*Tulyabalirodhe Vikalpaḥ*' (texts of equal strength, are both optionally authoritative) and therefore the compounding of a word in genitive case with another ending in 'TRC' or 'AKA' becomes grammatically correct, as indicated by the use '*Janikartuh*' of Pāṇini. The result is that the usage of *Janikartuh* and *Tatprayojakah* by PĀNINI cannot be said to be ungrammatical.

It is admitted on all hands that grammar depends on the practical usage of words. Not only Pāṇini, but also Kātyāyana and Patañjali make use of this expression in '*Jātivācakatvāt*' and '*Guṇiviśeṣakah*' respectively. When all the three sages showed the usage it must have the support of a rule of a grammatical nature, which (rule) for some reason or other did not find a specific and outspoken mentioning in the work of PĀNINI. Under 1-4-12 Kaiyaṭa rightly remarks on '*Guṇiviśeṣaka*' of Patañjali — '*Ata eva vacanāt anityah saṁsthīsamāsapratisedhalī*'. The prohibition of *saṁsthīsamās* in question is by '*Trijakābhyaṁ Kartari*'.

By the expression '*Anityah*' Kaiyaṭa means that it is not universal but subject to exception and this lends support to my opinion explained above. Therefore the usages '*Janikartuh*', '*Tatprayojakah*' and '*Jativā-*

'cakatvāt' are grammatically and practically correct, and the objection of the opponent is not founded on facts.

By the explanation of the compound word *Janikartuh* of PĀNINI the correctness of 'Tatprayojakāḥ' of Kātyāyana also becomes explained. So Kātyāyana is saved from the first attack. Let us now consider his other uses.

It is said that the word *ānyabhāvyam* is not correct inasmuch as the *Taddhita* suffix cannot be applied.

I need not take much pains for its justification. The group Brāhmaṇādi of Guṇavacanabrahmaṇādibhyah is an Ākṛtigāṇa and the word Anyabhāva finds a safe place in it as shown by Kāśikākāra and others. The suffix *ṣyañ* can easily be added to it and the word *ānyabhāvya* will simply denote the meaning of *Anyabhāva*. This is known as 'Svārthaṣyañanta'; the word is analogous to Cāturvarṇya which means only *Catvāro Varṇāḥ*. *Anyabhāva* is a genitive-Tatpuruṣa and means the quality of being different' (*Anyasya bhāvah — Anyatvam*). Kaiyatā explains the same in another way also. He takes the word *bhāva* in the sense of *vastu* an entity, and thereafter adds the suffix *ṣyañ* in the usual sense of 'Tasya Bhāvah' — 'its quality'. In both ways it is correct and I quote here the words of Kaiyatā for the sake of easy reference. Under 5-2-59 he says —

'Anyasya Bhāvah — Anyabhāval, Anyabhāva eva Ānyabhāvyam Brāhmaṇādiṣu Pratipadapāthāt Svārthe ṣyañ. Athavā anyo bhāvah (Anyabhāvah — Karmadhārayah) Anyat vastu; Tasya Bhāvah (Bhāve ṣyañ) Ānyabhāvyam — Anyavastutvam Ityarthah'. Under 5-1-124 Tattvabodhinī has an interesting para on this point.

Brāhmaṇīdirākṛtigāṇa iti. Keṣāñcit (śabdānām) Pāṭhastu Kāryāntarāya; Tathā hi — Arhato nūmiceci Numarthah Pāṭhah. Ekabhāva — Tribhāva-Anyabhāva-Eṣāñ Pāṭhah Svārthe Vidhānāḥ — ah. Tathāca Pratyāhārālinike Vārtika Prayogah — Ānyabhāvyanītu Kālaśabdavyavāyāt Iti. Anyabhāva eva Ānyabhāvyam; Anyavastutvam Ityarthah. Yattu Vyākaranādhikaraṇe Bhaṭṭapādair uktam 'Ānyabhāvyamapapravayoga iti, Tattu Avaiyākaraṇamāṁśakasantoṣārthamityavadheyam.'

It is thus clear that *Ānyabhāvya* of Kātyāyana is grammatically right, and therefore the opinion of the opponent is wrong and deserves to be rejected.

I now proceed to the usages of Patañjali who was also made a victim of the onslaughts of the *Pūrvapakṣin*.

It is stated that the word *Aviravikanyāyena* of Patañjali contains a grammatical deviation, because the elision of the Nominative termination in the first part of the *Dvandva* compound, which is compulsory, is omitted.

The author of the *Nyāyasudhā*, the commentary on *Tantravārtika* says that the quotation *Aviravikanyāyena* is from the *Mahābhāṣya*, under the rule *Karmaṇyāṇ* (3-2-1) (vide N.S. Ch. ed. P. 275). But it is not available there and it is found under 4-1-88 and some other rules. The full sentences run thus —

'Tatra Dvayośabdāyos Samānārthakayorekena Vigrahāḥ, Aparasmādutpattir Bhaviṣyati 'Aviravikanyāyena'. Tadyathā Avermāniśamiti vigṛhya, Avikāśabdādutpattirbhavatyāvikamiti. E�am Pañcasu kapāleśu saṁskṛta iti Vigṛhya 'Pañcakapāla'iti Bhavati. Pañcakapalyāmiti Vigṛhya Vākyameva Bhaviṣyati.,'

"When there are two words of equal meaning, we shall have the *Vigrahavānya* or dissolution, with the help of one word, but the suffix will take place after the other according to the maxim of '*Aviravikanyāyā*'. We have the dissolution as '*Avermāniśam*', but the suffix will take place after the word *Avika*, resulting in the form *Āvikam*. In the same manner, we shall have the *Vigraha* as '*Pañcasu Kapāleśu Saṁskṛtah*', (Prepared in five *Kapālas*-earthern vessels) and the final form will be as *Pañcakapālam* (by adding the suffix 'AN' which is dropped by *Dvigorlughanapatye*). If we have the *Vigraha* as *pañcakapalyām saṁskṛtah* (Prepared in a group of five vessels) then there will be one form."

Kaiyatā explains the word in two ways. According to him '*aviravikanyāyena*' may be two words *avir-avikanyāyena* or one compound word which contains a quotation of the part of a sentence. In the first case the question of eliding the Nominative termination 'R' does not arise at all. In the second method also, the 'R' of 'AVIR' cannot be elided. The idea is this. It is only a quotation of the exact wording 'AVIR' the part of the sentence '*aviravikāśabdadvāreṇa pratyayamutpādayati*'. The verbal quotation will stand for and denote the conglomoration of letters 'AVIR' of the sentence cited. So, the

suffix 'S' will be added to it i.e. 'avirs'; then we shall have the DVANDVA compound with the word 'avika'; thereafter the the genitive-tatpuruṣa, thus bringing the final form as 'aviravikanyāyena'. In the dvandva compound the ending 'S' of 'avirs' will be elided and not the 'R', for it is only the part of the quotation and not the termination of the first part of the compound. According to this explanation the dissolution of the compound will be 'avir(s) ca,—avikś ca tayorṇyāyah, tena. There the difficulty will be that Nyāya or maxim does not belong to the inflected form 'AVIR' as the compound word denoted. Kaiyatā himself was perhaps conscious of this defect, and that was why, not being fully satisfied with that explanation he states at the end 'athavā Bhāṣyakāravacanapramāṇyādasya sādhutvam'. Introducing this sentence of Kaiyatā, Nāgeśa remarks 'Nyāyasya prathamānte pade na viṣaya ityarucerāha Bhāṣyakāreti'. To avoid this difficulty, we can go a step farther than Kaiyatā and get an easier explanation.

We can have the form 'Aviravika' (and not 'Avir' alone) as quotation from the sentence 'aviravikāśabddvāreṇa pratyayamutpādayati, Then with the quotation 'AVIRAVIKA' we shall have a compound (*Madhyamapadalopī Samāsaḥ*) in which the final word of the first part is dropped like aviraviketi padam-aviravikapadam 'aviravikādikam', or 'aviravikaghatitam' vākyam-aviravikavākyam (here-ādika or ghatita is dropped), aviravikavākyasya (pratipādyo) nyāyah aviravikavākyanyāyah. Here again by eliding the word vākya, similarly, we get the form 'aviravikanyāyah'. The 'aviravikanyāyah' is a succinct expression for 'aviravikāśabdadvāreṇa pratyayamutpādayatītvākyapratipādyo nyāyah'.

The maxim of method which is explained by the sentence which contains or begins with 'Aviravika' is succinctly called 'Aviravikanyāyah'. Such expressions containing quotations as this are not rare in Sanskrit literature.

2. Under 2-2-24 Patañjali uses 'agnaukaravāṇinyyāyena'. 'Agnau karavāṇi havīḥ' is the complete sentence of which the first two words are imitated and the compound word 'agnaukaravāṇinyyāyena' is derived therefrom. Here Kaiyata says — Agnau Karavāṇi iti yad vākyam tadanukarāṇametat", whereupon Nāgeśa comments "Evaṁca tadviṣayo

nyāya iti madhyamapadalopī samasaḥ". Here the locative ending of "AGNAU" is not dropped.

3. 'Asyavāmiyam sūktam' is a well-known expression. The hymn begining with 'asya vāmasya palitūī' is mimicked and hence the form 'asyavāmiyam'. Here also the genetive ending "SYA" of 'ASYA' is not elided.

It is thus clear that the whole usage of 'AVIRAVIKA' (not 'AVIR' alone) is only a quotation of words and does not stand for any compound. So the objection based on the supposition of a compounded form is wide of the mark.

C (2) 'Anyathā kṛtvā coditam, anyathā kṛtvā phrihāraī' is another usage of Patañjali, instanced by the opponent. He said that Patanjali should have used 'ANYATHĀKĀRAM' instead of 'ANYATHĀ-KRTVĀ'. "Atra anyathaivāṅkathamiththam ityanvākhyātāsādhutvo'pi-namul na prayuktah" is the assertion of the Pūrvapakṣin. The demand herein made is vague, and betrays the wavering mind of the opponent. The suffix 'KTVĀ' prescribed by 'Samānakartṛkayoh pūrvakāle' is general and the suffixes 'NAMUL' etc. are exceptions to it. It being the case, I am not able to ascertain the definite opinion of the questioner. Does he think (1) that, the NAMUL, being an exception, should supersede the 'KTVĀ' compulsorily? Or

(2.) does he mean that though the NAMUL is an exception optionally, and though KTVĀ can be used, yet Pantanjali should have used NAMUL alone?

It is absurd to compel one to use a particular form alone, when the other form is also grammatically correct. The second presumption is tantamount to absurdity.

The first presumption is also wrong; for the NAMUL is not an exception to be observed compulsorily. The Paribhāṣā 'Vāsarupo 'striyām' declares it to be an exception optionally.

Haradatta the commentator on Kāśikā, says under 3-4-28, 'evaih ca kṛtvā purvasutre pi (in the Sutra anyath) pena kṛtvā bhavati. Bhāṣye 'pi tatra tatra prayujyate anyathākṛtvā coditam, anyathākṛtvā parihāraī ityādi',

Bhaṭṭoji in Praudhāmanoramā and Mādhabacārya in Dhātuvṛtti also declare that the NAMUL is optional. So, the usage anyathākṛtvā of

Patañjali is as correct as 'anyathākāram', and the objection of the opponent is therefore inspired by imperfect understanding of the rule.

I have thus vindicated Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali by showing that their usages are entirely flawless. The authority of the science of grammar therefore remains unshaken and the science stands vindicated as reliable a source of valid knowledge as any other science would be, and this is in conformity with the standpoint of not only the exponents of the science of grammar but also the *Mīmāṃsā*s headed by KUMĀRILA and the *Naiyāyikas* with JAYANTABHATTA at the vanguard. The later maxim, sponsored by the subsequent writers of the *Nyāya* school that 'every expression is correct if it is expressive enough and the rules of grammar are only the obsession of pretenders to scholarship without logical sense' is only a device of escapism. The funny adage "We logicians are concerned only with the meaning and have the scantiest regard for the linguistic forms which will take care of themselves" is not to be endorsed by serious students. The adage in Sanskrit is couched in words which are instances of absurd solecisms ¹. In the field of scholarship logic cannot be independent of formal correctness. The content is expressed in linguistic form and the unsoundness of the latter must affect the purity of the former. Whatever be the ultimate metaphysical differences regarding forms and contents, word and meaning, the intimate relation between them cannot be impugned even by the boldest free-lance who makes an apotheosis of empiricism. This has been laid down in the first *Vārtika* by KĀTYĀYANA as the fundamental principle. Though grammar is mainly concerned with the linguistic form and logic with meaning conveyed by it, the two disciplines must swim or sink together.

¹ "Asmākūsām Naiyāyikesām arthani tātparyam sabdani kościntā".

VIJNAPTIMATRATASIDDHI

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VIJÑAPTI MĀTRATĀ SIDDHI

VIMŠATIKĀ of Vasubandhu

Verse—I

All this World-show is nothing but a manifestation of consciousness and has no reality apart and aloof from consciousness, pure and simple. The things that appear as contents of consciousness are absolutely unreal. That is to say these phenomena have no objective status and are merely subjective ideas. The whole world of appearance has no better status than the hallucinations of a man of diseased vision, who sees a tuft of hair or doublemoon and so on and so forth.

Verse I (Exposition)

In Mahāyāna systems the entire universe, which is divided into three spheres of existence in Orthodox Budhist tradition called (1) *Kāmadhātu*—the sphere of desire, (2) *rūpadhātu*—the sphere of form and colour, and (3) *arūpadhātu*—the sphere of formless and colourless beings, is affirmed to be of the stuff of consciousness, and nothing else. This conclusion is confirmed by a dictum (*sūtra*) believed to embody the assertion of the Buddha himself. The dictum runs as follows : “O sons of the Jina (Victor) that which is said to be divided into three spheres of existence, i.e, the whole universe, is nothing but *citta*—consciousness”. The word *citta* is synonymous with such other words as *Manas*, *Vijñāna* and *Vijñapti*. All these words mean consciousness and nothing else. ‘Consciousness’ in the present context includes also the derivative psychical phenomena associated with it (*sasamprayoga*). The expression ‘nothing but’ (*mātra*) in the dictum quoted, is used advisedly for the negation of objective reals.

Verse—II

If consciousness were to be entirely independent of objective reality, determination in respect of space and time and the absence of determination in respect of percipient individuals (literally consciousness-continua) and also accomplishment of physical acts and their pragmatic consequence would not be capable of a rational explanation.

Verse-II (Exposition)

It is urged by the opponent that this denial of objective reality would involve the aforesaid difficulties. The contention of the realist emphasizes these consequences. If there can be a cognition of material body (*rūpa*) without there being anything material corresponding to it in the objective plane, then how can you explain the spatio-temporal determinations of experienced objects? An experience is found to occur in a particular space, and not indiscriminately everywhere; and in that space also it occurs only occasionally and not for all times. Again such experience occurs to all the individuals that happen to be there, and not to a particular individual (which ought to have been the case, if it were only an erroneous experience). If all experiences were to be dismissed as hallucinations, which purely subjective experiences devoid of objective control are found to be, why should then the hallucinatory experiences of a tuft of hair and the like by a person suffering from defects of vision should occur to that individual alone and not others? Furthermore, the tuft of hair or the bees and so on experienced by a man of diseased vision, are found to be incapable of discharging the functions of the real hair, etc. But that does not argue that really objective bees and hair do not exist or exercise their pragmatic efficiency. Certainly such objects as are experienced by normal persons do exist and produce real consequences. It is extreme perversion to tar them with the same brush and condemn them as hallucinations irrespective of the difference of their pragmatic functions and results. The hair of hallucination has no use whereas a real hair has. In dreams we see food, drink, cloth, poison, and so on; but they are not found to give pragmatic satisfaction which the food and drink of normal experience afford. A glass of water seen in dream does not allay thirst, nor does such food satisfy hunger. The dreamed poison does not kill and the dreamed sword does not cut. But the food, drink and the sword normally experienced do produce these consequences. The town appearing in the clouds does not provide actual accommodation, but this does not mean that the town and palaces seen in normal experience should also be equally deceptive appearances. It follows, therefore, that on the denial of objective reals, the spatio-temporal determination of experienced things, the want of restriction of identical

experience to one identical person, in other words the common experience of a large number of individuals and pragmatic satisfaction afforded by the experienced objects cannot be susceptible of a rational explanation.

It is not a fact that these do not admit of a rational explanation.

Verse—III

So far as spatio-temporal determination is concerned this can be explained on the analogy of dream-experience., and as regards the want of limitation of percipients that also is capable of explanation on the analogy of the experience of rivers of pus and the like by departed spirits residing in hell.

Verse—III (Exposition)

In dream though there are not any bee, garden, women, or men and the like existing in reality (independent of the dreamer), still these are experienced and that again in a determinate place and not everywhere. These again are observed in their place of occurrence at a determinate time and not for all times. This shows that spatio-temporal determination is possible even in the absence of real objective facts. As regards the absence of the limitation to a particular individual that also can be accounted for on the analogy of the experience of the departed spirits, when they all without restriction see rivers of pus and the like in hell. A large number of these departed spirits, who have done similar misdeeds and have arrived at the stage of the fruition of such acts, experience without any restriction in hell such phenomena as a river of pus in spate passing by them. This experience is not confined to one individual but shared by all. They also likewise come across rivers of urine and ordure under the surveillance of guards brandishing clubs and swords. This demonstrates the fact that the lack of limitation of experiences and the fact that they are shared by a community of percipients does admit of a rational explanation, even if there be no external objects to determine the experiences.

As for the performance of the physical acts it does not also presuppose the existence of actual objects. The experience of sexual commerce and the discharge of the seminal fluid, though there is no actual contact between persons of opposite sexes, can be cited as an instance in

support. Likewise for the fourfold determination of space, time, act etc., other examples can also be adduced to show that the objective existence is not a necessary condition.

Verse—IV

The performance of the so-called physical acts is explainable on the analogy of nervous irritation (and its result) in dream. All determinations are capable of explanation on the analogy of hell where all the denizens see the guards of hell and so on and experience the torture inflicted by them.

Verse—IV (Exposition)

The actualization of the physical activities is capable of explanation on the analogy of nervous irritation in dream. As the actualization of the interruption of the dream occurs in the shape of the discharge of semen even without the union of a couple, so in the same fashion the spatio-temporal determination and other phenomena cited in the fourfold condition can be shown to be possible on the basis of other instances. And every thing again becomes actualized on the analogy of hell. The expression 'on the analogy of hell' implies 'as in the hell'. How is it rendered possible ? It is on a par with the perception of the guardians of hell and the like and also the infliction of punishment by them. For instance, in the hell the perception of the guardians of the hell and so on by the hell-spirits takes place in compliance with the law of spatio-temporal determination. The mention of the expression 'so on' refers also to the perception of the appearance and the disappearance of hell-hounds, crows, iron hills and the like. And this act of perceiving occurs in all and not in an individual alone. The infliction of torture upon them by those beings is possible even on the unreality of the guardians of the hell and the like owing to the predominance of the result of their own identical *karman*. Likewise it is to be understood that in other places also all these four issues viz. the limitation of time and space and the like (absence of limitation in an identical continuum, and the causal efficiency) can be assumed to take place with perfect plausibility. (in the absence of objective facts)

Verse—V

There is no possibility of animals of lower order in hell, though

they are actual inhabitants of heaven. And so also of the departed souls, since they do not feel the torment and torture originating from it (hell).

Verse—V (Exposition)

What, again, is the ground that these guardians of the hell, those very hell-hounds and the crows are not regarded as actual denizens of the region ? The answer is that the supposition is not amenable to reason. It is not possible that they are hell-born, since they do not feel the torment and torture in the same way as the hell-spirits do. In the event of mutual persecution the normal order that 'these are hellish-beings' and 'these are the guardians of the hell' would not hold good.

Besides if the denizens of the hell possessed of similar stature, size and strength, were supposed to torment one another, that would not account for the terror produced by these inflictions. It is not supposable that creatures, who are liable to suffer the unbearable pain of burning sensation in the red-hot iron furnace in the hell, should be commissioned to inflict similar pain on others. If on the contrary they are immune from such pain and thus not condemned to suffer in hell, how could these people be possibly born there? [The conclusion seems to be irresistible that these tormentors in hell are rather pure phantasms with no real constitution and local habitation.]

As for the animals of the lower order (birds and beasts) who are actually born in heaven by dint of meritorious acts which are capable of producing the pleasure and happiness that can possibly be enjoyed in those regions of blissful existence, they are regarded as real inhabitants of those realms, because they do experience the happiness proper to the regions concerned. But the guardians of the hell and the like are not supposed to suffer the pain and misery of hellish existence. It is therefore reasonable to infer that these lower animals or the so-called guardians of the hell are not real creatures.

Verse—VI

If it be supposed that it is by means of their (of the hell-citizens) *Karman* that living organisms are begotten there in the hell, which develop diverse activities, then why is it not conceived that they are the products of the diseased mentality of the hellish creatures ?

Verse—VI (Exposition)

It may be supposed that it is due to the power of the evil deeds of the spirits condemned to hell that there come into existence in the hell creatures endowed with awe-inspiring colour, shape, size and strength, who are designated as the guardians of hell and the like. These creatures are so evolved as are observed to make various postures such as waving their arms in such a manner as to strike terror. Likewise it is experienced by the denizens of the hell that hills assuming the shape of combatant rams move forward and backward and also the thorns in the silk-cotton trees made of iron move downward and upward in order to rouse feelings of abject terror and pain. It is not the fact that they are not real existents in these regions.

This supposal does not commend itself. Instead of supposing that these beings are actually created by dint of the evil deeds of the hellish creatures, it is quite legitimate to suppose them to be the phantoms of the diseased mentality of these unfortunate creatures. There is no logical necessity behind the creation of these actual beings.

Verse—VII

Furthermore, the active predisposition (*vāsanā*) of the acts (good or bad) is stored up in one place and its results are supposed to emerge in another. What is the reason that the result is not posited to occur in the place in which the active predisposition (i.e. the cause of it) is in deposit?

Verse—VII (Exposition)

Moreover, the emergence of the beings (hell-guards and the like) and also their future development (activities) are assumed to occur by force of the acts of the hellish creatures. But the Karmic predisposition is evidently deposited in the psychical continuum of the condemned persons and not elsewhere. It passes one's understanding why the results (viz. the hell-guards and other tormentors) are not posited in the very place where the predisposition is in existence. Why are the results not regarded as the direct developments of the psyche? The law of causation presupposes that cause and effect should take place in the same spatio-temporal continuum. What is the reason that leads the realists to suppose that the result of the predisposi-

tion occurs in a place in which its cause (viz. the predisposition) is absent ?

[The contention of the idealist is that there can be no real beings who are supposed to function as the guardians and superintendents of the hell and the same is the case with the so-called beasts and birds which are supposed to carry out the orders of the officers. It is by means of these beasts and birds that punishment is inflicted upon the sinners condemned to hell-life. The idealist contends that the experience of these creatures is nothing but a phantasmagoria. These officers of the hell cannot be supposed to be condemned creatures, because they are not the victims of the sufferings of hell life. They are rather agents and instruments. If they were also supposed to suffer like the sinners, it would be difficult to account for the difference in their roles, one class acting as functionaries, and another as the victims of their torture. It is again preposterous to suppose that these persecuting officers are born there to enjoy the deserts of their good and pious deeds in their past life. So these must be the phantasms created by the mentality of the condemned people. But the opponent points to the analogous instance of the existence of creatures of lower order in heaven. There are heavenly birds and beasts who serve as the agents or instruments of catering to the happiness of the denizens of heaven. If these creatures can be accepted as real beings, one should not take exception to the existence of analogous beings in hell. This contention is dismissed by Vasubandhu as based on pointless analogy. The creatures of the lower order in heaven are born there in order to enjoy the fruits of their meritorious deeds in the past life and in this they are on a level with the blessed persons who enjoy their domicile in the happy regions.

The case of the denizens of hell, the tormentors and tormented, is different. The tormentors are destined neither to suffer pain, nor to enjoy bliss and their task is entirely thankless. So these are nothing but creatures of the muddled imagination of the sufferers in hell. And Vasubandhu makes capital out of the unreality of these creatures in support of his subjective idealism. It might be equally plausible to imagine that the so-called heavenly creatures are also unreal phantasms. But this cannot be endorsed even by the idealist as this chain of argu-

ments would make the reality of other individuals equally subjective and imaginary. In one word this will lead to solipsism which is a difficult position even for the idealist.

The appeal to the law of causation that cause and effect must be coincident may help the idealist in dismissing the objective existence of the officers of hell and the like. But it is difficult to ignore the tendency of the idealist's argument to solipsism. This question was tackled by Dharmakīrti in his work *Santānāntarasiddhi*. Dharmakīrti contends that the idealist's insistence on the substantial identity of consciousness and content does not commit him to the denial of other subjects. But his arguments are pragmatic and empirical.

It is a curious event in philosophical thought that solipsism has been justified as a philosophical tenet. Prakāśānandasaravatī of the 15th century, is a staunch adherent of Vedantic monism. He has however adopted the dictum of Dharmakīrti, viz., the identity of consciousness and its content (*sahopalambhaniyama*) and ultimately arrives at solipsism as the legitimate conclusion. This doctrine is called *Ekajīvavāda*. Prakāśānanda seems to be more consistent and faithful to the fundamental dictum of idealism than others.]

But the supposition of the separate occurrence of the cause and effect in different loci is necessitated by a statement in the scripture. If consciousness were possessed only of the image of the matter etc. and the latter were not real existents, then the Lord would not have affirmed the existence of the bases such as matter and the rest. This affirmation would be entirely devoid of a logical necessity (if the idealist's contention were true.) The answer to this objection is given below.

The fact that the Lord has affirmed the existence of the matter and the like as bases cannot be made the ground of their objective reality. For—

Verse—VIII

The assertion of the existence of matter and the like as bases is motivated by a deep purpose for the edification of those disciples (who have an ingrained belief in them). It is on a par with the assertion regarding beings born without conception in the mother's womb.

Verse—VIII (Exposition)

The Lord has asserted “There is a class of beings who are born without physical contact of parents.” There is a deep intention behind this utterance, viz. that the continuum of (personal) consciousness is not snapped in its subsequent career.

Such assertions cannot be understood in their literal significance, because there is the express and definite counter-assertion, “There is no individual or soul. All these entities are brought into being by causes and conditions.” In the same way the existence of bases such as matter (*rūpa*) and the like has been affirmed by the Lord. That assertion also is possessed of a hidden implication, as they are addressed to persons who are to be edified by the discourse.

What is that hidden implication ?

Verse—IX

Since there are the two conditions, viz. the one which forms the proper cause (seed) of the cognition, and the other its content, this two-fold condition has been asserted as the two bases by the Sage.

Verse—IX (Exposition)

What is the upshot of this? The root-cause (viz. the predisposition which gives rise to the cognition of matter after having attained a state of development—(1) this (root-cause) and (2) the content which determines its structure, have been respectively described as the two-fold basis—the subjective, as the organ of sight, and the objective, as colour-matter. This also holds good in the case of other sense perceptions up to the sense of touch and its object. The developed predisposition which is the seed, as it were, of tactful perception and the content of it, which determines its structure and is felt as tactile substance, form respectively the two-fold basis—viz. the organ of touch and the object of tactful perception. This is the implication, (and it has no reference to the extra-mental and independent existence of the two conditions).

Verse—X

In this manner access is got into the nothingness of the individual selves, and instruction in the other way (i.e. instruction on the sole

reality of consciousness) is for the entrance into the nothingness of things through the medium of its imaginary character.

Verse—X (Exposition)

What, again, is the merit of imparting instruction with a hidden implication in this fashion ? Because thus instructed the disciples are enabled to realize and enter into the nothingness of the individual self. The six varieties of consciousness proceed from the two-fold base. There is not a permanent being as a seer. Such is the case with the percipient of the mental cognition. By knowing this those who have rendered themselves fit for receiving the instruction regarding the nothingness of the individual self, find access into the truth of the unreality of the individual subject. The other instruction has a reference to the reality of consciousness alone. How is the entrance into the nothingness of things rendered possible ? It is by realizing that this is merely consciousness which comes into existence in the form of colour and the like, and there is no such thing as of the nature of colour. If the objects do not exist in any conceivable way and they are all of the stuff of pure consciousness, why should not they be declared to be non-existent straightway ? (Or how and by what *modus operandi* do you establish the thesis that external objects do not exist ?) The answer is that the realization of the unreality of external objects is not capable of being effected by the mere assertion that the things have no existence. This truth is realized only by way of apprehension of the unreality of the character in which they are apprehended. The nature of things imagined as cognizable and cognizer and the like by the unenlightened is declared to be false and unreal.

The instruction has no reference to the nature of the pure *Nairātmya* which is the object of the realization of the enlightened ones and does not lend itself to verbal characterization. Likewise consciousness as such is realized to be incapable of being known as a content by another consciousness. By the realization of pure consciousness (as devoid of subject-object polarization) the essencelessness of all entities is capable of being realized. This cannot be done by mere repudiation of their existence. Otherwise a consciousness might be supposed to be cognizant of another consciousness as its content and so the truth of pure

consciousness would not be established, since it is undeniable that (empirical) consciousness has necessarily an objective reference.

[N.B. Empirical consciousness has a necessary objective reference and even if the external object be known to be unreal the reality of the idea of the object as its content will remain uncancelled. But content distinct from consciousness is only an imaginary construction.]

But how is it to be understood that the Lord affirmed the existence of *rūpāyatana* (matter and the like), with this intention and not that these things exist in reality and become the objects of different cognitions ?

Because—

Verse—XI

That (external object) cannot be an indivisible unit, nor can it be a manifold of atoms, nor can it possibly be a conglomoration of the atoms, since the atoms *per se* are not capable of being established as real entities.

Verse—XI (Exposition)

What is meant is this. The external matter such as colour, taste and the like, which appear to be the objects of their relevant cognitions, may be regarded as one indivisible unit after the *Vaiśeṣikas* who posit the existence of *one* whole (apart from the constituent elements); or it may be supposed that they are a manifold of atoms; thirdly, they may be a mere conglomeration of these very atoms combined in different ways. Now the external object cannot be one indivisible unit (as supposed by the *Vaiśeṣikas*), since a unitary whole is never perceived apart and aloof from the constituent parts. Neither can it be supposed to be a manifold of atoms, because atoms *per se* are incapable of being perceived. (A manifold of atoms is nothing but many atoms and an atom being imperceptible *per se*, a plurality of atoms will also have the same character). Nor can it be supposed that these atoms coalesce with one another and thus become the object of perception, inasmuch as an atom as a substantive unit is not capable of being established as a real.

Why is it not capable of being established ? For the following reasons :—

Verse—XII

If it be the hypothesis that an atom combines with six other atoms at one and the same time, it must be conceded that an atom is possessed of six facets. And if on the other hand the six atoms combined with it in one and the same unit of space, a material body will have the dimension of an atom (and not more).

Verse—XII (Exposition)

If it is supposed that six different atoms from six different points of space (east, west, north, south, above and below) combine with an atom, then the latter, it has to be admitted, must possess different parts. The point of space which is occupied by one atom will not be allowed to provide accommodation for another. If, on the other hand, it be supposed that the locus of one will also be the locus of all the six, then all the atoms will occupy one point of space and in consequence the mass formed by them will have the magnitude of one atom (and not anything in excess). And the consequence will be that the mass formed will not be visible on account of the complete merger and loss of difference from one another.

It is however contended by the *Vaibhāṣikas* of Kāśmīra that atoms surely cannot come into conjunction because they are bereft of parts. So the allegation of this absurdity has no *raisen d'etre*. But these atoms when brought into a collocation do combine with one another by way of conjunction. They are to be confronted with this question in view of the fact that a collocation of atoms is not anything numerically different from the atoms.

Verse—XIII

The conjunction of an atom being ruled out as an impossibility, the collocation of the same (also being not different from the constituent atoms), what can this conjunction appertain to ? Nor can it be maintained that the impossibility of the conjunction is due to the absence of parts (of the atoms).

Verse—XIII (Exposition)

If it be that even in the state of collocation they do not coalesce together, then it cannot be said that the coalescence is not possible due

to the lack of the component parts of the atoms. Because coalescence has not been conceded to even of a collocation possessed of constituent parts. So an atom cannot be an indivisible thing whether coalescence of the atom is desired or not ?

Verse—XIV

That which is susceptible of differentiation in terms of the spatial divisions (points of compass) cannot logically be affirmed to be possessed of an (indivisible) unity. How can there be distribution of light and shade and also coverture? If again the body (supposed to be formed by the atoms) be not numerically different, these two phenomena (viz. (1) light and shade,—(2) and coverture) cannot be accounted for by reference to the body also.

Verse—XIV (Exposition)

The eastern direction of an atom is different from (other such directions) including the lowermost region (which demarcates it from the bottom). An atom being thus susceptible of spatial differentiation, how can this differentiation be compatible with its indivisible unity ? If again the atoms do not severally admit of spatial division, how can the separate incidence of light and shade after sunrise be accounted for ? If the atom be indivisible it cannot have another part which escapes illumination by the sun's light. Again, how can the covering of one atom by another be accountable, if there be no spatial division in it ? An indivisible atom cannot have an extra part which will prevent access to another, and thus make mutual exclusion possible by collision. If there be no collision and consequent exclusion (of one atom from the space occupied by another) all atoms will merge into one another and occupy the same point of space and all possible collocations will have the dimension of one atom and this has been set forth in clear terms.

But (the opponent may contend), why do you not accept that the interception of light and coverture appertain to the body, and not to the atom ? The contention is met by a query. Is the body posited to be different from the atom so that these two incidents may be accounted for by the former ? The answer must be in the negative. If the body be not different numerically from the atoms they cannot be predicated of it (the body).

(The opponent may further contend that) it is a hypothesis necessitated by the problem of adjustment (of the atoms in space). What is the use of this speculation whether it is an atom or a conglomerate (of atoms) so long as the definitive character of matter and the like is not repudiated? What is their defining character? It is nothing but the attribute of being the object of the organ of vision and the like or being possessed of colour-form blue and the like. (The author now answers). This is the very matter which is subjected to examination. Now, the matter, which is posited as the object of the visual organ and so on and asserted to be a blue or a yellow is intelligible either as a unitary substance or as a manifold. But what is the objective of such speculation? Well, the consequences of a manifold entity have already been set forth abundantly.

Verse—XV

If the object were an indivisible unit, there could possibly be no graduated and successive act of movement, and synchronous perception and non-perception, the existence of discrete and diverse things, and the non-observation of minute (microbes) would not be possible.

Verse—XV : (Exposition)

If the object, apprehended by the visual organ as an undivided, continuous and non-multiple unit, were to be conceived as one entity, there would not be graduated and successive acts of movement on earth, as the entire surface would be covered by one solitary planting of the foot (the surface of the earth being one indivisible unit, it would be covered by one foot step with no untraversed part left over). Furthermore, the simultaneous apprehension of the fore part and non-apprehension of the hinder part would not be possible. The perception and the non-perception of the same thing in the same unit of time are contrary to reason. The existence of discrete and diverse entities such as elephants and horses in different units of space would not be intelligible. If the area were one unit the existence of the one would be in the same place as occupied by the others and as such how could there be the possibility of their mutual exclusion? How again could the area be regarded as one unit, when it is occupied and at the same time not occupied by both of them, since the intervening space is found to be

empty of contents? Moreover the non-observation of minute aquatic organisms, which are possessed of kindred structural form with the bigger ones, would not be capable of a rational explanation, if the numerical difference of entities were to be determined by the difference of the defining attributes and not otherwise. It follows therefore as an inevitable consequence that numerical difference of things should be supposed to be due to the diverse combination of atoms. It has however been found that an atom is not capable of being established as a real unitary substance. The failure of the proof of an atom necessarily entails the unreality of matter as an object of the visual perception. This makes the conclusion inevitable that consciousness alone is the only reality.

Now (it has been contended that) the existence or non-existence of a thing is decided by the verdict of a cognitive organ. Perceptual cognition is the most important among all the cognitive organs, and if there be no external object, how can we account for the emergence of such experience 'it is a case of perceptual cognition'?

Verse—XVI

Perceptual cognition takes place in the same way as it does in dreams and when it (perceptual cognition) occurs, the supposed object of it is not perceived. Such being the case how can we regard it as a case of perceptual cognition?

Verse—XVI (Exposition)

Perceptual cognition is perfectly possible as in dream and the like even without an external object and this has been explained before. Now, when the perceptual cognition such as "I perceive this object" emerges into being by that time the object is not perceived. It is only cognized by mental perception, since the visual perception has become defunct by that time. How can then it be regarded as a case of perception (of an external object), particularly when it is momentary? At that unit of time (in reference to which the act of perception is supposed to take place) that colour or taste is extinct.

Now it is contended that what has not been experienced cannot be recollected by mental cognition. The fact (that it is recollected) implies that there must have been an antecedent experience and this experience

must be intuition. And it is natural that the object of such intuition, such as coloured matter and the like, is perceived (and a perceived object cannot be unreal). (The contention has no cogency.) It has not yet been established that recollection is possible only of an object experienced before.

Because

Verse—XVII

It has already been set forth how a cognition can emerge informed with the image of the (supposed object) as its content and a recollection is made possible by this cognition. And as regards the actual non-existence of the object of experience in dream, it is not realized by a person until he is awakened (from dream).

Verse—XVII (Exposition)

It has been set forth with abundant clearness how visual perception and like cognitions can come into existence possessing the semblance of the objects as their content, though the corresponding objects are not in existence. And the mental cognition induced by recollection emerges into being under the impetus of the previous cognition, impregnated with the same image which gives rise to the conception of the coloured matter and the like. It is therefore evident that the intuition of the object is not proved by the emergence of recollection.

It may however be contended that if the experiences even of our wakeful state are cognizant of unreal objects like the experiences of dream, then in that case even ordinary people should realize the unreality of the experienced objects by themselves (without the argumentative lecture of a teacher). But such is not found to be the case. Therefore it must be conceded that all our experiences of external objects are not without their corresponding objects as they are found to be in dream. But this contention is not based upon evidence which compels acceptance. Because, people do not realize the unreality of the objects of dream before they are aroused from sleep. Exactly in the like manner the ordinary people of the world are overpowered by the sleep of ignorance induced by the predispositions engendered by the prolonged repetition of false experiences (which are of the nature of constructions of untrammelled imagina-

tion). Accordingly they do not realize the unreality of the objects experienced before they are awakened from the spiritual sleep. But when they are awakened by the attainment of transcendental intuition which is the antidote of such sleeping ignorance, then the correct intellectual judgment which follows in the wake of this indeterminate (Pure) intuition dawns upon his mind and he realizes in the light of this judgment the non-existence of the objects of ordinary experience in their true perspective. So the analogy between the two cases of dream, physical and spiritual, is perfectly on all fours.

It is contended that the cognitions of (unenlightened) people come into existence with the image of the objects exclusively as the outcome of a specific state of evolution in the stream of consciousness proper to each individual and are not due to (the causal efficiency of) specific objects. Then how can you explain the diverse determination of the course of conscious career of individual persons, which arises from the contact of sinful and righteous companions and also from the hearing of discourses on true and false religion, particularly when in your view this physical contact with good and evil persons and their discourses is not really existent?

Verse—XVIII

The reciprocal determination (of the course) of conscious career of individuals is due to mutual influence. In dream the mind is over-powered by torpor (which makes independent exercise of judgment impossible) and the disparity in the (moral) consequences is due to this (lack of independence).

Verse—XVIII (Exposition)

The reciprocal determination of the career of consciousness of all individuals without exception is due to the reciprocal influence of respective consciousness-centres on one another. This (reciprocal determination) is to be understood according to the nature of the results. Consequently a determinate cognition arises in one consciousness continuum (individual person) and is engendered by specific cognition which occurs in another consciousness continuum. Such cognitions do not derive their genesis from specific external objects.

If the cognitions even of a wakeful person are devoid of the control

of external objects exactly as they are in dream on your hypothesis, then how can you account for the absence of similar results (good and bad) accruing from the emergence of (morally) good and evil acts occurring at a subsequent moment to a person in dream and the wakeful state? The answer has already been given, viz. that the mind is incapable of exercising independent judgment owing to the loss of vigil entailed by sleep and the disparity of consequences is due to this circumstance and not to the influence of an external object.

(Contention) If all this world-show be only the play of pure consciousness and thus there will be no physical organism or speech (as the external objective existence), how can you in that case account for the death of sheep slaughtered by shepherds and butchers? If the death of these animals be not due to the agency of these shepherds and butchers, why should these persons be visited with the evil consequences due to the killing of life?

Verse—XIX

Death is a state of transformation which is induced by the influence of another conscious continuum (individual person). It is exactly analogous to the loss of memory and such other phenomena which emerge in beings that fall a prey to the purely mental influence exerted by the evil spirits and the like.

Verse—XIX (Exposition)

The matter is capable of being explained by parity of reasoning. Thus it is found that persons who become the victims of the influence exercised by the mentality of ghosts and other spirits, do develop such pathological symptoms as loss of memory, the experience of abnormal dreams, and unwonted reactions incident to the haunting of evil spirits and hobgoblins and adverse turns of fortune due to the subtle influence of planets. This may also be due to the spiritual influence of persons endowed with supernormal powers. We may cite concrete instances such as the dream seen by Sāraṇa under the influence of Venerable Mahākātyāyana; and the defeat of Vemacitra entailed by the provocation of the wrath of a forest hermit. Likewise there may arise a certain transition in the mentality of other individuals, Putting the organ of vitality out of commission of other minds.

And this transition leads to physical death which is nothing but the intercession of a homogeneous course of consciousness continuum under the operation of the law of homogeneous causation.

Verse—XX

How can otherwise the total desolation and depopulation of the Dāṇḍaka forest be accounted for as the outcome of (the curse of) the indignant hermits? How can again the extreme deadliness of spiritual punishment be capable of rational justification?

Verse—XX (Exposition)

This event cannot be accounted for unless the death of the beings in the Dāṇḍaka forest be admitted to be the direct result of the spiritual power exercised by another conscious being. With a view to demonstrating the excessively baleful character of the infliction of spiritual punishment, the householder Upāli was asked by the Lord (the Buddha) "Have you ever heard, O householder, by whom the Dāṇḍaka forests, Mātaṅga forests and Kalinga forests were rendered desolate of population and again consecrated (thereby)?" He, Upāli, answered, "Yes O Gautama I am told that it was accomplished by the mental perturbation of the sages."

Otherwise how can the excessive malignity of spiritual punishment be reasonably accepted? It may be supposed that the beings inhabiting those forests were exterminated by (invisible) superhuman beings instigated by the infuriated sages, and that their death was not due directly to the mental perturbation of the sages. But on this hypothesis how can it be established that the infliction of the spiritual punishment is by far the deadliest—far deadlier than the infliction of pain by body or speech. This can be established only if the death of all those living beings be supposed to have been the outcome of the mental perturbation of the sages.

(Another difficulty is raised by the realist.) If all this phenomenal world-order is of the stuff of pure consciousness (as you suppose), then those persons who are (credited) with the power of reading other people's minds—are they really acquainted with the minds (and activities) of other persons or not? But what is the bearing of this question? It is this. If they do not have this awareness, how can

they be regarded as knowers of others' minds? If again they are acknowledged to be cognizant (of others' minds).

Verse—XXI

How can the knowledge of these knowers of others' minds (thought-readers) be contrary to the nature of the object (to be known)? (The answer is that) it is just as erroneous as the knowledge of one's own mind, because it is not known as it is realizable by the enlightened soul.

Verse—XXI (Exposition)

Why should the knowledge of one's own mind fail to grasp the reality as it is?

(The answer is that) it is not known in the way as it is envisaged by the enlightened soul in its true character which is incapable of being described by words. So due to their failure to reach the status of the perfect knowledge, both of them (the knowledge of one's own mind and that of other's mind), are not regarded as true to the nature of reality. Both these types of cognition are vitiated by false contents inasmuch as they fail to transcend the conceptual differentiation of the knower and the known. This limitation is absent in pure consciousness, the profundity of which is unfathomable and which has been the subject of an infinite variety of speculative judgments.

Verse—XXII

This logical determination of pure consciousness has been accomplished by me in so far as it has been possible for my limited powers and resources.

This profound truth is incapable of logical determination in all its bearings. It is only capable of being envisaged by the enlightened souls.

Verse—XXII (Exposition)

This profound truth of pure consciousness (which is bereft of subject-object polarization) is not capable of being determined by men of limited knowledge like me in its infinite expanse and bearings, because it does not come within the ken of speculative reason. Who has then the power to envisage it in all its bearings—in its infinite

depth and expanse? The answer is that it is the object of the realization of the enlightened souls. This is the ultimate reality which is capable of being realized in all its depth and extent by the enlightened souls of infinite powers, because there can be no impediment to thwart the expansion of their knowledge which embraces within its scope all that is to be known and in all their aspects.

Thus ends the work of the Master Vasubandhu, entitled *Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi* (The proof of pure Consciousness as the sole Truth) consisting of a score of verses.



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विज्ञतिमात्रतासिद्धिः
(विंशतिका)



आचार्यवसुबन्धुकृता (विंशतिका) विज्ञप्तिमालतासिद्धः

विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवैतदसदर्थावभासनात् ।

यथा तैमिरिकस्यासत् केशचन्द्रादिदर्शनम् ॥१॥

अनर्था यदि विज्ञप्तिनियमो देशकालयोः ।

सन्तानस्यानियमश्च युक्ता कृत्यक्रिया न च ॥२॥

देशादिनियमः सिद्धः स्वप्नवत् प्रेतवत् पुनः ।

सन्तानानियमः सर्वे पूयनद्यादिदर्शने ॥३॥

[महायाने त्रैधातुकं^१ विज्ञप्तिमात्रं व्यवस्थाप्यते, चित्तमात्रं भोजिनपुत्रा यदुत् त्रैधातुकमिति सूत्रात् । चित्तं मनो विज्ञानं विज्ञप्तिश्चेति पर्यायाः । चित्तमत्र संसंप्रयोगमित्रेतम् । मात्रमित्यर्थप्रतिषेधार्थम् ॥२॥

अत्र चोद्यते ।

अनर्था यदि विज्ञप्तिनियमो देशकालयोः ।

सन्तानस्यानियमश्च युक्ता कृत्यक्रिया न च ॥ ३ ॥]^२

किमुक्तं भवति ? यदि विनापि रूपाद्यर्थेन रूपादिविज्ञप्तिरूपद्यते न रूपाद्यर्थात् । कस्मात् क्वचिद् देश उत्पद्यते, न सर्वत्र । तत्रैव च देशे कदाचिदुत्पद्यते, न सर्वदा ? तद्देशकालप्रतिष्ठितानां सर्वेषां सन्तान उत्पद्यते, न केवलमेकस्य । यथा तैमिरिकाणां सन्ताने केशाद्याभासो नान्येषाम् । कस्मात् ? यत् तैमिरिकैः केशभ्रमरादि दृश्यते, तेन केशादिक्रिया न क्रियते, न च तदन्यैर्न क्रियते । यदन्नपानवस्त्रविषायुधादि स्वप्ने दृश्यते, तेनान्नादिक्रिया न क्रियते, न च तदन्यैर्न क्रियते । गन्धर्वनगरेणासत्त्वान् नगरं क्रिया न क्रियते, न च तदन्यैर्न क्रियते । तस्मादर्थाभावे देशकालनियमः सन्तानानियमः कृत्यक्रिया च न युज्यते ॥२॥

न खलु न युज्यते । यस्मात्—देशादिनियम-सिद्ध-स्वप्नवत्' । स्वप्न इव स्वप्नवत् । कथं तावत् ? स्वप्ने विनाप्यर्थेन क्वचिदिदेव देशे किंचिद् अमरारामस्त्रीपुरुषादिकं

दृश्यते, न सर्वत्र । तत्रैव च देशो कदाचिद् दृश्यते, न सर्वकालमिति सिद्धो विनाप्यर्थेन
देशकालनियमः । प्रेतवत् पुनः सन्तानानियमः । सिद्ध इति वर्तते । प्रेतानामिव
प्रेतवत् । कथं सिद्धः ? समं 'सर्वं पूयनद्यादिदर्शने' ॥ पूयपूर्णा नदी पूयनदी, घृत
घटवत् । तुल्यकर्मविपाकावस्था हि प्रेताः सर्वेऽपि पूयपूर्णा नदीं पश्यन्ति, नैक एव^३ ।
यथा पूयपूर्णम्, एवं भूत्रपुरीषादिपूर्णम् । दण्डसिंधरैश्च पुरुषैरधिष्ठितामित्या
दिग्रहणेन । एवं सन्तानानियमो विज्ञप्तीनामसत्यप्यर्थे सिद्धः ॥३॥

स्वप्नोपधातवत् कृत्यक्रिया नरकवत् पुनः ।
सर्वं नरकपालादिदर्शने तैश्च बाधने ॥४॥
तिरश्चां सम्भवः स्वर्गं यथा न नरके तथा ।
न प्रेतानां यतस्तज्जं दुःखं नानुभवन्ति ते ॥५॥
यदि तत्कर्मभिस्तत्र भूतानां सम्भवस्तथा ।
इष्यते परिणामश्च कि विज्ञानस्य नेष्यते ॥६॥

स्वप्नोपधातवत् कृत्यक्रिया^४ । सिद्धेति वेदितव्यम् । यथा स्वर्णे द्व्यसमापत्तिमन्त-
रेण शुक्रविसर्गलक्षणः स्वप्नोपधातः । एवं तावदन्यान्यद्वृष्टात्मैर्देशकालनियमादि-
चतुष्टयं सिद्धम् । नरकवत् पुनः सर्वं सिद्धमिति वेदितव्यम् । नरकेष्व नारकाणां नरक-
पालादिदर्शनं देशकालनियमेन सिद्धम् । श्व-वायसायसपर्वताद्यागमनगमनदर्शनं चेत्या-
दिग्रहणेन । सर्वेषां च, नैकस्यैव । तैश्च तद्वाधनं सिद्धम्, असत्स्वपि नरकपाला-
दिषु समानस्वकर्मविपाकाधिपत्यात् । तथान्यत्रापि सर्वमेतद् देशकालनियमादिचतुष्टयं
सिद्धमिति वेदितव्यम् ॥४॥

कि पुनः कारणं नरकपालास्ते च श्वानो वायसाश्च सत्त्वा नेष्यन्ते । अयोगात् ।
न हि ते नारका युज्यन्ते, तथैव तद्दुःखाप्रतिसंवेदनात् । परस्परं यातयतामिमे नारका
इमे नरकपाला इति व्यवस्था न स्यात् । तुल्याकृतिप्रमाणबलानां च परस्परं यातयतां
न तथा भयं स्यात् । दाहदुःखं च प्रदीप्तायामयोमय्यां भूमावसहमानाः कथं तत्र परान्
यातयेयुः ? अनारकाणां वा नरके कुतः सम्भवः ?

कथं तावत् तिरश्चां स्वर्गसम्भवः? एवं नरकेषु-तिर्यक्प्रेतविशेषाणां नरक-पालादीनां सम्भवः स्यात् ।

ये हि तिर्यञ्चःस्वर्गे संभवन्ति, ते तद्भाजनलोकमुखसंवर्तनीयेन कर्मणा तत्र सम्भूता-स्तज्ज्ञं सुखं प्रत्यनुभवन्ति । न चैवं नरकपालादयो नारकं दुःखं प्रत्यनुभवन्ति । तस्मान्न तिरश्चां सम्भवो युक्तो नापि प्रेतानाम् ॥५॥

तेषां तर्हि नारकाणां कर्मभिस्तत्र भूतविशेषाः सम्भवन्ति वर्णकृतिप्रभाणबल-विशिष्टाः, ये नरकपालादिसंज्ञां प्रतिलभन्ते । तथा च परिणमन्ति यद् विविधां हस्त-विक्षेपादिक्रियां कुर्वन्तो दृश्यन्ते भयोत्पादनार्थम् । यथा मेषाङ्कतयः पर्वता आगच्छन्तो-ज्यःशालमलीवने च कण्टका अधोमुखीभवन्त ऊर्ध्वमुखीभवन्तश्चेति । न ते न सम्भव न्त्येव ।

विज्ञानस्यैव तत्कर्मभिस्तथा परिणामः कस्मान्नेष्यते? किं पुनर्भूतानि कलप्यन्ते? ॥६॥
अपि च

कर्मणो वासनान्यत्र^३ फलमन्यत्र कलप्यते ।

तत्रैव नेष्यते यत्र वासना किं नु कारणम् ॥७॥

रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वं तद्विनेयजनं प्रति ।

अभिप्रायवशादुक्तमुपपादुकसत्त्ववत् ॥८॥

यतः स्वबीजाद् विज्ञप्तिर्यदाभासा प्रवर्तते

द्विविधायतनत्वेन ते तस्या मुनिरङ्गवीत् ॥९॥

अपिच येन हि कर्मणा नारकाणां तत्र तादृशो भूतानां सम्भवः कलप्यते परिणामश्च । कर्मणो वासना तेषां विज्ञानसन्तानसन्निविष्टा, नान्यत्र । यत्रैव च वासना, तत्रैव तस्याः फलं तादृशो विज्ञानपरिणामः किं नेष्यते? यत्र वासना नास्ति, तत्र, तस्याः फलं कलप्यत इति किमत्र कारणम् ॥१०॥

आगमः कारणम् । यदि विज्ञानमेव रूपादिप्रतिभासं स्यान्न रूपादिकोर्थस्तदा-रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वं भगवता नोक्तं स्यात् । अकारणमेतत्, यस्मात्

[रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वं तद् विनेयजनं प्रति ।

अभिप्रायवशादुक्तमुपपादुकसत्त्ववत् ॥७॥]

यथास्ति सत्त्वं उपपादुकं इत्युक्तं भगवता । अभिप्रायवशात् चित्तसन्तत्यनुच्छेदभायत्यामभिप्रेत्य ।

नास्तीह सत्त्वं आत्मा वा धर्मसत्त्वेते सहेतुकाः

इति वचनात् । एवं रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वमप्युक्तं भगवता । तद्देशना-विनेयजनमधिकृत्येत्याभिप्रायिकं तद्वचनम् ॥८॥

कोऽत्राभिप्रायः ?

[यतः स्वबीजाद् विज्ञप्तिर्यदाभासा प्रवर्त्तते ।

द्विविधायतनत्वेन ते तस्या मुनिरव्रवीत् ॥९॥]

किमुक्तं भवति । रूपप्रतिभासा विज्ञप्तिर्यंतः स्वबीजात् परिणामविशेषप्राप्तादुत्पद्यते । तच्च बीजं, यत्प्रतिभासा च सा, ते तस्या विज्ञप्तेश्चक्षुरूपाद्यायतनत्वेन यथाक्रमं भगवानब्रवीत् । एवं यावत् स्प्रष्टव्यप्रतिभासा विज्ञप्तिर्यतः स्वबीजात् परिणामविशेषप्राप्तादुत्पद्यते । तच्च बीजं, यत्प्रतिभासा च सा, ते तस्या कायस्प्रष्टव्यायतनत्वेन यथाक्रमं भगवानब्रवीदित्ययमभिप्रायः ।

तथा पुद्गलनैरात्म्यप्रवेशो ह्यन्यथा पुनः ।

देशना धर्मनैरात्म्यप्रवेशः कल्पितात्मना ॥१०॥

न तदेकं न चानेकं विषयः परमाणुशः ।

न च ते संहता यस्मात् परमाणुर्न सिद्ध्यति ॥११॥

षट्केन युगपद् योगात् परमाणोः षड़शता ।

षणां समानदेशत्वात् पिण्डः स्यादणुमात्रकः ॥१२॥

एवं पुनरभिप्रायवशेन देशयित्वा को गुणः ? [तथा पुद्गलनैरात्म्यप्रवेशो हि] तथाहि देश्यमाने पुद्गलनैरात्म्यं प्रविशन्ति । द्वयाद् विज्ञानषट्कं प्रवर्त्तते । न तु कश्चिदेको द्रष्टास्ति न यावन्मन्तेत्येवं विदित्वा ये पुद्गलनैरात्म्यदेशनाविनेयास्ते पुद्गलनैरात्म्यं प्रविशन्ति । अन्यथेति । विज्ञप्तिमात्रदेशना । कथं धर्मनैरात्म्य-

प्रवेशः । विज्ञप्तिमात्रमिदं रूपादिग्रतिभासमुत्पद्यते, न तु रूपादिलक्षणो धर्मः कोऽप्यस्तीति विदित्वा । यदि तर्हि सर्वथा धर्मो नास्ति, तदपि विज्ञप्तिमात्रं, नास्तीति कथं तर्हि (न) व्यवस्थाप्यते । न खलु सर्वथा धर्मो नास्तीत्येवं धर्मनैरात्म्यप्रवेशो भवति । अपितु [कल्पितात्मना] । यो बालैर्धमणिं स्वभावो ग्राह्यग्राहकादिः परिकल्पितस्तेन कल्पितेनात्मना तेषां नैरात्म्यम्, न त्वनभिलाप्येनात्मना यो बुद्धानां विषय इति । एव विज्ञप्तिमात्रस्यापि विज्ञप्त्यन्तरपरिकल्पितेनात्मना नैरात्म्यप्रवेशाद् विज्ञप्तिमात्र-व्यवस्थापनया सर्वधर्मणिं नैरात्म्यप्रवेशो भवति, न तु तदस्तित्वापवादात् । इतरथा हि विज्ञप्तेरपि विज्ञप्त्यन्तरमर्थः स्यादिति विज्ञप्तिमात्रत्वं न सिध्यते, अर्थवतीत्वाद विज्ञप्तीनाम् ॥१०॥

कथं पुनरिदं प्रत्येतव्यम् अनेनाभिप्रायेण भगवता रूपाद्यायतनास्तित्वमुक्तं, न पुनः सन्त्येव तानि यानि रूपादिविज्ञप्तीनां प्रत्येकं विषयीभवन्तीति । यस्मात्
[न तदेकं न चानेकं विषयः परमाणुशः ।

त च ते संहता यस्मात् परमाणुर्तं सिध्यति ॥११॥

इति । किमुक्तं भवति ? यत् तद् रूपादिकमायतनं रूपादिविज्ञप्तीनां प्रत्येकं विषयःस्यात्, तदेकं वा स्याद्, यथावयविरूपं कल्प्यते वैशेषिकैः । अनेकं वा परमाणुशः । संहता वा त एव परमाणवः । न तावदेकं विषयो भवति, अवच्छेन्योऽन्यस्यावयविरूपस्य क्वचिदप्यग्रहणात् । नाप्यनेकं, परमाणुनां प्रत्येकमग्रहणात् । नापि ते संहता विषयी-भवन्ति । यस्मात् परमाणुरेकं द्रव्यं न सिध्यति ॥११॥

कथं न सिध्यति ? यस्मात्

[षट्केन युगपद् योगात् परमाणोः षडंशता ।

षड्म्यो दिग्म्यः षड्भिः परमाणुभिर्युगपद् योगे सति परमाणोः षडंशता प्राप्नोति एकस्य हि यो देशस्तत्रान्यस्यासंभवात् ।

षणां समानदेशत्वात् पिण्डः स्यादणुमात्रकः ॥१२॥

परमाणोरसंयोगे तत्संघातेऽस्ति कस्य सः

न चानवयवत्वेन तत्संयोगो न सिध्यति ॥१३॥

दिग्भागभेदोऽयस्यास्ति तस्यैकत्वं न युज्यते ।

छायावृतीः कथं वान्यो न पिण्डशब्दे तस्य ते ॥१४॥

अथ य एवैकस्य परमाणोर्देशः स एव षण्णाम् । तेन सर्वेषां समानदेशत्वात् सर्वः पिण्डः परमाणुमात्रः स्यात् परस्पर(रा)व्यतिरेकादिति न कश्चित् पिण्डो दृश्यः स्थात् । नैव हि परमाणवः संयुज्यन्ते निरवयवत्वात् । मा भूदेष दोषप्रसङ्गः । संहतास्तु परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते इति काश्मीरवैभाषिकाः । त इदं प्रष्टव्याः । यः परमाणूनां संघातो न स तेऽप्योऽर्थान्तरमिति ॥१२॥

[परमाणोरसंयोगे तत्संघातोऽस्ति कस्य सः ।
संयोग इति वर्तते ।

न चानवयवत्वेन तत्संयोगो न सिद्धति ॥१३॥]

अथ संघाता अप्यन्योन्यं न संयुज्यन्ते । न तर्हि परमाणूनां निरवयवत्वात् संयोगो न सिद्धतीति वक्तव्यम्, सावयवस्यापि हि संघातस्य संयोगानभ्युपगमात् । तस्मात् परमाणुरेकं द्रव्यं न सिद्धति । यदि च परमाणोः संयोग इष्यते यदि वा नेष्यते ॥१३॥

अन्यो हि परमाणोः पूर्वदिग्भागो यावदधोदिग्भाग इति दिग्भागभेदे सति कथं तदात्मकस्य परमाणोरेकत्वं योक्ष्यते ।

यद्योक्तकस्य परमाणोर्दिग्भागभेदो न स्यात्, आदित्योदये कथमन्यत्र छाया भवत्यन्यत्रातपः । न हि तस्यान्यः प्रदेशोऽस्ति, यत्रातपी न स्यात् । आवरणं च कथं भवति, परमाणोः परमाणवन्तरेण यदि दिग्भागभेदो नेष्यते । न हि कश्चिदपि परमाणोः परभागोऽस्ति, यत्रागमनादत्येनान्यस्य प्रतिष्ठातः स्यात् । असति च प्रतिष्ठाते सर्वेषां समानदेशत्वात् सर्वं संघातः परमाणुमात्रः स्यादित्युक्तम् ।

किमेवं नेष्यते, पिण्डस्य ते छायावृती न परमाणोरिति । किं खलु परमाणुभ्योऽन्यः पिण्ड इष्यते, यस्य ते स्याताम् । नेत्याह “अन्यो न पिण्डशब्दे तस्य ते” यदि नान्यः परमाणुभ्यः पिण्डः इष्यते, न ते तस्येति सिद्धं भवति ।

संनिवेशपरिकल्प एषः, परमाणः संघात इति वा किमनया चिन्तया ? लक्षणं तु रूपादि(देः)यदि न प्रतिषिद्ध्यते । किं पुनस्तेषां लक्षणम् ? चक्षुरादिविषयत्वं नीलादित्वं च । तदेवेदं सम्प्रधार्यते, यच्चक्षुरादीनां विषयो नीलपीतादिकमिष्यते, किं तदेकं द्रव्यमयथा तदनेकमिति । किञ्चातः ? अनकृत्वे दोष उक्तः ॥१४॥

एकत्वे न क्रमेणेति युगपन्न ग्रहाग्रही ।
 विच्छिन्नानेकवृत्तिश्च सूक्ष्मानीक्षा च नो भवेत् ॥१५॥
 प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः स्वप्नादौ यथा साच यदा तदा ।
 न सोऽर्थो दृश्यते तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं कथं मतम् ॥१६॥
 उक्तं यथा तदाभासा विज्ञप्तिः स्मरणं ततः ।
 स्वप्ने दृग्विषयाभावं नाप्रवृद्धोऽवगच्छति ॥१७॥

यदि यावदविच्छिन्नं नानेकं चक्षुषो विषयस्तदेकं द्रव्यं कल्प्यते; पृथिव्यां क्रमेणेतिर्नं स्याद् गमनमित्यर्थः । सकृत् पादक्षेपेण सर्वस्य गतत्वात् । अर्बाग्भागस्य च ग्रहणं परभागस्य चाग्रहणं युगपन्न स्यात् । न हि तस्यैव तदानीं ग्रहणं चाग्रहणं च युक्तम् । विच्छिन्नस्य चानेकस्य हस्त्यश्वादिकस्यानेकत्र वृत्तिर्नं स्याद्, यत्रैव ह्येकं, तत्रैवापरमिति कथं तयोर्विच्छेद इष्यते । कथं वा तदेकं यत्प्राप्तं च ताम्यां न च प्राप्तम् अन्तराले तच्छून्यग्रहणात् । सूक्ष्माणां चौदकजन्तूनां स्थूलैः समानरूपाणामनीक्षणं न स्यात् । यदि लक्षणभेदादेव द्रव्यान्तरत्वं कल्प्यते नान्यथा । तस्मादवश्यं परमाणुशो भेदः कल्पयितव्यः । स चैको न सिद्ध्यति । तस्यासिद्धौ रूपादीनां चक्षुरादिविषयत्वमसिद्धमिति सिद्धं विज्ञप्तिमात्रं भवतीति ॥१५॥

प्रमाणवशादस्तित्वं नास्तित्वं वा निर्धार्यते । सर्वेषां च प्रमाणानां प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं गरिष्ठमित्यसत्यर्थं कथमियं बुद्धिर्भवति प्रत्यक्षमिति ।

[प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः स्वप्नादौ यथा]

विनाप्यर्थेनेति पूर्वमेव ज्ञापितम् ।

सा च यदा तदा न सोऽर्थो दृश्यते तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं कथं मतम् । यदा च सा प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिर्भवति, इवं मे प्रत्यक्षमिति । तदा न सोऽर्थो दृश्यते, मनोविज्ञानेनव परिच्छेदात् चक्षुविज्ञानस्य च तदा निरुद्धत्वादिति कथं तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वमिष्टम्, विशेषेण तु क्षणिकस्य विषयस्य । तदानीं निरुद्धमेव तद्रूपं रसादिकं वा ॥१६॥

नाननुभूतं मनोविज्ञानेन स्मर्यते इत्यवश्यमर्थानुभवेन भवितव्यम् । तच्च दर्शनमित्येवं तद्विषयस्य रूपादेः प्रत्यक्षत्वं मतम् । असिद्धमिदमनुभूतस्यार्थस्य स्मरणं भवतीति । यस्मात्

[उक्तं यथा तदाभासा विज्ञप्तिः]

विनाप्यर्थेन यथार्थभासा चक्षुर्विज्ञानादिका विज्ञप्तिरूत्पद्यते, तथोक्तम् ।

[स्मरणं ततः]

ततो हि विज्ञप्ते: स्मृतिसंप्रयुक्ता तत्प्रतिभासैव रूपादिविकल्पिका मनोविज्ञप्तिरूत्पद्यत
इति न स्मृत्युत्पादादर्थनुभवः सिध्यति ॥

यदि यथा स्वप्ने विज्ञप्तिरभूतार्थविषया तथा जाग्रतोऽपि स्यात् । तथैव तदभावं
लोकः स्वयमवगच्छेत् । न चैवं भवति । तस्मान्न स्वप्ने इवार्थोपलब्धिः सर्वा निरर्थिका ।
इदमज्ञापकम् । यस्मात्—

अन्योन्याधिपतित्वेन विज्ञप्तिनियमो मिथः ।

मिद्देनोपहतं चित्तं स्वप्ने तेनासमं फलम् ॥१५॥

मरणं परविज्ञप्तिविशेषाद् विक्रिया यथा ।

स्मृतिलोपादिकार्येणां पिशाचादिमनोवशात् ॥१६॥

[स्वप्ने दृग्विषयाभावं नाप्रबुद्धोऽवगच्छति]

एवं विथविकल्पान्यासवासनानिद्रया प्रसुप्तो स्वप्ने इवाभूतमर्थं पश्यन्नप्रबुद्धस्तदभावं
यथावज्ञावगच्छति । यदा तु तत्प्रतिपक्षलोकोत्तरनिविकल्पकज्ञानलाभात् प्रबुद्धो
भवति, तदा तत्पृष्ठलब्धशुद्धलौकिकज्ञानसंमुखीभावाद् विषयाभावं यथावदवगच्छतीति
समानमेतत् ॥१७॥

यदि स्वसन्तानपरिणामविशेषादेव सत्त्वानामर्थप्रतिभासा विज्ञप्तय उत्पद्यन्ते, नार्थ-
विशेषात् । तदा य एष पापकल्याणमित्रसंपर्कात् सदसद्वर्षश्रवणाच्च विज्ञप्तिनियमः
सत्त्वानां स कथं सिध्यति असति सदसत्संपर्कं तद्देशनायां च ।

[अन्योन्याधिपतित्वेन विज्ञप्तिनियमो मिथः]

सर्वेषां हि सत्त्वानामन्योन्यविज्ञप्त्याधिपत्येन मिथो विज्ञप्तेनियमो भवति यथायोगम् ।
मिथ इति परस्परतः । अतः सन्तानान्तरविज्ञप्तिविशेषात् सन्तानान्तरे विज्ञप्ति-
विशेष उत्पद्यते, नार्थविशेषात् ।

यदि यथा स्वप्ने निरर्थिका विज्ञप्तिरेवं जाग्रतोऽपि स्यात्; कस्मात् कुशलाकुशल-
समुदाचारे सुप्तासुप्तयोस्तुल्यं फलमिष्टानिष्टमायत्यां न भवति । यस्मात्—

[मिद्देनोपहतं चित्तं स्वप्ने तेनासमं फलम् ।]

इदमत्र कारणं न त्वर्थसङ्घावः ॥१८॥

यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदं न कस्यचित् कायोऽस्ति न वाक् । कथमनुक्रम्यमाणानामौर-
भ्रिकादिभिरुभ्रादीनां मरणं भवति । अतत्कृते वा तन्मरणे कथमौरभ्रिकादीनां
प्राणातिपातावद्येन योगो भवति ।

[मरणं परविज्ञप्तिविशेषाद् विक्रिया यथा ॥

स्मृतिलोपादिकान्येषां पिशाचादिमनोवशात् ॥१९॥]

यथा हि पिशाचादिमनोवशादन्येषां स्मृतिलोपस्वप्नदर्शनभूतग्रहावेशविकारा भवन्ति ।
ऋद्धिमन्मनोवशाच्च । यथा सारणस्यार्थमहाकात्यायनाधिष्ठानात् स्वप्नदर्शनम् ।
आरण्यकर्षिमनःप्रदोषाच्च वेमचित्रपराजयः । तथा परविज्ञप्तिविशेषाधिपत्यात्
परेषां जीवितेन्द्रियविरोधिनी काचित् क्रियोत्पद्यते यथा सभागसन्ततिविच्छेदाख्यं मरणं
भवतीति वेदितव्यम् ॥१९॥

कथं वा दण्डकारण्यशून्यत्वमृषिकोपतः ॥१०॥

मनोदण्डो महावद्यः कथं वा तेन सिद्ध्यति ॥२०॥

परचित्तविदां ज्ञानमयथार्थं कथं यथा ।

स्वचित्तज्ञानमज्ञानाद् यथा बुद्धस्य गोचरः ॥२१॥

विज्ञप्तिमात्रतासिद्धिः स्वशक्तिसदृशी मया ।

कृतेयं सर्वथा सा तु न चिन्त्या बुद्धगोचरः ॥२२॥

यदि परविज्ञप्तिविशेषाधिपत्यात् सत्त्वानां मरणं नेष्यते । मनोदण्डस्य हि महासाव-
द्यत्वं साधयता भगवतोपालिर्गृहपतिः पृष्ठः कल्पिते गृहपते श्रुतम्, केन तानि दण्ड-
कारण्यानि मातङ्गारण्यानि कलिङ्गारण्यानि शून्यानि भेद्यीभूतानि । तेनोक्तं—
श्रुतं मे भो गौतम क्रृषीणां मनःप्रदोषेणेति ।

मनोदण्डो महावद्यः कथं वा तेन सिद्ध्यति ।

वद्येवं कल्प्यते । तदभिप्रस(ण) न्नैरमानुष्टस्तद्वासिनः सत्त्वा उत्सादिता न त्वृषीणां
मनः प्रदोषान्मृता इत्येवं सति कथं तेन कर्मणा मनोदण्डः कायवाग्दण्डाम्यां महावद्यतमः
सिद्धो भवति । तन्मनोदोषमात्रेण तावतां सत्त्वानां मरणात् सिद्ध्यति ॥२०॥

यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदं, परचित् विदः कि परचित्तं जानन्त्यथ न । किं चातः ?
यदि न जानन्ति कथं परचित्तविदो भवन्ति ।

अथ जानन्ति

[परचित्तविदां ज्ञानमयथार्थे कथं यथा
स्वचित्तज्ञानं]

तदपि कथमयथार्थं

अज्ञानाद् यथा बुद्धस्य गोचरः
यथा तन्निरभिलाप्येनात्मना बुद्धानां गोचरः तथा तदज्ञानात् तदुभयं न यथार्थं वितथः
प्रतिभासतया ग्राह्यग्राहकविकल्पस्याप्रहीणत्वात् ॥२१॥

अनन्तविनिश्चयप्रभेदागाधगाम्भीर्यायां विज्ञप्तिमात्रतायां—

[विज्ञप्तिमात्रतासिद्धिः स्वशक्तिसदृशी मया
कृतेयं सर्वथा सा तु न चिन्त्या]

सर्वप्रकारा तु सा मादृशैश्चिन्तयिष्येन न शक्यते, तर्काविषयत्वात् । कस्य पुनः सा सर्वथा
गोचर इत्याह—बुद्धगोचरः । बुद्धानां हि सा भगवतां सर्वप्रकारं गोचरः सर्वाकारसर्वज्ञेय-
ज्ञानाविधातादिति ।

[विशेषिका विज्ञप्तिमात्रतासिद्धिः]
कृतिरियमाचार्यवसुवन्धोः ।

¹ NVTT., p. 206; रूपधातु रूपधातुः कामधातुरिति त्रैधातुकं जगत्-।
vide also J.D., p. 9. मोक्षो हि कामरूप्यारूप्यधातुत्रयादिष्यते ।

¹ The text within box brackets was not found in the original Sanskrit MSS., but was restored from the Tibetan and Chinese translations by Prof. Sylvan Levi. It is taken from his edition with some alteration in the first quarter of Verse II due to exigencies of matter. I have also consulted the Tibetan and Chinese versions, but do not feel the necessity of making any emendation. I own my debt to the Savant.

3 See J.D., p. 136: अर्थक्रिया च न स्यात् । यथा स्वप्ने स्नातानुलिप्ताशितपीतवस्त्राच्छादितानाम्-फलत्वं दृष्टम्, एवमिहापि स्यात् । शुक्रविसर्गवदिति चेत्, स्यादेतत्—यथा द्वयसमाप्तिपूर्वकः शुक्रविसर्गः स च तदभावेऽपि स्वप्ने भवति । एवमितरत् स्यादिति ।*** प्रेतवदिति चेत् ।*** यथा प्रेतानामसद्गः पूयनच्यादिभिरर्थक्रिया, नरकपालैश्च बाधनम् एवमत्रापि स्यादिति ।

4 Cf. N.V., p. 1085; अथ मन्यसे, यथा तुल्यकर्मविपाकोत्पन्नः प्रेता पूयपूर्णानदीं पश्यन्ति, न तत्र नद्यस्ति न पूयम् । न ह्येकं वस्त्वनेकाकारं भवितुमहंति । दृष्टश्च विज्ञानभेदः, केचित् तामेव जलपूर्णा पश्यन्ति, केचिद् रुधिरपूर्णामित्यतोऽवसीयते यथाऽव्यात्मे (व्यासे ?) निमित्तापेक्षमसति बा होनिमित्ते विज्ञानमेव तथोत्पच्चत इति ।

5 The verse has been quoted in the N.V., p. 1085 and has been expounded by the author as follows: यत्रैव किल कर्म, तत्रैव किल फलेन भवितव्यम्; यस्य तु चित्तव्यतिरेकिणो विषयास्तस्यान्यत्रकर्मान्यत्र फलमिति व्यधिकरणे कर्मफले भवत इति ।

6 This verse occurs in the different classics of both orthodox and non-orthodox system of Indian Philosophy. It has been referred to in the N.V. and has been expounded there as under:

परमाणुर्यगपत् षड्भिः सम्बधयमानः षड़शः प्राप्नोति, भिन्नदेशत्वात् संबंध्यानाम् । अथ मानदेशाः सर्वे संयोगाः षण्णां परमाणुनाम् । पिण्डः परमाणुमात्रकः प्राप्नोति । यदि हे हे द्रव्ये अधिकृत्याभिधीयते, तयोऽभिन्नदेशाः । अथ परमाणुनां सम्बन्धिनं परमाणुमधिकृत्याभिधीयते । ततोऽरनेकैः संयोगः समानदेश इति न किंचिद्बाध्यते—N.V., p. 1068.

It has also been alluded to by Saṅkarācārya in his *Bhāṣya* on the B.S. ch II, ii. 17. *Vide* also the *Bhamati*, p. 477: तथाचोपर्यधःपाश्वस्थाः

षड्पि परमाणवः समानदेशा इति प्राथिमानुपत्तेरणुमात्रः पिण्डः प्रसञ्जेत इति ।

See also the *Kalpataru* and the *Parimala* in loc. cit for further elucidation.

7 This verse has been quoted by the author of the N.V. with a variant reading:

दिग्देशभेदो यस्यास्ति तस्यैकत्वं न युज्यते इति—

— N.V. p. 1070

8 *Vide* the NV, p. 1071:

छायावृती तर्हि न प्राप्नुतः परमाणोरदेशत्वादिति

9 Cf. *Bhāmati* on B.S.ch II. ii, 32 : ग्रथन्तस्तावत् पश्यना तिष्ठानमिद्धपोषधा-
द्यसाधुपदप्रयोगः । इति ।

See also the *Kalpataru* loc. cit:

दर्शनमिति वक्तव्ये पश्यनेत्यपशब्दः । स्थानमिति वक्तव्ये तिष्ठनेत्य-
पशब्दः । तिष्ठतेर्दृशेच शिति प्रत्यये तिष्ठ पश्यावादेशौ युच्च प्रत्यये तु न, तस्या-
शिष्ट्वात् । मिह सेचने इव्यस्य निष्ठान्तस्य भीडमिति सिद्ध्यति । मिद्धमिति त्वपशब्दः ।
पोषधशब्द उपवासे बौद्धैः प्रयुज्यते स्नातः शुचिवस्त्राभरणः पोषधं विदधीतेति । स च
लोकैरप्रयुक्तत्वादपशब्दः इति प्रतिभातीत्युक्तमिति । बौद्धव्याकरणे त्वेतेषां पदानां
साधुत्वं व्युत्पादितम् ।

And also the *Parimala* in the same context: यद्यपि बौद्धव्याकरणे
श्यनादिशब्दा साधुतया व्युत्पादिता इति ।

10 For an elaborate account of the incident see Rāmāyaṇa's Aranya-
kaṇḍa Canto 22, and Uttarakanda, Canto 79-81. Vide also the
Vyai abhaṣya on the Y.S., IV 17 and *Bhāmati* on the *Sanikalpādhikarana* of the B.S., Ch. IV.

विग्रहव्यावर्तनी



विग्रहव्यावर्तनी

सर्वेषां भावानां सर्वत्र न विद्यते स्वभावश्चेत् ।
त्वद्वचनमस्वभावं न निवर्तयितुं स्वभावमलम् ॥१॥

यदि सर्वेषां भावानां हेतौ प्रत्ययेषु च हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्र्याच्च पृथक् च सर्वत्र स्वभावो न विद्यते इति कृत्वा शून्याः सर्वभावा इति । नहि बीजे हेतुभूतेऽङ्करोऽस्ति न पृथिद्य व्यप्तेजोवाच्चादीनामैकस्मिन् प्रत्ययसंज्ञिते, न प्रत्ययेषु समग्रेषु, न हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्र्याम्, न हेतुप्रत्ययविनिर्मुक्तः पृथगेव च । यस्मादत्र सर्वत्र स्वभावो नास्ति तस्मान्निः-स्वभावोऽङ्करः । यस्मान्निःस्वभावस्तस्माच्छून्यः । यथा चायमङ्करो निःस्वभावो निःस्वभावत्वाच्च शून्यस्तथा सर्वभावा अपि निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्या ।

अत्र वयं ब्रूमः । यद्येवम्, तवापि वचनम् यदेतच्छून्याः सर्वभावा इति तदपि शून्यम् । किं कारणम् । तदपि हेतौ नास्ति महाभूतेषु संप्रयुक्तेषु विप्रयुक्तेषु वा, प्रत्ययेषु नास्त्युरः कण्ठौष्ठजिह्वादन्तमूलतालुनासिकामूर्ढंप्रभृतिषु यत्तेषु उभयसामग्र्यां नास्ति, हेतुप्रत्ययविनिर्मुक्तं पृथगेव च नास्ति । यस्मादत्र सर्वत्र नास्ति तस्मान्निःस्वभावम् । यस्मान्निःस्वभावं तस्माच्छून्यम् । तस्मादनेन सर्वभावस्वभावव्यावर्तनमशक्यं कर्तुम् । न ह्यसततनिना शक्यं दग्धम् । न ह्यसता शस्त्रेण शक्यं छेत्तुम् । न ह्यसतीभिरङ्ग्निः शक्यं क्लेदयितुम् । एवमसता वचनेन न शक्यः सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधः कर्तुम् । तत्र यद्युक्तं सर्वभावस्वभावः प्रतिषिद्ध इति तत्र ।

अथ सस्वभावमेतद् वाक्यं पूर्वा हता प्रतिज्ञा ते ।

वैषमिकत्वं तस्मिन् विशेषहेतुश्च वक्तव्यः ॥२॥

अथापि मन्यसे मा भूदेष दोष इति सस्वभावमेतद्वाक्यं सस्वभावत्वाच्चाशून्यम् तस्मादनेन सर्वभावस्वभावः प्रतिषिद्ध इति, अत्र ब्रूमः । यद्येवम्, या ते पूर्वा प्रतिज्ञा, शून्याः सर्वभावा इति, हता सा ।

किं चान्यत् । सर्वभावान्तर्गतच्च त्वद्वचनम् । कस्माच्छून्येषु सर्वभावेषु त्वद्वचनम् शून्यम्, येनाशून्यत्वात् सर्वभावस्वभावः प्रतिषिद्धः? एवं षट्कोटिको वादः प्रसवतः

स पुनः कथमिति । हन्त चेत् पुनः शून्याः सर्वभावाः, तेन त्वद्वचनं शून्यम्, सर्वभावात्-
र्गतत्वात् । तेन शून्येन प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः । तत्र यः प्रतिषेधः शून्याः सर्वभावा इति
सोऽनुपपत्तिः; उपपत्तिश्चेत् पुनः शून्याः सर्वभावा इति प्रतिषेधः, तेन त्वद्वचनमपि(प्य?)-
शून्यम् । (अ) शून्य त्वादनेन प्रतिषेधोऽनुपपत्तिः । अथ शून्याः सर्वभावास्त्वद्वचन-
ञ्चाशून्यम्, येन प्रतिषेधः, तेन त्वद्वचनं सर्वत्रासंगृहीतम् । तत्र दृष्टान्तविरोधः ।
सर्वत्र चेत्पुनः संगृहीतं त्वद्वचनं सर्वभावाश्च शून्याः, तेन तदपि शून्यम् । शून्यत्वादनेन
नास्ति प्रतिषेधः । अथ शून्यमस्ति चानेन प्रतिषेधः शून्याः सर्वभावा इति, तेन
शून्या अपि सर्वभावाः कार्यक्रियासमर्था भवेयुः । न चैतदिष्टम् । अथ शून्याः
सर्वभावाः, न च कार्यक्रियासमर्था भवति मा भूद् दृष्टान्तविरोध इति कृत्वा, शून्येन
त्वद्वचनेन सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधो नोपपत्ति इति ।

किञ्चान्यत् । एवं तदस्तित्वाद् वैषमिकत्वप्रसङ्गः किञ्चिच्छून्यम् किञ्चिद-
शून्यमिति । तर्स्मश्च वैषमिकत्वे विशेषहेतुर्वक्तव्यो येन किञ्चिच्छून्यम् किञ्चिद-
शून्यं स्यात् । स च नोपदिष्टो हेतुः । तत्र यदुक्तं शून्याः सर्वभावा इति तत्र ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

मा शब्दवदित्येतत् स्यात्ते बुद्धिं चैतदुपपत्तिम् ॥

शब्देन ह्यत्र सता भविष्यतो वारणं तस्य ॥३॥

स्यात्ते बुद्धिः, यथा नाम कश्चिद् ब्रूयान्मा शब्दं कार्णीरिति स्वयमेव शब्दं कुर्यात्तेन
च शब्देन तस्य शब्दस्य व्यावर्तनं क्रियेत, एवमेव शून्याः सर्वभावा इति शून्येन वचनेन
सर्वभावस्वभावस्य व्यावर्तनं क्रियत इति ।

अत्र वयं ब्रूमः । एतदप्यनुपपत्तिः । कि कारणम् । सता ह्यत्र शब्देन भविष्यतः
शब्दस्य प्रतिषेधः क्रियते । न पुनरिह भवतः सता वचनेन सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधः
क्रियते । तत्र हि मतेन वचनमप्यसत्, सर्वभावस्वभावोऽप्यसत् । तस्मादवं मा
शब्दवदिति विषमोपन्यासः ।

प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेधोऽप्येवमिति मतं भवेत्तदसदेव ॥
एवं तब प्रतिज्ञा लक्षणतो दूष्यते न मम ॥४॥

स्याते बुद्धिः, प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेधोऽप्यनेनैव कल्पेनानुपपन्नः, तत्र यद्ग्रावान् सर्वभाव-
स्वभावप्रतिषेधवचनं प्रतिषेधयति तदनुपपन्नमिति । अत्र वयं ब्रूमः । एतसदप्यसदेव।
कस्मात् । तब हि(एतत्?) प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तं न मम । भवान् ब्रवीति शून्याः सर्वभाव।
इति नाहम् । पूर्वकः पक्षो न मम । तत्र यदुक्तं प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेधोप्येवं सत्यनुपपन्न इति
तन्न । किञ्चान्यत्

प्रत्यक्षेण हि तावद् यद्युपलभ्य विनिवर्तयसि भावान् ।
तन्नास्ति प्रत्यक्षं भावा येनोपलभ्यन्ते ॥५॥

यदि प्रत्यक्षतः सर्वभावानुपलभ्य भावान्निवर्तयति शून्याः सर्वभावा इति तदनुपपन्नम्।
कस्मात् । प्रत्यक्षमपि हि प्रमाणं सर्वभावान्तर्गतत्वाच्छून्यम् । यो भावानुपलभते सोऽपि शून्यः ।
तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणेन नोपलभभावः, अनुपलब्धस्य च प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ।
तत्र यदुक्तं शून्याः सर्वभावा इति तदनुपपन्नम् । स्याते बुद्धिः, अनुमानेनागमेनोपमानेन
वा सर्वभावानुपलभ्य सर्वभावव्यावर्तनं क्रियत इति, अत्र ब्रूमः ।

अनुमानं प्रत्युक्तं प्रत्यक्षेणागमोपमाने च ॥
अनुमानागमसाध्या येऽर्था दृष्टान्तसाध्याश्च ॥६॥

अनुमानोपमानागमाश्च प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणेन प्रत्युक्ताः । यथा हि प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं
शून्यम्, सर्वभावानां शून्यत्वादेवमनुमानोपमानागमा अपि शून्याः, सर्वभावानां
शून्यत्वात् । येनुमानसाध्या अर्था आगमसाध्या उपमानसाध्याश्च तेऽपि शून्याः।
सर्वभावानां शून्यत्वात् । अनुमानोपमानागमैश्च यो भावानुपलभते सोऽपि शून्यः
तस्माद्ग्रावानामुपलभाभावोऽनुपलब्धानान्व स्वभावप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः । तत्र यदुक्तं
शून्याः सर्वभावा इति तन्न ।
किञ्चान्यत्

कुशलानां धर्मणां धर्मविस्थाविदश्च मन्यन्ते ।

कुशलं जनाः स्वभावं शोषेष्वप्येष विनियोगः ॥७॥

इह जना धर्मविस्थाविदो मन्यन्ते कुशलानां धर्मणामेकोनविशशतम् । तद्यथैकदेशो विज्ञानस्य वेदनायाः संज्ञायाश्चेतनायाः स्पर्शस्य मनसिकारस्य छन्दस्याधिमोक्षस्य वीर्यस्य स्मृतेः समाधेः प्रज्ञाया उपेक्षायाः प्रयोगस्य संप्रयोगस्य प्राप्तेररध्याशयस्या— प्रतिघस्य रतेव्यवसायस्यौत्सुक्यस्योन्मुखेरत्साहस्याविधातस्य वशितायाः प्रतिधातस्या— विप्रतिसारस्य परिग्रहस्यापरिग्रहस्य... धृतेररध्यवसायस्यानौत्सुक्यस्यानुन्मुखेरत्साहस्य प्रार्थनायाः प्रणिधेर्मदस्य विषयाणां विप्रयोगस्यानैर्याणिकताया उत्पादस्य स्थितेरनि- त्यतायाः समन्वागमस्य जरायाः परितापस्यारत्वितर्कस्य प्रीतेः प्रसादस्य...प्रेमणः प्रतिकूलस्य प्रदक्षिणग्राहस्य वैशारद्यस्य गौरवस्य चित्रीकारस्य भक्तेरभक्तेः शुश्रुषाया आदरस्यानादरस्य प्रश्वव्यहृत्स्य वाचो विस्पन्दनायाः सिद्धस्याप्रसादस्याप्रश्वव्यः.. दाक्षस्य सौरत्यस्य विप्रतिसारस्य शोकस्योपायासायासस्य...अप्रदक्षिणग्राहस्य संशयस्य संवराणां परिशुद्धेरध्यात्मसंप्रसादस्य भीरुतायाः, श्रद्धा ह्रीराज्वमवच्चनमुपशमोऽ- चापलमप्रमोदो मार्दवं प्रतिसंख्यानं निर्वैरपरिदाहावमदोऽलोभोऽदोषोऽमोहः सर्वज्ञता— प्रतिनिःसर्गो विभवोऽपत्राप्यमपरिच्छादनं मननं कारणं मैत्र्यदीनतारणा... अनुपना— होऽनीर्या चेतसोऽपर्यादानं क्षत्तिव्यवसर्गोऽसौरत्यं परिभोगान्वयः पुण्यमसंज्ञिसमापत्ति— नैर्याणिकतासर्वज्ञतासंस्कृता धर्मा इत्येकोनविशशतं कुशलानां धर्मणां कुशलः स्वभावः तथाऽकुशलानां धर्मणामकुशलः स्वभावः, निवृताव्याकृतानां निवृताव्याकृतः, प्रकृत- व्याकृतानां प्रकृताव्याकृतः, कामोक्तानां कामोक्तः रूपोक्तानां रूपोक्तः, आरूप्योक्ता- नामरूप्योक्तः, अनास्त्रवाणामनास्त्रवः, दुःखसमुदयनिरोधर्मार्गोक्तानां दुःखसमुदय- निरोधर्मार्गोक्तः, भावनाप्रहातव्यानां भावनाप्रहातव्यः, अप्रहातव्यानामप्रहातव्यः यस्मादेवमनेकप्रकारो धर्मस्वभावो दृष्टस्तस्माद् यदुक्तं निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावानि:स्व। भावत्वाच्छूल्या इति तत्र ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

नैर्याणिकस्वभावो धर्मा नैर्याणिकाश्च ये तेषाम् ।

धर्मविस्थोक्तानामेवमनैर्याणिकादीनाम् ॥८॥

इह च धर्मविस्थोक्तानां नैर्याणिकानां धर्मणां नैर्याणिकः स्वभावः, अनैर्याणि-
कानामनैर्याणिकः, बोध्यंगिकानां बोध्यंगिकः, अबोध्यंगिकानामबोध्यंगिकः, बोधि-
पक्षिकाणां बोधिपक्षिकः, अबोधिपक्षिकाणामबोधिपक्षिकः। एवमपि शेषाणाम् ।
तद्यस्मादेवमनेकप्रकारो धर्मणां स्वभावो दृष्टस्तस्माद् यदुक्तं निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा
निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्या इति तत्र ।
किञ्चान्यत् ।

यदि च न भवेत्स्वभावो धर्मणां निःस्वभाव इत्येव ।
नामापि भवेत्त्वैव नाम हि निर्वस्तुकं नास्ति ॥६॥

यदि सर्वधर्मणां स्वभावो न भवेत्तत्रापि निःस्वभावो भवेत् । तत्र निःस्वभाव
इत्येवं नामापि न भवेत् । कस्मात् । नाम हि निर्वस्तुकं किञ्चिदपि नास्ति । तस्मा-
त्तामसद्भावात् स्वभावो भावानामस्ति स्वभावसद्भावाच्चाशून्याः सर्वभावाः । तस्माद्
यदुक्तं निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्या इति तत्र ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

अथ विद्यते स्वभावः स च धर्मणां न विद्यते तस्मात् ॥
धर्मविना स्वभावः स यस्य तद्युक्तमुपदेष्टुम् ॥१०॥

अथ मन्यसे मा भूदवस्तुकं नामेति कृत्वास्ति स्वभावः, स पुनर्धर्मणां न संभवति,
एवं धर्मशून्यता निःस्वभावत्वाद् धर्मणां सिद्धा भविष्यति, न च निर्वस्तुकं नामेति, अत्र
वयं द्रूमः । एवं यस्येदानीं स स्वभावो धर्मविनिर्मुक्तस्यार्थस्य स युक्तमुपदेष्टुमर्थः ।
स च नोपदिष्टः । तस्माद् या कल्पनास्ति स्वभावो न स पुनर्धर्मणामिति सा हीना ।
किञ्चान्यत् ।

सत एवप्रतिषेधो नास्ति घटो गेह इत्ययं यस्मात् ॥
दृष्टः प्रतिषेधोऽयं सतः स्वभावस्य ते तस्मात् ॥११॥

इह च सतोर्धस्य प्रतिषेधः क्रियते नासतः । तद्यथा नास्ति घटो गेह इति सतो
घटस्य प्रतिषेधः क्रियते नासतः । एवमेव नास्ति स्वभावो धर्मणामिति सतः स्वभावस्य
प्रतिषेधः प्राप्नोति नासतः । तत्र यदुक्तं निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा इति तत्र । प्रतिषेध-
संभवादेव सर्वभावस्वभावोऽप्रतिषिद्धः ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

अथ नास्ति स स्वभावः किं नु प्रतिषिद्धयते त्वयानेन ।

वचनेनर्ते वचनात्प्रतिषेधः सिद्धति (१) ह्यसतः ॥१२॥

अथ नास्त्येव स स्वभावः अनेन वचनेन 'निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा' इति किं भवता
प्रतिषिद्धयते । असतो हि वचनाद्विना सिद्धःप्रतिषेधः, तद्यथाग्नेः शैत्यस्य अपामौष्ण्यस्य।
किञ्चान्यत् ।

बालानामिव मिथ्या मृगतृष्णायां यथा जलग्राहः ।

एवं मिथ्याग्राहः स्यात्ते प्रतिषेधतो (२) ह्यसतः ॥१३॥

स्यात्ते वुद्धिः, यथा बालानां मृगतृष्णायां मिथ्या जलमिति ग्राहो भवति, ननु निर्जला
सा मृगतृष्णेति तत्र पण्डितजातीयेन पुरुषेणोच्यते तस्य ग्राहस्य विनिवर्तनार्थम् । एवं
निःस्वभावेषु यः स्वभावे ग्राहः सत्त्वानां तस्य व्यावर्तनार्थं निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा
त्युच्यत इति ।

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

नन्वेवं सत्यस्ति ग्राहो ग्राहा' च तद्ग्रहीता च ॥

प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषेद्वा चेति षट्कमृतत् ॥१४॥

यदेवम्, अस्ति तावत्सत्त्वानां ग्राहः, अस्ति ग्राह्यम्, सत्त्विच तद्ग्रहीतारः, अस्ति
प्रतिषेधस्तस्यापि मिथ्याग्राहस्यास्ति प्रतिषेध्यं यदिदं मिथ्याग्राहो नाम, सन्ति च प्रति-
षेदारो युष्मदादयोऽस्य ग्राहस्येति सिद्धं षट्कम् । तस्य षट्कस्य सिद्धत्वाद् यदुक्तं
शन्याः सर्वभावा इति तत्र ।

अथ नैवास्ति ग्राहो नैव ग्राहां न च ग्रहीतारः ।
प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषेद्वारो ननु न सन्ति ॥१५॥

अथ मा भूदेष दोष इति कृत्वा नैव ग्राहोऽस्ति नैव ग्राहां न च ग्रहीतार इत्येवं सति
हस्य यः प्रतिषेधो निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः इति सोऽपि नास्ति, प्रतिषेध्यमपि नास्ति,
प्रतिषेद्वारोऽपि न सन्ति ।

प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषेद्वारश्च यद्युत न सन्ति ।
सिद्धा हि सर्वभावास्तेषामेव स्वभावश्च ॥१६॥

यदि च न प्रतिषेधो न प्रतिषेध्यं न प्रतिषेद्वारः सन्त्यप्रतिषिद्धाः सर्वभावा अस्ति च
सर्वभावानां स्वभावः ।
किञ्चान्यत् ।

हेतोश्च ते न सिद्धिर्निःस्वाभाव्यात् कुतो हि ते हेतुः ।
निर्हेतुकस्य सिद्धिर्न चोपपन्नास्य तेऽर्थस्य ॥१७॥

निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा इत्येतस्मिन्नर्थे ते हेतोरसिद्धिः । किं कारणम् । निःस्व-
भावत्वाद्वि सर्वभावानां शून्यत्वात्तो हेतुः कुतः । असति हेतौ निर्हेतुकस्यार्थस्य शून्याः
सर्वभावा इति कुत एव प्रसिद्धिः । तत्र यदुक्तं शून्याः सर्वभावा इति तत्र ।
किञ्चान्यत् ।

यदि चाहेतोः सिद्धिः स्वभावविनिवर्तनस्य ते भवति ॥
स्वाभाव्यस्यास्तित्वं ममापि निर्हेतुकं सिद्धम् ॥१८॥

अथ मन्यसे निर्हेतुकी(का) सिद्धिनिःस्वभावत्वस्य भावानामिति यथा तत्र स्वभाव-
विनिवर्तनं निर्हेतुकं सिद्धं तथा ममापि स्वभावसद्वावो निर्हेतुकः सिद्धः ।

अथ हेतोरस्तित्वं भावास्वाभाव्यम् इत्यनुपपन्नम् ॥
लोकेषु निःस्वभावो न हि कश्चन विद्यते भावः ॥१६॥

यदि हेतोरस्तित्वं मन्यसे निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा इति, तदनुपपन्नम् । किं कारणम् ।
न हि लोके निःस्वभावः कश्चच्छ्रावोऽस्ति ।
किञ्चान्यत् ।

पूर्वं चेत्प्रतिषेधः पश्चात्प्रतिषेधमित्यनुपपन्नम् ॥
पश्चाच्चानुपपन्नो युगपच्च यतः स्वभावः सन् ॥२०॥

इह पूर्वं चेत्प्रतिषेधः पश्चाच्च प्रतिषेधमिति नोपपन्नम् । असति हि प्रतिषेध्य
कस्य प्रतिषेधः । अथ पश्चात्प्रतिषेधः पूर्वं प्रतिषेधमिति च नोपपन्नम् । सिद्धे हि
प्रतिषेध्ये किं प्रतिषेधः करोति । अथ युगपत् प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेध्ये इति तथापि न प्रतिषेधः
प्रतिषेध्यस्यार्थस्य कारणम्, प्रतिषेध्यो न प्रतिषेधस्य च । यथा युगपदुत्पन्नयोः
शशविषाणयोर्नैव दक्षिणं सव्यस्य कारणं सव्यं वा दक्षिणस्य कारणं भवतीति । तत्र
यद्युक्तं निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा इति तत्र २ ।

अत्रोच्यते । यत्तावद्वतोक्तं

सर्वेषां भावानां सर्वत्र न विद्यते स्वभावश्चेत् ।
तद्वच्चनमस्वभावं न निवर्तयितुं स्वभावमलम् ॥इति

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्र्यां च पृथक् चापि मद्द्वचो न यदि ॥
ननु शून्यत्वं सिद्धं भावानामस्वभावत्वात् ॥२१॥

यदि मद्द्वचो हेतौ नास्ति महाभूतेषु संप्रयुक्तेषु विप्रयुक्तेषु वा, प्रत्ययेषु नास्त्युरः-
कण्ठाष्ठजिह्वादन्तमूलतालुनासिकामूर्द्धप्रभृतिषु यत्नेषु, नोभयसामग्र्यामस्ति, हेतु-

१ प्रतिषेधषेष्य इति (J K) २—cf. NS. II. १-१२-१४

प्रत्ययसामग्रीविनिर्मुक्तं पृथगेव च नास्ति, तस्मान्निःस्वभावम्, निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्यम्। ननु शून्यत्वं सिद्धं निःस्वभावत्वादस्य मदीयवच्चसः । यथा चैतन्मद्वचनं निःस्वभावत्वा-च्छून्यं तथा सर्वभावा अपि निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्या इति । तत्र यद्भूवतोक्तं त्वदीयवच्चसः शून्यत्वाच्छून्यता सर्वभावानां नोपपद्यत इति तज्ज ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

यश्च प्रतीत्यभावो भावानां शून्यतेति सा प्रोक्ता ॥
यश्च प्रतीत्यभावो भवति हि तस्यास्वभावत्वम् ॥२२॥

शून्यतार्थं च भवान् भावानामनवसाय प्रवृत्त उपालम्भं वक्तुं त्वद्वचनस्य निःस्व-भावत्वाद्भावानां स्वभावप्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यत इति । इह हि यः प्रतीत्यभावो भावानां सा शून्यता । कस्मात् । निःस्वभावत्वात् । ये हि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्ना भावास्ते न सस्वभावा भवन्ति स्वभावाभावात् । कस्मात् । हेतुप्रत्ययसापेक्षत्वात् । यदि हि स्व-भावतो भावा भवेयुः, प्रत्याख्यायापि हेतुप्रत्ययञ्च भवेयुः । न चैवं भवन्ति । तस्मा-निःस्वभावा निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्या इत्यभिधीयन्ते । एवं मदीयमपि वचनं प्रतीत्य-समुत्पन्नत्वान्निःस्वभावं निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्यमित्युपपन्नम् । यथा च प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न-त्वात् स्वभावशून्या अपि रथपटघटादयः स्वेषु स्वेषु कार्येषु काष्ठतृणमृत्तिकाहरणं मधूदकपयसां धारणे शीतवातातपरित्राणप्रभृतिषु वर्तन्ते, एवमिदं मदीयवचनं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वान्निःस्वभावमपि निःस्वभावत्वप्रसाधने भावानां वर्तते । तत्र यदुक्तं निःस्वभावत्वात् त्वदीयवचनस्य शून्यत्वं, शून्यत्वात्स्य च तेन सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधो नेपपन्न इति तज्ज ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

निर्मितको निर्मितकं मायापुरुषः स्वमायया सृष्टम् ॥
प्रतिषेधयेत यद्भूत् प्रतिषेधोऽयं तथैव स्यात् ॥२३॥

यथा निर्मितकः पुरुषोऽन्यं निर्मितकं पुरुषं कर्स्मिश्चिदर्थं वर्तमानं प्रतिषेधयेत् मायाकारेण वा सृष्टो मायापुरुषोऽन्यं मायापुरुषं स्वमायया सृष्टं कर्स्मिश्चिदर्थं वर्तमानं

प्रतिषेधयेत् । तत्र यो निर्मितकः पुरुषः प्रतिषिद्ध्यते सोऽपि शून्यः । यः प्रतिषेधयति सोऽपि शून्यः । यो मायापुरुषः प्रतिषिद्ध्यते सोऽपि शून्यः । यः प्रतिषेधयति सोऽपि शून्यः । एवमेव मद्भवतेन शून्येनापि सर्वभावानां स्वभावप्रतिषेध उपपन्नः । तत्र यद्भवतोक्तं शून्यत्वात्त्वद्भवनस्य सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधो नोपपन्न इति तत्त्व । तत्र यो भवता षट्कोटिको वाद उक्तः सोऽपि तेनैव प्रतिषिद्धः । नैव ह्येवं सति न सर्वभावान्तर्गतं मद्भवनं, नास्त्यशून्यम्, नापि सर्वभावा अशून्याः ।

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्

अथ स्वभावमेतद्वाक्यं पूर्वा हता प्रतिज्ञा ते ।
वैषमिकत्वं तस्मिन् विशेषहेतुश्च वक्तव्यः ॥इति
अत्रापि बूमः ।

न स्वाभाविकमेतद्वाक्यं तस्मान्न वादहानिमें ।
नास्ति च वैषमिकत्वं विशेषहेतुश्च न निगाद्यः ॥२४॥

न तावन्ममैतद्भवनं प्रतीत्यसमुपश्नत्वात् स्वभावोपपन्नम् । यथा पूर्वमुक्तं स्वभावा नुपपन्नत्वाच्छून्यमिति । यस्माच्चेदमपि मद्भवनं शून्यं शेषा अपि सर्वभावाः शून्याः तस्मान्नास्ति वैषमिकत्वम् । यदि हि वयं बूम इदं वचनमशून्यं शेषाः सर्वभावाः शून्याः इति ततो वैषमिकत्वं स्यात् । न चैतदेवम् । तस्मान्न वैषमिकत्वम् । यस्माच्च वैषमिकत्वं न संभवतीदं वचनमशून्यं शेषाः पुनः सर्वभावाः शून्या इति, तस्मादस्माभिर्विशेषहेतुन् वक्तव्योऽजेन हेतुनेदं वचनमशून्यं सर्वभावाः पुनः शून्या इति । तत्र यद्भवतोक्तं वादहानिस्ते वैषमिकत्वं च विशेषहेतुश्च त्वया वक्तव्य इति तत्त्व ।

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्

मा शब्दविदित्येतत्स्याते बुद्धिर्न चैतदृपपन्नम् ।
शब्देन ह्यत्र सता भविष्यतो वारणं तस्य ॥ इति

अत्र बूमः ।

मा शब्दवदिति नायं दृष्टान्तो यस्त्वया समारब्धः ॥

शब्देन तच्च शब्दस्य वारणं नैवमेवैतत् ॥२५॥

नाप्ययमस्माकं दृष्टान्तः । यथा कश्चिन् मा शब्दं कार्षीरिति ब्रुवन् शब्दमेव करोति
शब्दं च प्रतिषेधयति, तद्वत् तच्छून्यं वचनं न शून्यतां प्रतिषेधयति । किं कारणम् ।
अत्र हि दृष्टान्ते शब्देन शब्दस्य व्यावर्तनं क्रियते । न चैतदेवम् । वयं ब्रूमो निःस्वभावाः
सर्वभावा निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्या इति । किं कारणम् ।

नैःस्वभाव्यानां चेत्तैःस्वभाव्येन वारणं यदि हि ।

नैःस्वभाव्यनिवृत्तौ स्वभाव्यं हि प्रसिद्धं स्यात् ॥२६॥

यथा मा शब्दं कार्षीरिति शब्देन शब्दस्य व्यावर्तनं क्रियते, एवं यदि नैःस्वभाव्येन
वचनेन नैःस्वभाव्यानां भावानां व्यावर्तनं क्रियते ततोऽयं दृष्टान्त उपपक्षः स्यात् ।
इह तु नैःस्वभाव्येन वचनेन भावानां स्वभावप्रतिषेधः क्रियते । यदि नैःस्वभाव्येन
वचनेन भावानां नैःस्वभाव्यप्रतिषेधः क्रियते नैःस्वभाव्यप्रतिषिद्धत्वादेव भावाः
सस्वभावा भवेयुः । सस्वभावत्वादशून्याः स्युः । शून्यतां च वयं भावानामाचक्षमहे
नाशून्यतामित्यदृष्टान्त एवायमिति ।

अथवा निर्मितकायां यथा स्त्रियां स्त्रीयमित्यसद्ग्राहम् ॥

निर्मितकः प्रतिहन्यात् कस्यचिदेवं भवेदेतत् ॥२७॥

अथवा यथा कस्यचित्पुरुषस्य निर्मितकायां स्त्रियां स्वभावशून्यायां परमार्थं तु
स्त्रीयमित्यसद्ग्राहः स्यात्, एवं तस्यां तेनासद्ग्राहेत् स रागमुत्पादयेत् । तथागतेन:
वा तथागतश्रावकेण वा निर्मितको निर्मितकः स्यात् । तथागताधिष्ठानेन वा तथागत-
श्रावकाधिष्ठानेन वा स तस्य तमसद्ग्राहं विनिवर्तयेत् । एवमेव निर्मितकोपमेन
शून्येन मधुचनेन निर्मितकस्त्रीसद्वेषु सर्वभावेषु निःस्वभावेषु योऽयं स्वभावग्राहः स
निवर्त्यते । तस्मादयमत्र दृष्टान्तः शून्यताप्रसाधनं प्रत्युपपद्यमानो नेतरः ।

अथवा साध्यसमोऽयं हेतुर्न हि विद्यते ध्वनेः सत्ता ॥

संव्यवहारं च वयं नानभ्युपगम्य कथयामः ॥२८॥

मा शब्दवदिति साध्यसम एवायं हेतुः । कस्मात् । सर्वभावानां नैःस्वाभाव्येनाविशिष्टत्वात् । न हि तस्य ध्वनेः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् स्वभावसत्ता विद्यते । तस्याः स्वभावसत्ताया अविद्यमानत्वाद्युक्तं शब्देन ह्यत्र सता भविष्यतो वारणं तस्येति तदव्याहृत्यते ।

अपि च न वयं व्यवहारसत्यमनभ्युपगम्य व्यवहारसत्यं प्रत्याख्याय कथयामः शून्याः सर्वभावा इति । न हि व्यवहारसत्यमनागम्य शक्या धर्मदेशना कर्तुम् । यथोक्तं-व्यवहारमनाश्रित्य परमार्थे न देश्यते ।

परमार्थमनागम्य निर्वाणं नाधिगम्यत ॥ इति

तस्मान्मद्वचनवच्छून्याः सर्वभावाः सर्वभावानां च निःस्वभावत्वमुभयथोपपद्ममानमिति ।

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्

प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेधोऽप्येवमिति मतं भवेत् तदसदेव ।

एवं तव प्रतिज्ञा लक्षणतो दूष्यते न मम ॥ इति

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

यदि काचन प्रतिज्ञा स्यान्मे तत एष मे भवेद्दोषः ।

नास्ति च मम प्रतिज्ञा तस्मान्नैवास्ति मे दोषः ॥२९॥

यदि च काचन मम प्रतिज्ञा स्यात् ततो मम प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तत्वात्पूर्वको दोषो यथा त्वयोक्तस्तथा मम स्यात् । न मम काचिदस्ति प्रतिज्ञा । तस्मात् सर्वभावेषु शून्येष्वत्यन्तोपशान्तेषु प्रकृतिविविक्तेषु कुतः प्रतिज्ञा । कुतः प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तिः । कुतः प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तिकृतो दोषः ।

तत्र यद्भवतोक्तं तव प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तत्वात्तवैव दोष इति तत्र ।

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्

प्रत्यक्षेण हि तावद्युपलभ्य विनिवर्तयसि भावान् ।
तन्नास्ति प्रत्यक्षं भावा येनोपलभ्यन्ते ॥

अनुमानं प्रत्युक्तं प्रत्यक्षेणागमोपमाने च ।
अनुमानागमसाध्या येऽर्था दृष्टान्तसाध्याश्च ॥ इति
अत्र वयं ब्रूमः ।

यदि किञ्चिदुपलभेय प्रवर्तयेयं निवर्तयेयं वा ।
प्रत्यक्षादिभिर्येष्टदभावान्मेऽनुपालभ्यः ॥ ३० ॥

यद्याहं किञ्चिदर्थमुपलभेय प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानागमैश्चतुर्भिः प्रमाणैश्चतुर्णां वा
प्रमाणानामन्यतमेन, अत एव प्रवर्तयेयं वा निवर्तयेयं वा । यतोऽर्थमेवाहं किञ्चिच्चन्नो
पलभे तस्मान्न प्रवर्तयामि न निवर्तयामि ।

तत्रैवं सति यो भवतोपालभ्य उक्तो यदि प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणानामन्यतमेनोपलभ्य
भावान्विनिवर्तयसि ननु तानि प्रमाणानि न सन्ति, तैश्च प्रमाणैरपि गम्या अर्था न
सन्तीति स मे भवत्येवानुपालभ्यः ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

यदि च प्रमाणतस्ते तेषां तेषां प्रसिद्धिरथनाम् ।
तेषां पुनः प्रसिद्धं ब्रूहि कथं ते प्रमाणानाम् ॥ ३१ ॥

यदि च प्रमाणतस्तेषां तेषामर्थानां प्रमेयाणां प्रसिद्धं मन्यसे यथा मानैर्मेयानाम्,
तेषामिदानीं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानागमानां चतुर्णां प्रमाणानां कुतः प्रसिद्धिः । यदि
तावन्निष्प्रमाणानां प्रमाणानां स्यात्प्रसिद्धिः, प्रमाणतोऽर्थानां प्रसिद्धिरिति हीयते
प्रतिज्ञा । तथापि ।

अन्यर्थदि प्रमाणैः प्रमाणसिद्धिर्भवेत्तदनवस्था ।

यदि पुनर्मन्यसे प्रमाणैः प्रमेयाणां प्रसिद्धिस्तेषां प्रमाणानामन्यैः प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिरेव-
मनवस्थाप्रसंगः । अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गे को दोषः ।

नादेः सिद्धिस्तत्रास्ति नैव मध्यस्य नात्यस्य ॥३२॥

अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गं आदेः सिद्धिर्नास्ति । किं कारणम् । तेषामपि हि प्रमाणानामन्यै
प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिस्तेषामन्यैरिति नास्त्यादिः । आदेरसङ्घावात् कुतो मध्यं कुतोऽन्तः ।
तस्मातेषां प्रमाणानामन्यैः प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिरिति यदुक्तं तत्रोपपद्यत इति ।

तेषामथ प्रमाणैविना प्रसिद्धिवीयते वादः ॥
वैषमिकत्वं तस्मिन् विशेषहेतुश्च वक्तव्यः ॥३३॥

अथ मन्यसे तेषां प्रमाणानां विना प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिः, प्रमेयाणां पुनरथनां प्रमाणैः
प्रसिद्धिरिति, एवं सति यस्ते वादः प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिरथनाम् इति स हीयते । वैषमिकत्वं
च भवति केषांचिदर्थानां प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिः केषांचिन्नेति । विशेषहेतुश्च वक्तव्यो येन
हेतुना केषांचिदर्थानां प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिः केषांचिन्नेति । स च नोपदिष्टः । तस्मादिय-
पि कल्पना नोपपन्नेति ।

अत्राह । प्रमाणान्येव स्वात्मानं परात्मानञ्च प्रसाधयन्ति । यथोक्तं

द्योतयति स्वात्मानं यथा हृताशस्तथा परात्मानम् ।

स्वपरात्मानावेवं प्रसाधयन्ति प्रमाणानि ॥ इति

यथाग्निः स्वात्मानं परात्मानञ्च प्रकाशयति तथैव प्रमाणानि प्रसाधयन्ति स्वात्मानं
परात्मानञ्चेति ।

अत्रोच्यते

विषमोपन्यासोऽयं न ह्यात्मानं प्रकाशयत्यग्निः ॥
न हि तस्यानुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा तमसीव कुम्भस्य ॥३४॥

विषम एवोपन्यासोऽग्निवत् प्रमाणानि स्वात्मानञ्च प्रसाधयन्ति परात्मानञ्च
प्रसाधयन्तीति । न ह्यग्निरात्मानं प्रकाशयति । यथा प्रागेवाग्निनाऽप्रकाशितस्तमसि
कुम्भो नोपलभ्यते उथोत्तरकालमुपलभ्यते अग्निना प्रकाशितः सन्, एवमेव यद्यप्रकाशितः

प्राग्गिनिस्तमसि स्यादुत्तरकालमग्नेः प्रकाशनं स्यात्, अतः स्वात्मानं प्रकाशयेत्। न चैतदेवम्। तस्मादित्यमपि कल्पना नोपपद्यते इति।

किञ्चान्यत्।

यदि च स्वात्मानमयं त्वद्वचनेन प्रकाशयत्यग्निः।

परमिव नन्वात्मानं परिधक्षयत्यपि हुताशः॥३५॥

यदि च त्वद्वचनेन यथा परात्मानं प्रकाशयत्यग्निरेवमेव स्वात्मानमपि प्रकाशयति, ननु यथा परात्मानं दहत्येवमेव स्वात्मानमपि धक्षयति। न चैतदेवम्। तत्र यदुक्तं परात्मानमिव स्वात्मानमपि प्रकाशयत्यग्निरिति तत्र।

यदि च स्वपरात्मानौ त्वद्वचनेन प्रकाशयत्यग्निः॥

प्रच्छादयिष्यति तमः स्वपरात्मानौ हुताश इव॥३६॥

यदि च भवतो मतेन स्वपरात्मानौ प्रकाशयत्यग्निः, नन्विदानीं तत्प्रतिपक्षभूतं तमोऽपि स्वपरात्मानौ छादयेत्। न चैतद् दृष्टम्। तत्र यदुक्तं स्वपरात्मानौ प्रकाशयत्यग्निरिति तत्र।

किञ्चान्यत्।

नास्ति तमश्च ज्वलने यत्र च तिष्ठति परात्मनि ज्वलनः॥

कुरुते कथं प्रकाशं स हि प्रकाशोऽधकारवधः॥३७॥

इह चाग्नौ नास्ति तमो नापि च यत्राग्निस्तत्रास्ति तमः। प्रकाशश्च नाम तमसः प्रतिधातः। यस्माच्चाग्नौ नास्ति तमो नापि च यत्राग्निस्तत्रास्ति तमः, तत्र कस्य तमसः प्रतिधातमग्निः करोति यस्य प्रतिधातादग्निः स्वपरात्मानौ प्रकाशयतीति।

अत्राह। ननु यस्मादेवं नाम्नौ तमोऽस्ति नापि यत्राग्निस्तत्र तमोऽस्ति, तस्मादेव स्वपरात्मानौ न प्रकाशयत्यग्निः, कुरुतः। तेन ह्यत्पद्मानेनैवाग्निना तमसः प्रतिधातः। तस्मान्नाग्नौ तमोऽस्ति नापि यत्राग्निस्तत्र तमोऽस्ति यस्मादुत्पद्मान एवोभयं प्रकाशयत्यग्निः स्वात्मानं परात्मानंचेति। अत्रोच्यते।

उत्पद्यमान एव प्रकाशयत्यग्निरित्यसद्वादः ॥

उत्पद्यमान एव प्राप्नोति तमो न हि हुताशः ॥३८॥

अयमग्निरुपद्यमान एव प्रकाशयति स्वात्मानं परात्मानं चेति नायमुपद्यते वादः ।
कस्मात् । नह्युत्पद्यमान एवाग्निस्तमः प्राप्नोति, अप्राप्तत्वान्नैवोपहन्ति तमसश्चा-
नुपधातान्नास्ति प्रकाशः ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

अप्राप्तोऽपि ज्वलनो यदि वा पुनरन्धकारमुपहन्यात् ॥

सर्वेषु लोकधातुषु तमोऽयमिह संस्थितो हन्यात् ॥३९॥

अथापि मन्यसेऽप्राप्तोऽप्यग्निरन्धकारमुपहन्तीति नन्विदानीमिह संस्थितोऽग्निः सर्व-
लोकधातुस्थमुपहन्त्यति तमस्तुल्यायामप्राप्तौ । न चैतदेवं दृष्टंम् । तस्मादप्राप्यैवा-
ग्निरन्धकारमुपहन्तीति यदिष्टं तत्र ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

यदि स्वतश्च प्रमाणसिद्धिरनपेक्ष्य तव प्रमेयाणि ॥

भवति प्रमाणसिद्धिर्न परमपेक्षा स्वतः सिद्धिः ॥४०॥

यदि चाग्निवत् स्वतः प्रमाणसिद्धिरिति मन्यसे, अनपेक्षायापि प्रमेयानर्थात् प्रमाणानां
प्रसिद्धिर्भविष्यति । किं कारणंम् । न हि स्वतः सिद्धिः परमपेक्षते । अथपेक्षते न
स्वतः सिद्धिः । अत्राह यदि नापेक्षन्ते प्रमेयानर्थात् प्रमाणानि को दोषो भविष्यतीति ।
अत्रोच्यते ।

अनपेक्ष्य हि प्रमेयानर्थात् यदि ते प्रमाणसिद्धिरिति ॥

न भवन्ति कस्यचिदेवमिमानि तानि प्रमाणानि ॥४१॥

यदि प्रमेयानर्थानपेक्ष्य प्रसिद्धिर्भवति प्रमाणानामित्येवं तरनीमानि प्रमाणानि न
कस्यचित् प्रमाणानि भवन्ति । एवं दोषः । अथ कस्यचिद्द्रुवन्ति प्रमाणानि नैवे-
दानीमनपेक्ष्य प्रमेयानर्थात् प्रमाणानि भवन्ति ।

अथ मतमपेक्ष्य सिद्धिस्तेषामित्यत्र भवति को दोषः ।
सिद्धस्य साधनं स्यान्नासिद्धोऽपेक्षते ह्यन्यत् ॥४२॥

अथापि मतमपेक्ष्य प्रमेयानर्थान् प्रमाणानां सिद्धिर्भवतीति, एवं सिद्धस्य प्रमाण-
चतुष्टयस्य साधनं भवति । किं कारणम् । न ह्यसिद्धस्यार्थस्यापेक्षणं भवति । न
ह्यसिद्धो देवदत्तः कंचिदर्थमपेक्षते । न च सिद्धस्य साधनमिष्टं कृतस्य कारणानुप-
पत्तेरिति ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

सिध्यन्ति हि प्रमेयाण्यपेक्ष्य यदि सर्वथा प्रमाणानि ॥

भवति प्रमेयसिद्धिनपिक्षयैव प्रमाणानि ॥४३॥

यदि प्रमेयाण्यपेक्ष्य प्रमाणानि सिध्यन्ति नेदानीं प्रमाणान्यपेक्ष्य प्रमेयाणि सिध्यन्ति
किं कारणम् । न हि साध्यं साधनं साधयति साधनानि च किल प्रमेयाणां
प्रमाणानि । किञ्चान्यत् ।

यदि च प्रमेयसिद्धिनपिक्षयैव भवति प्रमाणानि ।

किं ते प्रमाणसिद्ध्या तानि यदर्थं प्रसिद्धं तत् ॥४४॥

यदि च मन्यसेऽपेक्षयैव प्रमाणानि प्रमेयाणां प्रसिद्धिर्भवतीति किमिदानीं ते प्रमाण-
सिद्ध्या पर्यन्विष्टया । किं कारणम् । यदर्थं हि तानि प्रमाणानि पर्यन्विष्येरन् ते प्रमेया
अर्था विनापि प्रमाणैः सिद्धाः । तत्र किं प्रमाणैः कृत्यम् ।

अथ तु प्रमाणसिद्धिर्भवत्यपेक्षयैव ते प्रमेयाणि ॥

व्यत्यय एवं सति ते ध्रुवं प्रमाणप्रमेयाणाम् ॥४५॥

अथापि मन्यसेऽपेक्षयैव प्रमेयानर्थान् प्रमाणानि भवन्तीति मा भूत्युर्वोक्तदोष इति
कृत्वा, एवं ते सति व्यत्ययः प्रमाणप्रमेयाणां भवति । प्रमाणानि ते प्रमेयाणि भवन्ति
प्रमेयैः साधितत्वात् । प्रमेयाणि च प्रमाणानि भवन्ति प्रमाणानां साधकत्वात् ।

^१ अथ ते प्रमाणसिद्ध्या प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमेयसिद्ध्या च ॥

भवति प्रमाणसिद्धिनस्त्युभयस्यापि ते सिद्धिः ॥४६॥

अथ मन्यसे प्रमाणसिद्धया प्रमेयसिद्धिर्भवति प्रमाणापेक्षत्वात् प्रमेयसिद्धया च प्रमाणसिद्धिर्भवति प्रमेयापेक्षत्वादिति, एवं ते सत्युभयस्यापि सिद्धिर्भवति । किं कारणम् ।

सिद्ध्यन्ति हि प्रमाणैर्यदि प्रमेयाणि तानि तैरेव ॥

साध्यानि च प्रमेयैस्तानि कथं साधयिष्यन्ति ॥४७॥

यदि हि प्रमाणैः प्रमेयाणि सिद्ध्यन्ति तानि च प्रमाणानि तैरेव प्रमेयैः साधयितव्यानि नन्वसिद्धेषु प्रमेयेषु कारणस्यासिद्धत्वादसिद्धानि कथं साधयिष्यन्ति प्रमेयाणि ।

सिद्ध्यन्ति च प्रमेयैर्यदि प्रमाणानि तानि तैरेव ॥

साध्यानि च प्रमाणैस्तानि कथं साधयिष्यन्ति ॥४८॥

यदि च प्रमेयैः प्रमाणानि सिद्ध्यन्ति तानि च प्रमेयाणि तैरेव प्रमाणैः साधयितव्यानि नन्वसिद्धेषु प्रमाणेषु कारणस्यासिद्धत्वादसिद्धानि कथं साधयिष्यन्ति प्रमाणानि ।

पित्रा यद्युत्पादः पुत्रो यदि तेन चैव पुत्रेण ॥

उत्पादः स यदि पिता वद तत्रोत्पादयति कः कम् ॥४९॥

यथापि नाम कश्चिद् ब्रूयात्पित्रा पुत्र उत्पादनीयः सच्च पिता तेनैव पुत्रेणोत्पादनीय इति, तत्रेदानीं ब्रूहि केन क उत्पादयितव्य इति । तथैव खलु भवान् ब्रवीति प्रमाणैः प्रमेयाणि साधयितव्यानि तान्येव च पुनः प्रमाणानि तैरेव प्रमेयैरिति, तत्रेदानीं ते कतम्: कतमानि साधयितव्यानि ।

कश्च पिता कः पुत्रस्तत्र त्वं ब्रूहि तावुभावपिच ।

पितापुत्रलक्षणधरौ यतो भवति नोऽत्रसदेहः ॥५०॥

तयोश्च पूर्वोपदिष्टयोः पितापुत्रयोः कतरः पुत्रः कतरः पिता । उभावपि तावुत्पा दक्षत्वात् पितूलक्षणधरावुत्पाद्यत्वाच्च पुत्रलक्षणधरौ । अत्र नः संदेहो भवति कतरस्तत्र पिता कतरः पुत्र इति । एवमेव यान्येतानि भवतःप्रमाणप्रमेयाणि तत्र कतराणि

प्रमाणानि कतराणि प्रमेयाणि । उभयान्यपि हेतानि साधकत्वात् प्रमाणानि साध्यत्वात् प्रमेयाणि । अत्र नः संदेहो भवति कतराण्यन्त्र प्रमाणानि कतराणि प्रमेयाणीति ।

नैव स्वतः प्रसिद्धिर्वा परस्परतः परप्रमाणैर्वा ॥
न भवति न च प्रमेयैर्न चाप्यकस्मात् प्रमाणानाम् ॥५१॥

त स्वतः प्रसिद्धिः प्रत्यक्षस्य तेनैव प्रत्यक्षेण, अनुमानस्य तेनैवानुमानेन, उपमानस्य तेनैवोपमानेन, आगमस्य तेनैवागमेन । नापि परस्परतः प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानोपमानागमैः अनुमानस्य प्रत्यक्षोपमानागमैः, उपमानस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैः, आगमस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानैः नापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानागमानाभन्यैः प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानगमैर्यथास्वम् ।

नापि प्रमेयैः समस्तव्यस्तैः स्वविषयपरविषयसंगृहीतैः । नापि समुच्चयेनैतेषां कारणानां पूर्वोद्दिष्टानां विशिष्टशब्दार्थत्रष्ट्रविशेषो(?)र्वा । तत्र यदुक्तं प्रमाणाधिगम्यत्वात् प्रमेयाणां भावानां सन्ति च ते प्रमेया भावास्तानि च प्रमाणानि यैस्ते प्रमाणैः प्रमेयाभावाः समधिगता इति तत्र । यत्पुर्वभवतोक्तम् ।

कुशलानां धर्मणां धर्मावस्थाविदश्च मन्यन्ते ॥
कुशलं जनाः स्वभावं शेषेष्वप्येष विनियोग ॥ इति
अत्र ब्रूमः ।

कुशलानां धर्मणां धर्मावस्थाविदो ब्रुवन्ति यदि ॥
कुशलं स्वभावमेवं प्रविभागेनाभिधेयः स्यात् ॥५२॥

कुशलानां धर्मणां धर्मावस्थाविदः कुशलं स्वभावं मन्यन्ते । स च भवता प्रविभागेनोपदेष्टव्यः स्यात् । अयं स कुशलः स्वभावः । इमे ते कुशला धर्माः । इदं तत्कुशलं विज्ञानम् । अयं स कुशलविज्ञानस्वभावः । एवं सर्वेषाम् । न चैतदेवं दृष्टम् । तस्माद्यदुक्तं यथास्वमुपदिष्टः स्वभावो धर्मणाभिति तत्र ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

यदि च प्रतीत्य कुशलः स्वभाव उत्पद्धते स कुशलानाम् ॥
धर्मणां परभावः स्वभाव एवं कथं भवति ॥५३॥

यदि च कुशलानां धर्मणां स्वभावो हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्रीं प्रतीत्योत्पद्यते स परभावादु-
त्पन्नः कुशलानां धर्मणां कथं स्वभावो भवति । एवमेवाकुशलप्रभृतीनाम् । तत्र
यदुकं कुशलानाम् धर्मणां कुशलः स्वभावोऽप्युपदिष्टः, एवमकुशलादीनां
चाकुशलादिरिति तन्न ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

अथ न प्रतीत्य किञ्चित् स्वभाव उत्पद्यते स कुशलानाम् ॥
धर्मणामेवं स्याद्वासो न ब्रह्मचर्यस्य ॥५४॥

अथ मन्यसे न किञ्चित्प्रतीत्य कुशलानां धर्मणां कुशलः स्वभाव उत्पद्यते, एवम-
कुशलानां धर्मणामकुशलः, अव्याकृतानामव्याकृत इति, एवम् सत्यब्रह्मचर्यवासो
भवति । किं कारणम् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य हेवं सति प्रत्याख्यानं भवति । प्रतीत्य-
समुत्पादस्य प्रत्याख्यानात् प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाददर्शनप्रत्याख्यानं भवति । न ह्यविद्यमानस्य
प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य दर्शनमुपपद्यमानं भवति । असति प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाददर्शने धर्मदर्शने
न भवति । उक्तं हि भगवता यो हि भिक्षवः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं पश्यति स धर्मं पश्यतीति ।
धर्मदर्शनाभावाद् ब्रह्मचर्यवासाभावः ।

अथवा प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादप्रत्याख्यानाद् दुःखसमुदयप्रत्याख्यानं भवति । प्रतीत्यसमु-
त्पादो हि दुःखस्य समुदयः । दुःखसमुदयस्य प्रत्याख्यानाद् दुःखप्रत्याख्यानं भवति ।
असति हि समुदये तत्कुतो दुःखं समुदेष्यति । दुःखप्रत्याख्यानात् समुदयप्रत्याख्यानाच्च
दुःखनिरोधस्य प्रत्याख्यानं भवति । असति हि दुःखसमुदये कस्य प्रहाणान्निरोधो
भविष्यति । (दुःखनिरोधप्रत्याख्यानान्मार्गस्य प्रत्याख्यानं भवति) । असति हि दुःख-
निरोधे कस्य प्राप्तये मार्गो भविष्यति दुःखनिरोधगामी । एवं चतुर्णिर्मार्यसत्यानाम-
भावः । तेषामभावाच्छामण्यफलाभावः । सत्यदर्शनाच्छामण्यफलानि हि समधि-
गम्यन्ते । श्रामण्यफलानामभावादब्रह्मचर्यवास इति ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

नाधर्मो धर्मो वा संव्यवहाराश्च लौकिका न स्युः ॥
नित्याश्च सस्वभावाः स्युर्नित्यत्वादहेतुमतः ॥५५॥

एवं सति प्रतीत्य समुत्पादं प्रत्याचक्षाणस्य भवतः को दोषः प्रसज्यते । धर्मो न भवति । अधर्मो न भवति । संव्यवहाराश्च लौकिका न भवन्ति । किं कारणम् । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पदं हेतत्सर्वमस्ति प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादे कुतो भविष्यति । अपि च सस्वभावो-प्रतीत्यसमुत्पदो निर्हेतुको नित्यः स्यात् । किं कारणम् । निर्हेतुका हि भावा नित्याः । स एव चाब्रह्मचर्यवासः प्रसज्यते । स्वसिद्धान्तविरोधश्च । किं कारणम् । अनित्या हि भगवता सर्वसंस्कारा निर्दिष्टाः । ते सस्वभावनित्यत्वान्नित्या हि भवन्ति ।

एवमकुशलेष्वव्याकृतेषु नैर्याणिकादिषु च दोषः ॥

तस्मात्सर्वं संस्कृतमसंस्कृतं ते भवत्येव ॥५६॥

यश्चैष कुशलेषु धर्मेषु निर्दिष्टः कल्पः स एवाकुशलेषु, स एवाव्याकृतेषु, स ए-नैर्याणिकप्रभूतिषु । तस्मात्ते सर्वमिदं संस्कृतमसंस्कृतं संपद्यते । किं कारणम् । हेतौ ह्यसत्युत्पादादिष्ठितभंगा न भवन्ति । उत्पादादिष्ठितभंगेष्वसत्त्वे संस्कृतलक्षणाभावात् सर्वं संस्कृतमसंस्कृतं संपद्यते । तत्र यदुक्तं कुशलादीनां भावानां स्वभावसद्ग्रावाद शून्याः सर्वभावा इति तत्र । यत्तुर्तमभवतोक्तं

यदि च न भवेत्स्वभावो धर्माणां निःस्वभाव इत्येव ।

नामापि भवेत्त्वं नाम हि निर्वस्तुकं नास्ति ॥

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

यः सद्भूतं नामात्र ब्रूयात्स्वभाव इत्येवम् ।

भवता प्रतिवक्तव्यो नाम ब्रूमश्च न वर्यं तत् ॥५७॥

यो नामात्र सद्भूतं ब्रूयात्स्वभाव इति स भवता प्रतिवक्तव्यः स्यात् । यस्य सद्भूतं नाम स्वभावस्य तस्मात्तेनापि स्वभावेन सद्भूतेन भवितव्यम् । न ह्यसद्भूतस्य स्वभावस्य सद्भूतं नाम भवतीति । न पुनर्वर्यं नाम सद्भूतं ब्रूमः । तदपि हि भावस्वभावस्याभावान्नाम निःस्वभाम्, तस्माच्छून्यम्, शून्यत्वादसद्भूतम् । तत्र सद्भवतोक्तं नामसद्भावात् सद्भूतः स्वभाव इति तत्र ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

नामासदिति च यदिदं तर्त्कि नु सतो भवत्युताप्यसतः ॥
यदि हि सतो यद्यसतो द्विधापि ते हीयते वादः ॥५८॥

यच्चैतन्नामासदिति तर्त्कि सतोऽसतो वा । यदि हि सतस्तन्नाम यद्यसत उभयथापि प्रतिज्ञा हीयते । तत्र यदि तावत्सतो नामासदिति प्रतिज्ञा हीयते । न हीदानीं तदस-दिदानीं सत् । अथासतोऽसदिति नाम, असद्भूतस्य नाम न भवति । तस्माद्या प्रतिज्ञा नामः सद्भूतः स्वभाव इति सा हीना ।

किञ्चान्यात् ।

सर्वेषां भावानां शून्यत्वं चोपपादितं पूर्वम् ।
स उपालम्भस्तस्माद् भवत्ययं चाप्रतिज्ञायाः ॥५९॥

इह चास्माभिः पूर्वमेव सर्वेषां भावानां विस्तरतः शून्यत्वमुपपादितम् । तत्र प्राङ्गलाम्नोऽपि शून्यत्वमुक्तम् । स भावानशून्यत्वं परिगृह्ण परिवृत्तो वक्तुं यदि भावानां स्वभावो न स्यादस्वभाव इति नामापीदं न स्यादिति तस्मादप्रतिज्ञोपालम्भोऽयं भवतः संपद्यते । न हि वयं नाम सद्भूतमिति ब्रूमः ।

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्

अथ विद्यते स्वभावः स च धर्मणां न विद्यते तस्मात् ।
धर्मैर्विना स्वभावः यस्य तद्युक्तमुपदेष्टुम् ॥ इति
अत्र ब्रूमः
अथ विद्यते स्वभावः स च धर्मणां न विद्यते इतीदम् ॥
आशङ्कितं यदुक्तं भवत्यनाशङ्कितं तच्च ॥६०॥

न हि वयं धर्मणां स्वभावं प्रतिषेधयामो धर्मविनिर्मुक्तस्य वा कस्यचिदर्थस्य स्वभावमम्युपगच्छामः । नन्वेवं सति य उपालम्भो भवतो यदि धर्मा निःस्वभावाः कस्य खल्विदानीमन्यस्यार्थस्य धर्मविनिर्मुक्तस्य स्वभावो भवति स युक्तमुपदेष्टुमिति द्वारापक्षेष्ट्रमेवैतद्भवति, उपालम्भो न भवति ।

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तं

सत एव प्रतिषेधो नास्ति घटो गेह इत्यर्थं यस्मात् ।

दृष्टः प्रतिषेधोऽयं सतः स्वभावस्य ते तस्मात् ॥ इति

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

सत एव प्रतिषेधो यदि शून्यत्वं ननु प्रसिद्धमिदम् ॥

प्रतिषेधयते हि भवान् भावानां निःस्वभावत्वम् ॥६१॥

यदि सत एव प्रतिषेधो भवति नासतो भवान्त्वं सर्वभावानां निःस्वभावत्वं प्रतिषेधयति, ननु प्रसिद्धं सर्वभावानां निःस्वभावत्वम् । त्वद्वचनेन प्रतिषेधसद्ग्रावान् निःस्वभावत्वस्य च सर्वभावानां प्रतिषिद्धत्वात् प्रसिद्धा शून्यता ।

प्रतिषेधयसेऽथ त्वं शून्यत्वं तच्च नास्ति शून्यत्वम् ॥

प्रतिषेधः सत इति ते नन्वेष विहीयते वादः ॥६२॥

अथ प्रतिषेधयसि त्वं सर्वभावानां निःस्वभावत्वं शून्यत्वं नास्ति तच्च शून्यत्वम्, या तर्हि ते प्रतिज्ञा सतः प्रतिषेधो भवति नासत इति सा हीना ।

किञ्चान्यत् ।

प्रतिषेधयामि नाहं किञ्चित् प्रतिषेधमस्ति न च किञ्चित् ॥

तस्मात्प्रतिषेधयसीत्यधिलय एष त्वया क्रियते ॥६३॥

यद्यहं किञ्चित्प्रतिषेधयामि ततस्तदपि त्वया युक्तमेव वक्तुं स्यात् । न चैवाहं किञ्चित् प्रतिषेधयामि, यस्मान्न किञ्चित्प्रतिषेद्व्यमस्ति । तस्माच्छून्येषु सर्वभावेष्वविद्यमाने प्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधे च प्रतिषेधयसीत्येष त्वया प्रस्तुतोऽधिलयः क्रियत इति । यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम् ।

अथ नास्ति स स्वभावः किं नु प्रतिषिद्धते त्वयानेन ।

वचनेनर्ते वचनात्प्रतिषेधः सिद्ध्यति (१) ह्यसत इति ॥

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

यच्चाहर्ते वचनादसतः प्रतिषेधवचनासिद्धिरिति ॥

अत्र ज्ञापयते वागसदिति तत्र तच्च न प्रति निहन्ति ॥६४॥

यच्च भवान् ब्रवीति, ऋतेऽपि वचनादसतः प्रतिषेधः प्रसिद्धः, तत्र किं निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा इत्येतत्तद्वचनं करोतीति, अत्र ब्रूमः । निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा इत्येतत्खलु वचनं न निःस्वभावानेव सर्वभावान् करोति । किंतु असति स्वभावे भावा निःस्वभावा इति ज्ञापयति । तद्यथा कश्चिद् ब्रूयादविद्यमानगृहे देवदत्तेऽस्ति गृहे देवदत्त इति । तत्रैवं कश्चित्प्रतिब्रूयान् नास्तीति । न तद्वचनं देवदत्तस्यासङ्क्रावं करोति किंतु ज्ञापयति केवलमसंभवं गृहे देवदत्तस्य । तद्वज्ञास्ति स्वभावो भावानामित्येतद्वचनं न भावानां निःस्वभावत्वं करोति किंतु सर्वभावेषु स्वभावस्याभावं ज्ञापयति । तत्र यद्भवतोक्तं किमसति स्वभावे नास्ति स्वभाव इत्येतद्वचनं करोति, ऋतेऽपि वचनात् प्रसिद्धः स्वभावस्याभाव इति तत्र युक्तम् ।

अन्यच्च ।

बालानामिव मिथ्या मृगतृष्णायां यथा जलग्राहः ।

एवं मिथ्याग्राहः स्यात्ते प्रतिषेधतो ह्यसतः ॥

इत्यादयो या पुनश्च तस्मो गाथा भवतोक्ता अत्र ब्रूमः ।

मृगतृष्णादृष्टान्ते यः पुनरुक्तस्त्वया महांश्चर्चः ॥

तत्रापि निर्णयं श्रृणु यथा स दृष्टान्तं उपपन्नः ॥६५॥

य एष त्वया मृगतृष्णादृष्टान्ते महांश्चर्च उक्तस्तत्रापि यो निर्णयः स शूयतां यथोप-
पन्न एष दृष्टान्तो भवति ।

यदि स्वभावतः स्याद् ग्राहो न स्यात्प्रतीत्य संभूतः ।

यश्च प्रतीत्य भवति ग्राहो ननु शून्यता सैव ॥६६॥

यदि मृगतृष्णायां स यथा जलग्राहः स्वभावतः स्यान्ते स्यात्प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नः यतो मृगतृष्णाञ्च प्रतीत्य विपरीतञ्च दर्शनं प्रतीत्यायोनिशोभनस्कारञ्च प्रतीत्य स्याद्-
भूतोऽतः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नः । यतश्च प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नोऽतः स्वभावतः शून्य एव ।

यथा पूर्वमुक्तं तथा ।
किञ्चान्यत् ।

यदि च स्वभावतः स्याद् ग्राहः कस्तं निर्वर्तयेद् ग्राहम् ॥
शेषेष्वप्येष विधिस्तस्मादेषोऽनुपालम्भः ॥६७॥

यदि मृगतृष्णायां जलग्राहः स्वभावतः स्यात् क एव तं विनिर्वर्तयेत् । न हि स्वभावः
शक्यो विनिर्वर्तयितुं यथाग्नेरुष्णत्वमपां द्रवत्वमाकाशस्य निरावरणत्वम् । दृष्टं चास्य
विनिर्वर्तनम् । तस्माच्छून्यस्वभावो ग्राहः । यथा चैतदेवम् शेषेष्वपि धर्मेष्वेष क्रमः
प्रत्यवगन्तव्यो ग्राह्यप्रभृतिषु पञ्चतु । तत्र यद्भवतोक्तं षट्कभावादशून्याः सर्वभावा
इति तत्र ।

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तं

हेतोश्च ते न सिद्धिर्नःस्वभाव्यात्कुतो हि ते हेतुः ॥
निर्हेतुकस्य सिद्धिर्न चोपन्नास्य तेऽर्थस्येति ॥

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

अथ ते हेत्वभावः प्रत्युक्तः पूर्वमेव स समत्वात् ॥
मृगतृष्णादृष्टान्तव्यावृत्तिविधी य उक्तः प्राक् ॥६८॥

एतेन चेदानीं चर्चेन पूर्वोक्तेन हेत्वभावोऽपि प्रत्युक्तोऽवगन्तव्यः । य एव हि चर्चः
पूर्वस्मिन् हेतावुक्तः षट्कप्रतिषेधस्य स एवेहापि चर्चयितव्यः ।

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तं

पूर्वं चेत्प्रतिषेधः पश्चात्प्रतिषेध्यमित्यनुपपन्नम् ॥
पश्चाच्चानुपपन्नो युगपच्च यतः स्वभावः सन् ॥ इति

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

यस्त्रैकाल्ये हेतुः प्रत्युक्तः पूर्वमेव स समत्वात् ।
त्रैकाल्यप्रतिहेतुश्च शून्यतावादिनां प्राप्तः ॥६९॥

य एव हेतुस्त्रैकाल्ये प्रतिषेधवाची स उक्तोत्तरः प्रत्यवगन्तव्यः । कस्मात् । साध्य-
समत्वात् । तथा हि त्वद्भवनेन प्रतिषेधस्त्रैकाल्येऽनुपपन्नप्रतिषेधवत्स प्रतिषेध्योऽपि ।

तस्मात् प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेधेऽस्ति यद्भवान् मन्यते प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषिद्ध इति तत्र ।
यस्त्रिकालप्रतिषेधवाची हेतुरेष एव शून्यतावादिनां प्राप्तः सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधक-
त्वान्न भवतः ।

अथवा कथमेतदुक्तोत्तरम् ।

प्रेतिषेधयामि नाहं किञ्चित्प्रतिषेध्यमस्ति न च किञ्चित् ॥

तस्मात्प्रतिषेधयसीत्यधिलय एष त्वया क्रियते ॥

इति प्रत्युक्तम् । अथ मन्यसे त्रिष्वपि कालेषु प्रतिषेधः सिद्धः, दृष्टः पूर्वकालीनोऽपि
हेतुः, उत्तरकालीनोऽपि, युगपत्कालीनोऽपि हेतुः, तत्र पूर्वकालीनो हेतुर्था पिता
पुत्रस्य, पश्चात्कालीनो यथा शिष्य आचार्यस्य, युगपत्कालीनो यथा प्रदीपः प्रकाश-
स्येत्यत्र ब्रूमः । न चैतदेवम् । उक्ता ह्येतस्मिन् क्रमे त्रयः पूर्वदोषाः । अपि च यद्येवम्,
प्रतिषेधसङ्घावस्त्वयाभ्युपगम्यते प्रतिज्ञाहनिश्च ते भवति । एतेन क्रमेण स्वभाव-
प्रतिषेधोऽपि सिद्धः ।

प्रभवति च शून्यतेयं यस्य प्रभवन्ति तस्य सर्वार्थाः ॥

प्रभवति न तस्य किञ्चिन्न प्रभवति शून्यता यस्य ॥७०॥

यस्य शून्यतेयं प्रभवति तस्य सर्वार्था लौकिकलोकोत्तराः प्रभवन्ति । किं कारणम् ।
यस्य हि शून्यता प्रभवति तस्य प्रतीत्य समुत्पादः प्रभवति । यस्य प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः
प्रभवति तस्य चत्वार्यार्थसत्यानि प्रभवन्ति । यस्य चत्वार्यार्थसत्यानि प्रभवन्ति तस्य
श्रामण्यफलानि प्रभवन्ति, सर्वविशेषाधिगमाः प्रभवन्ति । यस्य सर्वविशेषाधिगमाः
प्रभवन्ति तस्य त्रीणि रत्नानि बुद्धधर्मसंघाः प्रभवन्ति । यस्य प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः प्रभवति
तस्य धर्मो धर्महेतुर्धर्मफलं च प्रभवन्ति, तस्याधर्मोऽधर्महेतुर्धर्मफलं च प्रभवन्ति ।
यस्य धर्मधिमौ धर्माधर्महेतु धर्मधर्मफले च प्रभवन्ति तस्य क्लेशाः क्लेशसमुदयः
क्लेशवस्तुनि च प्रभवन्ति । यस्यैतत्सर्वं प्रभवति पूर्वोक्तं तस्य सुगतिदुर्गतिव्यवस्था
सुगतिदुर्गतिगमनं, सुगतिदुर्गतिगमी मार्गः, सुगतिदुर्गतिव्यतिक्रमणं, सुगतिदुर्गतिव्यति
क्रमोपायः सर्वसंव्यवहाराश्च लौकिका व्यवस्थापिताः । स्वयमधिगन्तव्या अनया

दिशा किञ्चिच्छक्यं वचनेनोपदेष्टमिति ।

भवति चात्र ।

यः शून्यतां प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं मध्यमां प्रतिपदं च ।

एकार्थं निजगाद प्रणमामि तमप्रतिमबुद्धम् ॥

इति कृतिरियमाचार्यनागार्जुनपादानाम् ॥



प्रसन्नपदा



प्रसन्नपदा *

अत्र केचित्परिचोदयन्ति । अनुत्पन्ना भावा इति किमयं प्रमाणजो निश्चय उता-
प्रमाणजः । तत्र यदि प्रमाणज इष्यते तदेदं बक्तव्यम् । कति प्रमाणानि किं लक्षणानि
किविषयाणि किं स्वत उत्पन्नानि किं परत उभयतोऽहेतुतो वेति । अथाप्रमाणजः स न
युक्तः, प्रमाणाधीनत्वात्प्रमेयाधिगमस्य अनधिगतो ह्यर्थो न विना प्रमाणैरधिगन्तुं
शक्यत इति प्रमाणाभावादर्थाधिगमाभावे सति कुतोऽयं सम्यद्भिन्नश्चय इति न युक्तमे-
तदनिष्पन्ना भावा इति । यतो वायं निश्चयो भवतोऽनुत्पन्ना भावा इति भविष्यति तत
एव ममापि सर्वभावाः सन्तीति, यथा चायं ते निश्चयोऽनुत्पन्नाः सर्वधर्मा इति तथैव
ममापि सर्वभावोत्पत्तिर्भविष्यति । अथ ते नास्ति निश्चयोऽनुत्पन्नाः सर्वभावा इति,
तदा स्वयमनिश्चितस्य परप्रत्य (१)यनासंभवाच्छास्त्रारम्भवैयर्थ्यमेवेति सन्त्यप्रति-
षिद्धाः सर्वभावा इति ॥

उच्यते । यदि कश्चिन्निश्चयो ना (मा) स्माकं स्यात्, स प्रमाणजो वा स्यादप्रमाणजो
वा । न त्वस्ति किं कारणम् । इहानिश्चयसंभवे सति स्यात्तप्रतिपक्षस्तदपेक्षो निश्चयः ।
यदा त्वनिश्चय एव तावदस्माकं नास्ति, तदा कुतस्तद्विश्वद्विश्वद्विश्वद्वो निश्चयः स्यात्संब-
न्ध्यन्तरनिरपेक्षत्वात् खरविषाणस्य ह्लस्वदीर्घतावत् । यदा चैव निश्चयस्याभावः,
तदा कस्य प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रमाणानि परिकल्पयिष्यामः । कुतो वैषां संख्या लक्षणं विषयो
वा भविष्यति । स्वतः परत उभयतो (अहेतुतो) वा समुत्पत्तिरिति सर्वभेतन्न बक्तव्य-
मस्माभिः ।

यद्येवं निश्चयो नास्ति सर्वतः; कर्थं पुनरिदं निश्चितरूपं वाक्यमुपलभ्यते भवतां, न
स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्यहेतुतो भावा भवन्तीति ॥ उच्यते, निश्चितमिदं
वाक्यं लोकस्य स्वप्रसिद्ध्यैवोपपत्त्या नार्याणांम् ।

किं खल्वार्णामुपपत्तिर्नास्ति । केनेतदुक्तमस्ति वा नास्ति वेति । परमार्थे
ह्यार्थ (एणां) तूष्णीभावः, ततः कुतस्तत्र प्रपञ्चसंभवो यदुपपत्तिरनुपपत्तिर्वा स्यात् ।

* From the *Prasannapada*, a Commentary on the *Mulamādhyamikakārikās* of
Nāgārjuna, by Candraśākī (St. Petersbourg, 1933, pp. 55-74.)

यदि ह्यार्था उपर्यन्ति न वर्णयन्ति केन खलिवदानीं परमार्थं लोकं बोधयिष्यन्ति ॥
 न खल्वार्था लोकसंब्यवहारेणोपपत्तिं वर्णयन्ति, किन्तु लोकत एव या प्रसिद्धोपपत्तिस्तां
 परावबोधार्थमन्युपेत्य तयैव लोकं बोधयन्ति । यथैव हि विद्यमानामपि श रीराशुचितां
 विपर्यसानुगता रागिणो नोपलभन्ते शुभाकारं चाभूतमध्यारोप्य परिविलशन्ते, तेषां
 वैराग्यार्थं तश्चागतर्निर्मितो देवो वा शुभसंज्ञया प्राक् प्रच्छादितान् कायदोषानुपवर्णयेत्,
 सन्त्यस्मिन् काये कलेशा (इत्या) दिना । ते च तस्याः शुभसंज्ञया विमुक्ता वैराग्यमासा-
 दयेयुः । एवमिहाप्यार्थः सर्वथाप्यनुपलभ्यमानात्मकं भावानामविद्यातिमिरोपहृतमति-
 नयनतया विपरीतं स्वभावमध्यारोप्य कवचिच्च त्रिविद्विशेषमतितरां परिविलशन्ति
 पृथग्जनाः । तानिदानीमार्यस्तत्प्रसिद्धवैयोपपत्त्या परिबोधयन्ति, यथा विद्यमानस्य
 घटस्य न मृदादिभ्य उत्पाद इत्यम्युपेतमेवमुत्पादात्पूर्वं विद्यमानस्य विद्यमानत्वान्ना-
 स्त्युत्पाद इत्यवसीयतांम् । यथा च परभूतेभ्यो ज्वालाङ्गारादिभ्यो झंडु रस्योत्पत्ति-
 नास्तीत्यम्युपेतमेवं विवक्षितेभ्योऽपि बीजादिभ्यो नास्तीत्यवसीयताम् ।

अथापि स्यादनुभव एषोऽस्माकमिति ॥ एतदप्ययुक्तम् । यस्मादनुभव एष मृषा,
 अनुभवत्वात् । तैमिरिकद्विचन्द्राद्यनुभ (व) वदिति । ततश्चानुभवस्यापि साध्यसम-
 त्वातेन प्रत्यवस्थानं न युक्तमिति ।

तस्मादनुत्पन्ना भावा इत्येवं तावद्विपरीतस्वरूपाध्यारोपत्रिपक्षेण प्रथमप्रकरणा-
 रम्भः । इदानीं कवचिद्यः कश्चिद्विशेषोऽव्यारोपितस्तद्विशेषापाकरणार्थं शेषप्रकरणा-
 रम्भः, गन्तुगन्तव्यगमनादिकोऽपि निरवशेषो विशेषो नास्ति प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्येति
 प्रतिपादनार्थम् ॥

अथ स्यादेष एव प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारो लौकिकोऽस्माभिः शास्त्रेणानुर्वर्णित इति ।
 तदनुवर्णनस्य तर्हि फलं वाच्यम् ॥ कुर्तार्किकैः स नाशितो विपरीतलक्षणाभिधानेन ।
 तस्यास्माभिः सम्यग्लक्षणमुक्तमिति चेत् ॥ एतदप्ययुक्तम् । यदि हि कुर्तार्किकै-
 विपरीतलक्षणप्रणयनं कुतं लक्ष्यवैपरीत्यं लोकस्य स्यात्, तदर्थं प्रयत्नसाफल्यं स्यात्,
 न चैतदेवमिति व्यर्थं एवायं प्रयत्नं इति ।

अपि च, यदि प्रमाणाधीनः प्रमेयाधिगमस्तानि प्रमाणानि केन परिच्छिद्यन्त इत्या-
 दिना विप्रहव्यावर्तन्यां विहितो दोषः । तदपरिहारात् सम्यग्लक्षणद्योतकत्वमपि
 नास्ति । किं च यदि स्वसामान्यलक्षणद्वयानुरोधेन प्रमाणद्वयमुक्तं, यस्य तल्लक्षणद्वयं

किं लक्ष्यमस्ति, अथ नास्ति । यद्यस्ति तदा तदपरं प्रमेयमस्तीति कथं प्रमाणद्वयम् । अथ नास्ति लक्ष्यम् । तदा लक्षणमपि निराश्रयं नास्तीति कथं प्रमाणद्वयम् । वक्ष्यति हि,

लक्षणासंप्रवृत्तौ च न लक्ष्यमुपपद्यते ।

लक्ष्यस्यानुपपत्तौ च लक्षणस्याप्यसंभवः ॥इति॥

अथ स्याद्व लक्ष्यते ज्ञेनेति लक्षणं, किं तर्हि कृत्यल्युटो बहुलमिति कर्मणि ल्युटं कृत्वा लक्ष्यते तदिति लक्षणम् ॥ एवमपि तेनैतस्य लक्ष्यमाणत्वासंभवाद्येनैतलक्ष्यते तस्य करणस्य कर्मणोऽर्थान्तरत्वात्, स एव दोषः ।

अथ स्यात् । ज्ञानस्य करणत्वात्तस्य च स्वलक्षणान्तर्भावादयमदोष इति ॥ उच्चते । इह भावानामन्यासाधारणमात्मीयं यत्स्वरूपं तत्स्वलक्षणम्, तदथा पृथिव्याः काठिन्यं वेदनाया विषयानुभवो विज्ञानस्य विषयप्रतिविज्ञप्तिः, तेन हि तल्लक्ष्यत इति कृत्वा-प्रसिद्धानुगतां च व्युत्पत्तिमवधूय कर्मसाधनमभ्युपगच्छति । विज्ञानस्य च करणभाव प्रतिपद्मानेनेत्युक्तं भवति, स्वलक्षणस्यैव कर्मता स्वलक्षणान्तरस्य करणभावश्चेति । तत्र यदि विज्ञानस्वलक्षणं करणं तस्य व्यतिरिक्तेन कर्मणा भवितव्यमिति स एव दोषः ।

अथ स्यात् । यत्पृथिव्यादिगतं काठिन्यादिकं विज्ञानगम्यं तत्स्य कर्मास्येव तच्च स्वलक्षणाव्यतिरिक्तमिति ॥ एवं तर्हि विज्ञानस्वलक्षणस्य कर्मत्वाभावात्प्रमेयत्वं न स्यात्, कर्मरूपस्यैव स्वलक्षणस्य प्रमेयत्वात् । ततश्च द्विविधं प्रमेयं स्वलक्षणं सामान्य-लक्षणं च, इत्येतद्विशेष्य वक्तव्यं, किञ्चित्स्वलक्षणं प्रमेयं यत्लक्ष्यत इत्येवं व्यपदिश्यते । किञ्चिदप्रमेयं यत्लक्ष्यते ज्ञेनेति व्यपदिश्यत इति । अथ तदपि कर्मसाधनं तदा तस्यायेन करणेन भवितव्यं, ज्ञानान्तरस्य करणभावपरिकल्पनायामनवस्थादोषश्चापद्यते,

अथ मन्यसे स्वसंवित्तिरस्ति, ततः स्वसंवित्त्या ग्रहणात्कर्मतायां सत्यामस्त्येव प्रमेयान्तर्भवि इति ॥ उच्चते, विस्तरेण मध्यमकावतारे स्वसंवित्तिनिषेधात्, स्व-लक्षणं स्वलक्षणान्तरेण लक्ष्यते तदपि स्वसंवित्त्या इति न युज्यते । अपि च तदपि नाम ज्ञानं स्वलक्षणाव्यतिरेकेणासिद्धेरसंभवात्लक्ष्याभावे निराश्रयलक्षणप्रवृत्त्यसंभवात् सर्वथा नास्तीति कुतः स्वसंवित्तिः ।

तथाचोक्तमार्यरत्नचूड परिपृच्छायम् । सचित्तमसमनुपश्यन् चित्तधारां पर्येषते कुतः शिच्चत्तस्योत्पत्तिरिति । तस्यैवं भवति । आलम्बने सति चित्तमुत्पद्यते । तत्किमन्यदा

लम्बनमन्यच्चितं, अथ यदेवालम्बनं तदेव चित्तंम् । यदि तावदन्यदालम्बनमन्यच्चितं तदा द्विचित्तता भविष्यति । अथ यदेवालम्बनं तदेव चित्तं, तत्कथं चित्तेन चित्तं समनुपश्यति । न च चित्तं चित्तं समनुपश्यति । तद्यथापि नाम तयैवासिधारया सैवासिधारा न शक्यते छेत्तुम् । न तेनैवाङ्गल्यग्रेण तदेवां गुल्यग्रं शक्यते स्प्रष्टुं, एवमेव न तेनैव चित्तेन तदेव चित्तं शक्यं द्रष्टुम् । तस्यैवं योनिशः प्रयुक्तस्य या चित्तस्यानवस्थानात्मुच्छेदाशश्वतता न कूटस्थता नाहेतुकी न प्रत्ययविरुद्धा न ततो नान्यतो न सैव नान्या तां चित्तधारां चित्तलतां चित्तधर्मतां चित्तानवस्थिततां चित्ताप्रचारतां चित्तादृश्यतां चित्तस्वलक्षणतां तथा जानाति तथा पश्यति यथा तथतां न च निरोधयति । तां च चित्तविवेकतां तथा प्रजानाति तथा पश्यति, इयं कुलपुत्र (बोधिसत्त्वस्य) चित्ते चित्तानुपश्यना स्मृत्युपस्थानमिति ॥

तदेवं नास्ति स्वसंवित्तिस्तदभावात् किं तेन लक्ष्यते ॥

किं च, भेदेन वा तल्लक्षणं लक्ष्यात्त्यदि (स्याद्?) भेदेन वा । तत्र यदि तावद्भेदेन-तदा लक्ष्याद्विभृत्वादलक्षणवल्लक्षणमपि न लक्षणंम् । लक्षणाच्च भिन्नत्वादलक्ष्य-वल्लक्ष्यमपि न लक्ष्यंम् । तथा लक्ष्याद्विभृत्वाल्लक्षणस्य लक्षणनिरपेक्षं लक्ष्यं स्यात्ततश्च न तल्लक्ष्यं लक्षणनिरपेक्षत्वात् खपुष्पवत् ॥ अथाभिन्ने लक्ष्यलक्षणे । तदा-लक्षणादव्यतिरिक्तत्वाल्लक्षणं स्वात्मवद्विहीयते लक्ष्यस्य लक्ष्यता । लक्ष्याच्चाव्य-तिरिक्तत्वाल्लक्षणस्वात्मवल्लक्षणमपि न लक्षणस्वभावम् । यथा चोक्तंम् ।

लक्ष्याल्लक्षणमन्यच्चेत् स्यात्तलक्ष्यमलक्षणंम् ।

तयोरभावोऽन्यत्वे विस्पष्टं कथितं त्वया ॥ इति ॥

न च विना तस्वान्यत्वेन लक्ष्यलक्षणसिद्धावन्या गतिरस्ति । तथा च वक्ष्यति,

एकीभावेन वा सिद्धिर्नानाभावेन वा ययोः ।

न विद्यते, तयोः सिद्धिः कथं (नु) खलु विद्यते ॥ इति ॥

अथवोच्यते, (अवाच्यत) या सिद्धिर्भविष्यतीति चेन्नैतदेवंम् । अवाच्यता हि नाम परस्परविभागपरिज्ञानाभावे सति भवति । यत्र च विभागपरिज्ञानं नास्ति, तत्रेदं

लक्षणमिदं लक्ष्यमिति विशेषतः परिच्छेदासंभवे सति द्वयोरप्यभाव एवेति । तस्मादवा-
च्यतयापि नास्ति सिद्धिः ।

अपि च, यदि ज्ञानं करणं विषयस्य परिच्छेदे कः कर्ता, न च कर्तारमन्तरेणास्ति
करणादीनां संभवशिष्ठदिक्रियायामिव ॥ अथ चित्तस्य तत्र कर्तृत्वं परिकल्प्यते, तदपि
न युक्तं, यस्मादर्थमात्रदर्शनं चित्तस्य व्यापारोऽर्थविशेष (दर्शनं) चैतसानांम् ।

तत्रार्थदृष्टिविज्ञानं तद्विशेषे तु चैतसाः ।

इत्यम्युपगमात् । एकस्यां हि प्रधानक्रियायां साध्यायां यथास्वं गुणक्रियानिर्वृत्ति-
द्वारेणाङ्गीभावोपगमात् करणादीनां करणादित्वं । न चेह ज्ञानविज्ञानयोरेका प्रधान-
क्रिया, किं तर्ह्यर्थमात्रपरिच्छेदित्तिर्विज्ञानस्य प्रधानक्रिया, ज्ञानस्य त्वर्थविशेषपरिच्छेद
इति नास्ति ज्ञानस्य करणत्वं नापि चित्तस्य कर्तृत्वं । ततश्च स एव दोषः ॥

अथ स्यात्, अनात्मानः सर्वधर्मा इत्यागमात् कर्तुः सर्वथाभावात्, कर्तारमन्तरेणापि
विद्यत एव क्रियादिव्यवहार इति ॥ एतदपि नास्ति, आगमस्य सम्यगर्थनिवधारणात् ।
एतदेवोक्तं मध्यमकावतारे ॥

अथापि स्यात्, यथा शिलापुत्रकस्य शरीरं राहोः शिर इति शरीरशिरोव्यतिरिक्त-
विशेषणासम्भवेऽपि विशेषणविशेषभावोऽस्ति, एवं पृथिव्याः स्वलक्षणमिति स्वलक्षण-
व्यतिरिक्तपृथिव्यसंभवेऽपि भविष्यतीति ॥ नैतदेवमतुल्यत्वात् । शरीरशिरःशब्दयोर्हि
बुद्ध्यादिपाण्डादिवत्सहभाविपदार्थान्तरसापेक्षताप्रकृतौ । शरीरशिरशब्दमात्रालम्बनो
बुद्ध्युपजननः सहचारिपदार्थान्तरसाकांक्ष एव वर्तते, कस्य शरीरं कस्य शिर इति ।
इतरोऽपि विशेषणान्तरसंबन्धनिराचिकीर्षया शिलापुत्रकराहुविशेषणध्वनिना लौकिक-
संकेतानुविधायिना प्रतिकर्तुः कांक्षामपहन्तीति युक्तंम् । इह तु काठिन्यादिव्यतिरिक्त-
पृथिव्याद्यसंभवे सति न युक्तो विशेषणविशेष्यभावः ।

तीर्थिकैर्व्यतिरिक्तलक्ष्याम्युपगमात्तदनुरोधेन विशेषणाभिधानमद्वष्टमिति चेत्, नैत-
देवंम् । न हि तीर्थिकपरिकल्पिता युक्तिविधुरा: पदार्थाः स्वसमयेऽम्युपगमन्तुः न्यायाः ।
प्रमाणान्तरादेवरप्यम्युपगमप्रसङ्गात् ।

अपि च पुद्गलादिप्रज्ञप्तिवत् सशरीरोपादानस्य शिलापुत्रकस्य (१) पादातुलौ-
किकव्यवहाराङ्गभूतस्य विशेषणस्याविचारप्रसिद्धस्य सङ्घावात् । शिरउपादानस्य च
राहोरूपादातुः सङ्घावादयुक्तमेतत्त्रिदर्शनम् ॥

शरीरशिरोव्यतिरिक्तस्थार्थान्तरस्यासिद्धेस्तन्मात्रस्योपलम्भात् सिद्धमेव निर्दर्शन-
मति चेत्, नैतदेवम्। लौकिके व्यवहार इत्थंविचाराप्रवृत्तेरविचारतश्च लौकिक-
पदार्थानामस्तित्वात्। यथैव हि रूपादिव्यतिरेकेण विचार्यमाण आत्मा न संभवति,
अपि च लोकसंवृत्या स्कन्धानुपादायास्यास्तित्वम्, एवं राहुशिलापुत्रक्योरपीति नास्ति
निर्दर्शनसिद्धिः। एवं पृथिव्यादीनां यद्यपि काठिन्यादिव्यतिरिक्तं विचार्यमाणं लक्षणं
नास्ति लक्ष्यव्यतिरेकेण च लक्षणं निराश्रयं तथापि संवृतिरेवेति, परस्परापेक्षया तयोः
सिद्ध्या सिद्धिं व्यवस्थापयांबभूवरुचार्याः। अवश्यं चैतदेवमभ्युपेयम्, अन्यथा हि
संवृतिरूपपत्त्या न वियुज्येत, तदेव तत्त्वमेव स्यात् संवृतिः॥ न चोपपत्त्या विचार्य-
माणानां शिलापुत्रकादीनामेवासंभवः, किं तर्हि वक्ष्यमाणया युक्त्या रूपवेदनादीनामपि
नास्ति संभव इति तेषामपि संवृत्या शिलापुत्रक (१) दिवन्न (१) स्तित्वमास्थेयं स्यात्।
न चैतदेवमित्यसदेतत्॥

अथ स्यात्, किमनया सूक्ष्मेक्षिकया, नैव हि वयं सर्वप्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारं सत्य-
मित्यात्मक्षमहे, किं तु लोकप्रसिद्धिरेखामुना न्यायेन व्यवस्थाप्यत इति।

उच्यते। वयमप्येवं ब्रूमः, किमनया सूक्ष्मेक्षिकया लौकिकव्यवहारेऽवतारिकया
तिष्ठतु तावदेषा विपर्यासमात्रासादितात्मभावसत्ताका संवृतिमुक्त्याणां मोक्षावाहक-
कुशलमूलोपचयहेतुर्याविन्न तत्त्वाधिगम इति। भवांस्त्वेतां संवृतिपरमार्थसत्यविभाग-
दुर्विदध्वबुद्धितया क्वचिदिदुपपत्तिमवतार्यान्यायतो नाशयति। सोऽहं संवृतिसत्यव्यवस्था-
वैक्षण्यलालौकिक एव पक्षे स्थित्वा संवृत्येकदेशनिराकरणोपक्षिप्तोपपत्त्यन्तरमुपपत्त्य-
न्तरेण विनिवर्तयन् लोकं वृद्ध इव लोकाच्चारात्परिभ्रश्यमानं भवन्तमेव निवर्तयामि न तु
संवृतिम्॥ तस्माद्यदि लौकिको व्यवहारस्तदावश्यं लक्षणवल्लक्ष्येणापि भवितव्यम्।
ततश्च स एव दोषः। अथ परमार्थस्तदा लक्ष्याभावाल्लक्षणद्वयमपि नास्तीति कृतः
प्रमाणद्वयम्॥

अथ शब्दानामेव क्रियाकारकसंबन्धपूर्विका व्युत्पत्तिर्नाङ्गीक्रियते। तदिदमतिकष्टं,
तैरेव क्रियाकारकसंबन्धप्रवृत्तैः शब्दैर्भवान् व्यवहरति शब्दार्थं क्रियाकरणादिकं च
नेच्छतीति, अहो बतेच्छामात्रप्रतिबद्धप्रवृत्तिता भवतः॥

यदा चैवं प्रमेयद्वयमव्यवस्थितं तदा (स्व)सामान्यलक्षण (१) विषयत्वेनागमादीनो

प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् ।

किं च घटः प्रत्यक्ष इत्येवमादिकस्य लौकिकव्यवहारस्यासंग्रहाद् (न) यर्व्यवहाराभ्युपगमाच्चाव्यापिता लक्षणस्येति न युक्तमेतत् ।

अथ स्यात्, घटोपादाननीलादयः प्रत्यक्षाः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणपरिच्छेदत्वात् । ततश्च यथैव कारणे कार्योपचारं कृत्वा बुद्धानां सुख उत्पाद इति व्यपदिश्यते, एवं प्रत्यक्षनीलादिनिमित्तकोऽपि घटः कार्ये कारणोपचारं कृत्वा प्रत्यक्ष इति व्यपदिश्यते ॥ नैवंविधे विषय उपचारो युक्तः । उत्पादो हि लोके सुखव्यतिरेकेणोपलब्धः, स च संस्कृतलक्षणस्वभावत्वादनेकदुष्करशतहेतुत्वादसुख एव, स सुख इति व्यपदिश्यमानोऽसंबद्ध एवेत्येवं विषये युक्त उपचारः । घटः प्रत्यक्ष इत्यत्र तु न हि घटो नाम कश्चिद्द्योऽप्रत्यक्षः पृथगुपलब्धो यस्योपचारातप्रत्यक्षत्वं स्यात् ।

नीलादिव्यतिरिक्तस्य घटस्याभावादौपचारिकं प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति चेत्, एवमपि सुतरामुपचारो न युक्त उपचर्यमाणस्याश्रयस्याभावात् । न हि खरविषाणतैक्ष्यमुपचर्यते ।

अपि च, लोकव्यवहाराङ्गभूतो घटो यदि नीलादिव्यतिरिक्तो नास्तीति कृत्वा तस्यौपचारिकं प्रत्यक्षत्वं परिकल्प्यते, नन्वेवं सति पृथिव्यादिव्यतिरेकेण नीलादिकमपि नास्तीति नीलादेरस्यौपचारिकं प्रत्यक्षत्वं कल्प्यताम् । यथोक्तम् ।

रूपादिव्यतिरेकेण यथा कुम्भो न विद्यते ।

वाय्वादिव्यतिरेकेण तथा रूपं न विद्यते ॥इति ।

तस्मादेवमादिकस्य लोकव्यवहारस्य लक्षणेनासंग्रहादव्यापितैव लक्षणस्येति । तत्त्वविदपेक्षया हि प्रत्यक्षत्वं घटादीनां नीलादीनां च नेष्यते । लोकसंवृत्या त्वभ्युपगन्तव्यमेव प्रत्यक्षत्वं घटादीनाम् ॥

यथोक्तं शतके ।

सर्वं एव घटोऽद्वृष्टो रूपे दृष्टे हि जायते ।

ब्रूयात् कस्तत्त्वविज्ञाम घटः प्रत्यक्ष इत्यपि ॥

एतेनैव विचारेण सुगन्धि मधुरं मृदु ।

प्रतिषेधयितव्यानि सर्वाण्युत्तमबुद्धिना ॥इति ।

अपि चापरोक्षार्थवाचित्वात्रत्यक्षशब्दस्य साक्षादभिमुखोऽर्थः प्रत्यक्षः, प्रतिगतमक्षम स्मित्तिं कृत्वा घटनीलादीनामपरोक्षाणां प्रत्यक्षत्वं सिद्धं भवति । तत्परिच्छेदकस्य ज्ञानस्य तृणतुषाग्निवत्रत्यक्षकारणत्वात् प्रत्यक्षत्वं व्यपदिश्यते ॥ यस्त्वक्षमक्षं प्रति वर्तत इति प्रत्यक्षशब्दं व्युत्पादयति तस्य ज्ञानस्येन्द्रियाविषयत्वा (द् विषयविषयत्वा) च्च न युक्ता व्युत्पत्तिः । प्रतिविषयं तु स्यात् प्रत्यर्थमिति वा ॥

अथ स्यात् । यथोभयाधीनायामपि विज्ञानप्रवृत्तावाश्रयस्य पटुमन्दतानुविधानाद्विज्ञानानां तद्विकारविकारित्वादाश्रयेणैव व्यपदेशो भवति, चक्षुर्विज्ञानमिति । एवं यद्यप्यर्थमर्थं प्रति वर्तते, तथाप्यक्षमक्षमाश्रित्य वर्तमानं विज्ञानमाश्रयेण व्यपदेशात् प्रत्यक्षमिति भविष्यति । दृष्टो ह्यसाधारणेन व्यपदेशो भेरीशब्दो यवांकुर इति ॥

नैतत्पूर्वेण तुल्यम् । तत्र हि विषयेण विज्ञाने व्यपदिश्यमाने रूपविज्ञानमित्येवमादिना विज्ञानषट्कस्य भेदो नोपर्दर्शितः स्यात्, मनोविज्ञानस्य चक्षुरादिविज्ञानैः सहैकविषय-प्रवृत्तत्वात् । तथा हि नीलादिविज्ञानषट्के विज्ञानमित्युक्ते साकांक्ष एव प्रत्ययोजायते किमैतद्रूपीन्द्रियं विज्ञानमाहोस्विन्मानसमिति । आश्रयेण तु व्यपदेशो मनो-विज्ञानचक्षुरादिविज्ञानविषयप्रवृत्तिसंभवेऽपि परस्परभेदः सिद्धो भवति ।

इह तु प्रमाणलक्षणविवक्षया कल्पनापोढमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वाभ्युपगमे सति विकल्पका देव तद्विशेषत्वाभिमतत्वादसाधारणकारणेन व्यपदेशो सति न किंचित्प्रयोजनमुपलक्ष्यते प्रमेयपरतन्त्रायां च प्रमाणसंख्याप्रवृत्तौ प्रमेयाकारानुकारितामात्रतया च समासादितात्मभावसत्ताकयोः प्रमाणयोः स्वरूपस्य व्यवस्थापनान्नेन्द्रियेण व्यपदेशः किंकिमुप-करोतीति सर्वथा विषयेणैव व्यपदेशो न्यायः ॥

लोके प्रत्यक्षशब्दस्य प्रसिद्धत्वाद्विवक्षितेऽर्थे प्रत्यर्थशब्दस्याप्रसिद्धत्वादाश्रयेणैवव्यु-त्पत्तिराश्रीयत इति चेत् । उच्यते । अस्त्वयं प्रत्यक्षशब्दो लोके प्रसिद्धः । स तु यथा लोके तथास्माभिरुच्यत एव । यथास्थितलौकिकपदार्थतिरस्कारेण तु तद्भूत्पादे-क्रियमाणे प्रसिद्धशब्दतिरस्कारः प्रसिद्धः स्यात् । ततश्च प्रत्यक्षमित्येवं (न)स्यात् । एकस्य च चक्षुर्विज्ञानस्यैकेन्द्रियक्षणाश्रयस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वं न स्याद्वौत्सार्थभावात् । एकैकस्य च प्रत्यक्षत्वाभावे बहूनामपि न स्यात् ॥

खण्डनखण्डखायम्



खण्डनखण्डखाद्यम्

अविकल्पविषय एकः त्थाणुः पुरुषः श्रुतोऽस्ति यः श्रुतिषु ।
इश्वररम्यमया न परं वन्देजनुमयाऽपि तमधिगतम् ॥

मानापनोदनविनोदनते गिरीशो भासेव सङ्कुचितयोरुचितन्तदिन्दोः ।
भेत्तुम्भवानिशचितं द्विरितं भवानि न अभीभवानि घनमज्जिसरोजयोस्ते । ।

शब्दार्थनिर्वचनखण्डनया नयन्तः सर्वत्र निर्वचनभावमखर्वगर्वन् ।
धीरा यथोक्तमपि कीरवदेतदुक्त्वा लोकेषु दिग्बिजयकौतुकमातनुध्वम् ॥

अथ कथायां वादिनो नियममेतादृशमन्यन्ते “प्रमाणादयः सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्ततया
सिद्धाः पदार्थाः सन्तीति कथकाम्यामभ्युपेयम्” ।

तदपरे न क्षमन्ते । तथाहि प्रमाणादीनां सत्त्वं यदभ्युपेयं कथकेन तत् कस्य हेतोः ।
कि तदनभ्युपगच्छद्भ्यां वादिप्रतिवादिभ्यां तदभ्युपगमसाहित्यनियतस्य वाग्व्यवहारस्य
प्रवर्त्तयितुमशक्यत्वात्, उत कथकाम्यां प्रवर्त्तनीयवाग्व्यहारं प्रति हेतुत्वात्, उत
लोकसिद्धत्वात्, अथवा तदनभ्युपगमस्य तत्त्वनिर्णयविजयफलातिप्रसञ्जकत्वात् ।

न तावदाद्यः । तदनभ्युपगच्छतोऽपि चावकिमाध्यमिकादेवाग्निवस्तराणां प्रतीय-
मानत्वात् । तस्यैव वाऽनिष्पत्तौ भवतस्तत्रिरासप्रयासानुपत्तेः । सोऽग्रमपूर्वः प्रमा-
णादिसत्त्वानभ्युपगमात्मा वाक्स्तम्भनमन्त्रो भवताभ्यूहितो नूनं यस्य प्रभावाद्गवत्
सुरगुरुणा लोकायतसूत्राणि न प्रणीतानि, तथागतेन वा मध्यमागमा नोपदिष्टाः,
भगवत्पादेन वा बादरायणीयेषु सूत्रेषु भाष्यं नाभाष्यि ।

“प्रमाणाद्यनभ्युपगम्यापि प्रवर्तयन्तु नाम ते वाचोभङ्गी : । तास्तु साधनबाधनक्षम् ।
न भवन्ति तावतेति ब्रूम्” इति चेत् ।

न । प्रमाणाद्यनभ्युपगम्य प्रवर्तितत्वं तदीयसाधनबाधनाक्षमतायां न नियामकं, किन्तु सद्वचनाभासलक्षणयोगित्वमित्यवस्थाभ्युपेयं भवता । येनाभ्युपगम्यापि प्रमाणादीनि प्रवर्तिता मतान्तरानुसारिभिव्यवहारा अभ्युपगतप्रमाणादिसत्त्वैर्मतान्तरव्यवहारिभिरपरैस्तथाभूता इति कथ्यन्ते ।

यदि त्वस्मद्वचसि सद्वचनाभासलक्षणं न भवान् दर्शयितुमीष्टे तदा अनभ्युपगम्य प्रमाणादीनि भवता प्रवर्तितोऽयं व्यवहार इति शतकृत्वस्त्वयोच्यमानेऽपि नास्माकमादरः । अन्यथाभ्युपगम्य प्रमाणादीनि भवता प्रवर्तितोऽयं व्यवहार इत्येतावता भवदीयो व्यवहाराभास इत्यस्माभिरपि वक्तुं शक्यत एव ।

“ननु यदि प्रमाणादीनि न सन्ति तदा व्यवहार एव धर्मी कथं सिद्धयेत् । दूषणादिव्यवस्था वा कथं स्यात् । सर्वविधिनिषेधानां प्रमाणाधीनत्वात्” ।

मैवम् । न ज्ञूमो वयं न सन्ति प्रमाणादीनीति स्वीकृत्य कथारम्येति । किञ्चाम सन्ति न सन्ति वा प्रमाणादीनीत्यस्यां चिन्तायामुदासीनैः, यथा स्वीकृत्य तानि भवता व्यवहित्यते तथा, व्यवहारिभिरेव कथा प्रवर्तयतामिति । अन्यथा न सन्ति प्रमाणादीनीति भतमस्माकमारोप्य यदिदम्भवता दूषणमुक्तं तदपि न वक्तुं शक्यम् ।

कीदृशीं मर्यादामालम्ब्य प्रवर्तितायां कथायां दूषणमुक्तम् । किं प्रमाणादीनां सत्त्वमभ्युपगम्योभास्यां वादिभ्यां प्रवर्तितायां कथायाम् । उतासत्त्वमभ्युपेत्य । अर्थेकेन सत्त्वमपरेण चासत्त्वमज्जीकृत्य । न तावदाद्यः अभ्युपगतप्रमाणादिसत्त्वं प्रत्येतावृशपर्यनुयोगानवकाशात् । द्वितीये तु स्वतोऽप्यापत्तेः । न तृतीयः । तथैव कथान्तरस्यापि प्रसक्तेः, उभयाभ्युपगमानुरोधित्वाच्च कथानियमस्य । अन्यथा स्वाभिप्रायमालम्ब्य तेनापि त्वद्वचसि यत्किञ्चिद्वागात्मनि दूषणेऽभिहिते कस्य जयो व्यवतिष्ठताम् प्रमाणाद्यभ्युपगन्तुरेव यावच्चियमभरयन्त्रणा महती स्यात् ॥

तस्मात् प्रमाणादिसत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्युपगमीदासीन्येन व्यवहारनियमेन समयं बद्ध्वा कथायां प्रवर्तितायां भवतेदं दूषणमुक्तमित्युचितमेव तथा सति स्यात् । योऽयं

भवान् स्वाभिप्रायमपि नावधारयितुं शकनोति दूरतस्तस्मिन् पराभिसन्धानावधारण-
प्रत्याशा ।

“अथ वादीकृत्य दुर्विषिदिकं तस्मन्नुपाधौ वाधोऽभिधीयत इत्येव नेष्यते, शिष्या-
दयस्तु तस्य कथनाधिकारं जाप्यन्ते । अत एव भाष्यकारः स प्रयोजनमनुयुक्तो “यदि
प्रतिपद्यते” इत्याह स्म न तु प्रतिपद्यम इति ।”

मैवम् । शिष्यादीन् प्रत्येषि चार्वाकादेवोषोऽभिमित्येवाभिधातव्यम् । कथञ्च तथा
स्यान् । तस्य कथाप्रवेशनाप्रवेशनयोस्तद्वाधाक्षमत्वात् । कथायामेव हि निग्रहः ।

नापि द्वितीयः । तथा हि स्यादप्येवं यदि कथकप्रवर्तनीयवाग्यवहारं प्रति प्रमाणा-
दीनां हेतुता तत्स्त्वानभ्युपगमे निवर्त्तेत । न त्वेवं सम्भवति । तथा सति तत्स्त्वान-
भ्युपगन्त्यां वाग्यवहारस्वरूपमेव न निष्पद्येत् हेतुनुपपत्तेः । उक्तश्चायमर्थो यन्मा-
व्यमिकादिवाग्यवहाराणां स्वरूपापलापो न शक्यत इति ।

अथ मन्यमे “कथकवाग्यवहारं प्रति हेतुत्वान् प्रमाणादीनां सत्त्वं, सत्त्वाच्चाभ्य-
पगमः, यत्सत्तदभ्युपगम्यत इति स्थितेरिति” ।

मैवम् । कथाऽपि नियमस्थित्या प्रवृत्तायां कथायां कथकवाग्यवहारं प्रति हेतुत्वान्
प्रमाणादीनां सत्त्वं सत्त्वाच्चाभ्युपगमो भवता प्रसाध्यः ।

कथातः पूर्वं तत्स्त्वावधारणं वा परपराजयं वाऽभिलेपद्भ्यां कथकाभ्यां यावता
विना तदभिलिपिं न पर्यवस्थिति तावदनुरोद्धव्यम् । तच्च व्यवहारनियमसमयबन्धादेव
इत्यामपि ताभ्यां सम्भाव्यत इति व्यवहारनियमसमयमेव बद्धीतः ।

म च—‘प्रमाणेन तर्केण च व्यवहृतव्यं वादिना । प्रतिवादिनाऽपि कथाङ्गतस्त्वज्ञान-
विपर्ययलिङ्गप्रतिज्ञाहात्याद्यन्यतमनिग्रहस्थानं तस्य दर्शनीयम् । तनुपादने प्रथमस्य
भङ्गो व्यवहृतव्यः । अन्यथा तु द्वितीयस्यैव । तादृशेतरौ च जेतृतया व्यवहृतव्यौ ।
प्रामाणिकः पक्षस्तत्त्वकतया व्यवहृतव्यः’—इत्यादिरूपः ।

अत एव ‘व्यवहारनियमसमयबन्धे हेतुर्वक्तव्यः’, तथा च सोऽपि हेतुः कथायां प्रवृत्ता-

यामभिधातुं युक्त' इति प्रमाणसत्त्वाभ्युपगमहेत्वभिधानवत् प्रत्यवस्थानमनवकाशम्, द्वाभ्यामपि वादिभ्यां विचारप्रवृत्त्याभिलब्ध्यमाणतत्त्वव्यवस्थाजयमूलत्वेन व्यवहारनियमस्य स्वेच्छयैव परिगृहीतत्वात् ।

नचैवं प्रमाणानुपज्ञस्वेच्छामात्रगृहीतमूलत्वान्मूलापरिशुद्धिसम्भवेन सर्वविचारविचार्यंतत्कलविप्लवापत्तिः स्यात् । अविद्यमानादिपारम्पर्यायातस्य लोकव्युत्पत्तिगृहीतसंवादस्य च तस्यान्यथाभावासम्भाव्यतालक्षणस्वतःसिद्धिपरिशुद्धत्वात् ।

न च प्रमाणादीनां सत्ताऽपीत्यमेव ताभ्यामङ्गीर्त्तुमुचिता । तादृशव्यवहारनियममात्रेणैव कथाप्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः । प्रमाणादिसत्तामभ्युपेत्यापि तथाव्यवहारनियमव्यतिरेके कथाप्रवृत्तिं विना तत्त्वनिर्णयस्य जयस्य वाऽभिलषितस्य कथक्योरपर्यवसानात् ।

नापि तृतीयः । लोकव्यवहारो हि प्रामाणिकव्यवहारो वा स्यात् पामरादिसधारणव्यवहारो वा । नाद्यः । विचारप्रवृत्तिमन्तरेण तस्य दुर्ब्रिरूपत्वात् । तदर्थमेव च पूर्वनियमस्य गवेषणात् । नापि द्वितीयः, शरीरात्मतादीनामपि तथा सति भवता स्वीकर्त्तव्यतापातात् ।

"पश्चात्तद्विचारबा व्यतया नाभ्युपेयत" इति चेत्, तर्हि प्रमाणादयोऽपि यदि विचारबाध्या भविष्यन्ति तदा नाभ्युपेया एव, अन्यथा तूपगंतव्या इति लोकव्यवहारसिद्धतया सत्त्वमभ्युपगम्यत इति तावन्न भवति ।

नापि चतुर्थः । यादृशो भवता प्रमाणादीन्यभ्युपगम्य व्यवहारनियमः कथायामालम्ब्यते तस्यैव प्रमाणादिसत्त्वासत्त्वानुसरणोदासीनैरसमाभिरप्यवलम्बनात् । तस्य यदि मां प्रति फलातिप्रसङ्गकत्वं तदा त्वां प्रत्यपि समानः प्रसङ्गः ।

"स्यादेतन्नियतवारव्यवहारक्रियासमयबन्धेन कथां प्रवर्त्तयताऽपि व्यवहारसत्ताऽभ्युपगन्तव्या । नहि सत्तामनभ्युपगम्य व्यवहारक्रियाऽभिधातुं शक्या । क्रिया हि निष्पादना, असतः सद्वृपताप्रापणमिति यावत् । प्रमाणैर्वर्वहर्तव्यमिति नियमबन्धनम्-प्रमाणकारणभावस्य नियमान्तर्भावात् नियतपूर्वसत्त्वरूपं कारणत्वं प्रमाणानामनादाय,

न पर्यवस्थति । दूषणानाङ्गचास्तित्वेन भङ्गावधारणनियमबन्धने साधनाङ्गानां व्याप्त्यादीनां सत्त्वेन तद्विषयस्य तत्त्वरूपताव्यवहारनियमनादौ च कण्ठोक्तमेव तस्य तस्य सत्त्वमङ्गीकृतमिति रिक्तमिदमुच्यते प्रमाणादीनां सत्तामनम्युपगम्य कथारम्भः शक्यत इति ।

मैवम् । एभिरपि वाधकैः कथायामारव्याधायामेवाभिमतस्य प्रसाधनीयत्वे पूर्वोक्तव्याधाया अनिस्तारात् ।

न च व्यवहारनियमस्य स्वेच्छाङ्गतस्यैव प्रमाणादिसत्तास्वीकारपर्यवसायितया नायं दोषः स्यात् । यतः सत्ताज्ञानस्य तत्राङ्गत्वम्, न तु सत्तायाः ।

तत्र कि सत्तावगममात्रात्मताऽन्युपगम्येति मन्यसे, अवाधितात्तदवगमाद्वा । न तावदाद्यः । मस्मरीचिकादौ जलरूपतामङ्गावाम्युपगमप्रसङ्गात् । द्वितीयेषि कि वादिप्रतिवादिमध्यस्थमात्रस्य-तस्यापि कथाकालमात्र एव-वाधितावगमाभावात्, अथवा कस्यचिदिषि कालान्तरेषि वाधितवोधविरहात् । नाद्यः । अतिप्रसङ्गात्, पुरुषत्रयावगतस्यापि एकक्षणावगतस्य च पुरुषान्तरेण-तेनापि क्षणान्तरे-बहुलवाध्यतादर्शनादिति । न चासावर्थोऽमन्त्रणि द्विवादिपुरुषमात्रपूर्वजाततत्प्रतीत्यनुरोधाद्, वाधर्दशने सत्येषि, तथैव सन्भित्यम्युपगम्यते । तस्माद् द्वितीयः पक्षः परिशिष्यते । यत्र सर्वप्रकारेण वाधितत्वं नास्ति तत्सदित्यम्युपगत्तव्यम् ।

तदित्थं यदि नाम वादिप्रतिवादिमध्यस्थमात्रस्य दूषणादिसत्तावगमः कथाकालमात्रे तैर्बाध्यमानः कथाङ्गत्वेनाम्युपेयते, किमायात् सर्वप्रकारावाधिततत्सत्त्वावगमाय-तत्त्वात्मतत्सत्त्वाम्युपगमकथा ज्ञानाङ्गीकारस्य । कतिपयप्रतिपत्तृकतिपयकालतथात्वावगमा देव च प्रायेण नौकिकव्यवहारः प्रतीयते । तादृशश्चार्यं सत्त्वावगमः कथाङ्गम् । एतत्तदुच्यते व्यावहारिकौं प्रमाणादिसत्तामादाय विचारारम्भ इति ।

तस्माद्याद् व्यवहारनियमः कृतः तन्मर्यादाऽनेन नोल्लंघितेति । यद्वादिवाग्व्यवहारे

मध्यस्थावगमः स विजयते, यस्य च वचसि नैवं तस्यावगमस्तस्य पराजयः । यत्र वाच्यक्तनिग्रहसत्त्वावगमः स निगृहीतः, तदितरस्तु न तथेत्यादिनियम एव कथारम्भाय ग्राह्यः ।

अनेन नियमेन व्यवहृत्वमित्यस्य ह्यमर्थः—अनेन नियमेनोक्तमनेनेति मध्यस्थावगमस्य विषयीभवितव्यमिति ।

न च वाच्यम्—“ततस्तदवगमस्यापि सत्ताऽम्युपेयेति ।” तस्यापि सत्ताक्षित्तायां तत्सत्तावगमान्तरस्यैव शरणत्वात् ।

न चैवमनवस्था । तदनुसरणावश्यम्भावानङ्गीकारात् । ‘एवं त्रिचतुरज्ञानजन्मनो नाधिका मतिरिति’ न्यायात् ।

न च—“अन्तिमासत्त्वे पूर्वपूर्वप्रवाहासत्त्वापत्तिः, तथाचावगममादायापि न निस्तार” इति वाच्यम् । अस्तु एवम् तथाऽपि त्रिचतुरज्ञानकक्षागवेषणमात्रविश्रान्तेन विचारेण ततः परमनुसरणरमणीयेनैव समयं बद्ध्वा कथायाम्मिथः सम्प्रतिपत्त्या प्रवर्तनात् । अन्यथा प्रमाणादिसत्ताऽम्युपगमेऽपि ज्ञानानवस्थाया दुष्परिहरत्वात् ।

न च वाच्यम्—“मत्पक्षे स्वरूपसत्ता ज्ञानेन व्यवहारस्य चरितार्थयितुं शक्यत्वात् न ज्ञानस्य परम्परानुसरणमुचितम् । न त्वेवं त्वत्पक्षे, ज्ञानस्वरूपसत्ताङ्गीकारप्रसङ्गादिति ।” स्वरूपसत्तामादायापि परिहरतोऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गस्य स्वप्रकाशप्रस्तावे वक्तव्यत्वात् । यथा च त्वत्पक्षे स्वरूपसत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि ज्ञानस्वरूपसत्तैव परं व्यवहारोपपादिका न घटादिसत्ता, एवमेवासत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि ज्ञानमेवासद्व्यवहारोपपादकं नात्यत् ।

“असच्चोपपादकञ्चेति व्याहृतमिति” चेत्र । सदुपपादकमिति कुतो न व्याहृतम् । न हि सदुपपादकमसच्च नेति क्वचिदावयोः सिद्धम् ।

“ननु तदसत्त्वाविशेषात्तकार्यस्यान्यदाऽपि प्रसङ्गः” न । कार्यस्याद्यसत्ताक्षण इवान्यदाऽपि सामग्र्यसत्त्वाविशेषात्तवापि किं नान्यदा कार्यजन्म ।

“अथ न मम तदानीलनं सामग्रीसत्त्वं तदातनस्य कार्यजन्मनो नियामकम् किन्तु ततः

प्राक् सामग्रीसत्त्वम्, तथादर्शनात् ॥—तर्हि ममापि कालान्तरस्थमपि तदसत्त्वं तदातन-
कार्यजन्मतो नियामकम्, तथादर्शनादेव ।

मम तदव्यवहितोत्तरत्वं तदा कार्यनियामकमिति चेत्, न । समसमयत्वादगन्तु-
कत्वाच्चाविशेषेण नियम्यनियामकव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः । तस्मादन्यदास्थाया एव साम-
धास्तदा कार्यनियमोऽभ्युपेयः तथादर्शनादित्येव मन्तव्यम् । तथा च समः समाधिः ।

“तथापि कार्यजन्मकालस्य को विशेषः ॥” कार्यजन्मैव । अन्यथा यद्विशेषान्तरं
तदापि विशेषान्तरवतः कालस्य स्यादित्यपर्यवसानमेव पर्यवस्थेत् ।

तथापि तत्कालस्यानुगतं किं रूपमिति चेत् रूपान्तरवतोपि किं रूपमित्यपि पर्यनुयो-
गस्यानुवृत्तेः ।

किञ्चन

अन्तर्भावितसत्त्वञ्चेत् कारणं तदसत्ततः ।

नान्तर्भावितसत्त्वञ्चेत्कारणं तदसत्ततः ॥

तथा ह्यन्तर्भूतसत्त्वं यदि कारणत्वं तदा स्वविशिष्टस्ववृत्तिरंशतः स्वाश्रयत्वमा-
पादयति । विशिष्टस्याधान्तरत्वेषि च स्वस्मिन् स्ववृत्तिव्यतिरेकवत् स्वविशिष्टे
स्ववृत्तिव्यतिरेकनियमदर्शनात् न सैव सत्ता तस्मिन्निति अन्यस्यास्तस्या विशिष्ट-
वृत्त्यम्युपगमे तामसशिवेश्य कारणत्वमभ्युपगन्तुः सर्वथैव कारणमसत्पर्यवस्थति ।
अपरापरसत्तानिवेशने चापर्यवसानमेव ।

न च सत्ताभेदानन्त्यमस्येवेत्यपि पादप्रसारिका निस्ताराय । सत्ताभेदे हि सद्गुद्धि-
व्यवहारानुगमननिबन्धनलंघिनः (नि?) प्रथमाऽपि सत्ता न स्यादिति सत्त्ववृद्धि-
मिष्ठवतो मूलमपि ते नष्टमिति कष्टतरम् ।

न च स्वरूपसत्तोपगमाय स्वस्ति । भिन्नानप्यनुगतवृद्ध्याद्याधानपदेऽभिषिञ्चता
त्वया जातिमात्राय जलाङ्गलिंबितीयेत । मा भूदनुगतिः स्वरूपसत्त्वस्थेति च वदन्

तद्गर्भिणीं कारणतां कथमनुगमयितासीति ।

किञ्च स्वरूपसत्त्वं स्वरूपात् घटाद्यात्मनो नाधिकम्, असतोऽपि स्वरूपं स्वरूपमेव ।
नह्यसन् घटादिः । तथा सति 'घटादिनं' इत्यपि न स्यात्; असतोऽघटादित्वात् ।

अथ सदपि सत्तामनन्तर्भाव्य कारणम्, तदानीमसदपि तत्थास्तु, सत्तासत्तयोः
कारणकोट्यप्रवेशाविशेषात् ।

अथ "न सत्ता कारणकोटिनिविष्टा किंतु कारणत्वं सत्त्वम्, नियतपूर्वसत्तां हि
कारणतामन्य" इति मन्यसे तर्हि मत्पक्षे सैव कारणताऽस्तु ।

तर्हि कारणसत्तामभ्युपगतवानसीति घट्कुट्यां प्रभातमिति चेत्, न । भावानव-
बोधात् । सत्तामसतीमभ्युपगच्छताऽपि सत्ता मयाऽभ्युपगतैव । अन्यथा कासावसतीति ।
त्वमपि किं सत्तान्तसत्तामन्तर्भाव्य कारणत्वमिच्छसि । नत्वेवम् । पूर्ववत् क्वापि
सत्तात्यागो वा अनवस्थायां (वा) पर्यवसानं स्यात् ।

असत्त्वाविशेषात्कारणनियमः कथं स्यादिति चेन्न, सत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि तुल्यत्वात् ।

सत्त्वेऽस्त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानम् तस्य तज्जातीयस्य वा । त्वपक्षे त्वसत्त्वा-
विशेषाद् व्यतिरेकः । परं सोऽप्यनियतः । यदा कारणाभावस्तदा कार्यभावावश्य-
भावानभ्युपगमात् नित्यासतः कारणस्यासत्त्व एव कदाचित् कार्योत्पादात् । अन्वयस्तु
न क्वचिदपि"—इति चेत्, न । तुल्यत्वात् । अन्ययो नास्तीत्यभ्युपगच्छताऽप्यन्वयोप-
गमात् । अन्वयस्यापि सत्तान्तर्भविने कथितदोषापत्तेः ।

एतेन "आशामोदकतृप्ता ये ये चोपार्जितमोदकाः । रसवीर्यविपाकादि तेषां तुल्य
प्रसञ्जते" इत्यस्यापि बाधकत्वमाशामोदकायते । सत्तान्तर्भवानन्तर्भवाम्यां प्रत्या-
देशात्, आशामोदकादिनापि च रसवीर्यविपाकादिजननात् ।

तदसत्कथं कार्यं स्यादिति चेन्न । सत्तामन्तर्भाव्य कार्यत्वोपगमे कारणवत्कार्येष्वि-
उक्तदोषस्य-अनन्तर्भवि वा ऽविशेषस्य पूर्ववदावृत्तेः ।

तस्मात्

पूर्वसम्बन्धनियमे हेतुत्वे तुल्य एव नौ ।

हेतुत्ववहिर्भूतसत्त्वासत्त्वकथा वृथा ॥

आस्तां प्रतिवन्दिग्रहग्रहः । कथं पुनरसतः कारणत्वमवसेयम्, प्राक्सत्त्वनियमस्य विशेषस्यानभ्युपगमात्, असत्त्वस्य चाविशेषादिति” चेत्त । इदमस्माच्चियतं प्राक्स-दिति वुद्धया विशेषात् ।

“आन्तैवंबुद्धिगोचरेऽतिप्रसङ्गः” इति चेत्त । यावृद्धया हि धिया त्रिचतुरकक्षा-बाधानवरोधविश्रान्तया वस्तुसत्त्वनिश्चयस्ते, तादृश्यैव विषयीकृतस्य ममापि कारणता-निश्चयः । केवलन्ततः परास्त्वपि कक्षामु वाधात् पूर्वपूर्वं आन्तिसम्भवेन न तावता सत्त्वावधारणं वयं मन्यामह इति विशेषः । परदर्शनसिद्धान्तस्य भूरिकक्षाधाविनोऽपि ततः परकक्षाबाध्यमानत्वेनातथाभावोपगमात् । अन्यथैकदर्शनपरिशेषःस्यात् ।

एतेन “असत्त्वाविशेषात् कथं कस्यचित्पक्षस्य त्रिचतुरकक्षाधावित्वमास्ता”मित्यपि निरस्तम् ।

“अनेवंबुद्धिविषयतादशायां को विशेषः” इति चेत्, यदा कदापि तादृशबुद्धिविषयतैव । अन्यथा कथय कथमन्यदातनतादृशबुद्धिविषयतया अन्यदा सत्त्वं स्यात् । “तदातन-सत्त्वमन्यदास्येन गृह्णात्” इति चेत्, अन्यकालिकमेव तर्हि तत् तदातनकारणत्वोपयो-गीति समानम् । तदेतत् संवृतिसत्त्वमिति गीयते ।

“असती सा न विशेषिका सती सा नेष्टा”—इत्यभिसन्धानेन—“संवृतिरपि सती न वेति” पृच्छन् प्रतिवक्तव्यः । ज्ञानं तावद्व्यवहारोपपादकतया द्वाम्यामप्यनुमतम् तस्यापि जिज्ञासायां त्रिचतुरकक्षाविश्रान्तावेषणस्य यदि सत्ता प्रतिपन्ना भविष्यति, तदा सता लेनेदमुपिपादितम्भविष्यति । अथासत्ता तस्य पर्यंवसास्यति, तदा असतैव तेनेदमुपपादत इति स्वीकर्तव्यम्, अमविषयेणव भ्रमे विशिष्टताव्यवहारः ।

अविचायव तावत्तस्याः सदसत्त्वं विचार आरब्धव्यः । अन्यथा प्रथममेव मतिकर्दमे
कथारभ्यणमशक्यमापद्येत् । स्वीकृतञ्च भवताऽपि भविष्यदादिविषये विज्ञाने विशिष्ट-
व्यवहारनिदानत्वमसतो विषयस्य । कारणशक्तेश्च विशेषकमसदेव कार्यम् ।

न च “कालान्तरसम्बन्धिनी सत्ता तस्यैकत्र, अन्यत्र नान्यदापीति वैधम्यं मतयोरपीति”
वक्तव्यम् । विशिष्टव्यवहारप्रवृत्तिसमये ह्योरप्यसत्त्वाविशेषात् प्रयोजनानुपयुक्ते काले
तस्य स्वरूपतो ज्वस्थानं पाटञ्चरलुण्ठिते वेशमनि यामिकजागरणवृत्तान्तमनुहरति ।

“तथाऽपि कालान्तरस्थित्या घटादिकं स्वरूपतो विशेषणतश्च व्यवच्छिन्नं तद्विज्ञानेन
स्वभावबलात्स्वविशेषणत्वेनोपादीयते । न त्वेव मत्यन्तासङ्घविनुमर्हति, तस्य स्वरूपतो
विशेषणतश्च व्यवच्छिन्नतया जन्मीकारात्कुत्र स्वभावतो विज्ञानं सम्बन्धिनिरूप्येत्” ।
न । उक्तमत्रासतोऽपि तदेव स्वरूपम् तस्य नियतस्वरूपतैव, नियतविशेषणस्यैवासत्त्वात् ।
अन्यथाऽपित्रसङ्गात् भ्रान्तिविषयेण दत्तोत्तरत्वाच्चेत्यलमतिविस्तरेण ।

अपरे पुनश्चेत्सोऽपि शून्यताङ्गीकारे मनःप्रत्ययमनासादयन्तः सर्वमिदमसदेव
विश्वमित्यभिधातुं सहसैवानुत्सहमाना मन्यन्ते-विज्ञानं तावत् स्वप्रकाशं स्वत एव
सिद्धस्वरूपम् । न खलु विज्ञाने सति जिज्ञासोरपि कस्य चिज्जानामि न वेति संशयः
न जानामीति वा विपर्ययो व्यतिरेकप्रमा वा । तेन जिज्ञासितस्यातत्त्वज्ञानव्यतिरेक-
प्रमाणानामभावसमुदायः स्वव्यापकं जिज्ञासितस्य प्रमितत्वमानयति । अन्यथा हि
जिज्ञासितप्रमितत्वव्यतिरेकव्यापकं जिज्ञासितव्यतिरेकोल्लेखि ज्ञानमविभिन्नजिज्ञासस्य
स्यात् । अतः सर्वजनस्वात्मसंवेदनसिद्धं वोधस्य स्वरूपम् ।

“व्यवसायस्यानुव्यवसायनियमान्त्र तत्र संशयादि” इति चेन्न । यत्रैवानुव्यवसाये
ज्ञेयता नोपेया तत्र जिज्ञासायामात्मधर्मिकं तत्संशयमारभ्य व्यवसायविषयपर्यन्तं
संशयाकान्तेदुर्घरिहरत्वात् । विषयिसङ्घावसंशये च तद्विषयेष्वि संशयस्य सम्भवात् ।
एवं त्रिचतुरसंवेदनकथाज्ञानाद्वौव्यनियमाभ्युपगमेऽपीति । स्वयंप्रकाशे तु मानमेय-

व्यवस्थाया अभावादेव तदाश्रया दोषा निरवकाशः । अन्यथा तु बोधस्वरूपमेव न सिद्ध्यन्त् । यदि हि विज्ञानं परतः सिद्ध्येत्तदाऽवस्था स्यात् ।

न च वाच्यम्—“अवश्यवेद्यता वित्तेर्नाम्युपेयते । स्वार्थो व्यवहारस्तु स्वरूपसत्तया प्रसूयत इति क्वानवस्था”—इति । यतस्तस्यां प्रमाणानुपन्यासे स्वरूपसत्ताऽपि कुतः यथा व्यवहारोपपत्तिः । को ब्रूते सती सा वित्तिः, असत्येव न कुतः ।

“सामान्यतो वित्तेस्तथात्वविधावपेक्षितसिद्ध्या यत्र विशेषरूपायां प्रमाणाप्रवृत्तिः तदा तत्र सत्त्वसाधनासत्त्वेऽपि जिज्ञासायां सत्यां पदचादृव्यवहारसत्त्वैव वा अन्यद्वा प्रमाणमस्त्यवेति” चेन्न । तस्यापि सत्त्वं कथमित्यनवस्था स्यात्, शेषासिद्ध्या सर्वासिद्धिर्वा प्रसज्येत—इत्यर्थासिद्धिपर्यन्तस्य व्यसनस्य दुरुत्तरत्वात् । सेयम् ‘अप्रत्यक्षो-पलभस्य नार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिद्ध्यति’ इति ।

घटसत्तां हि व्यवहरता प्रामाणिकेन तत्र प्रमाणसङ्घावो वाच्यः । यदि प्रमाणमनु-पन्यस्य साऽस्तीत्यङ्गीक्रियते तदा वैपरीत्यमेव किन्न स्यात् । ततश्च घटसत्तायां प्रमाणसत्ता दर्शनीया । तथा च प्रमाणसत्ताऽपि तत्प्रमाणसत्तामन्तरेण न प्रामाणिक-स्याङ्गीकाराह सिर्वप्रमाणसत्तानिवृत्तेर्वस्तुसत्तानिवृत्तिनियतत्वात् ; अन्यथा सप्तमर-सादेरप्यापत्तेः, इति व्यक्तमनवस्थादौस्थ्यमस्वप्रकाशवादिनः स्यात् । यदि हि विनैव प्रमाणसत्तां प्रमाणसत्तां परोऽङ्गीकार्येत तदा घटसत्ताभिपि तथैवाङ्गीकार्यताभिति घटेऽपि वृथा प्रमाणोपन्यासायासः ।

अथ “नाव्यवधानलभ्नवित्तिद्वित्तिधाराभ्युपगम्यते, किञ्चाम कदाचित् कुतश्चित् काचिद् वित्तिः प्रमीयते, इति सर्वा वित्तिः प्रमाणसिद्धैवेत्यम्युपेयते”—इति चेन्न । स्यादप्येवं यदि घट इति घटं जानामीत्यतोऽधिका घटवित्तिद्वित्तिधारया विषयभावेन प्रविष्ट्या तादृग्विषयशातभारमन्थरा वित्तिरस्मदादेश्तपद्मानाऽनुभूयेत ।

यद्यस्मदादिविलक्षणजन्मनि सा सम्भाव्यते तदा यस्या अपि वित्तेस्तावद्विषयगम्भिता धीर्विषयः साप्यन्यया कथाचिद्गुल्लेख्यत्वं प्रमाणाभावश्चानिमोक्षापत्तिश्च । न हि

स्वमन्तरभाव्य कयाचिद्दिया स्वप्रवाहो ग्राह्यः, तथा सति स्वप्रकाशतासिद्धेः। अत एवान्योन्यविषयताऽपि निरस्ता, सविषयकान्योन्यग्रहे स्वप्रहापत्तेः।

न च पुरुषान्तरेण सा प्रमास्यते, न तु तदभाव इति ते प्रमाऽस्ति। तदर्थमपि प्रमाणान्तरसङ्घावपरम्परापत्तेः।

न चैवं घटसामग्रीतत्सामग्रीगवेषणेऽप्यनवस्था स्यात्, वैप्यात्। यदि घटसामग्री-तत्सामग्रीधारा कुत्रचिद्दिच्छिद्येत तदा घटः सदातनः स्यादित्यर्थापत्त्यैव घटः सामग्री-परम्पराविच्छेदविरहित एव प्रमीयते। यदि तु ज्ञानेऽप्येवं स्यात्तदा स्वस्य प्रवेशात् स्वप्रकाशापत्तिः अप्रवेशादनवस्था, अवेदने शेषासिद्ध्या सर्वासिद्धिः इति व्यसनं दुरुत्तरमेव। ये च मानमेयभावाश्रया दोषाः कीर्तनीयास्तेऽपि प्रसज्येरन्।

न च तैर्दोषैर्नास्त्येव ज्ञानमित्यास्थेयम्, स्वतः सर्वसिद्धस्य दुरपह्लवत्वात्, स्वप्रकाशाङ्गीकारादेव चानुभवस्य सर्वदोषहानेवंक्ष्यमाणत्वात्। प्रकाशात्मतामात्रस्यैव स्वतः-सिद्धिसम्भवे जडात्मनां धर्मणां केषामपि तदन्तर्भावानुपपत्तिः।

अत एव धर्मोपग्रहपर्वतिष्णुवाव्यवहारविषयत्वम्। कालानवच्छेदभादाय नित्यतो-पचारः। देशानवच्छेदभादाय विभुत्वव्यपदेशः। प्रकारावच्छेदविरहनिबन्धनशब्द सर्वात्मत्वाद्वैतादिव्यवहारः। सौगतप्रभाकरवत् भावे अभावं प्रति-नैयायिकवच्च भावे-ज्ञावानतिरेकस्वीकारादेवाद्वैताव्याधातः। ऋगविषयनिषेधवच्च प्रतियोगिनः सर्व-यैवासिद्ध्याऽपि न काचित् क्षतिः।

तदेतत् श्रुत्या प्रमाणेनोपलक्षणन्यायात् तात्पर्यतः प्रकाशयते। तेन परमार्थतोऽभिधानाभिधेयभावविरहे तात्पर्यतः श्रुतिस्तस्मिन्नविद्यादशायां पराम्युपगमरीत्या प्रमाण-मित्युच्यते। वस्तुतस्त्वात्मसिद्धमेव चिद्रूपम्।

“ननु च स्वप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानस्येत्यनुपपन्नमिदम्, क्रियाकर्मभावस्य भेदव्यतिरेकेनानु-पत्तेः। कार्या क्रिया हि कर्मणो भवति। कर्म च कारकं क्रियायाः। न च स्वेनैव स्वनिष्पादनं शक्यम्, पूर्वपरभावविशेषस्य हेतुहेतुमङ्गावरूपत्वात्। न च तस्मादेव तदेव पूर्वमपरञ्च सम्भवति, तदनवच्छेदकालविशेषस्य तत्पूर्ववशब्दार्थत्वात्। तदा च तस्य सङ्घावस्थी कारे स एव कालस्तदवच्छिन्नो जनवच्छेदश्वेति विरोधात्।”

मैवम्। क्रियायाः कर्मजन्यतानियमानङ्गीकारात्, सर्वयैवानागतविज्ञाने तद-

सम्भवात्, कविज्जनकताभादाय च कर्मणि कारकत्वव्यपदेशात्, करणव्यापार-विषयत्वाद्वा परस्मवेतक्रियाकलभागित्वाद्वा कर्मलक्षणात् विनापि क्रियाजनकत्वेन कर्मव्यवहारोगणनः ।

किञ्चन तत्कर्मत्वम् यत् स्वं प्रति विहृथ्यते? परस्मवेतक्रियाकलभागित्वमिति” चेन्न, अपादानस्यातिव्याप्तेः । ‘अपादानञ्ज्ञर्मणीति’ चेन्न, ‘वृक्षात्पर्णम्पतति’ इतिवत् वृक्षं पर्णं पतति” इत्यपि स्यात् । “विवक्षातः कारकाणि भवन्ति इति तदविवक्षातो नैवमिति” चेन्न, वस्तुतः सतस्नाद्यस्य यदि विवक्षा स्यात् तदा तदपि स्यात् । “अपादानस्य कर्मत्वन्न विवहृथ्यत इति शाद्विकसम्ब्रदाय” इति चेत्, तर्हि निवृत्तसर्वकर्म-व्यवहारेऽपि स्वकृतकर्मलक्षणानुरोधेन कर्मत्वमन्युपगच्छता वस्तुमात्रञ्ज्ञर्मेत्यपि लक्षणं सावकाशितं स्यात् । कथञ्च लोकोत्तरश्चेन निवृत्तसर्वकर्मव्यवहारेऽपि कर्मत्वमस्तीति ज्ञातम् । “अपादानेतरदीदृशं कर्मेति” चेन्न, तत्राऽपि “नदी वर्ढते” इत्यादौ तद्वृद्धेर-‘प्राप्ततीरभागप्राप्तिकलायाः सकर्मत्वापत्तेः । ‘अपादानेतरत्’ इत्यस्य स्याने क्रियानाशक’—इतिकरणेऽप्यस्य तदवस्थत्वात् । विनाशलक्षणायां वृद्धौ तदयोगाच्च । ‘वृक्षं स्यज्जति’ इत्यादावकर्मकत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

‘आत्मानञ्जानामि’ इत्यत्र च परत्वाभावादकर्मकत्वापत्तेः । “तत्राप्युपाधिभेदात्परत्वम्, कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाद्युपहितस्यैवात्मनो ज्ञेयत्वाम्युपगमादिति” चेन्न । यतोऽस्तु तावदेवं यथाकथञ्चित्, तथाऽप्यध्यात्मविदो निश्चाधिभात्मानञ्जानतो ज्ञानशात्म-कर्मकं स्यात् । ‘पच्यते ओदनः स्वयमेव’ इत्यादौ कर्मकस्त्वंरि का गतिः स्यात् । सर्व-ज्ञमीश्वरमन्यमानेन च नित्यज्ञाने तस्मिन् भगवति फलनाशकत्वस्यानम्युपगमात् तं प्रत्येतल्लक्षणासिद्धिः । तस्माद्व्याकरणकारैः शब्दसिद्ध्यर्थं नदीवृद्ध्यादिवत्कर्मपि परिभाषितमित्यलं तदनुगतलक्षणगेषण्या ।

“करणव्यापारविषयः कर्म” इति चेन्न । ‘हस्तेन रामेण शरेण’ इत्यादावतिप्रसङ्गात्-लक्षणं विनाऽपि क्रियाजनकत्वे सति व्यापारोद्देश्यत्वेन कर्मव्यवहारोपत्तेः ।

शोषञ्चेश्वरभिसन्धौ स्वप्रकाशवादे निर्वक्ष्यामः ।

“ननु चाभेदे विषयविषयिभावस्यैवासञ्ज्ञतत्वम् । विषयित्वं हि विषयसम्बन्धिता

सम्बन्धश्च भेदमन्तरेणासम्भवदवस्थितिः, सम्बन्धस्वमितेः सम्बन्धस्वरूपभेदमिति-
व्यतिरेके वैपरीत्यावधारणात् ।”

मैवम् । विषयविषयभावो हि सम्बन्धो न सम्बन्धस्वरूपाद्विभः । तथा भूतत्वेऽपि
चान्ततस्तस्म्बन्धस्यापि स्वाश्रयात्मकत्वमभ्युपगम्यम्, अनवस्थाभयात् । तथा सति च
सैव यथा सम्बन्धमितिः सम्बन्धस्वरूपात्सम्बन्धनो भेदमनादायैव पर्यवस्थतीत्यभ्युप-
पग्न्तव्यम्, स्वभावसम्बन्धस्येतरसम्बन्धमर्यादातिशायित्वात्, तथा विनाऽपि सम्बन्ध-
भेदं विषयविषयभावात्माऽयं सम्बन्धः पर्यवसास्यति । तदवगमोऽपि तथावगमव्यति-
रेकेणैव भविष्यति । को विरोधः ॥

न चैव घटतज्ञानयोर्याद्विग्निषयविषयभावस्ततो मात्रयापि स्वप्रकाशविषयविषय-
भावान्यत्वे बाध्यत्वक्त्र स्यात् । अस्त्येव ह्यविद्यया विद्यमाने घटतज्ञाने बाध्यत्वम्-
परमार्थसति तु स्वप्रकाशो पारमार्थिकत्वमिति द्वयोरननुगमेष्यि न दोषः ।

अथवा स्वात्मना सह क्रियाकर्मभावो विषयविषयभावो वा स्वप्रकाशार्थ इति
नाभ्युपेयमेव । यथा तु भवतां सत्तासम्बन्धादितरत्र सद्व्यवहारव्यवस्था, सत्ता तु
स्वयमेव सदूपा, न चैतावता स्वात्माश्रयता तस्याः, तथाज्ञानमपि स्वत एव सिद्ध-
स्वरूपम् ।

अथवा यथा बहुब्रीहिसमासे तद्गुणसंविज्ञाने गुणमादायैव प्रधानस्यान्यपदार्थस्य
बहुब्रीहिसिद्धपदप्रतिपाद्यता तथा विज्ञानस्याविषयमपि स्वात्मानमादायैव स्वविषय-
व्यवहारप्रवर्तनं समर्थताम् । सोऽयं गुरुणां सविषयकविज्ञानस्वप्रकाशतापक्षो न
ब्रह्मस्वप्रकाशतापक्षः, तत्र विषयाभावात् । एतावन्मात्रेण तु स्यात्, यथा स्वाऽविषये-
ऽपि कुटादौ बहुब्रीहिवाक्यं व्यवहारं प्रवर्तयति तथा ज्ञानमविषयेऽप्यात्मन्यविद्यादशाया-
मिति ।

तदेवं यद्यदन्यत्र दृष्टवैधर्म्यं स्वप्रकाशो पर्यवसास्यति तत् सर्वमन्यथानुपपत्तिरेव
स्वप्रकाशप्रसाधकतया प्रदर्शिता स्वीकारयिष्यति । तथथा—‘अन्यो जाता अन्यश्च ज्ञेय’
इत्यन्यत्र दृष्टम् ‘अहम्’ इति व्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या त्याज्यम्, तथा अन्यज्ञानमन्यज्ञ-
ज्ञेयमिति जानामीति व्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या त्याज्यम् । सर्वतो बलवती ह्यन्यथानुप-

पत्तिः तथादृष्टतामात्रवलमवलम्भ्य प्रवृत्तं तर्कशतमपि बाधते । तदिदमाहुः । “प्रमा-
णवन्त्यदृष्टानि कल्प्यानि सुबहून्यपि ।” इति (तं वा० ३७४)

तस्मात्—

अन्यथानुपपत्तिश्चेदस्ति वस्तुप्रसाधिका ।
गिनपिट दृष्टवैमत्यं सैव सर्ववलाधिका ॥
वाच्याज्यथोपपत्तिर्वा त्यज्यो वा दृष्टतामाहः ।
नह्येकत्र समावेशश्छायातपदेतयोः ॥ इति

तदित्थं त्वदङ्गीकृतसद्विचारलक्षणोपमन्नैरेवंविधैर्विचारैः स्वप्रकाशता भवता सुप्रति-
पदा । अस्माभिस्तु स्वसंवेदनबलादेव स्वतः सिद्धरूपं विज्ञानमाश्रीयत इति ।
एवञ्च सति सौगतब्रह्मवादिनोरयं विशेषो यदादिमः सर्वमेवानिर्वचनीयं वर्णयति ।
तदुक्तम्भगवता लङ्घावतारे ।

“बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते ।
अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते निस्त्वभावाश्च देशिताः ॥

इति । विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तम्भुनरिदं विश्वं सदसद्गूचां विलक्षणम्भ्रह्मवादिनः सञ्ज्ञरत्ने ।
तथा हि नेदं सद भवितुमर्हति, वक्ष्यमाणदूषणग्रस्तत्वात्, नाष्पसदेव, तथा सति लौकिक-
विचारकाणां सर्वव्यवहारव्याहृत्यापत्तेः ॥

यदपि “निर्वक्तुमसामर्थ्ये गुरव उपास्यन्तां येभ्यो निरुक्तयः शिष्यन्त”—इत्युपाल-
म्भवचनं तत्तदा शोभेत यदि मेयस्वभावानुगामिनीयमनिर्वचनीयतेति न ब्रूयुः; वक्तृ-
दोषादिति च वदेयुः ।

यस्तु वादी निरुक्त्यभिमानं घत्ते स निर्वक्तु, न तु शक्यति, वक्तव्यदोषात् । न च—
“ते दोषाः स्वोक्तिमपि धन्तो जातयः कथं न स्यः”—इति वाच्यम् । यतो निर्वचनीयत्वं
बाध्यते तैर्दोषैः स्वयमप्यनिर्वचनीयरेव, अनिर्वचनीयरपि च तैर्व्यवह्रियत एवेति
कुतोऽस्मान् प्रति व्याखातः स्यात्, तज्जातित्वस्य च निरुच्य योजयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।

“ननु ‘सदसत्पक्षदोषवर्णनादर्ननिर्वचनीयता’—इति ब्रुवाणस्य किं सदसत्त्वसंशयः ?
किं वा सदसत्पक्षदहिर्भावान्मुपगमः ? आद्ये भवतिव्यन्तावत्सदसत्त्वयोरन्यतरेण

इत्येकपक्षदोषस्थाभासत्वम् । तच्च सत्त्वपक्षदोषस्यैवाभ्युपेयम् , आवश्यकत्वात् । यदि तावत् सत्त्वपक्षः, तदा सत्त्वपक्षदोषः कथं सञ्ज्ञच्छेत् ? अथासत्त्वपक्षस्तदा सर्वसित्त्वे तदोषः कथं सञ्ज्ञावमनुभवितुम्भवेत् । द्वितीयस्तु व्याधातादेवासम्भवी । परस्पर-विरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिरिति ।

तदेतदनाकलितपराभिसन्धेः प्रत्यवस्थानम् । यो हि सर्वमनिवंचनीयसदसत्त्वं ब्रूते स कथमनिवंचनीयतासत्त्वव्यवस्थितौ पर्यनुयज्येत । सापि हि कृत्स्नप्रपञ्चपरसर्वशब्दाभिधेयमध्यनिविष्टैव । परस्यैव तु व्यवस्थयैवं पर्यवस्थति—निवंचनप्रतिक्षेपादनिवंचनीयत्वम् , विधिनिषेधयोरेकतरनिरासस्येतरपर्यवसायितायास्तेनाभ्युपेतत्वात् । ततः परकीयरीत्येदमुच्यते—‘अनिवंचनीयत्वं विश्वस्य पर्यवस्थतीति’ । वस्तुतस्तु वयं प्रभञ्च-सत्त्वव्यवस्थापनविनिवृत्ताः स्वतः सिद्धे चिदात्मनि ब्रह्मतत्त्वे केवले भरमवलम्ब्य चरितार्थाः सुखभास्महे ।


ये तु स्वपरिकल्पितसाधनदूषणव्यवस्थया विचारमवतार्य तत्त्वं निर्णेतुमिच्छन्ति तान् प्रतिब्रूमः—न साध्वीयम्भवतां विचारव्यवस्था, भवत्कल्पितव्यवस्थयैव व्याहृतत्वात् । अत एवास्मदुपन्यस्यमानदूषणस्थितिविषयाः पर्यनुयोगा निरवकाशाः, त्वद्व्यवस्थयैव त्वद्व्यवस्थाया व्याहृत्युपन्यासात् । न चोपन्यास एव निर्बन्धकारणम् , विचारोपन्यासस्य सदसत्त्वोपगमोदासीनैविचार्यमित्यभ्युपेत्यैव परं विचारप्रवर्त्तनायाः शक्यत्वमित्यावेदितत्वात् ।

यदि तु विचारस्य सत्त्वमनभ्युपेत्य न विचारयितुं शक्यमित्युच्यते तदा प्रमाणमव्यापार्य न तदीयसत्त्वाभ्युपगमोपि शक्यते, अतिप्रसञ्जात्—इति विचारस्यापि विचार्यग्रहणेऽनवस्थाया विचारारम्भ एवाशक्यः स्यात् ।

न च ‘पूर्वपूर्वसिद्धत्वाद्विचारे विचारान्तरमिदानीमगवेषणीयमिति’—वाच्यम् । विचारस्य पूर्वसिद्धत्वे विचार्यरूपस्वविषयव्यवस्थितत्वात् तस्य विचार्यमपि पूर्वमेव विचारितमित्यनारम्भ एव विचारस्य । अथ विचार्यविशेषस्य पूर्वमसिद्धत्वात्तदर्थविचारारम्भस्तर्हि विचारविशेषस्यापि तद्विषयकस्य पूर्वमसिद्धिरेवेति वृथा शुष्कचर्वणम् ।

यदा च त्वद्दर्शनरीत्याभिर्धीयमानमस्माभिर्बाधं बाधसे तदा स्वाभ्युपगमरीति-
बाधाविधायिनैव ते स्यात् । अस्माभिर्निर्वाह्यमानस्य त्वया खण्डनयुक्त्यैव बाधे
त्वस्माकमेव जेतृता । खण्डनयुक्तयो वाधिकाः निर्वाह्यपक्षश्च बाध्य इत्यस्मदुक्तस्य
पक्षस्य त्वयैव निर्वाहात् । तस्मात्त्वया निर्वाह्यमस्माभिस्तु खण्डनीयमितीदृश्यामेव परं
कथायां त्वनिर्वाह्यनिवर्हि तव जयो नान्यथेति ।

तदेवं भेदप्रपञ्चोऽनिर्वचनीयः ब्रह्मैव तु परं परमार्थसद्वयमिति स्थितम् ।



शोध्यानि (ERRATA)

पुस्तकम्	पंक्तिः	अवशुद्धम्	शुद्धम्
१	२	सदर्थी	सदर्थी
"	१०	प्रतिषेधार्थम्	प्रतिषेधार्थम्
"	२२	नियम-सिद्धः	नियमः सिद्धः
४	१२	चक्षुरूपा	चक्षूरूपा
६	१६	यत्रातपी	यत्रातपो
७	१	युगपन्न	युगपन्न
"	२१	विज्ञानेनव	विज्ञानेनैव
१०	४	अयथार्थे	अयथार्थे
१०	१३	चिन्तयिवेच	चिन्तयितुमेव
"	२४	matter	metre
११	६	बाह्ये	बाह्ये
"	२४	प्रायिम	प्रथिम
१२	८	ग्रन्थन्त	ग्रन्थत
"	१८	श्यना	पश्यना
"	२१	Vyaiaabhaṣya	Vyāsabhbhaṣya
१५	५,८	ड़ज्कर	ड़ज्कुरो
१७	११	सोडपि	सोपि
१८	१६	क्षान्ति	क्षान्ति
"	२०	मार्गो	मार्गो
२०	२१	मित्रयाप्रहो	मित्र्याप्रहो
२१	४	हस्य	याहस्य
२२	८	प्रतिषेध्ये	प्रतिषेध्ये

पुटम्	पंकितः	अशुद्धम्	शुद्धम्
२४	३	शन्यः	शून्यः
"	१५	वचमशून्यं	वचनमशून्यं
२५	१७	परमार्थतुः	परमार्थतः
२६	२	मन्यै	मन्यैः
२८	२१	ह्यत्पद्यमानो	ह्युत्पद्यमानो
३४	१२	दर्शन	दर्शनं
३५	६	ए-	एव
"	१२	मसंस्कृत	मसंस्कृतं
"	२१	भावस्व	भावस्व-
"	२२	सद्	यद्
३८	१५	पुनश्च तस्मो	पुनश्चतस्मो
४७	१२	करणभाव	करणभावं
"	२०	येन	न्येन
"	२	उच्चते	उच्यते
"	२६	रत्नचूड परिपृच्छाय म्	रत्नचूडापरिपृच्छायाम्
४८	२	चितं	चित्तं
४९	१६	इशब्दयो	इशब्दयो
५०	१८	वैचक्षण्यलां	वैचक्षण्याल्
५१	२२	रुपे	रुपे
५२	१३	किमतद्रूपी	किमेतद्रूपी
"	२४	स्याद्वीत्सा	स्याद्वीप्ता
५५	१	त्थाणुः	स्थाणुः
"	१०	कि	कि
५७	१२	सत्त्वाच्चाभ्यु-	सत्त्वाच्चाभ्यु-
"	१८	इभ्यामपि	द्वाभ्यामपि

पुटम्	पंक्तिः	अशुद्धम्	शुद्धम्
५८	१०	सधारण	साधारण
"	२३	मनादाय	मनादाय
६१	८	जन्मतो	जन्मनो
६२	१८	तुल्य	तुल्यं
६३	२०	पिपादित	पपादित
६४	१४	कारहसिवं	काराहा सर्वं
६५	२१	व्यतिरेकेना	व्यतिरेकेणा
६६	५	त्यभ्युस-	त्यभ्यु-
६७	६	पदा	पादा
७०	२५	चर्वणम्	चर्वणम्